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THE HISTORY OF
BRITISH CIVILIZATION
VOLUME TWO

THE HISTORY OF BRITISH CIVILIZATION

By ESMÉ WINGFIELD - STRATFORD
D.Sc., M.A., LATE FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

VOLUME TWO

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BOOK III

THE OLIGARCHY

CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONS OF OLIGARCHY

I

DIVES TRIUMPHANS

WITH the King back at Whitehall, the country mad with joy, a Cavalier Parliament, and a Church triumphant, it is easy to misunderstand the significance of the Restoration. To all outward appearance the cause of the Martyr King had won a victory complete and overwhelming beyond the fairest dreams he could have entertained. Loyalty and non-resistance were the order of the day. And yet, looking back at these events in the light of their sequel, we may well question whether these appearances were not after all deceptive, whether it were indeed royalty that had won the game.

It is natural to think of the Civil War as a straight issue between Cavalier and Roundhead. The reality was not quite so simple; the contest would be more plausibly, though still very roughly, described as three-cornered. The rich and aristocratic party which had first raised the standard of rebellion had not been permitted to enjoy the fruits of victory, and it was this party that, in the bitterness of its heart at the way in which it had been jockeyed out of power by its own army, had sought to redress the balance by bringing back a King whom it had only wished to render its figure-head and not its victim.

The very men, who had been most distinguished in the old Long Parliament days for their resistance to the last King, were now holding positions of trust and power under his successor. Among the commission that sent to a horrid death those stern men who had sat in judgment on their King, were actually two of those members whose attempted impeachment by, Charles I had precipitated the civil war. These were the Earl of Manchester, the victor of Marston Moor, who received the Garter, and Denzil Holles, another gentleman

of aristocratic descent, who had long ago assisted in holding down a too loyal Speaker in his chair, but who had been a victim of Colonel Pride's purge of the Presbyterian majority of the Commons and had conceived a violent hatred against Cromwell on account of the latter's neglectful treatment of lords. Holles was, at the Restoration, the recipient of a barony. Among those who played a chief part in bringing the King back was the old commander of the New Model, Fairfax, another rich and well-connected rebel, who is entitled to everlasting gratitude for having saved the stained glass of York city. The typical Parliamentarian of the old school was, in fact, thoroughly sick of Commonwealth and Puritanism alike, and had come to realize that the danger from below was greater than that from above. Cromwell had found little support among the great families; the head of the Russells, whose attitude has ever been a reliable indication to that of other calculating magnates, changed from Roundhead to Cavalier early in the war, and soon retired to devote himself to the promising speculation of draining the fens.

The strong hand of Cromwell had indeed kept the extreme democratic tendencies of the Puritan left wing in check, but what had actually happened had in all conscience been disquieting enough; the triumph of the army and the preachers had brought to the head of affairs an unprecedented number of men of poor and obscure origin; degree had been vizarded to an extent calculated to alarm and scandalize those whose importance had been secured under the old order of things. Accordingly when monarchy was restored, and before parties had time to take shape, there was an effective though unformulated agreement between all sections of the governing classes that whatever their subsequent contentions, the mistake of the Civil War must never be repeated, and that under no circumstances must the situation be allowed to get so disastrously out of the right hands as during the past fifteen years.

Thus even in a Parliament elected amid a frenzy of joyous reaction, certain tendencies are apparent from the first by no means inspired by a disinterested Royalism. The principle of non-resistance is well enough, because resistance entails an army and an army has a way of taking matters into its own hands, and it is an obvious enough policy to set up the old order in Church and State, and to take merciless vengeance on those who have turned the majority of Parliament out of doors in order to knock the keystone out of the social arch. But when it was a question of undoing the early work of the Long Parliament and restoring the prerogative intact, the

Houses politely but firmly declined. Even the revenue which they allowed to His Majesty for his life was by no means sufficient to enable him to live comfortably of his own. And it was not long before they were asserting the rights of Parliament against the Crown in the most disconcerting manner.

It was, however, not against the Crown but the incipient democracy that Parliament bent its energy in the first years following the Restoration. Puritanism was now thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the upper class, and it was no longer fashionable for the scions of distinguished families to identify themselves with the movement. Hence in driving the Puritans from public employment and subjecting them to the most harassing persecution that ingenuity could devise, the Lords and gentlemen of Parliament were taking effective steps to purge the classes below them of their most dangerous element. At the same time, it was safe to restore the Church, now that her claws had been cut. The ideal of Archbishop Laud, of a Church standing above all classes, and with as stern a care for the life of the lord as that of the beggar, had vanished for ever. No longer were the vices of the great in danger of the High Commission, and the Church had received an even sharper lesson than the aristocracy as to the danger of subversive tendencies in doctrine or policy. Henceforward her interests were steadily united with those of the possessing class.

One of the first financial measures of the Restoration was one which, whatever its merits, shifted taxation from the shoulders of the landed gentry on to those of the whole community. The cumbrous feudal liabilities which were the heritage of a military social system were commuted for an excise. More important was the blow struck at the poor by the Act of Settlement of 1662. This terrible measure, though the principle of it was not new, enacted that any poor man who had settled in a parish for more than forty days would become chargeable to that parish in case of destitution. The parish was, however, allowed to have him sent home in the interval, and, naturally wishing to keep down the rates, would be reasonably sure to do so. The effect was obvious. The institution of villeinage, which had been allowed practically to become extinct in the reign of Elizabeth, though it was pleaded in legal cases after her day, was reintroduced under another name, and without any of the advantages of seigniorial protection and the custom of the manor. The poor country labourer was tied to the soil more effectively than ever; he was debarred from seeking employment elsewhere, and

declined towards the status of a serf dependent on the tender mercies of the local employers and such doles as the parish might concede as the necessary minimum to keep him above ground. To complete the process it was only necessary to take away what remained of his common lands.

Whatever else may be said of the policy thus inaugurated, there can be no doubt of its effectiveness. Ever since the Middle Ages there had been outbreaks, at long intervals, against the social system, for we can fairly count the Levellers and Diggers as the successors of Ball and Kett. After the Restoration nothing serious of the sort occurred in rural England, until the damp squib of the Swing Riots which fizzled in 1830. The towns were still a formidable obstacle in the way of oligarchy, especially London, whose mob was capable of taking matters into its own hands, and against which the hardest statesmen did not dare, as yet, to employ military force—though that would come in due time.

And yet here, as elsewhere in our history, we must beware of too unqualified generalization. If the lot of the poor man was hard, it was not wholly without its compensations. For in a sense unknown to the great monarchies of the Continent, England was a free country. Neither the monarchy nor the oligarchy, in the hour of their most dazzling triumph, ever dared attack the formidable edifice of the Common Law. And crabbed and merciless as this law could be—so many as ten thousand poor debtors were reputed to be languishing in jail at one time—in it was contained the guarantee against tyranny ever becoming absolute. The Common Law may be said to have been practically completed at the Restoration, its principles had become embedded in the very life of the country. Henceforward commences the era of statute law, in which Parliament, with the King's assent, itself decides what additions can be made. But such was the strength of the Common Law that it proved capable of assimilating and interpreting all additions, so as to lose neither character nor continuity.

Indeed, it was during this very period that some of its most valuable safeguards were permanently established. Bushell's case secured the freedom of a jury to bring in whatever verdict it chose, without question or punishment. The Habeas Corpus Act, passed in the height of party controversy, affirmed an old principle in establishing the freedom of the individual from arbitrary arrest. It may seem a mockery to assert that it made a decisive difference that tyranny and extortion had to work through the forms of law,

but the importance of this will be realized when we compare the state of England with that of the despotisms which were becoming fashionable abroad. Everywhere the trend was towards absolute government, and the Roman Law, which dominated the Continent, was powerfully biased in favour of centralization. But English Law was tough in its championship of liberties, and by that zigzag path lay the likeliest way, though long and hard, to eventual liberty.

In tracing the formation of the oligarchy which was to dominate England so completely during the eighteenth century, we must not lose sight of the fact that there was an absence of class feeling which is astonishing when we consider how completely the poorer class came to be subjugated and despoiled, until the Industrial Revolution added the horrors of the first factories to those of a starved and pauperized peasantry. The mere fact that historians up to a very recent period have so strangely ignored this formidable development is not without its significance. For, paradoxical as it may seem, it is to a large extent true that the victims themselves ignored it. There is no evidence of any persistent and widespread class feeling. The people of England were capable of getting furiously excited about the prospect of Seven Bishops going to prison, or Dr. Sacheverell's having a damper put on his pulpit eloquence; they were capable of being lashed into murderous hysterics by a Titus Oates or, a hundred years later, by a Lord George Gordon, about the horrible doings of Catholics, but of any class feeling at all corresponding to that which inspires the modern proletariat, and did burst out in France at the Revolution, they were comparatively free. Of this apathy we shall have more to say hereafter. Interpret it as we will, it is one of the strangest and most suggestive phenomena of our history.

2

INSULARITY AND VERSAILLES

One of the most important results of the Restoration was to open this country to a fresh stream of Continental influence. The Puritan Revolution, especially in its later and more democratic stage, had tended towards a close and intense nationalism. The community of God's elect, into which the Puritans had aimed at making England, had no need of instruction from the children of this world without the pale. Even the Dutch influence, which had played so large a part in moulding the early Puritanism, waxed faint when Tromp

hoisted his broom at the masthead and Dutch prizes were a familiar sight in our harbours. God, in Milton's words, had revealed Himself, as His manner was, first to us Englishmen.

The bonds of nationalism were accordingly tightened and the Navigation Act lay down the lines on which foreign and commercial policy, which were more and more coming to be identified with each other, were to be carried on at the expense of other nations. It is about this period that a new barrier is set up between the nations of Europe, by the gradual discontinuance of Latin as a medium of intellectual exchange. Newton's masterpiece, published in 1687, was indeed given to Europe in Latin, but this was reverting to a fashion that was rapidly becoming out of date. One reason for this is that a vernacular prose has come into being on both sides of the Channel, capable of expressing the subtlest shades of meaning with conciseness and intelligibility. Thomas Hobbes, in his *Leviathan*, had shown with what downright vigour philosophical ideas could be expounded in the King's English, and Dryden was to enforce the lesson in the sphere of literary criticism. A clear cut practicality, in the best Puritan tradition, was now succeeding to the gorgeous pageantry of a Milton, and the long-drawn, mazy reveries of a Burton and a Brown.

Nationalism is, in fact, becoming everywhere more intense and all-absorbing. The struggles that devastated Europe up to the middle of the seventeenth century may not have been so religious in reality as they were in name, but Protestantism and the Counter Reformation were movements that did not stop short at frontiers. Cromwell, like Gustavus Adolphus before him, had aspired to be the Protestant champion of Europe, and Cromwell's intervention on behalf of the "slaughtered saints" of Piedmont had about it a touch of religious Knight-errantry. But the policy of the Navigation Act and the Dutch Wars was that which survived the Restoration, and a hard and brutal John Bullishness towards foreigners becomes painfully conspicuous. Too characteristic are the manners of a jolly English naval captain, returning from the Mediterranean, who, on receiving an offer of help from a French Admiral, our ally at the time, replied that he wanted nothing, and if he did, would not take it from such rogues as they were. The most bitter expression of the envy, hatred, and malice which are too often dignified by the name of patriotism came from Lord Shaftesbury, when he tried to incite his countrymen to a shameful war with Holland in the better and spirit of the elder Cato's *delenda est Carthago*. War

was unavoidable, the States were England's natural enemy, the bond between nations was interest and not sentiment, and so on, in the most approved style of Modern Jingoism.

There is, happily, another side to the picture in the humanity and chivalry which, despite ugly incidents, did on the whole distinguish our Dutch wars on both sides.¹ It was a gentlemanly act of Charles II to release a Dutch Admiral out of admiration for his bravery, and one respects De Witt for his admission that the British defeat in the Four Days' Battle had cast more glory upon them than ten victories could have done. Prisoners were humanely treated. Men like Evelyn were still capable of a nobler patriotism than that which is founded on conscious greed and sub-conscious fear; they could look upon even a Dutchman as a man and brother. But the main current of national sentiment was flowing steadily in the direction of a selfish materialism.

Under these circumstances it was perhaps not a wholly unmixed evil that the King, who had now come to enjoy his own, was half a Frenchman by birth, and more than half in spirit. For Charles II was his mother's son as surely as James II was his father's. His swarthy, vivacious, and sharply cut features were manifestly of a Southern type. When he came to England his spiritual home was in France. Seldom had any King been so devoid of patriotic sentiment. Charles had perhaps knocked about the world too long for him to fix his heart on any one land. When he chose to exert himself he could be an efficient and resourceful ruler, just as a doctor may prescribe calmly and skilfully for a patient whom, personally, he would as soon see dead as alive. There are not a few patients who prefer such an impersonal attitude in their physician. Charles II could at least have pleaded in his defence that the country enjoyed a steadily increasing prosperity under his auspices, whereas his virtuous father had plunged it into civil war, and the devout man of genius, Cromwell, had brought it to the brink of ruin.

With the coming of Charles II we take a step forward from a remote and romantic atmosphere into one with which we are familiar. Charles II would have been quite at home in the cocktail bar at the Ritz or in the enclosure at Ascot, except that he might have been considered somewhat disconcertingly "brainy". It is impossible to imagine Falkland or Newcastle or Cromwell, or indeed any of the protagonists in the Civil War, as being anything else than hopelessly out of place. The emotional impulses that had determined men's

¹ See, especially G. B. Hertz, *English Public Opinion after the Restoration*.

conduct hitherto scarcely affected Charles II. The Church of Rome possessed a certain aesthetic attraction for him, but he was not prepared to inconvenience himself for that or any other religious body. Fundamentally he was an agnostic, and a realist of the most uncompromising type. For national honour he cared no more than Falstaff. On the other hand he had an insatiable curiosity with regard to nature and her processes, and he passed long hours experimenting in his laboratory. About his prospects, or those of others, in any other life than this he was genially indifferent; he believed in getting all the enjoyment there was to be got between the cradle and the grave, and unlike the Puritans, he liked to see others getting it to.

Posterity would do well if it were to be less profuse in moral strictures on Charles II and his court. It requires but little imagination to conceive of the wicked enjoyment with which the respectabilities of college dons must be received in Elysium. Reprehensible as his conduct may have been, the nation at large, as well as those who were brought into contact with him, esteemed him the best of fellows. Possessed of an imperturbable good temper, a sportsman, a humorist, and endowed by his very cynicism of outlook with an easy-going tolerance, he knew well that his subjects would never get rid of him to make a King of his earnest and devout brother, nor yet to inaugurate another rule of saints and Major-Generals. And posterity, in spite of the pundits, will go on liking him in a shamefaced sort of way.

It is Charles II's great achievement that he did something to inculcate a new way of life, not better than that of the Puritans, but complementary to it. Puritanism had inculcated a deep and healthy seriousness, but it had built on too narrow a basis. Charles was serious about nothing, not even about his own death, but he did realize the necessity of getting the best he could out of this world, and therein he was, in his generation, wiser than the children of light. If society in England was to be organized henceforth for the benefit of the few, it was at least as well that these favoured ones should justify their existence by the standard of life they maintained. And with all its unabashed viciousness and secret corruption, never had an English court breathed such an intellectual atmosphere as that of Whitehall. The most worthless of them all, the Duke of Buckingham, was a dilettante both in science and music, while that fascinating scamp, the Earl of Rochester, was reputed to have been the most brilliant scholar among the nobility, and was as ready to

compound a prescription as he was to dash off a satirical quatrain. The philosopher Hobbes, that bugbear of the clergy, was welcomed and, for a time, pensioned by a monarch who appreciated a nimble repartee more than orthodox principles. "Here comes the bear to be baited," Charles would remark, when the formidable old gentleman put in an appearance. The King was a steady and judicious patron of the sciences, and if his amours attracted more attention than his intellect, it is at least possible that he owed much of his popularity to his having flaunted the one and concealed the other under a mask of indolence.

• The mere fact that Charles was, to all intents and purposes, a Frenchman, enabled him to temper the growing insularity of his people by exposing his court to the rays that emanated from *Le Roi Soleil*, Louis XIV of France. For Versailles had become, for the time being, the centre of European culture. When we walk through the halls and gardens of that most imposing of palaces, with its accommodation for ten-thousand souls, we should be dull indeed if the spirit of the place could not impart to us some inkling of its historical significance. It embodies the crowning triumph of the French monarchy. From being only one among feudatories as powerful as themselves, the sovereigns of France had at last so thoroughly crushed their aristocracy as to be able to concentrate it round their own persons in a condition of splendid but absolute obedience. Their châteaux knew them no more save for an occasional brief visit; the bonds were loosened that united them to their people. Such was the magnificence of their bondage that they felt it not, but rather rejoiced to partake of a life so rich and so spacious.

The court of Versailles had this advantage over the earlier Renaissance, that it held up a more positive and self-sufficient ideal. The scholars who had gathered round Lorenzo de Medici on the banks of the Arno had aimed at reviving the glories of a past age, they looked not to the future but to Plato. Even Montaigne, even Milton did not dream of any worldly culture which could hold a candle of its own to their beloved classics. In spiritual matters the Puritans may have aimed at making all things new, but the pride of Louis XIV and the measureless self-confidence of the French temperament did not shrink from a similar attempt in the temporal sphere. Louis had no more doubts of his qualifications to act as an autocrat in taste than in politics. *Enlevez moi ces grotesques!* had been the scornful words with which he had disposed of the paintings of Teniers. It was his part to give the law, not to receive it.

Intellectually the tone had been given by René Descartes, who had died in 1650. This weak and sickly boy from Touraine had compensated for his bodily infirmity by an invincible ambition to conquer the ultimate truth of philosophy by his own unaided resources. He had not the least reverence for antiquity and he did not trouble to make himself master of the classics. Certainty was his aim, and the only fact that he would take for granted was his own existence. With his clear-cut French logic and his innate mathematical genius he conceived of a universe as neat and calculable as a well-constructed machine, with God as the supreme mechanic. Even animals were, to his thinking, merely automata, without souls or capacity for feeling, a piece of pedantry that gave rise to hideous cruelties of vivisection at Port Royal. Naturally Descartes, like the prudent man he was, reserved intact the whole doctrine of the Church, but the effect of what he did was to take to pieces the universe as it had appeared to his predecessors, and to construct it again on mechanical principles. Those who came after him would know what to do with his orthodoxies and even his God.

The court of Versailles was certainly by no means so iconoclastic as Descartes; it had even a pedantic reverence for Greece and Rome, but none the less Louis XIV did aspire to realize a splendour and grace of life that should surpass everything that had gone before. France was not only to give the law to Europe politically, but in art and letters she was to be *arbitrix elegantiarum* among nations. Over central Europe and, in the eighteenth century, as far as distant St. Petersburg, her spiritual dictation came to be unquestioned even by those who had hurled back her arms from their frontiers. It was the aspiration of Charles II to set up a model of Versailles at Whitehall, and to make French influence in the latter half of the century what Dutch influence had been in the former.

It is customary to draw comparisons between the two courts, much to the disadvantage of Whitehall. This is doubtless due partly to our national habit of castigating vices that, in reality, rather pleasantly intrigue us. The court was the smart set of that day, and would have lacked half its attraction without its sins. But the delightful memoirs of Count Grammont are in themselves enough to show that with all its faults there was a light-heartedness and bonhomie about its masques and love-making and occasional visits to some fashionable watering place, that compared not unfavourably with the stiff and ill-natured atmosphere that centred round that humourless egotist Louis XVI. Among the worst doings of the

English court, we never read of any such exhibition of pure caddishness as that recorded in Saint Simon's memoirs of the practical joke played upon the Princesse de Harcourt, an old if singularly unpleasant lady. The jokers, among whom was the heir to the throne, burst into her bedroom on a winter's night and pelted her mercilessly with snowballs, going on, in spite of her screams, until her bed was swimming with water. Even Sedley and Rochester might have shrunk from such boorish brutality. Nor, to take another comparison, does the Court of Charles II appear to have exceeded in grossness that of his grandfather, James I.

• It would be a mistake to talk as if Whitehall, with the culture that emanated from it, was nothing but a small and cheap edition of Versailles. The French influence was powerful and fructifying, but it did not break the continuity of English life. The debauchery that had come to be associated with the Cavalier party had been rife under the virtuous auspices of the Martyr King, and was due to the gradual decadence of the Elizabethan upper class, or rather to the lack of concentration and discipline which had been its weakness all along. In a sense Rochester and his fellow gallants were the last and least estimable of the Elizabethans. It is equally true to speak of them as embodying an extravagant and temporary reaction against Puritan strictness. Even then we have not stated the whole of the case, for they are, to some extent, the forerunners of a very different age and ideal, the genteel rationalism of the eighteenth century.

“THE WISDOM OF BEING RELIGIOUS”

The Restoration has not been a period upon which posterity has been accustomed to dwell with much satisfaction ; at best it has presented a series of richly coloured scenes like those of a costume play, but compared with the great days and motives that preceded it, it offers a spectacle of low ideals and corrupt protagonists. There is a lowering of the passions ; the fire of Milton and Cromwell dies with them. We are on the threshold of an age in which correctness is more sought after than greatness, what Matthew Arnold has happily designated as a prose age. This feeling of disappointment is by no means unreasonable, when we reflect that the general cooling of inspiration is associated with certain ominous changes in the social system, and the concentration of power and culture within the

bounds of a privileged and wealthy minority. But whatever our final judgment, it is necessary first to understand what the men of this age were aiming at and what they achieved.

The Puritan no less than the Elizabethan scheme of life had broken down through its own inherent defects. For a diffuse joy of living it had substituted a tense and all too narrow concentration, it had eliminated too much of the colour and richness of life; its cult of the Hebrew classics had afforded an insufficient basis for any satisfactory philosophy. The high, contending ideals of the previous generation had, it was generally felt, succeeded in deluging the land with blood without doing much good to anybody. And men of all shades of opinion began seriously to doubt whether questions of doctrine and dogma were after all worth fighting about, and whether it would not be better to live and let live than to press one's ideals home at point of pike.

The new type of cavalier, who thronged the benches of Parliament and the ante-chambers of Whitehall, differed almost as much from the dead Verney and Montrose and the living Clarendon and Ormonde, as from the Puritans themselves. He did not take the questions at issue so seriously, and in spite of a critical delight in sermons, he was bored by an excess of fervour which his not unnatural prejudice against the new saints caused him to identify with hypocrisy. His view of the civil war is admirably stated in Butler's rollicking satire of *Hudibras*—

“ When civil dudgeon first grew high,
And men fell out, they knew not why,
When hard words, jealousies and fears
Set folk together by the ears,
And made them fight, like mad or drunk,
For Dame Religion as for punk. . . .
When pulpit, drum ecclesiastic,
Was beat with fist instead of a stick. . . .”

On the other hand, that thorough-paced materialist, Hobbes, would have settled the religious question once and for all, by making conformity with whatever religion the sovereign happened to fancy an obligation on every subject. He had already shown how the virtual denial of any sort of religion was consistent with a verbal and ironic orthodoxy. What it came to in effect was that you might believe that black was white as a matter of faith, while holding the exact opposite as a matter of fact. This was not an heroic or even a particularly ingenuous attitude, but Hobbes was, even less than Erasmus, of the stuff of which martyrs are made, and it was better to prevaricate than to suffer.

The new spirit of toleration and lowered enthusiasm had begun to penetrate even the Church. The terrible earnestness of Laud, who might have taken the "all or nothing" of Ibsen's Pastor Brand for his motto, had not been restored with the establishment for which he died. There was now no danger of an Archbishop of Canterbury affronting the greatest in the land by tactless interference with their morals, nor of his assuming, as Laud had done, in the case of the Richmond Park enclosure, the part of Elijah to the King's Ahab. The Church had been taught a lesson that was never to need repetition, and to the maxim "no Bishop, no King", was tacitly added, "no parson, no squire." The Crown and oligarchy between them had, in effect, captured the Church, and it now only remained for the oligarchy to capture the Crown to obtain the mastery of England, but for the one momentous qualification involved in the continued existence of the Common Law.

Nevertheless the Church of England was, for a generation, to enjoy a St. Martin's summer that gave her a deceptive appearance of vigour. Many of those who had been brought up in the Laudian tradition were now in high office, and while they lived something of the great Archbishop's spirit lived on. There was Rainbowe, Bishop of Carlisle, who might have gone on to Lincoln if he had not, in the true Laudian spirit, fallen foul of a great lady of the court over a point of morals. His liberality to the poor was lavish and unwearied, as was also that of Cosin, the splendid and munificent Bishop of Durham, who was thoroughly imbued with Laud's conception of the beauty of holiness, and sought to realize it not only by outward adornment, but also by the authorship of some exquisite collects. The demand for sermons, a heritage of Puritanism, was supplied by a galaxy of pulpit orators, South, Barrow, Stillingfleet, Bull, and finally Tillotson, men whose excellent prose is more honoured than read by a less homiletic generation. On a deeper level of piety there dwelt a singularly sweet though scarcely an intense mysticism in those two lyrical Celts, Thomas Traherne and Henry Vaughan, not to speak of Henry's equally remarkable twin brother Thomas, an adept in the Hermetic mysteries, better known under his pen name of Eugenius Philalethes. And finally there was Thomas Ken, the saintly author of "Glory to Thee my God this night", who defied Charles II by declining the delightful experience of entertaining Nell Gwynn, and was rewarded by her good-humoured Defender with a bishopric—"To whom should I give it but to the little black fellow who refused poor Nelly a night's lodging?"

But in spite of it all, a new spirit was beginning to permeate the leaders of the Church, which, whatever its merits in the abstract, was little conducive to religious fervour. Reason was enlarging its empire at the expense of the emotions, commonsense and clear thinking were coming to be the first requisites of a cleric no less than of a layman. "To teach doubt and experiment," Blake was to write, "certainly was not what Christ meant," but it was what the intellectual leaders of the later seventeenth century meant, and could not help meaning, so strongly was the current running in this direction. Logically it was the outcome of the Reformation no less than of the Renaissance; the more extreme Puritans had plainly shown that the spirit that constantly protests may come to be the same thing as the spirit that constantly denies. Some of the Ranters had differed little from atheists. And within the bounds of the Church itself, similar tendencies had already begun to manifest themselves.

Among the brilliant company who had gathered under the roof of Lord Falkland before the Civil War was William Chillingworth, the foremost of Anglican apologists against Rome. The book on which his fame rests is one which it is not easy to read through nowadays with the patience that its merit demands. A Jesuit, calling himself Knott, had written a Catholic apologetic of no particular importance; a certain Doctor Potter had answered him; Knott had answered Dr. Potter, and then Chillingworth set himself to dissect Knott's answer and to refute it sentence by sentence, after the amiable controversial fashion of that time, which would not admit that an adversary was capable of stringing three words together without falling into gross, demonstrable, if not unpardonable error.

In this unpromising form, Chillingworth contrived not only to annihilate poor Knott many times over, but also to advance arguments hardly less dangerous to his own side. To Knott's championship of authority he responds with what amounts to an unlimited assertion of each man's right to judge for himself, and he quotes, with telling effect, St. Paul's "prove all things, hold fast that which is good". Before you can accept any authority, he argues, you must be convinced on rational grounds of that authority's credentials. Even faith will not avail as a substitute for reason, "faith is not knowledge, no more than three is four." Chillingworth is of course convinced that reason will lead up to a moderate and Bible-grounded Protestantism, but from this conclusion other reasoners may differ. Through the lips of her ablest defender, the Church has appealed

to a Caesar whose throne is the brain, a dangerous concession indeed, which was perhaps in the mind of the charitable Presbyterian divine who insisted on attending Chillingworth's funeral in order to throw the dead man's masterpiece on the top of his coffin with the words, "Get thee gone, thou corrupt, rotten book . . . get thee gone into the place of rottenness, that thou mayest rot with the author and see corruption!"

This pious wish was far from being fulfilled, for it was in the spirit of Chillingworth that the best minds of the succeeding generation were more and more inclined to face the disputed questions of faith. It is now that the University of Cambridge for the first time comes into prominence as a centre of liberal thought, a position that she was henceforward to hold in contrast to her more conservative sister. Even before Milton had gone down, the first stirrings of this spirit must have been perceptible, and he may perhaps have made the acquaintance of a future Provost of King's, Benjamin Whichcote, one of the wisest and sweetest personalities that has ever graced Cambridge courts, one whose influence over men may be compared with that of the Oxonian Jowett in a later age. It is characteristic of him that he insisted, in spite of the suspicion he thereby incurred, in having half the emoluments of his provostship paid to his unfortunate predecessor whom Puritan rigour had displaced. Two of the clumsy, long names so dear to literary historians have been applied to him, Neo-Platonist and Latitudinarian, but he was not one of those men who fit easily into categories. He prepared the way for a broader minded and more rational view of religion by what he was rather than by what he wrote, and he shunned notoriety as much as others court it.

What Whichcote divined, more by the brightness of his own nature than by any formal reasoning, was that religion is not the exclusive property even of Christians, but is natural to man; it is nothing more nor less than health, "the very temper and complexion of a man's soul." Of course he believes, with all his heart, in Christianity and revelation, but, as he himself says, "religion doth not destroy nature, but is built upon it." Prior to all revealed religion is that which is implanted in the mind, that truth which is "connatural to a man's soul". Good Provost Whichcote would no doubt have been scandalized if anyone had suggested to him that the tendency of his thought was so far to widen the bounds of religion as ultimately to threaten the monopoly of any denomination or creed whatsoever, but there is no denying the deadly implication of such aphorisms as,

"If you say you have a revelation from God, I must have a revelation from God too before I can believe you."

This Provost was turned out at the Restoration, but his spirit continued to inform the common rooms of his University. Little practical purpose would be served nowadays by unravelling the intricacies of what is rather vaguely known as Neo-Platonism, as it manifests itself in Ralph Cudworth, one of those perennial dons who devote their lives to one never finished work of portentous erudition, in Henry More, whose bent was as much towards a discursive mysticism as philosophy, or in those two obscure yet not insignificant thinkers, Nathaniel Culverwell and John Smith, Cambridge men and Fellows of their colleges. They were, consciously and ostensibly, defenders of Christianity against such assailants as Thomas Hobbes, who would have reduced morality to mere egotistic calculation, and would only have admitted it at all under the sanction and protection of a sovereign power. But the defence was little less damaging than the attack, for though the distinction between right and wrong was posited as absolute and eternal, the foundations of morality were natural and rational, and not necessarily Christian. Morality was, in fact, being divorced from dogma.

In the same way Smith, in defending the immortality of the soul, appealed (with imperfect knowledge of the facts) to the universal consent of all peoples. Christianity might be the expression of ultimate truth, but if its essentials could be deduced by the light of nature or from the writings of Pagan philosophers, its unique claims to recognition would lapse. "The inference," as Coleridge truly says, "is as perilous as inevitable, namely, that even the mysteries of Christianity needed no revelation, having been previously discovered and set forth by the unaided reason."

The Cambridge Platonists, to use a question-begging and unsatisfactory term, represented the extreme left wing of the Church, and it was not to be expected that the spirit of the time should express itself throughout the whole body as in these single-hearted and erudite men. If they tended to loosen the bonds of faith, it was through their earnestness and devotion to the truth, but a far greater number of Churchmen were working to the same end by their very indifference. It was not to be expected that cynicism and corruption would confine their effects to the laity, and there was a general disposition to take all questions of faith and dogma less seriously. It was under the Merry Monarch that the Vicar of Bray first got preferment. Enthusiasm had fallen into terrible discredit

by reason of the Puritan extravagances. On some minds this reaction had the effect of substituting a sweet reasonableness for dogmatic assertion; Jeremy Taylor made what was then the startling discovery that honest error is no crime, and Whichcote beautifully remarked that "the largest sword, the strongest lungs, the most voices, are false measures of truth".

But toleration is not always the effect of indifference. There is a cold as well as a hot bigotry, and a spiritual lukewarmness is no reason for abating one jot of ecclesiastical pretension. In the next generation the most ruthless asserter of High Church claims was Bolingbroke, who was, from the Church's point of view, a thorough-paced infidel. But the most crooked staff was good enough to trounce Dissenters. Even the gravest divines thought of religion in a more rationalistic and commonsense way than would have been possible in Gothic times. The best type of Churchman is found in the cautious and courtly Tillotson, and among the fourteen volumes of his sermons, perhaps the most notable discourse is the one on "the wisdom of being religious". The following of Christ offered, in fact, a demonstrable balance of advantage to a man of sense.

4

PLUS ULTRA

Thus, even within the fold of the Church, a new spirit was astir to exercise a decisive influence on the development of Western civilization. The old faith was on the wane, a boundless curiosity had taken its place. If we were asked to name any one man as the representative of his time, we should be inclined to select Samuel Pepys, the charm of whose immortal diary consists in the fact that nothing was too common nor too mean to excite his interest. Something of a blackguard and more of a bounder, but a zealous, capable public servant, a brave man on occasion (did he not stop in London on the noble plea that as a soldier took his turn at the sword, so he, the clerk to the Navy Board, must take his at the plague?) and beloved by a distinguished circle of friends, he went through the world with the wondering eyes of a child, now hungrily exploring everything around him, now, with equal avidity, turned inward on himself. Well was such a man fitted to occupy, as he eventually did, the presidency of the Royal Society.

If we wish to form a fair or generous estimate of this much abused period it is upon Gresham College rather than Whitehall

that our attention should be focussed. The ephemeral comedy of Restoration politics and court scandal has attracted most of the attention, and a quite disproportionate amount of abuse. "A heartless, corrupt, and profligate age," remarks posterity, luxuriously muck-raking for yet another *liaison* of the Merry Monarch, while it forgets the men who quietly and with infinite pains were wrestling from nature secrets which, but for the neglect of men to profit thereby, might by this time have made life noble beyond the dreams of optimism.

Francis Bacon, in spite of his having contributed nothing of importance to scientific discovery, and whose very method was far from being ideal, nevertheless had, by his faith in the possibilities of science and his vision of its achievements, held up a standard of inspiration before those who mustered for the supreme war of man against matter. In his uncompleted fragment of the *New Atlantis*, he had imagined an organized society for the increase of human knowledge, which he had called the House of Solomon. What had been a dream with him became a reality, and was taking shape even in the year of Naseby. The scientific spirit was already in the air, and both in London and at Wadham College, Oxford, we hear of scholars coming together for purposes of research and experiment. At the Restoration, under the wise and enlightened patronage of the King, Solomon's House received incorporation on English soil as the Royal Society.

The idea of an academy for the study of science was no new thing; the first of them, as distinct from academies of classical culture, had been formed at Naples exactly a hundred years before. But of all such bodies, the Royal Society may justly claim to have been the richest in talent and the most fruitful of results. It was not entirely free from bickering and jealousy, and the callousness of the time allowed scant sympathy with the sufferings of such animals as happened to be selected for experiment, though in an age when tumours were seared off with red-hot iron or grubbed out with the fingers, men did not fare very much better. But take them for all in all, a more single-hearted and unselfish band of enthusiasts was never collected together. No social snobbery was allowed to mar the instinctive democracy of the truth. When the shopkeeper Graunt was proposed for membership, his claim was urged by the King himself, who gave particular charge that if they found any more such tradesmen, they should admit them all to the society. Subscriptions were remitted to those who could not afford them.

It is no part of our intention to detail the work that was accomplished in every known branch of science by this wonderful band of men, by Flamsteed, the frail and sickly astronomer royal, who went as far as St. Helena to map out the heavens, Ray, who first introduced scientific classification into botany, Sydenham, that wise and beloved physician, Wallis, the mathematician, Hooke, who perfected the microscope, Boyle, the father of modern chemistry, Halley, whose name is immortalized by a comet and who supplied valuable assistance and yet more valuable suggestions to Newton, and finally Newton himself, whose *Principia* perhaps represents the highest of individual human achievement in the realms of pure thought. It is with the most general aspects of their work and spirit that we are here concerned.

First, then, let us note to what an extent the new wine of thought was mixed with the old superstition and fallacies. Newton himself was not above wasting his time in trying to fit a key to the perennial puzzle of apocalyptic symbolism; the ingenious Marquis of Worcester imagined that he had solved the problem of perpetual motion, or that of supplying an everlasting increment of force out of nothing, and Sir Thomas Browne, who had written a refutation of vulgar errors, appeared in court against two poor old women accused of witchcraft. The Oxonian divine, Joseph Glanvill, in many respects one of the most enlightened men of his time, was not above publishing an elaborate treatise adducing all kinds of testimony to prove the reality of witchcraft, and it is pitiable to find one who, in his other work, carried on the torch of Bacon, gravely recording how the witches are in the habit of carrying off children by night to a country called Blockula, there to sup with Satan and his cronies. Some of the matters debated by the Royal Society seem childish enough when judged by our modern lights.

But the trend of the time had set definitely against these survivals, and progress, though gradual and irregular, was sure. Blockula and Glanvill notwithstanding, the witch mania died of its own accord, like the plague flea when exposed to the light of noon. Less was heard about Aristotle and Galen; indeed a definite movement was afoot, on both sides of the Channel, to exalt modern above ancient culture. Echoes of this controversy reach us in the works of Swift. Thought was, in fact, breaking free alike from its Hebrew and its Classical leading strings. The early scholars of the Renaissance had gone to Plato for inspiration, those of the Restoration went to the things themselves.

It is in this connection that the work of Joseph Glanvill assumes an importance startling enough in view of his solemn lucubrations about witches. His *Scepsis Scientifica* or *Vanity of Dogmatising* is as different from his credulous *Sadducismus Triumphatus* as can well be imagined. It is, in effect, a critique of human reason; he attempts for the scientific intelligence what Kant was to undertake in the realm of metaphysics. "Take nothing for granted," is the gist of his message, which is throughout a plea for the diligent humility which is the first requisite of the scientist. He not only shows what a fallible guide is human sense, but also teaches a lesson that has never been properly assimilated even now—how pitifully is the untrained reason at the mercy of the affections and will, how our conclusions are determined beforehand not by the facts but by our inherited dispositions, by custom, education, interest, the love of our own productions, and finally by our reverence for antiquity. On this last point Glanvill is worth quoting:

"While we think it so piaculous, to go beyond the Ancients; we must necessarily come short of genuine Antiquity, Truth."

"Our eyes," he says elsewhere, "like the preposterous animals, are behind us."

Newton's oft-quoted remark that he was like a child picking up pebbles on the sea shore, is thus thoroughly in the spirit of Glanvill, and indeed of the Renaissance itself. For the tendency of the Renaissance was to enlarge man's power and life by belittling his importance. It deposed him from the position at the centre of the universe and his status as the spoilt child of God; it set him to the task of pitting his will against a universe to which he was as nothing. He could only advance to a scientific apprehension of his surroundings by eliminating his own personality. The Greek had handicapped himself by postulating a neat and comprehensible universe; his mind would have been shocked by approximations and unthinkable conceptions like the roots of minus quantities. The Greek wanted not only to have a logical universe, that is to say one ordered on the same lines as his own brain, but also one on which he could impose his own standard of values. His classifications were befogged by the conception of a greater or less degree of perfection, and Ray, a member of the Royal Society, first got botany out of the Aristotlean rut by going to the plants themselves, and not to his own sense of right or fitness, for information.

The specialist is now coming into his own. Those grand and comprehensive intellects, the Leonardos, the Bacons, which had

taken the whole of art as well as science for their province, were being rendered impossible, for the time at any rate, by the increasing accumulation of knowledge, as well as by the tendency to take things in their stubborn actuality, instead of weaving them into some all-comprehensive system. The scientist came to nature, not as a Caesar forcing her to accept his image and superscription, but as a beggar humbly craving for any alms of knowledge, however insignificant. The idea of getting wise quick, with which even Bacon had been obsessed, gradually began to recede. Leibnitz, the German philosopher who discovered the calculus at the same time as Newton, conceived of a progress that should endure throughout infinite time. The spacious idea of the universe, to which the new astronomy compelled the minds of men, could not fail to exercise a sobering effect on the imagination. "The thought of those infinite spaces terrifies me," confessed Pascal. The idea of conquering all knowledge and all mysteries by the resolute application of some new method and in a few generations began to seem a trifle absurd.

And yet people were beginning to realize, that progress towards ever improving if still imperfect conditions was an attainable ideal. The old crippling conception of mankind sunk in original sin and having no power of themselves to help themselves was, by the most enlightened spirits, tacitly, if not formally abandoned. As men's imaginations had, in the preceding generations, fixed on America, so now they began to dream of the empire that science should, in the fullness of time, win from nature. Dryden, in the course of an ornate and somewhat tedious ode on the wonderful year, 1666, breaks into a rapture of prophetic vision of ships going "as by line" upon the ocean, of all the world as one city, and of men voyaging to the extreme verge of the earth and thence investigating the moon and stars. Cowley, addressing the Royal Society, finely says :

"From you, great champions! we expect to get
Those spacious countries, but discover'd yet;
Countries, where yet, instead of Nature, we
Her images and idols worshipped see."

Glanvill, who had played so important a part in trouncing the reactionary dogmatism that was impeding thought, took up the cudgels for the Society against a stupid doctor and clergyman who had denounced its proceedings as subversive of true religion and Aristotle. The title of his book is significant of its contents, *Plus ultra* or "More beyond", and it is not only a spirited panegyric of the Society's work, but also a vision of progress, gradual, laborious, but of limitless potentiality. "Let envy snarl," wrote

Oldenburg, the President of the Society, "it cannot stop the wheels of active philosophy in no part of the known world."

Another notable character characteristic of these Restoration scientists is the singular purity, if we may so express it, of their enthusiasm for knowledge. In striking contrast to a court where every man and most women had their price, was this band of comparatively obscure men who pursued their researches with a noble aloofness from utilitarian considerations. True, a certain proportion of their work, such as Evelyn's silviculture, Newton's contributions to scientific navigation, and Sydenham's reforms in medical practice, were of obvious and direct utility, but for the most part they were content to pursue the truth for her own sake, regardless of consequences. Newton's determination of the planetary motions, Flamsteed's mapping of the heavens, Ray's classification of plants, Boyle's law of gaseous compressability, might be destined indirectly to transform human life, but they offered no prospect of immediate gain either to their authors or anybody else. Perhaps it is wrong to talk of an irreligious age, when religion is only being diverted from the pulpit and the altar to the laboratory, the observatory and the dissecting room.

The progress of invention is, during this period, surprisingly meagre when we consider what advances were being made in pure science. The fact is that the discoverer is powerless in default of the economic ripeness of the time for his invention. And as yet, though the ground was being prepared, the time was not quite ripe for any decisive improvement in mechanical production. Two things were necessary, a large amount of disposable capital and a certain diffusion of technical ability. The latter was supplied when, during the short reign of James II, Louis XIV, with an almost insane consistency to his policy of centralization, revoked the Edict of Nantes, which had been the charter of the French Protestants, the most industrious and skilful of his subjects. He had previously given a lesson in the use of standing armies by quartering his black-guardly troopers on these innocent people, of course in the name of Christ. The result was that in spite of all efforts to prevent them, they flocked in their thousands to England, and Louis presented us with the industrial skill that might have gone to the enrichment of his own land and treasury.

As for the capital and capitalist organization, these were rapidly developing, especially since the Jews, in whose tracks commercial prosperity followed with uncanny certainty, had been admitted

to England through the tolerance of Cromwell, and the tactful persistence of Manasseh Ben Ephraim, a wise and high-minded Jewish patriot. A money market was beginning to take shape on modern lines; London was coming into rivalry with Amsterdam, and companies were being formed for all sorts of purposes, domestic as well as foreign. As the national prosperity ebbed and flowed, so did commerce and industry slacken or flourish, and Dr. Scott has done invaluable work in pointing out how a crop of inventions followed with each boom of commerce. This happened after the conclusion of peace with Holland in 1674, and during the boom between the two crises of 1678 and 1682, and there was another leap forward following on the Huguenot immigration.

But for the great advance the time was not yet ripe. Capitalist industry was still in an immature and experimental stage, and until it was more fully developed, the employer had only minor uses for the scientist. But the gradual accumulation of scientific knowledge was bound to produce overwhelming results, once the floodgates of industrial opportunity were thrown open to that long pent up stream of knowledge. The fact that economic organization had lagged behind scientific progress may have had no small part in determining the catastrophic swiftness of the Industrial Revolution, when it did come.

5

THE ARTS OF TRANSITION

The change of mind and outlook was bound to manifest itself in all forms of creative art. The Restoration is a time, essentially, of transition. Merrie England and Puritan England had had their day, and their spirit had sunk deep into the national consciousness. But neither joy of life nor spiritual discipline had been sufficient of themselves, and the spirit of reason and inquiry was now coming into its own. To a poetic and a religious age was succeeding a prose age, and much that was glorious and lovable in the seventeenth century seems to have perished in the eighteenth. But this winter-time of the spirit was not death but only the necessary seedtime, a new spring. Life, that had shed so much of its outward glory, was at work all the time beneath the soil, as fruitfully as ever. If we may press the analogy so far, we should describe the last forty years of the seventeenth century as being autumnal, and interested with all the peculiar splendour of decay.

The literary Colossus who bestrides this period of transition is John Dryden. There is perhaps no one who has so certainly impressed both his own time and posterity with the greatness of his personality, of whom it is so difficult to say in what, precisely, that greatness consists. We have accepted Dryden as among our immortals, his name appears, and could not help appearing, by critical consensus of his own and subsequent ages, among the unchallenged masters of English literature, and yet Dryden is little read, much less than many authors of far inferior pretensions, and no amount of scholarly galvinism is likely to revive his popularity. One or two magnificent character sketches from the satires, perhaps the finest of their kind in the language, odes which achieve everything except the undefinable afflatus that carries the hearer away and annihilates the critical faculty, some boldly chiselled epigrams and resounding passages culled here and there from larger works, are what he, who reads for delight and not for culture, chiefly values in Dryden's poetry. His lyrics are cold and self-conscious; they have not the poignancy of Rochester's best, nor the breezy insouciance of Dorset's. As for his plays, it is easy to indicate their fine points, but it would be by no means easy, we fancy, to sit through one of them from beginning to end.

Dryden, the poet and dramatist, is a giant battling grandly against the spirit of his time, which was running against poetry. It was a self-conscious age, and self-consciousness is the death of poetic inspiration. It is in the colder forms of verse that Dryden chiefly succeeds, in the deliberate and reasoned satire, in the ode which is constructed with as much care and forethought as St. Paul's Cathedral. Some autumn glory of the old poetic splendour clings about him—if he is as ice compared with the Elizabethans he is all fire judged by the standard of Pope and Johnson. But he is, most significantly, the first of English critics whose writings, other than fragmentary, possess more than an historical interest. In this department of literature his hand seldom fails. His prose is strong, sane, discriminating, and thought-out to the end. It would almost justify us in saying that England first began to know about poetry when she ceased for a season to produce it, though this, like all epigrams, would simplify the facts unduly.

Dryden, supported by Otway, Shadwell and Lee, made an effort to put the serious English drama on its feet again after its Puritan eclipse. That forlorn hope failed, though not ingloriously. The dramatic genius of the time best expressed itself through the

prose comedy of manners, of which that entirely disreputable but most amusing blackguard Wycherley was the first great exponent. *The Country Wife*, a rollicking farce concluding with a dance of cuckolds on the stage, is a play whose unexpurgated revival is unthinkable in an age when the cuckoo is no longer allowed to mock married men from every tree, but for sheer brilliancy of dialogue and rapier-play of wit it need not fear comparison even with Molière. And after Wycherley came Congreve, whom the keen eye of George Meredith singled out as a master of the comic spirit. For indeed, as Mr. Trevelyan has divined, it was the comic spirit, in the Meredithian sense, that had come to England with Charles II, a humorous and sham-dissolving commonsense.

But for heroics that age was entirely unsuited, and even Dryden could not, with all his forethought and theory, accomplish for a moment what Shakespeare had done with such majestic and unfailing ease. Dryden invited direct comparison with Shakespeare by dealing with the tragedy of Antony and Cleopatra. He threw the best of his genius into this attempt; he produced some sonorous blank verse and an ingeniously constructed plot, but between him and Shakespeare is a great gulf fixed over which he had not the wings to soar. "*All for Love*," as he called it, is an attractive costume play, with the conventional sex motive, and the characters and incidents carefully contrived to meet the requirements of an intelligent audience. How different is this from that earlier play, careless and unstudied in its dramatic technique, but in which we are watching not cunningly pulled puppets, but figures of an almost superhuman fealty, so grandly conceived as not to be dwarfed by a background of contending Empires and a world in travail!

It is at this time that English verse begins to be put into its eighteenth century strait-waistcoat of the rhymed, iambic couplet. No more effective restraint was ever devised for the aspiring muse. This is not to say that this metre can never give form to flexible and glowing verse if rightly used, as it has been by Keats, Shelley, Swinburne, and Mr. Masfield. But the rhymed couplet as it was used, largely in emulation of the French Alexandrine, by the poets of the Restoration, was not meant to be flexible, but as hard and precise as it could be made, a vehicle for pointed and epigrammatic statement. When it was adopted in a play, it meant that the characters did not talk, but made speeches. The back-chat of the hopelessly correct lovers in Dryden's rhymed plays is a game of scoring points; it is not life nor anything like it. Dryden himself was

beginning to find out this when he discarded rhyme for blank verse, but blank verse itself was beginning to go the way of the time, to become formal and rhetorical. Dryden saw this tendency and strove against it with all his technical skill, but in vain. He and Otway might produce a specious imitation of the vanished glory, but blank verse is on an inclined plane, and at the bottom is the dreadful, pompous monotony of Addison's Cato.

It was science and not poetry about which the age really cared. If any proof were needed of this, it would be furnished by the fact that while Aristotle and his rules were being turned out of science, they were actually, following French precedent, being introduced into the drama, and unities of place and time were becoming a veritable dramatic obsession. It was hard on Aristotle that his authority should have been falsely quoted in support of this nonsense, which was derived less from him than from the dull and uninspired hackwork of Seneca. But the scientists meant business and had no use for Aristotle. With the poetic drama it was different.

In the other arts, with the one exception of music, the value of the achievement is in direct proportion to the scope given to reason and the critical faculty. It is therefore not surprising that this should be one of the great periods of English architecture, dominated by the figure of Wren, surely the first among individual English architects—for the Gothic cathedral was more the work of a community than a man. Unknown is the grave of Arthur and unknown to fame is the architect of Old St. Paul's. But the graceful steeples and spacious interiors of Wren, that delight the eye and satisfy the pride of the true Londoner, are as definitely individual works as the Rokeby Venus and the *Essay on Man*. They are, and could be, the work of no man but Sir Christopher. And yet he would not have been what he was, had he not embodied the spirit of his time with a more sensitive completeness than any of his contemporaries.

Some critics have been bold enough to carp at Wren for no better reason, apparently, than that he expressed what he thought and felt, and did not conform to the standards of another age, or to some technical requirements of a kind known best to critics. It is true that we shall look in vain for the emotional satisfaction we are accustomed to derive from Gothic; there is about Wren's buildings no turbulence of aspiration, no sense of mystery—he would have eschewed both as positive faults. Everything to which he set his hand is clear-cut, lucid and rational. There is no need to seek the obvious contrast of the Gothic cathedral, it is enough to compare

St. Paul's at London with St. Peter's at Rome to realize how thoroughly imbued with mundane commonsense is Wren. For St. Peter's has its mystery; in its florid way, it seeks to overwhelm the imagination by a sense of its vastness and grandeur, as befits the power that it embodies of imperial and spiritual Rome. In St. Paul's those majestic spaces have been narrowed down until they are no longer formidable; all is as clear and expository as a scientific lecture:

"That, ladies and gentlemen, is what I have to say. The facts are before you. Judge calmly for yourselves whether or not it stands to reason."

Wren, we know, was a member of the Royal Society, and what he said in stone was substantially the same as what Newton had expressed in the propositions and diagrams of his *Principia*. We may not care for an art of this kind, and our caring about it or not makes little enough difference, but Wren and Wren's age had something not unimportant to say, and Wren succeeded in saying it with all the beauty of entire sincerity. Successive generations of Cambridge men can scarcely have failed to benefit, even without realizing it, from the spectacle of Neville's court and Trinity Library, with their silent exhortation to clear thought, thoroughness, and harmony. Wren's steeples have all the grace that comes from proportion, from that quality that the Greeks knew as "*eurhythmia*", they take us with the illusion of having ourselves overcome almost insuperable difficulties by a supreme effort of the brain.

His churches are certainly temples of no world but this; their interiors are those of spacious and dignified assembly rooms, designed not in the fear of God but for the sober elevation of man. But the Church itself, as the last of the Laudian survivors died off, was gradually ceasing to be a religious body in anything but name. To have provided a reverential or passionate setting for the discourses of such comfortable and commonsense gentlemen as were now coming into the occupation of benefices would have been sheer architectural bathos. And Wren had his own ideals, to which he gave noble and convincing expression:

"Architecture," he says, "establishes a nation, draws people and commerce; makes the people love their native country, which passion is the original of all great actions in a Commonwealth. . . . Architecture aims at eternity'. . . Beauty, firmness, and convenience are the principles."

In yet another branch of art, England attained to a glory that

has, by some freak of insular modesty, been successfully hidden under a bushel even to this day. To most people it will come as a surprise to hear of the Restoration as a golden age of English portrait painting, not unfit to stand comparison even with those of Gainsborough and Watts, and this is not on account of naturalized foreigners, but of artists English in birth and spirit, names little honoured and almost forgotten. That it should be portraiture and not landscape or religious painting for which this time is distinguished is exactly what we should expect. The Puritan insight into the depths of the soul, and the critical bent of the Restoration, are here happily met together.

Nowhere was the influence of the Low Countries more dominant than in English painting during the seventeenth century. Mytens is the best known among a number of Netherlandish painters in England as early as James I's reign, and after him comes Vandyck, who, with his fine sympathy for the Cavalier aristocracy, exercised a profound influence on the growth of a native school of portraiture. Gainsborough, on his death-bed, is reported to have said that he would be with Vandyck, and the latter may claim the credit of having divined what was noblest in the soul of Charles I before it had broken through the shell of that lonely, reserved nature. The Charles of Vandyck is not the weak blunderer who leaned on Buckingham and abandoned Strafford; he is the Christian gentleman who could do nothing common nor mean even on the scaffold, the Royal Martyr, who, though dead, was strong enough to bring about the downfall of his enemies. It was a worthy tribute of an artist to the only one of our sovereigns, since Henry III, who merits the title of connoisseur.

But powerful and decisive as the Netherlandish influence, Dutch and Flemish, undoubtedly proved, the direct continuity of English art may be traced from the missal painting which was carried to such delicate perfection by the monks of the Middle Ages. For the miniature is the secular child of the missal, and from Nicholas Hilliard the line of succession is through the Olivers and the elder Hoskins to the supreme mastery of Samuel Cooper, "the prince of English limners," as he was called, who showed that the miniature could be not only decorative, but also illuminative of the sitter's inmost personality. What could be more subtly characteristic than the dyspeptic, irritable expression, and the restless eye of Cooper's John Lilburne? An impossible person, you would agree with almost everyone who came in contact with him, to live or work with, and yet earnest to the woeful exclusion of commonsense and humour.

Easel portraiture by Englishmen first achieves noteworthy results about the time of the Civil War, with two masters who were, both formally and in spirit, of the opposing camps. William Dobson, the pupil of Vandyck, whom Charles I called the English Tintoretto, perfectly caught his master's manner, though the Cavalier gentlemen whom he painted have a touch of Englishry that is Dobson's own. The aristocracy, stimulated by their sovereign's example, were beginning to display an intelligent interest in painting; the Earl of Arundel, by no means an amiable personality, was a zealous and discriminating collector of pictures, and Charles I had a magnificent collection of his own, which was broken up and lost to the nation by Puritan vandalism.

But the best of the Puritans were by no means insensitive to art; Cromwell, in particular, loved both pictures and music, and of more importance to art than Dobson, because more original and of deeper artistic penetration, is his Puritan rival, Robert Walker. The very spirit of the man was that of the party whose chiefs he painted. He cared little for outward adornment, and he interpreted his sitters not with the flattering complaisance of the courtier, but more with the austere scrutiny of the preacher. His Lambert is the vain and unsubstantial creature that Lambert proved himself, and even his Hampden displays a hardness, almost a cunning, that give an ambiguous cast to his nobly chiselled features. Nowhere better than in Walker is displayed the Puritan tendency to look past appearances to the naked soul.

It was, however, at the Restoration, that English portraiture blossomed into full glory. It is almost a tragedy that the attention of posterity has been focussed upon the work of the Dutchman, Van der Vaes, better known as Lely, and, after him, the German Kneller. That Lely had a greatness of his own, the influence that he exercised over greater English painters who studied under him is enough to prove, but his was a very showy and obvious talent, and Lely was seldom able to attain more than the most superficial comprehension of the English men and women he painted. His beauties of the court are a row of blously attractive demi-mondaines posing for customers. Their portraits, with their gaudy colouring, make excellent advertisement posters, and tell us nothing whatever about the ladies except what might be expected to interest a discriminating *vieux marcheur*. This no doubt accounts for Lely's popularity with his fair sitters. His statesmen have usually masks for faces. His portraits of Danby and of Halifax, perhaps the greatest

political Englishmen of their time, tell us, no doubt, exactly what they would have liked Lely to tell, namely that they were both excellently dressed and could keep their secrets to themselves. His portraits of the Admirals at Greenwich Hospital certainly display a convincing, seamanlike manfulness, but even here, in some strange way, he has contrived to suggest that he has been painting their opponents by mistake, for these sea-dogs look more Dutch than English. As for Sir Godfrey, his faces are usually added, like those of the models in tailor's shops, to give an air of realism to the suits of clothes that he painted with such loving sympathy.

So rooted is the prejudice in favour of these foreigners, that any unusually good Restoration picture, in default of evidence as to authorship, is in danger of being catalogued without more ado as a Lely. Our galleries are shamefully lacking in the works of the English artists of this time, because it has been seldom thought worth while to acquire them. And England is still almost ignorant of the existence of a galaxy of portrait painters to whose work the best of Lely and Kneller is but surface glitter. Space forbids us to do more than glance in passing at Greenhill, some of whose work may be seen at Dulwich gallery, and who painted the superbly virile Captain Clements at Greenwich Hospital—no doubt of *his* being an Englishman! Poor Greenhill, in spite of his having, like Marlowe, died young as a sequel to a debauch, could yet paint a woman, and such a handsome woman as the "Unknown Lady" in the possession of Mr. Marsh,¹ without the prurient vulgarity too characteristic of Lely's feminine portraits. Among many others worthy of record we select the names of Joseph Michael Wright, whose Mrs. Margaret Herbert shows so true an appreciation of pure and high-souled womanhood, and Mary Beale, whose interpretation of character is so delicately and unmistakably feminine, and whose portrait of the fantastic poet Cowley displays a striking resemblance, that perhaps goes deeper than the surface, to the features of Rupert Brooke. And to come to a slightly later period, we would give the whole of Kneller and most of Lely put together for Gandy's one portrait of William Jane in the Bodleian, with its strength and insight.

But if the neglect of these masters is a reproach and a wonder, that of John Riley, the greatest of them all, is little short of an artistic tragedy. One is almost tempted to say that a man who can

¹ There is a fine reproduction of this, in Mr. Baker's *Lely and the Stuart Portrait Painters*.

go into the National Portrait Gallery, and see Riley's Dugdale, or his Chiffinch, or his James II, and then deliberately prefer the flaunting canvases of Lely, would be capable of bartering a Raphael for the Christmas Supplement to Soper's Popular Annual. Even that by no means profound dilettante, Horace Walpole, seems to have had some inkling of Riley's greatness. "One of the best native painters that have flourished in England," he calls him, "whose talents while living were obscured by the fame rather than the merit of Kneller, and depressed since by being confounded with Lely . . . with a quarter of Sir Godfrey's vanity," he continues, "he might have persuaded the world he was as great a master." And yet no life of him appears in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and his reputation has been no less insulted than injured by the attribution of some of his best work to Lely.

Riley was a fatally modest and nervous artist, and he allowed himself to be depressed, almost to the point of retiring from his profession, by the comment of Charles II, on surveying Riley's portrait of him :

"Is that like me ? Then, odds fish, I am an ugly fellow !"

There was no need for Riley to have been discouraged, for Charles, with his shrewd humour, was really paying him the subtlest of compliments, and no doubt realized it. For there were elements in the Merry Monarch's character such as court painters are not accustomed to emphasize in their sovereigns. But Riley had imbibed enough of the Puritan humour to be incapable, without treason to his art, of flattering a sitter. He was more mercilessly austere even than Walker. His James II, as fine a piece of technique even in the painting of gorgeous clothes as anything of Lely, gives a clearer explanation of that monarch's fall than most histories. James, though coarser fibred and duller witted, is—he who has eyes may see—his father's son as surely as Charles II is his mother's, and James has the same earnest yet bewildered outlook upon a world to which he can adapt himself no more successfully than his father before him. The sinister face of Riley's William Lord Russell is by no means that of a martyr for liberty, but of a Whig magnate such as the Russell family might be expected to produce. His portrait of Waller the poet is a severe and searching criticism ; we think not of the two or three immortal lyrics, but of the time-server, and of the winter of cold rationalism that was descending upon English poetry. And at pompous Arundel there is one family portrait that might well have suggested to Pope his couplet : —

"What can ennoble sots or slaves or cowards?
Alas! not all the blood of all the Howards."

But no one divined more surely the spirit of his age in its best as well as its worst aspects. Riley was never happier than when he was painting some man of scientific or scholarly intelligence. The spirit of an antiquary who is also a shrewd and kindly man of the world is that which informs his Sir William Dugdale, and his Sir Robert Boyle might very well bear the title of Boyle's masterpiece, *The Sceptical Chymist*. But perhaps the greatest of all Riley's portraits is that of Sir Christopher Wren, which constitutes a veritable summary in expression of Wren's architectural achievement, in all its thoughtfulness, its proportion, and its honesty of workmanship, a worthy ornament for the Royal Society. It is a thousand pities that Riley had not the opportunity of crowning his work by a portrait of Newton. He died young, but even so his place is with the immortals, where his fame, so unworthily quenched on earth, doubtless—

"Lives and spreads aloft by those pure eyes
And perfect witness of all-judging Jove;
As he pronounces lastly on each deed."

The realistic impulse had for a long time been felt in sculpture. In the Middle Ages monumental effigies had more commonly represented types than individuals, though it is hard to believe that such a recumbent painted figure as that of Archbishop Chichele at Canterbury is not an exact portrait, while of his neighbour, Henry IV, we know, from the desecration of his tomb, that he is represented thereon with substantial accuracy. After the Reformation, it became the sculptor's supreme object to represent his subject exactly as he or she was in life. Accordingly, while pose and drapery show a sad falling off from pre-Reformation standards, the features are portrayed with such vividness as to create, at best, almost an illusion of reality, though there is much unevenness of accomplishment, and sometimes the faces are as stiff as the figures. The Elizabethan and Jacobean sculptors were at their best in representing a very tired old man, to whom death seems a welcome rest from the cares of the world—such a one as Richard Owen at Westminster or Sir G. Snigge in St. Stephen's at Bristol. An endearing feature of this portrait sculpture is the sweetness and individuality of the numerous children represented.

If the Restoration was one of the great periods of English portrait painting, it is, in the most common estimation, the great era of English music. Unlike portrait painting, the musical genius of this time

has received adequate if tardy recognition, and the time is past when any historian of Macaulay's calibre could pen a comprehensive survey of England at the accession of James II without even the mention of Purcell.

Throughout Western Europe the seventeenth century was a time of musical transition. The old polyphonic melodies, of which the Elizabethans had shown such sweet mastery, were being superseded by a type of music in which the solo was the predominant factor, and this in spite of the part songs which were still, if we may trust Pepys, so pleasant a feature of social life. Music was, in fact, moving away from the Christian and democratic ideal of the Middle Ages, of which the idea was that the melody was equally contributed by all, and it was becoming the work of specialists.

Charles II, when he came to the throne, found English music like a house swept and garnished. The Puritans had been particularly hostile to Church music, and the Long Parliament had gone so far as to order the destruction of organs, a threat that was happily not always translated into deed. By the time of the Restoration the continuity of English music had been thoroughly broken, and the time was ripe for revolutionary changes. Now that the Church had come back to her own, Church music naturally came back with her, but the spirit of the Restoration had no use for the heavy and solemn devotional melodies that had delighted Charles I. The Merry Monarch took a keen interest in music, and he had learnt something of the new methods in France, where the naturalized Italian, Lully, who on 1662 was appointed court musician to Louis XIV, was beginning to transform French music. Charles had no wish to be bored in church more than necessary, so the Royal Band and the choir in the Chapel Royal were soon indoctrinated with the more sprightly and tuneful methods.

Charles was an energetic and discriminating patron, and it was something of a stroke of genius when he decided to send the most promising of all his choir boys to Paris, in order to study French methods on the spot. Pelham Humfrey was only sixteen when the King selected him for this honour, and he came back, as we gather from Pepys, with a considerably swollen head, "an absolute monsieur." But Humfrey turned out to be a genius of the highest order, one of a group whose names include those of Lock, Blow, and, above all, Purcell. The new methods achieved a success that was almost unnaturally rapid, and for the last time England could plausibly claim to stand in the forefront of European music. The

new impulse was soon felt in secular as well as Church music ; the genius of Purcell was extraordinarily comprehensive, and its only limits were fixed by the yet imperfect development of technique and instrumentation. He is perpetually struggling, with the resources of the seventeenth century, to do the work of the eighteenth and nineteenth. It is a marvel that he was able to accomplish so much of permanent value, including the first of English Operas, *Dido and Aeneas*, though as yet England was not ripe for its performance.

And then the outburst of musical genius died away almost as rapidly as it had begun. Throughout the eighteenth century England continued to be a land of song and of song-writers, taste was highly developed, and concerts of good music patronized. But her line of great composers was broken ; Blow and Purcell left no successors, and English music was soon to pass under the splendid but alien domination of Handel. The refined taste, which in that age of oligarchy alone counted, had got divorced from the national spirit. The new music of Charles II's reign, like that of contemporary France, was essentially courtly and aristocratic ; the heart of the people was probably little touched by it, though it was to the quick step of Purcell's music that Lillibullero marched James II out of England. The tendency of the new Church music was to transfer the singing from the lips of the congregation to those of the choir, and Cromwell's troopers, all chanting a Psalm together before going into action, were performing a more devotional if less tuneful act than a fashionable congregation listening to some highly trained boy singer lifting his voice alone in the anthem. Merrie and singing England had received from the Puritans a blow from which it never fully recovered ; it was not only from the Cathedrals that music and colour had been banished, but from life itself.

But how then do we account for so glorious a musical harvest as that garnered immediately after the Puritan domination, and for the fact, recorded by Pepys, that the ladies and gentlemen of the Restoration continued to delight in part-songs like any Elizabethans ? Perhaps we shall do well to remember the law discovered but not accounted for by Nietzsche : that, music, as a matter of practically universal experience, is later in its appearance than the sentiment it expresses, as when Bach and Handel give voice to the German Reformation, or when Mozart pays in clinking gold what is due to the age of Louis XIV ; or, we may add, when Sir Edward Elgar says complacently in the twentieth century what Leighton and Tennyson were saying in the nineteenth.

The clear-cut intellectuality of the Restoration, however well Wren might formulate it in stone, could find no conceivable expression in music. Certainly it is not that to which Purcell gave voice in his songs and anthems. But we should not be far wide of the mark if we were to describe the music of him and his fellows as the swan song of the Church of England. The spirit of pious sweetness, the beauty of holiness, which had been the dream of Laud and the reality of lives like Herbert's and Fuller's, found voice in the very hour of its passing. In form, men like Purcell were not only abreast but often ahead of the latest foreign developments, but the spirit that inspired their melody was akin to that of the gentle Herbert, who could say to his friend, "let me tell you, I would not willingly pass one day of my life without comforting a sad soul or showing mercy . . . and now let's tune our instruments."

6

DIVINE RIGHT YIELDS TO OLIGARCHY

We need not linger long over the ignoble spectacle of Restoration politics. The vicissitudes of our domestic struggles at this time are dramatic and complicated enough, but the main issues are simple, and they are all that count in the development of British civilization. The Restoration had brought back the Constitution to its old state of unstable equilibrium between a King responsible for managing the nation's business and a Parliament with no responsibility for governing, and yet possessing the control of the pursestrings. It was like the fable of the two goats crossing the stream by one narrow plank and meeting in the middle. One or other had to go down. Even the loyalty of the Cavalier Parliament was not proof against its continually seeking to encroach upon the King's prerogative.

Charles saw all this plainly enough. With his cool and lucid intelligence he perceived that the division of sovereignty between King and Parliament could not last, and he was resolved that the balance should turn in his own favour. He had none of the proud ambition that made Louis XIV work nine hours a day in order to impose his will not only on France but Europe. He was—and it does him honour—more interested in the advancement of man's empire over matter than in such bloody and resounding achievements. But he was, before everything else, an egoist—he had not studied Hobbes for nothing—and his egoism took a form which is surprising in so full-blooded and vigorous a man, who, like his father,

was in the habit of walking any ordinary companion off his feet. He had his own ideas of what constituted a happy life, and these he was determined to realize. If he valued power, it was not as an end, but as a means to living well. He would have been quite content to let the sleeping dogs of the Constitution lie, but if they showed a tendency to bite him, why, then, the only thing was, if not to poison, at least to drug them.

When the King came back he found himself confronted with an aristocratic and monied class which soon controlled, almost without question, the machinery of national and local government. The failure of the Puritan experiment had quenched for an indefinite period any hope of their power passing into the hands of the people ; the upper class had, in fact got the democracy fairly down, and it only remained to run through the victim's pockets legally and at leisure. But it was not likely that the descendants of the men who had plundered the Church and started one King on the road to the scaffold were going to share their power loyally with that King's successor. Charles had been brought back because it was only under the auspices of a king that the tyranny of the Saints could be removed ; now that the New Model was an evil dream of the past and the dissenters crushed and persecuted, it might be time to reconsider the King's position.

Such was the game that Charles, once his interest was fairly roused in it, set himself to play with a knowledge and finesse that would have done credit to a Tudor. He perfectly understood that the key to power was a golden one ; so long as he could manage to make both ends meet he could defy his Parliament. But he differed from Henry VIII and Elizabeth in his cosmopolitan indifference as to where that money came from—if it was necessary to raise it from the foreigner by mortgaging the national policy, he had no particular objection on principle. He was also well aware that nothing runs away with money and a Sovereign's power so much as war, even a successful war. It was therefore his aim to keep out of foreign trouble as much as possible.

There was working in his favour a trend of national sentiment that might give him a winning advantage. The mystical cult of Divine Right of Kings, which had been growing ever since the downfall of the Roman Church in England, had now reached an unprecedented pitch of intensity. Cavalier loyalty had fastened during the time of defeat and privation upon the person of the Sovereign and was too strong to be quenched even by disillusionment. As Butler put it :

"Loyalty is still the same,
Whether it win or lose the game."

The Church was solid for the monarchy and divines vied with each other in expressions of abject servility. The martyr King now attained a power over men's minds that he had never exercised during his life. A special service of humiliation was appointed for the day of his death, in which his sufferings were compared with those of Christ Himself, although, on that very day, it was whispered that in some secret haunt certain stout old rebels were still wont to meet and—horrible to relate—eat nothing but calves' head! The primitive idea of the King's being a medicine man was much to the fore; for some reason, his touch was supposed to be particularly efficacious for the cure of scrofula, and on Charles's first appearance in the park, an individual with a rapidly disappearing nose insisted upon rubbing its unsavoury remnant on the hand of his disgusted sovereign.

The extraordinary strength of English Royalist sentiment has been obscured by the event. The throne, in fact, had a cruel run of bad luck, as thrones dependent on the accidents of heredity will. The sovereigns who followed Charles II were either by their religion, their nationality, or their dullness, calculated to repulse the most ardent advances of loyalty, and yet even hen-witted Queen Anne was able to excite a passion of loyalty verging on national hysteria. What might not an Elizabeth or a Henry VIII, what might not one of the able Plantagenets have done with such a backing? As we might expect, such feelings were particularly strong among the honest country squires, the "lesser barons", who had neither the brains nor the opportunity for disillusionment with the court. The great, sophisticated magnates, and the growing class of bourgeois capitalists, had little enough sense of the divinity that hedges a King or anything else, except a fat estate and a comfortable bank balance.

So the cards were dealt, and the game between monarch and oligarchy began. Charles was too clever not to be as excellent a ruler as was compatible with his own interests and comfort. The nation never advanced more rapidly in prosperity than under his auspices, and though he was entirely indifferent to her honour, her interests abroad were quietly and substantially provided for. The work of American colonization went on rapidly and without hindrance, and Charles effected, at the end of his first Dutch war, the extremely advantageous exchange of our last footing in the East Indian Islands for the Dutch colony of New Holland, or New

York, thus linking up the Northern with the Southern group of American colonies, and giving us a clear stretch of coast from Maine to South Carolina. Our acquisition of Bombay, as part of the Queen's Portuguese dowry, was a notable step towards our eventual supremacy in India. Among Empire builders Charles II, with his quiet but understanding interest in colonial affairs, is surely entitled to a place.

The business of government started on unexceptionable lines by the appointment of Clarendon, a Cavalier of the best school and a statesman of the Tudor tradition, to what we should now call the premiership. After a few years the inevitable reaction succeeded the first delirium of loyalty. If plain men had been exasperated by a reign of the saints, they were inclined to be scandalized at the reign of the sinners, especially when old ruined Cavaliers went uncompensated, and the pretty ladies of the court accounted for no inconsiderable part of the national revenue. The most unpopular act of all was the one which does the greatest credit to Charles's good sense; Cromwell's expensive and dangerous acquisition of Dunkirk was quietly sold off to France. Then Charles found himself drifting into another war of attrition with Holland, and was probably telling no more than the truth when he professed to find himself the only man in England who did not desire war. This war was very bloody, obstinate and indecisive, but things were on the whole going in our favour, in spite of a terrible but final visitation of the bubonic plague, followed by a fire that reduced the most important part of London to a heap of smoking ruins.

It did not require a minute knowledge of our history to predict that a war would set Parliament, even a Cavalier Parliament, encroaching upon the prerogative. They raised all sorts of difficulties about granting money, and demanded to control its expenditure after it was granted. This was, of course, to give the legislature the control of the executive, and Clarendon, with his stiff Tudor theory of the prerogative, stoutly opposed it. As the King was not prepared to surrender his whole position, he found himself entering upon the third year of the war without the necessary funds to carry it on.* An earnest patriot like Charles I, confronted with a situation so menacing to the national safety and prestige, would have strained the law in order to provide himself with the means of doing his duty. That road lead to the scaffold, and Charles II saw no reason for taking it. If the nation's representatives refused to find the money for the nation's business, that was their affair. Charles

coolly laid up his hitherto successful fleet and negotiated for peace. The Dutch saw the opportunity and sailed up the Medway to Chatham, burning several of the now useless warships, but causing little loss of life, while Charles was amusing his seraglio by a moth hunt. The Dutch exploit had little more tangible effect than that of hurrying up the conclusion of the treaty on the lines, very advantageous to ourselves, previously arranged.

Rumour expected Charles to abdicate. He did nothing of the sort, and relieved himself of an awkward situation by the old Tudor trick of turning loose a scapegoat. Clarendon must go and take the unpopularity with him. Charles was bored with Clarendon's virtuous solemnity and airs of the old retainer; he disliked him for much the same reason as Queen Victoria disliked Gladstone. Gratitude was a sentiment in whose existence he had little belief, and with Clarendon disappeared the spacious, old-time tradition of the Cecils. The new type of politician was "restless, unfixed in principles and place", a quick-witted but unscrupulous adventurer, and with such men Charles preferred to deal. His Parliament had taught him the lesson that he must either be a master or a slave, and he determined to take the offensive. His quick grasp of essentials showed him that his best chance lay in linking his fortunes with those of the splendid despot who had achieved in France all, and more than all that he hoped to achieve in England.

His first idea was frankly to sell his support to Louis in return for the financial and military backing necessary to establish his own power and, incidentally, to set up the Roman Catholic religion in England. A secret treaty was signed to this effect, by no means disadvantageous to England's interests abroad, but committing her to the support of France in a shameful and treacherous attack upon Holland, in which the combined fleets were soundly repulsed. But Charles, not being an Englishman, had misjudged the national character and soon found out his mistake. Fear and hatred of Popery was still an obsession, and an attempt to suspend the persecuting laws against Catholics and Dissenters alike provoked a violent reaction and a still further addition to these laws by the passing of the Test act, excluding both Catholics and Dissenters from public employment. Charles had miscalculated the situation and instantly gave way. Catholicism was not practicable policy, and the first crude scheme was dropped.

Charles now shifted his ground, and gave the reins of power to a patriotic, if not too clean-handed minister, in the Earl of Danby, son

of a Yorkshire baronet, who pursued a policy of friendship with Holland and opposition to France. But Louis knew enough about Charles to give himself a blackmailer's advantage over his fellow-conspirator, and the publication of some secret correspondence of which Danby had been the unwilling instrument led to an outburst of popular fury which sent the minister to the Tower, and made Charles take the desperate step of dissolving his old Cavalier Parliament. The crisis of the reign had now come. Those members of the oligarchy who wanted to capture the executive and reduce the King to a crowned puppet, or, as the phrase now is, a constitutional monarch, commanded a majority in each of the Parliaments that now followed in quick succession. They were called the Country or Whig party, while those who still favoured the Divine Right and the old distribution of powers between a royal executive and a Parliamentary legislature were called the Tories. These were the same parties that had already begun to take shape in the Long Parliament, when Charles I upset everything by his imbecile attempt on the Five Members.

Charles II now had to deal with a situation little less difficult than that which had proved his father's ruin. Not only was Parliament preparing to push home its advantage to the practical extinction of any sovereignty but its own, but the country was now thoroughly roused. The London mob was still a formidable power, and London was in one of its fits of collective hysteria. Rumours got about, not unfounded on fact, of a plot to convert England to Popery, and the sensational murder of a sound Protestant magistrate, a mystery unsolved to this day, fired a long prepared train of anti-Catholic fury. People saw Jesuits everywhere, and a few enterprising rogues were able to fill their pockets by swearing away the lives and liberties of innocent people. Meanwhile the Whigs were clamouring for the exclusion of the King's brother James, now an open Catholic, from the succession. No power, it seemed, could stand against so overwhelming a flood of national sentiment.

Charles was roused to the height of his political genius. A single mistake, and he was ruined. But he made no mistake. Unlike his father, he knew how, and just how long, to wait. He bent before the storm, he allowed the plot-fever to run its course, and even when the fury was beginning to abate, he let the innocent Lord Stafford be thrown to the wolves to make all safe. Meanwhile, he succeeded in fixing up a secret arrangement with Louis that would give him just the money he needed to keep him independent of Parliament.

That gave him a winning advantage, and he used it with consummate finesse. He summoned a Parliament, still with a rampant Whig majority, not to Westminster but to Oxford, now the spiritual as it had formerly been the military headquarters of Royalism. The exasperated Whigs attended with bands of armed retainers. This was a fatal mistake and Charles knew it. They had raised the spectre of civil war, of another New Model, of the King cracking his last joke to the man in the mask in front of Whitehall. The tide of national sentiment was now turning against the Whigs as violently as it had run in their favour. Charles allowed his new Parliament just enough rope to put the seal on their unpopularity and then, with the genius of a born actor, had himself conveyed to their place of assembly in one coach and his robes in another, and dissolved Parliament almost before the members had realized what was happening. Panic overtook them, and the roads leading from Oxford were crowded with Whig magnates stampeding in every direction from they knew not what.

The Whigs had shot their bolt, and it only remained for the King to press home his victory. This he did with ability and entire unscrupulousness during the remaining years of his reign. A desperate plot to murder him gave him the opportunity of taking off the two ablest heads, next to Lord Shaftesbury's, among his opponents, and though Shaftesbury himself escaped his clutches, he retired to Holland a broken and dying man. The Whigs were, for the time, crushed and cowed almost as completely as the Dissenters had been, and though Charles defied the law by not summoning a Parliament for the brief remainder of his reign, he made himself fairly safe, should the necessity arise, by a series of audacious measures, the result of which was to pack the corporations, the electoral bodies of the towns, with his own nominees. He had now, with the tacit acquiescence of his subjects, established himself in a position more nearly approaching to absolute power than that of any of his predecessors, and there seemed a prospect of Parliament becoming a mere machine for registering, at long intervals, the sovereign's decisions.

But royalty is ever at the mercy of accidents. Charles could secure his brother's succession; he could make it safe that he should start with an ultra-loyalist Parliament and a generous revenue for life, but he could not prevent that brother from playing the fool of the most aggressive type. James II, on coming to the throne, displayed an unexampled ingenuity in doing everything that

could conceivably be thought of to bring down his throne in ruin. The nation had scarcely recovered from its fright of a Popish plot when James so openly endeavoured to force Catholicism down its throat that even the Pope declined to be a party to such madness ; Charles I had offended the nation by nothing more than by his Court of High Commission, this court was restored with Judge Jeffreys as its president ; memories of the Commonwealth had given the nation a horror of standing armies, James assembled an ill-disciplined and unreliable rabble in uniform to overawe London ; Charles II had made one of his few mistakes in his illegal attempt to dispense with persecution, this mistake was the only part of his policy his brother thought it worth while to copy ; “ no Bishop, no King,” was a safe and proven maxim, James prosecuted his Bishops and left nothing undone to bully the Church out of her servility. It was a truly Gilbertian situation when the Vice Chancellor of Cambridge was turned out of office for his contumacious disloyalty in refusing to break the law by allowing a Master of Arts to dispense with an oath of allegiance to the King, and an acknowledgment of that King’s supremacy over the Church of England.

The crowning folly was when James, one of those hopeless persons who believes that a strong line is a ready way out of every difficulty, began to bring native Irishmen over to coerce England. A song, of the kind only too familiar in Anglo-Irish politics, appealing to every instinct of bigotry and racial prejudice, was composed to the effect that the Irish were going to cut the throats of all the English and make the land their own. Everybody was singing this, including James’s soldiers at Hounslow. After a good deal of backstairs work among the magnates, who were now thoroughly agreed as to James’s impossibility, Prince William of Orange, the Protestant ruler of Holland, was invited over with his wife Mary, James’s daughter, to take the Crown. Louis XIV could and would have prevented this by keeping William busy at home, but James selected precisely this moment for standing on his dignity and so far irritating his august friend as to drive him to the supreme blunder of his career, that of launching his armies at Germany instead of Holland. With the door thus obligingly held open, William arrived in England with a mixed army of Dutch, Germans, and Swedes, who were greeted with the utmost delight by a nation in which the memory of a very different revolutionary army was still alive. James’s commanders, headed by Churchill, afterwards the great Duke of Marlborough, coolly

betrayed him, the redcoats offered no resistance, and James bolted as ignominiously as advocates of the strong line are apt to do when pressed. Corruption and foreign arms had triumphed, perhaps usefully but certainly not gloriously, over obstinate ineptitude, and one of the least glorious episodes of our history ended with a Dutchman as King, and an oligarchy in effectual sovereignty over England.

CHAPTER II

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OLIGARCHY

1

“ JE MAINTIENDRAI ”

WHEN the English political leaders, who might have fairly claimed to have the feeling of the country behind them, decided to confer the crown jointly on William of Orange and his wife Mary, they were regarding the matter from a standpoint widely different from that of their chosen sovereign. To them the issue at stake was largely between the Crown and the Parliament, that is to say, though they may not have put it so to themselves, between an hereditary monarch and a very small minority of the nation. To William himself, these high matters of domestic politics were of no more interest than the bickerings of children. He had come to England for one reason and one alone, to advance the cause to which his life was devoted, the cause neither of his natural nor yet of his adopted country, but of civilized Europe. William was in fact, and this is the whole clue to his career, a good European. He had attained a standpoint that even now would be considered, in most quarters, eccentrically advanced.

And yet never was hero less visibly heroic. William had about him little that was splendid, less still that was lovable. A fatherless, disinherited boy, he had grown up among enemies of his House in an atmosphere that made reserve and suspicion a part of his nature. We catch a glimpse of him, a correct, ungenial youth, visiting the court of Charles II, and we can imagine the wicked delight that his host must have taken in getting him so drunk that he tried to break into the apartments of the maids of honour. Then, two years afterwards, in 1672, came the onrush of Louis XIV's magnificent army upon a practically defenceless Netherlands, and in that hour of despair and ruin the Dutch turned instinctively to the scion of the patriot house whose motto had been ever *Je maintiendrai*—"I will maintain." The sickly youth was now the champion of European liberties; rather than yield, he said, he would die on the last dyke.

By flooding the country he gained a breathing space. His consummate diplomatic skill quickly gathered allies, and the long duel commenced, that was not even to end with his life, between this man of infinite pains but no genius, and the magnificent *Roi Soleil* with France at his back. Into this duel England was now drawn under his leadership.

Like all men who sacrifice their lives to a mission, he sacrificed everyone else to the same cause without scruple or mercy. Men and nations alike were the pawns with which the great game was played. He had no delight in cruelty, and yet when the De Witts were mobbed to death and when a Highland clan was treacherously exterminated in the valley of Glencoe, he found it convenient in each instance to shew favour to the murderers. He dragged England into the vortex of Continental warfare, but he concluded a treaty between England and Holland to the complete sacrifice of Dutch interests. All that concerned him was to bring England into line against Louis. For this the time was ripe. The more than half French sons of Charles I had held England in leash too long, and James, by his flight into France, and the military support which he sought and obtained from Louis, helped to open the nation's eyes to the real enemy to her liberties.

It was not long before a terrible danger fairly roused the country out of its habitual sense of insular security. Catholic Ireland had burst into revolt; Louis had thrown into the island a French force, with James himself, to provide it with a nucleus. William hurried thither with an Anglo Dutch army to relieve the pressure on the Protestant North East, and thence to strike by the East Coast route at the capital. In his absence the French Admiral de Tourville appeared in the Channel at the head of a fleet which, was for the moment overwhelming. Not far from the cliffs of Picardy lay an army under Marshal Humières, fully equipped for an invasion of England—there was nothing on land that could possibly stand up against it, and an unknown number of Jacobites were expected to join it at the first opportunity. A battle was fought off Beachy Head between Tourville and an Anglo Dutch fleet commanded by Lord Torrington. This brave and skilful seaman, finding himself confronted with impossible odds, took the one step possible for the saving of the situation. He drew off his fleet substantially intact and kept it in “*in being*”—the expression was his own—on Tourville's flank. Humières did not dare to embark, and Tourville frittered away his advantage by sailing down the Channel and burning

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Teignmouth. The fleet in being had saved England from the horrors of the dragonnades, just as another fleet was one day to save our countryside from the fate of Belgium. But the Admiral, though acquitted by a court martial of his brother officers, was dismissed from the service by the King, and has been held up to obloquy as a mean-spirited poltroon.

Matters soon righted themselves. On the very day of Torrington's action, an Irish army, with James at its head, bolted from its position behind Boyne Water, and the stamping out of that revolt was now only a matter of time and treaty-breaking. Next year the English and Dutch were strong enough to defeat Tourville and get the command of the Channel. An English force, still imperfectly trained and disciplined, went over with William to Flanders in order to take part in the long, dreary war that was wearing down the power of France. William was a second-rate general, and ill fitted to cope with so masterly a tactician as the Marshal de Luxembourg. Two desperate battles he fought and lost in two successive years, but he continued pegging away as doggedly as ever. Louis might keep striking right and left at the ring of enemies that encompassed his frontiers, but however skilfully the blows might be placed, they were growing feebler and feebler; they had none of the force behind them necessary for a knock-out. At last this exhaustion enabled William to reap the greatest success he ever attained. He recaptured the fortress of Namur with Marshal de Boufflers in command, a deadly blow at French prestige, a feat commemorated in the song, *The British Grenadiers*. Two years later the combatants, who had fought each other to a standstill, concluded a peace which left matters much where they were before all this slaughter began.

But the last and most exciting act of the drama was yet to be played. England, equally sick of Continental war, of a standing army and a Dutch King, was busy disarming, while Louis, realizing that Charles II of Spain was slowly dying, prepared to seize the splendid heritage of Imperial Spain for his great nephew Philip and his House of Bourbon. William, whose long, dreary struggle had now almost worn out his frail body, patiently set to work to provide against this contingency, and so to partition the Spanish Empire that only outlying provinces would fall to the Bourbons. He must have felt that, with England determined on peace at almost any price, he was bluffing from a weak hand, and that Louis knew it. Nevertheless the Spanish Empire, which was presumed to be incapable of a say in its own destinies, was partitioned and partitioned again in

anticipation. Then what life there was in poor Charles II of Spain flickered out, and Louis, who had some excuse for his action in the fact that it would probably have taken a war to force any partition of their empire upon the proud Castilians, tore up the Treaty and with ineffable dignity proclaimed to the assembled court of Versailles himself a perjurer, and his nephew King of Spain and the Indies. But even William might not have aroused England from her determination to seek peace and ensue it, come what might, had not Louis fairly goaded her into action by seizing the Barrier Fortresses of the Low Countries and by recognizing James II's son, on the death of his father, as King of England. This was too much, and the good European once again had the satisfaction of bringing England into line with Europe's other defenders. There was only one more service left for him to perform. Having entrusted the Flanders command to a general far more skilful than himself, he yielded his over-wrought frame to an unmarked grave in Westminster Abbey, and left England, united under an English sovereign, to crown his life's work with victory.

2

THE DUTCH KING AND HIS ENGLISH PARLIAMENT

So strong is the Whig tradition that dominated English history during the greater part of last century, that responsible historians are still to be found who talk of the Glorious Revolution which transferred the sovereignty of England from the Crown to the people. What actually happened at William III's accession was something quite different and much more prosaic. The worldly-wise and unsentimental magnates who combined to bring about the change were not going to repeat the mistake of their fathers of the Long Parliament, and exchange the rule of a King for that of their social inferiors. They were clear in their own minds as to the issue at stake, and their object was to end, in their own favour, that system of double rule by which the actual government of the realm had been in the hands of the King, and the means of government in those of the well-born and wealthy minority represented by Parliament. Hitherto Parliament had exerted its power in the manner of a father who perpetually keeps his son short of money, and the King had tried to maintain his independence by going without or raising the money in other ways.

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It was plain that this state of unstable equilibrium could not go on for ever. So long as it lasted, England was a house divided against itself, and Parliament, in the words of Professor Pollard, a permanent opposition. This might answer, after its fashion, so long as England could avoid being drawn into the main stream of European politics, but when quick decision and strong action were called for, she was fatally handicapped. The efforts of James I to intervene in the Thirty Years' War, of his son to assist the Huguenots, and the events which led to the Dutch triumph in the Medway, had witnessed the same paralysis of England owing to the fact that King and Parliament were pulling different ways, and that it was the settled policy of Parliament to reduce the resources of government to a minimum.

Now, however, England was being drawn into a struggle that would demand her utmost energy and resources to carry to anything but a ruinous conclusion. The power and ambition of Louis XIV constituted a threat that could not be much longer ignored. Sooner or later, England would have to choose whether to fight or sink into the position of a humble satellite. The latter policy, which was that of Charles II, was at least capable of defence. England had stood aside from the last Continental struggle, and yet Louis had failed to crush the powers leagued against him. She might have again stood fast behind her wooden walls and devoted herself to developing her resources and her dominion overseas. This would have been a prosaic policy, but the motives that impelled the Whig bellicosity against France were not themselves of a very exalted nature, when even the virtuous Sidney did not hesitate to fill his pockets at the expense of the French Secret Service.

Fortunately, perhaps, for England, the death of Charles II nipped this policy in the bud. It had no doubt been his intention to steer the ship of State quietly and dexterously towards the stagnant waters of absolutism. Charles, in fact, would have ended the divided sovereignty of King and Parliament by concentrating all power in his own hands. He was not a Hobbit for nothing. The gist of Hobbes's political doctrine was that sovereign power must be absolute and undivided. Hobbes himself does not rule out the possibility of a people or assembly retaining the supreme power in its own hands, but the bias of his teaching is towards just such an absolute monarchy as existed in most Continental nations.

But James II was incapable of thinking out any policy clearly. To make a success of his brother's scheme, it was necessary for him

to have maintained a bland indifference to any idea of maintaining England's prestige and influence—for what they were worth—in European politics, and to act as a loyal, if interested second to Louis XIV. But James, while he was flouting, with brutal tactlessness, all the most cherished traditions of his subjects, had hankerings after being a patriot King, and a power to be reckoned with beyond the seas. And he brought the question of divided sovereignty to a head, by demanding from his Parliament the means to create an effective standing army.

Naturally—if there was any question of putting up a fight, as a member of a Continental alliance against Louis XIV, elementary prudence demanded the creation of such a force. The citizen militia, on which England relied for her defence, would have been even more useless against the veterans of Louvois than the old Saxon Fyrd against the armies of the Conqueror. The question was keenly debated in Parliament, and the weight of argument was overwhelmingly on the side of those who asked, like a certain Sir Winston Churchill, whether the beefeaters constituted an army fit for our requirements. The only conclusive answer would have been one that it was impossible to make, to the effect that England did not mean to fight Louis at any price, and that Louis was too busy on the Continent to want to attack England. That, to a nation that already cherished an insular contempt for the “French dogs”, would hardly have been a palatable argument. A man wiser than James would never have raised the question.

For the constitutional issue was thereby raised in its most acute form. It had been over the command of the militia that Charles I had finally broken with his Parliament, and the New Model had put the fear of standing armies into the hearts of Englishmen for more than a century. A professional and disciplined army of any size could as easily be used to crush liberty at home as to defend it against the foreigner. Therefore it would be dangerous in the extreme to have an army at the King's unrestricted disposal, and if war with France were indeed inevitable, it followed that the division of sovereignty between King and Parliament must be ended by giving Parliament some sort of effective control over the executive.

William's accession was Parliament's opportunity, if not to end, at least to secure a decisive advantage in its struggle with the Crown. William's acceptance of the throne was hedged about with conditions which placed the Crown once and for all at the mercy of Parliament, and in a series of Acts, culminating in the Act of Succession

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towards the end of the reign, this advantage was pushed home. Every device by which the Crown had maintained or could maintain its independence of the Houses was made definitely illegal, and the standing army, which might have enabled the King to override Parliament, was ingeniously made the lever by which Parliament could control the King. The savage and remorseless terrorism that passed by the name of discipline in those days was, under the Mutiny Act, only legal for a year at a time, and without annual renewal by and therefore annual meeting of Parliament, the force would spontaneously dissolve into a mob of civilians.

The logical consequence of the Parliamentary victory, which was nothing more nor less than the capture from the Crown of the executive, did not immediately show itself. The reigns of William and Mary, of William alone, and of Anne, form a period of confused but inevitable transition. The Prince of Orange was too strong a man to accept the position of a crowned puppet, and he was too necessary to make it advisable for Parliament to drive him to the point of abdication. Towards the constitutional struggle in England he was coldly indifferent, except in so far as it affected his life's work, that of delivering Europe from Louis XIV. To this end he worked with whatever tools came to his hand, and without regarding the possible effect of his policy on the domestic status of himself and his successors.

He started, in the time-honoured fashion of English Kings, by selecting his ministers not from any particular party, but according to what he deemed to be their fitness for their posts. This did not turn out to be altogether a success. Parliament was not to be depended upon from one moment to another; it was corrupt and thoroughly irresponsible, and had not got out of the habit of regarding itself as a perpetual opposition. To the steadfast statesman, carrying on a desperate struggle for the deliverance of Europe, the mischievous vagaries of the politicians, his real masters, must have been a sad irritation.

The man who is said to have suggested a way out was about the most thorough-paced scoundrel of that by no means too clean-handed age,

“A second Machiavel, who soared above
The little ties of gratitude and love.”

This was Robert Spencer, second Earl of Sunderland, a man who had crawled to the harlots of Charles II, had changed his religion to curry favour with James II and subsequently betrayed him, and

now had insinuated himself into the good graces of William III, thanks to that monarch's habitual indifference as to the cleanness of the tools he employed. Sunderland's advice was simple, almost obvious, but it implied nothing short of a constitutional revolution. It was to the effect that William should ease the chronic friction with his Parliament, by selecting his ministers exclusively from the party which commanded a majority. This party happened to be Whig.

William had certainly no idea of accepting any new principle of government, but to his practical mind it seemed that Sunderland's expedient would serve the purpose of tiding over his immediate difficulties. It was the Whig party that kept him on the throne and supported him in his war with France, and though the Tories had, in their desperation, joined with their rivals in supporting his candidature, to the upholders of Divine Right a foreigner who reigned by virtue of a bargain struck with Parliament could never be anything but an odious makeshift, more odious still after the death of his Stuart wife. Accordingly William, making the best he could of his awkward situation, yielded to Sunderland's advice, and appointed a definitely Whig ministry, the leading members of which were nicknamed "the Junto". Thus a Parliamentary majority commanded the machinery of government, and a state of affairs was brought about which, if it were only to become permanent, would reduce the monarch to a mere puppet for registering the decisions of whatever party happened to have most votes for the moment.

But William did not mean the expedient to be permanent, and he presently reverted to his old device of a mixed ministry. The Crown had not yet sunk to the surrender of its prerogative of choosing its servants. And yet the ancient position it sought to defend was, in the long run, untenable. If Parliament desired to govern, govern it could, or in default, render all government impossible. Nevertheless, the power of the Crown died hard; until the coming of the Hanoverians the sovereign continued to preside over the councils of his ministers, and in the matter of foreign policy William, in particular, was jealous of any interference.

But Parliament was already sufficiently master of the government to arm it with powers that it would never have dreamed of tolerating in previous reigns. A standing army was raised for the war as great as the New Model itself, and fit to take its place in a Continental struggle. An even more striking innovation consisted in the formation of a national debt. The practice of anticipating

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the revenue had been common for some time, and had been carried almost to the point of bankruptcy under the Commonwealth. But this borrowing had been a hand to mouth expedient, and an effective limit was put on it by the fact that the King, who was lucky if he could meet his current expenses from year to year, could not guarantee the payment of interest, because he could not pledge the authority of Parliament in advance, and without Parliament extra money was not to be had. Charles II had met the difficulty by repudiating his debts, but this was a device which did not lend itself to repetition, nor lower the rate of interest for future borrowings.

Accordingly it was a notable step forward when Parliament, instead of levying crushing taxation for the war, proceeded to borrow the extra money in the city at a comparatively low rate of interest, the lenders being incorporated into the Bank of England, and their interest secured by earmarking a tax on shipping. The danger of the Crown being able to render itself independent of Parliament by borrowing from the Bank was expressly guarded against in the act of incorporation. The necessity of meeting the interest on the debt, as well as the ordinary expenses of the year did, in fact, make the King more dependent than ever upon Parliament for the means of paying his way. At the same time, it greatly strengthened the new settlement by enlisting the whole-hearted support of the monied interest on its side, for it was believed, not without reason, that no James would honour the debts of a William. A legitimist Restoration meant a financial crash in the city.

Thus was inaugurated what seemed to the men of that time the strange financial convention, by which the men of one generation may indulge in any extravagant adventure they choose, and pledge posterity for all time to foot the bills. It placed a new and formidable power in the hands of government, and that it should have been accepted at all shows how strong had become the patriotic solidarity which includes in the community not only its living members, but those who are dead, and those yet to be born.

3

WHIG REVOLUTION PRINCIPLES

Nothing is easier than to summarize the results of the Revolution in one rapid generalization, nothing is fraught with more peril. To say that it substituted the power of the people for that of the Crown is considerably further from the truth than to say that it meant the

capture of the executive by an oligarchy. But even this latter statement, though true in itself, does not comprehend quite the whole truth.

It must be remembered that, during this period of transition, Parliament was less undemocratic than it subsequently became. The Triennial Act kept it in reasonable touch with the constituencies, and made bribery at elections more expensive in proportion to their frequency. Twice, in the first decade of the eighteenth century, an appeal was made by the Sovereign to the constituencies, and each time a majority was returned expressing a genuine wave of popular feeling. Certainly there was never an age when politicians of all parties were more corrupt, but it was a more individual and less organized corruption than it became in the heyday of the rotten boroughs.

When, therefore, we say that the Revolution established an oligarchy in power, it must not be in oblivion of the fact that to no one of that age, so far as we can ascertain, was this perfectly apparent. To the Whigs, who stood most whole-heartedly for the new order of things, it was a triumph of law, of justice and of liberty. Moreover, this is substantially the verdict of Macaulay, of Hallam and of Burke. And yet it is a fact not to be seriously disputed, that during the century and a half that followed the Revolution, power became gradually concentrated in the hands of a small minority, who used it to depress the common people to a state of impotence and degradation scarcely preceded since the "devils and wicked men" of King Stephen's days.

To understand the nature of the Revolution, as it appeared to the best of the Whigs, we must hold to the connecting thread of the Common Law that runs all through our history. Among those who welcomed William III on his accession, was a famous old lawyer, Sir John Maynard, of the true breed of Sir Edward Coke, a man of vast erudition, an editor of medieval law-books, a counsel capable of straining the law mercilessly to secure a conviction, and withal, the father of the Bar, for he had entered the Middle Temple when Bacon was still Chancellor and Raleigh hardly cold in the grave. To William's congratulations on his having survived so many of his learned friends, he replied :

"I had like to have outlived the law itself, had not your Highness come over."

The ablest contemporary defence of the Revolution comes, almost certainly, from the pen of John Somers, a lawyer who had made

his mark by a five-minutes' speech as Junior Counsel on behalf of seven Bishops whom James II had been mad enough to prosecute. The unimpeachable integrity of Somers's character, no less than his commanding intellect and his profound legal erudition, rapidly brought him to the front and established his position as the chief of those Whig Fathers to whose authority Burke, in a famous pamphlet, was one day to appeal. Somers takes his stand on the ground of Sir John Fortescue, Sir Edward Coke and the great Common Lawyers. It was the reign of law which William's accession had established. "Our representatives," says Somers, "to secure us from the encroachments of this and all succeeding ages, have thought fit to declare and establish the rights of the people so fully, and upon such sure foundations, that England is now the securest and happiest nation of the world, if the natives can but be sensible of their own happiness." In the true spirit of Fortescue he contrasts the happiness of law-governed England with the misery of France, with her arbitrary monarch and permanent standing army.

"Nothing," he says, "could be more terrible to the English, who are so much in love with liberty, and property, than to see themselves be dragooned out of both with the help of so powerful an ally as Louis XIV." A cynic might adduce the experience of the ensuing century to prove that French assistance was by no means necessary to enable the squires and rich men to perform this feat at the expense of their neighbours.

Somers was a practical statesman and a lawyer speaking to his brief for a particular purpose ; what may be not unaptly described as the Bible of Whiggism is contained in John Locke's *Essay on Civil Government*. This spare, precise man, who was, like Cecil Rhodes, a native of the West Country, though an Oxford don and somewhat of a recluse, had been the intimate friend and adviser of that arch-schemer, the first Lord Shaftesbury, and the two had between them drawn up an extraordinary feudal constitution for North and South Carolina. In the dark days of Royalist triumph Locke had passed years of exile in Holland, the safe asylum for genius not tolerated elsewhere. Like Somers, he was a cautious man, with a balancing mind and a distrust of enthusiasm. It was only when he was well advanced in middle age that he felt sufficiently assured to publish his conclusions.

The treatise is as cold and cautious as the man ; it has none of the clear-cut grandeur of Hobbes, nor the passionate insight of Rousseau. It is, like the Revolution settlement, a series of

compromises, and carries on, in a respectable English way, the work of Hobbes in divorcing government from God and putting human affairs on a commonsense basis.

This was, indeed, the significance of William's Kingship. Charles II and his brother had, in the opinion of loyal Tories and Churchmen, been on the throne because God and heredity had put them there. The most disingenuous supporter of William could hardly urge this as his title to turn out James II. He was there for no other reason than that he and Mary were, in the opinion of Parliament, the next heirs to whom there was no insuperable objection. And accordingly Locke opens his case by a devastating attack upon a certain Sir Robert Filmer, a Tory apologist who had derived the Divine Right of Kings from certain prerogatives assumed to have been conferred on Adam by his Maker, and handed down from father to son ever since. Poor Sir Robert's sole title to remembrance is that Locke thought it worth expending powder and shot on him.

Locke, having annihilated his opponent at greater length than necessary, takes up the parable of Hobbes and Hooker, of a social contract between men in a state of nature. Locke's natural men are less formidable than the murderous anachis of Hobbes. They are, in the absence of government, in much the same mutual relations as the sovereigns of independent states; they are under a law of nature which imposes a certain elementary standard of justice and decency. And if they come together for the purpose of adding to this a human or positive law, they are not, like Hobbes's men, going to barter away their natural freedom forever and unconditionally. Their rulers are taken on by contract for a definite purpose; should they be guilty of flagrant breach of that contract they can be dismissed without for a moment dissolving the society, just as Parliament got rid of James II.

Locke has a fine conception of the duties of the legislative body which he describes as the supreme power in the Commonwealth, and on this subject the principles he lays down are worth quoting in full:

"First, they are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough.

"Secondly, these laws ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, but for the good of the people.

"Thirdly, they must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of the people, given by themselves, or their

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deputies. And this properly only concerns such governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.

“*Fourthly*, the legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere, but where the people have.”

Such is the Whig philosopher's conception of a reign of law, and of a Parliament, supreme indeed as regards the other powers in the State, but held in strict bounds of legality and always accountable to the people for whose good it has been appointed. There is no need to examine the details of Locke's social edifice. They are demonstrably tinged with ignorance, inevitable in those days, of social history, and the argument fails to take into account the complexity and organic stubbornness of human society. Locke writes as if it were possible to deal with men in the abstract, and to construct a polity without taking any account of time or national differences. What he does, as matter of fact, evolve, is nothing ideal or universal at all, but something characteristically English, a glorified version of the Revolution settlement, as seen through Whig glasses. Not the least characteristic feature is the importance Locke attaches to property. There are cases, he points out, where it would be justifiable to kill a man, but a crime to take his purse. It was during the eighteenth century that brutal assault went comparatively free, while to steal a sheep was a hanging matter.

Neither Tudor monarchy nor Whig oligarchy succeeded in doing away with the Common Law ; the Whigs were, in fact, pre-eminently the party of that law. And pedantic and cruel as the Common Law could be, so long as it was alive there could be no absolute nor arbitrary tyranny. The stubborn spirit of individual right was bound, in the long run, to prevail against any person or class that sought to monopolize power in the State. The best that can be said for the Whig Revolution is that it contained within itself the seeds of that very democracy against which its leaders were so careful to guard.

A curious and illuminating incident occurred at the very beginning of William's reign. Among those who, like Locke himself, came back from exile abroad, was a stern and venerable figure in which few could have recognized the old Ironside General Ludlow, who, as a young man of twenty-eight, had put his signature to the royal death-warrant, and who, at the age of three-score and ten, imagined that the accomplishment of another Protestant Revolution would restore

him to his native land and even, perhaps, to high command. He had pathetically misread the signs of the times ; no second triumph of the Saints was at hand—the rich magnates were not going to repeat that mistake. One of these magnates, head of the elder branch of the Seymours, a man of such boundless snobbishness that he insisted on speaking of the Duke of Somerset as belonging to *his* family and not he to the Duke's, had his eye on Ludlow. This was less owing to any reverence for Charles I, than to the fact that he, Seymour, had got hold of Ludlow's forfeited estates, and feared complications with the old owner. Accordingly he moved heaven and earth to get Ludlow apprehended and, presumably, hanged, drawn and quartered like the other regicides. The old republican soon was taught the difference between the rule of the Saints and that of the great families, and only just managed to make his escape, possibly with William's connivance, from the fate of Naboth. He never came back, and died in his quiet retreat among the Swiss mountains, trying to console himself by the reflection that to those whose father is God, every country is a fatherland.

4

TORY NATIONALISM

From a patriot's standpoint, no less than from that of William himself, the events of his reign must have seemed both inconclusive and unsatisfactory. The alliance of Whigs and Tories, which had turned out James, quickly fell to pieces when that monarch's ineptitude no longer held it together. William soon found himself reduced to holding his throne as the nominee of the anti-monarchial party. The English people did not love him, for he was neither an Englishman nor lovable. The spectacle of De Ruyter's fleet in the Medway was hardly more humiliating than that of the blue Dutch guards, with their enormous moustachios, lining the approaches to Whitehall. At the best, his rule was a lesser evil than that of James, at the worst, as his many opponents did not hesitate to assert, he was an outlandish usurper, bent on sacrificing English interests to those of Holland, and, in short, fit for the gallows.

It is not surprising that with the country in such a frame of mind, it should not be pulling together either for William or against Louis. It became a regular thing for British statesmen to conduct treasonable correspondence with James in his refuge at Saint Germain. The most honest and consistent of the clergy, headed by

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six of the seven Bishops whom James had persecuted, gave up their livings rather than acknowledge William as their King by Right Divine. English and Dutch did not always hit it off between themselves; Torrington was accused, though with less than justice, of having put the Dutch in the forefront of the action of Beachy Head, and then deserted them, and at our first battle in Flanders, the Dutch Count Solmes, instead of reinforcing our desperately pressed troops, merely remarked :

“Damn the English! If they are so fond of fighting, let them have a bellyful!”

The old party of Divine Right, finding themselves saddled with a Parliamentary King, now committed themselves to the narrowest kind of nationalism. This was the more surprising, as it was on the Tories that Charles II had relied, towards the end of his reign, to support him in his policy of subservience to France. But now the whole Tory party was for the rights of honest Englishmen against the hated Froglanders, as the Dutch were called, and for the liberty of the subject as against standing armies. When it was a question of nationalizing foreigners, one of the Members for Bristol made a slashing speech in which he adjured the Commons to kick the bill out of the house and the foreigners out of the kingdom. It was in vain that the speech was burnt by the common hangman, its author got the credit of being a saviour of his country and the bill had to be dropped. An unending stream of pamphlets and topical poems denounced Dutch rule and a pro-Dutch war, and our bloody and unsuccessful first Flemish campaigns served to swell the tide of feeling against the King and his government.

Not that there was ever any serious question of having James back. This was made clear enough when, after the battle of Beachy Head, the danger to the country produced a spontaneous rally even of the least well affected elements to the side of the government. It was then the turn of the Whig pamphleteers to point out the danger we were running of having our homes and women at the mercy of Louis's brutal troopers. And when Namur fell, something like a national triumph greeted William on his return; poems of ponderous jubilation were written by Mat Prior and others, and Englishmen were driven to realize that, with all his faults, their Dutch King was a man and perhaps a hero, not unfit to have the leading of redcoats to unaccustomed victory beyond the seas.

But when the strain of war was relaxed, a violent reaction set in; the Tories now had a majority, of which they availed themselves

in the worst spirit of partisanship. But there is no doubt that they had a case, and one not easily to be refuted, against the foreign policy that was draining England's blood and treasure in Continental campaigns. The old policy of the great Tudor Sovereigns had been to keep England out of adventures on the Continent, and to preserve an attitude of masterly inactivity towards the conflicts of her neighbours. Towards such outrages as the seizure of German and Italian fortresses in time of peace, the Tories would have preserved the attitude of Gallio. They had no ambition to become saviours of Europe, and William's aims were quite beyond their spiritual purview.

About the necessity of keeping a strong navy, they were as firm as the Whigs, but to have a standing army in time of peace was to revert to the dark days of the New Model, and to have Dutch troops quartered in London was intolerable. A furious controversy sprung up about the necessity of standing armies, one side urging the liberty of the subject, the other pointing out that with 150,000 French veterans constantly under arms, the peril of invasion was constant, and that with only raw levies to oppose a landing, the country would be at their mercy. One writer even went so far as to suggest National Service as a way out of the difficulty. The ablest contribution was that of Somers, who, granting the peril to liberty from standing armies in general, argued in true Whig fashion for one in England, on the ground that the army under the Revolution settlement really belonged to Parliament.

William's foreign policy of the Partition treaties scandalized the Tory mind, and Somers and other Whig ministers were actually impeached for their share in it, though the House of Lords absolved them. The Tories worked their will on the army, cutting it down to 7,000 men, though this did not include troops quartered in Ireland. The Dutch guards were packed unceremoniously home, and William, driven to distraction by this last affront, had serious thoughts of going with them, but with the dogged self-control that had always distinguished him, he stuck to his thankless post, and, with his sword arm crippled, took up the threads of his diplomacy as best he might. His best friend was Louis himself, who, by his brutal violence, roused such a feeling in the country as enabled William, a dying man, to end the Tory obstruction by a successful appeal to the constituencies.

THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

The European war that now ensued was of a more dramatic and decisive nature than any of those which, during Louis XIV's long reign, had preceded it. The *Roi Soleil* made his supreme bid for European domination under the most favourable auspices. Before the Grand Alliance of European Powers could be got together to oppose him, Spain and France were firmly united, the blue-coated armies had swamped the carefully contrived Dutch Barrier, overrun the ill-fated country that is now Belgium, and poured across the Alps to possess themselves of the Lombard plain. Nay more, French diplomacy had given Louis the door to Vienna in the shape of an alliance with Bavaria, through which an army based in Strassburg could strike down the Danube valley at the heart of the Empire. These magnificent advantages, which all his previous campaigns had been unable to give Louis, were counter-balanced by a handicap less obvious. France was an exhausted nation, and if proof were required, it would be in the fact that while England was raising money, through the Bank, at easy rates of interest, Louis was lucky if he could get an advance of 20 per cent. France must strike hard and home if she was to strike at all.

At this crisis the place of that dogged but mediocre commander-in-chief, William III, was taken by John Churchill, better known as the great Duke of Marlborough. This man was a product of the same restless, intellectual ferment that had found expression in the Royal Society, of which his father was a member. But Marlborough was not interested in the Heavens above, like Newton, nor in the earth beneath, like Boyle, but in life itself. Hitherto the ordering of a man's life had an affair between him and his God, or at any rate his Church; it was something mystical and authoritative. But Marlborough had, though but implicitly, conceived of his own life as a thing to be ordered, and shaped on a rational plan, with which neither religion nor any conventional standards of conduct had anything to do. It was a pity that Nietzsche did not make himself better acquainted with English history, for he might have found in Marlborough the nearest approach to his idea of the superman that the world has yet seen, a more finished and faultless specimen than either Napoleon or Caesar Borgia.

And certainly Marlborough furnishes a wonderful example of what a man can do for himself who bends his whole energies to

the task of self-development. He realized that a serene disposition and an imperturbable temper were good things, and he acquired both in the hardest of all schools, that of marriage to a virago. But it is better to love your wife, especially when that wife is your most valuable ally, than to be miserable, and consequently Marlborough insisted on loving and being happy with Sarah. Men were like clay in his hands; he knew all their foibles and how to find the weak joint in everyone's armour. Lord Chesterfield, no mean judge, acknowledged in him the pattern of all the graces. Success could not turn his head, the most cruel of luck could not provoke him to impatience.

As a soldier he alone of the world's great commanders seems never to have made a mistake of any importance. From first to last, he succeeded in everything he undertook, and this in face of almost incredible difficulties. Time and again his best laid schemes were brought to nothing by disloyal and disobedient allies, for every battle and campaign that he won he missed winning two more because he could not get Dutchmen and Germans to fight or allow him a free hand. In strategy, tactics, and military administration he was equally great, and he possessed to a pre-eminent degree that coolness of judgment which Lord Roberts thought to be the first requisite of a soldier, and in which even Napoleon more than once showed himself to be conspicuously lacking. He claimed, not unjustly, never to have thrown away the life of a man; he was as economical with his human material as with his private fortune. To this he added a tact and persuasiveness that enabled him to impose or rather insinuate his will upon tough soldiers like Charles XII of Sweden and pig-headed meddlers like the Dutch commissioners. His colleague, Prince Eugene, adored him; the soldiers knew him affectionately as Corporal John.

Marlborough suffers severely when brought to the bar of conventional morality by such respectable historians as Macaulay. But it is more a historian's business to understand the people of whom he writes than to vindicate his own respectability by thundering at their tombstones. And to understand Marlborough, it is necessary to place ourselves at what we may conceive to have been his standpoint. For he was just as much an innovator in life as Bacon in thought; as Nietzsche would have put it, he had completely broken down the old tables. Honour, duty, patriotism, were words that impressed him no more than they did Falstaff. If he swore to James II to defend him to the death, that was because it was the

best way to manage James ; if, after James had rejected his advice, he rode off into William's camp, it was because the time was come to abandon a fool to his fate. The charge that he deliberately betrayed British soldiers to their doom by communicating information of Talmash's ill-fated attack on Brest to the enemy is at least not proven, in view of the possibility that this may have been done with the connivance of William, in order to lure off French troops from Flanders, or, alternatively, that Marlborough took the highly characteristic course of imparting to James, as a token of good will, information that he knew he already possessed.

Marlborough must be classed not so much as an immoral, as a non-moral man, or at least as one who submitted to no verdict on his actions but that of his own calm and lucid intelligence. If he was without the merits he was at least without the drawbacks of conventional virtue. His serene disposition made him the most humane and considerate of men ; to cruelty he was a stranger, to jealousy or revenge he never condescended. If he had a weakness, even when judged by his own standard of rationality, it was that he fell into the common mental confusion between money as a means and an end of life. If it be true that, though one of the richest men in Europe, he walked about in his infirm old age rather than pay a few pence for a seat, our comment would be the word with which Marlborough himself was accustomed to dismiss unwelcome suggestions—"silly !"

If we have lingered at what may seem disproportionate length over Marlborough's personality, it is because it may reasonably be taken to constitute one of the most important phenomena of that age. Since the Restoration the tendency had been to pull to pieces the old world of faith and authority and rebuild it on purely rational lines. This was attempted by Newton and his fellows in science, by Locke in political philosophy, by the Deists in religion, but Marlborough took a step further—one in advance even of the present age—in rationalizing individual life, a thing very different from surrendering to libertine or criminal instincts. He gave, in his own person, perhaps the most conspicuous example ever afforded of what may be done by the steady and consistent application of reason to life.

The story of the war may be briefly told. Marlborough, who went to command the allied forces in the Netherlands, was effectually restrained by the Dutch from delivering any smashing blow at the French, and therefore, with his invariable talent for making the

best of a bad business, devoted himself to securing the lines of the Meuse and Lower Rhine for future operations. Then Louis gathered strength for launching his great effort at the heart of the alliance, and a Franco-Bavarian army threatened Vienna in seemingly irresistible force. Instantly grasping the peril, Marlborough succeeded not only in outwitting the enemy, but his own allies, feinting at France from Coblenz, and then marching across to the Danube, where he drove the Bavarians from their lines at Donauworth. This success was followed by a decisive victory over the combined French and Bavarians at Blenheim. Marlborough, who knew all there was worth knowing about mental discipline, passed a great part of the preceding night in prayer, and then, on the morrow, calmly estimating the weakness of the enemy's position, held them firmly on both flanks while his cavalry smashed the centre and then, wheeling round, compelled the French right wing, with Marshal Tallard, to surrender. It was an irreparable military disaster for Louis, it knocked Bavaria out of the war, and was most damaging of all to French prestige. "*Oh, que dira le roi ?*" wept the veterans as they laid down their arms, "*que dira le roi ?*"

Marlborough, advancing to the Rhine, would have followed this up, had he been allowed his way, with an advance on Paris by the direct route through Lorraine. This, however, was beyond the mental scope of his allies, and he again had to make the best he could out of the orthodox routine of eighteenth century warfare. He was robbed of his trouncing Villeroy, the most incompetent of Louis's marshals, on the field of Waterloo, the Dutch civilians crying "murder" and "massacre" when the thing was proposed. But next year the chance came again; he found Villeroy in position at Ramilles, and it was child's play to him to distract that courtier's attention by a furious attack on his left, and then to transfer a large enough force, behind a fold in the ground, to the other wing to deal such a blow, followed by such a pursuit, that the French were fairly hustled out of Belgium and behind their own frontiers.

Louis had at last the sense to see that the game was up. The war had been going as badly for him as it could; his country was threatened with invasion; the Austrian candidate for the Spanish throne had succeeded in establishing himself at Madrid. The exhaustion of his country was terrible, starvation stalked abroad, funds for the war were almost unobtainable. Louis therefore endeavoured to cut his losses by disowning his nephew's candidature for Spain, and granting the allies everything for which they could

reasonably have hoped. But the allies were flushed with victory, and the war and Marlborough had become the chief assets of the Whig party in England. The French overtures were therefore rejected; debt was to be piled up, the resources of civilization wasted, myriads of ignorant men condemned to death and Europe to years of misery for no intelligible object whatever, as far as England was concerned, though a very intelligible object indeed from the standpoint of the Whig bosses.

The war dragged on its course, and in 1707 the French rallied. Marlborough was faced by a very different adversary from Villeroy, Marshal Vendôme, who took care never to give him an opening, and meanwhile the most capable of all the French commanders, Villars, crossed the Rhine and penetrated into Swabia. Prince Eugene, the Imperial commander, who had in the previous September cleared the French from Lombardy, was repulsed in a joint British naval and Imperial military attack on Toulon. It also became evident that an Austrian candidate could not hold the Spanish throne against the will of the Spanish people, and the Allied cause in Spain collapsed as rapidly as it had risen, after a disaster at Almanza, caused, not as Macaulay would have it, by the incompetence of the Earl of Galway, the French commander of the allies, but by the disgraceful conduct of the Portuguese contingent.

So the war dragged on. Next year Vendôme, who had been saddled with an incompetent but royal colleague in the Duke of Burgundy, by a swift advance and connivance of the inhabitants got back Ghent and Bruges, but the hand of Marlborough was upon him. By a splendid forced march, Marlborough managed to catch the two French commanders trying to draw up their army in two different positions behind the Scheldt near Oudenarde, with the result that might have been expected. It was now Marlborough's plan to give the *coup-de-grâce* to exhausted France by marching straight on Paris. But this would have involved masking the frontier fortresses, and particularly the great fortress of Lille, and so terrible a deviation from orthodox strategy was too much even for Eugene. Accordingly Marlborough had to sit down with as good a grace as he could before Lille, where the brave old Marshal Boufflers surrendered for the second time in his career.

The situation was now desperate for Louis, and the proud old King offered terms that amounted to abject surrender. Everything that the allies wanted he would concede. But nothing short of his utter destruction would satisfy our allies, and the Whigs

were at the height of their power in England. To every other humiliation that France was ready to undergo was added the monstrous demand that Louis should join with his enemies in attacking his own allies, the Spaniards, in order to drive his own nephew out of his kingdom. The old King gave the only answer that any honourable man could have given to these proposals and threw himself on the support of the people whom his ambition had bled white. The national spirit of France, outraged beyond measure by the shame her enemies proposed to put upon her, rose nobly to the appeal. A ragged and starving but thoroughly patriotic army faced Marlborough under Villars, a commander almost, but not quite, worthy of his steel, and proved its quality in a desperate battle at Malplaquet in which, though Marlborough forced the French off the ground, he did so at the price of terrible losses, his Dutch contingent being so hard hit that it was crippled for the rest of the war.

That was the last big battle, but perhaps the most brilliant display of Marlborough's genius was yet to be seen. Though he knew that his home front had broken behind him, that his Duchess had fallen out of favour with her Queen, and that the Whigs, including Godolphin, who had given him the financial backing he needed, were fallen from power, he continued, within the limits prescribed for him, to show his superiority at every point to his great adversary. In 1711 Villars had fortified a line which he dared to describe as Marlborough's *ne plus ultra*, but the Duke, with inferior forces and almost incredible finesse, succeeded in turning and piercing these lines and putting himself within striking distance of Paris for the next campaign. But this campaign he was not to fight.

Meanwhile, in little regarded fields, England, or Great Britain as she became during the course of the war, was winning advantages that were to prove more important, in the long run, than victories in Flanders. Her sea power was undisputed, and she used it to establish a sure footing in the Mediterranean by the occupation of the Rock of Gibraltar, almost as much of an accident as that of Jamaica fifty years before. To this was added the hardly less important though less permanent acquisition of Minorca, whose importance as a naval base was one day to be put in the shade by that of Malta, but which may fairly be described as the Malta of the eighteenth century. Her Canadian conquests, the most important of all, were more the result of the peace than of the war.

THE TORY INTERLUDE AND THE PEACE OF UTRECHT

It is now time to consider what had been going on in England itself. The monarch who succeeded William on the throne was a commonplace lady of a type only too familiar in country houses to-day. Wholly devoid of any interest in art or literature, a pious Anglican and a passionate sportswoman, her affections were divided between a husband even more commonplace than herself and the woman who at any particular time possessed the key of her confidence. Historians are perhaps apt to make the mistake of her contemporaries in estimating too lightly this stout, plain woman. For with all her insufficiency she had a will of her own and, when she was once determined upon any course, the obstinacy of a mule, or to put it more strongly, of her father.

Her importance lies in the fact of her being, to all intents and purposes, the last of our sovereigns by Divine Right. Though her nephew in France, who called himself James III of England, was, strictly speaking, the hereditary sovereign, Anne was an Englishwoman and a Stuart, and had the advantage of that sentiment which, in England, seldom fails to hedge a Queen. She was, by temperament and inclination, as much a Tory as William had been a Whig. The miracle of the Royal Touch was revived, and Dr. Johnson, on whom it somehow failed to work, retained "a confused but somehow a solemn recollection of a lady in diamonds and a long black hood". At the beginning of her reign her ministry, though inclining to the Tory side, was of no decided party complexion, and it must be remembered that at the time parties were still very fluid, and few politicians had any scruples about shifting their allegiance from one to the other, least of all Marlborough, who was the most powerful personage in England, especially in view of the fact that his wife had, or believed she had, Anne completely under her thumb.

Marlborough's great interest was in the war, and the Whigs were the war party. He therefore, and his friend Godolphin, who managed the national finances with unostentatious ability, found it convenient to incline gradually to the Whig side; popular sentiment was flowing in this direction, and Anne at last found herself confronted with the same disagreeable necessity that had faced William, that of appointing a party ministry. The Whigs, with bullying discourtesy, spared no pains to make the Queen of England

realize that she was no longer her own mistress. When her stupid but tenderly beloved consort was actually dying, she was forced to make concessions to save him from being attacked in Parliament, and hardly was he in his grave than the Houses tormented her with an almost brutal petition that she should marry again. The decisive moment was when in 1708 Marlborough and Godolphin forced their Tory colleague Harley out of the ministry, sorely against the Queen's will, by a simultaneous threat of resignation. Another Whig junto was now forced on the Queen, including, to her no small disgust, the infidel rake Wharton. The new ministers soon made it clear that the power and patronage that were supposed to belong to the Sovereign were now the prerogative of her servants. Anne said little, but she bided her time, and waited for the tide to turn in her favour.

She had not long to wait. The country was beginning to feel the strain of the war, which it was evident that the Whigs were prolonging beyond all reason. After the murderous affair of Malplaquet feeling began steadily to arise against the Dutch and Germans who, it was alleged, were using us as a catspaw, against the ministers who connived at their doing so, and even against Marlborough himself, whose Duchess at last began to find that she had come to the end of her mistress's patience. No nation was, and perhaps is, more susceptible than the English to that emotional bias which is comprehended in the word Tory. It was quite on the cards that an ingrained Royalism might have nullified the effects even of the Revolution, had not the throne been so consistently unfortunate in its occupants. As it was, even so stupid a woman as Anne was able to score a dazzling victory over the Whig constitutional oligarchs.

Hardly less strong than the affection for royalty was that for the Church, which seemed to be threatened by the tolerant and secular policy dear to the Whigs and to the broad-minded men of the world whom William had chosen for bishops. "Low Church is no Church" was a saying of the time. It is not surprising, therefore, that a spark was put to a long-prepared train by the Whig impeachment of a reverend self-advertiser called Doctor Sacheverell, who had let himself go, in a sermon at Saint Paul's, about the duty of non-resistance and the awful dangers of toleration. Perhaps the war had put the country's nerves on edge, but the delighted Doctor found himself the centre of an agitation as violent and unreasoning as that previously excited by the Popish plot, and his three years' suspension from preaching, which was all the penalty the Whigs dared inflict,

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was not to be compared with the glory of so magnificent an appearance in the limelight. The Queen, correctly gauging the national feeling, dissolved Parliament, and the Whigs were "snowed under". So the woman whom everybody thought a fool got her way and her Tories after all.

During the four years of Tory ascendancy which closed the reign, the dominating influence was that of Henry St. John, who soon became Viscount Bolingbroke—much to his disgust, for he had expected to be made an Earl. In his rationalist and non-moral outlook on life, this brilliant but futile politician was not altogether dissimilar from Marlborough. But he was cast in a smaller mould; he was a slave to his appetites in a way that Marlborough never was, he lacked patience and serenity of judgment and, if not actually a coward, was apt to lose his nerve in a crisis.

Bolingbroke has himself given a delightfully candid account of the mood in which the Tories accepted office. "I am afraid," he says, "that we came to court in the same disposition as all parties have done; that the principal spring of our actions was to have the government of the State in our hands; that our principal views were the conservation of this power, great employments to ourselves, and great opportunities of rewarding those who had helped to raise us, and of hurting those who had stood in opposition to us. It is however true, that with these considerations of private and party interest, there were others intermingled which had for their object the public good of the nation, at least what we took to be such."

To this shameless anticipation of Tammany, had the old Cavalier party of prerogative, Divine Right, and the Church of England now sunk. But if a knave, Bolingbroke had all his wits about him, and he succeeded in promoting the country's interests if not exactly her honour. For the Tories had come in as the peace party, and their object was to get England out of the war at the greatest advantage to herself and at any cost to her allies. It was the golden age of the political pamphlet, and the Tories had the services of that most redoubtable of all special pleaders, Dean Swift. He and his friend Arbuthnot were both concerned in the creation of a character which has gone down to posterity as the national representative, John Bull. He is a cloth merchant, who gets engaged in a lawsuit about the estate of Lord Strutt, or the King of Spain, which is claimed by Lewis Baboon, a delicate rendering of Louis Bourbon. The way in which John and Lewis, with self-righteous assurance, partition the estate

before the owner is dead, and John's naive indignation at his lordship's resentment of this procedure, are deliciously told.

But, so the title runs, "the law is a bottomless pit," and John, who is both greedy and credulous, allows himself to be dragged by neighbours sharper than himself into an interminable lawsuit, which is deliberately prolonged by a villainous lawyer called Hocus, in other words, Marlborough. So public opinion was prepared for the abandonment of both Marlborough and the allies, with whom, by the way, we were pledged to co-operate. Bolingbroke went about this work in the spirit more of a card-sharper than a statesman. Negotiations were opened with Louis behind the back of the allies, Marlborough was dismissed from all his appointments and assailed with cries of "stop thief!" in the streets, and finally, after the Duke of Ormonde, the new commander-in-chief, had done all he could to thwart the efforts of the honest Eugene, the British contingent was withdrawn altogether, to the unspeakable shame of their officers. The effect was soon seen. Villars, instead of standing in the last ditch with his back to Paris, bounded forward, and the tide of war again flowed against the allies.

But the peace Bolingbroke arranged was, if we leave out of account its morality, a thoroughly smart piece of work. Philip was left on the throne of Spain, but this was better than the alternative of having a Hapsburg, the allied candidate, who was now Emperor into the bargain. England secured for herself the disgraceful privilege of the Asiento, or the monopoly of supplying Spanish America with negroes. The Stuart Pretender was banished from France, and the fortifications of Dunkirk, then as much a thorn in England's side as Zeebrugge during the Great War, were destroyed. A commercial treaty was concluded with France, that the Tories could not get ratified by Parliament, partly because it was in direct conflict with our previous engagements with Portugal. England kept her two naval bases in the Mediterranean, and the whole of the previously divided island of St. Kitts in the West Indies. Even more important were her acquisitions in North America.

Here France had been for some time engaged in a colonial enterprise which, if successful, would have given her the Empire of North America and left the English colonies a mere strip between the Eastern coast and the Alleghanies. Her colony of Canada, that sprang up along the St. Lawrence River, formed a striking contrast to the English group. Its numbers were always insignificant by comparison, being reckoned in tens of thousands when the English

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had topped the second million, and whereas our colonies were a natural growth or overflow, the French were an artificial product kept alive by the strenuous efforts of the Home government. Autocracy and feudalism were the principles of Canadian rule, to which the inhabitants, not having the English law in their blood, took kindly.

But the colony had all the advantages of unity and centralization, and thanks to intelligent direction and patriotic energy, seriously threatened to cut off the British from the hinterland of what is now the United States. A glance at a map will show that the States are divided into an Eastern and a Western strip, bounded by the Alleghanies and the Rocky Mountains, and that between these lies the vast basin of the Mississippi with its tributaries. In 1682 a French explorer, the Sieur de Lassalle, penetrated from the great lakes down to the mouth of the Mississippi and established a claim on the part of France to the valley he had explored. In 1697 the French planted a colony at the mouth of the Mississippi which they named, after their King, Louisiana.

It is obvious that if the French could have permanently linked up this with their Northern possessions, and so gradually have spread out over the Mississippi basin, they would have effectually pinned the British to the coast, and made themselves masters of the great bulk of the North American Continent. But neither in men nor in wealth were their resources equal to such an undertaking. Louis, when he embarked on his series of wars for the supremacy of Europe and strained the resources of his country to breaking point, had crippled any chance of French expansion overseas. Nevertheless, considering their small numbers and lack of sea power, the French did surprisingly well. The greatest of all their colonial administrators, the Count de Frontenac, not only managed to strike terror into the formidable Iroquois Indian confederacy, but also, during the war that followed William III's accession, to carry on a vigorous struggle against our colonists, and to drive an English expedition from the walls of Quebec.

Frontenac died, and the War of the Spanish Succession proved disastrous to the French colony, though another English attempt to take Quebec was repulsed. But the peace gave the English Newfoundland and the Hudson's Bay Territory, besides extending the English coast line Northward by the acquisition of Nova Scotia, and confining French Canada to the region of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes. But though scotched, the French menace of

encirclement was by no means killed, and the threat of linking up Canada with Louisiana had the effect of making our colonies more closely dependent than they would otherwise have been upon the British connection.

The war was only gradually extinguished between the various exhausted combatants in a series of treaties at Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden. Louis had come out of it, thanks to the British defection, better than he had had any right to expect, but England had done well enough for herself. The best that can be said for her is that in an age of political swindling, she had swindled best. The Tories, who had forced the treaty through a Whig House of Lords by creating peers of their own complexion, obtained popularity and a fresh lease of power. They had at least stopped the reckless waste of England's resources and the profitless death of her soldiers.

Their record at home was what might have been expected from men whose own interests were their first consideration. Bolingbroke, though a Deist himself, was ready enough to join in persecuting Dissenters, and the character of the Commons was rendered more oligarchic still by the imposition of a stiff landed property qualification even on borough members. It is probable that had the Queen been spared much longer, she would have found that she had but have exchanged one set of tyrants for another.

As was only to be expected, the two Tory leaders, Harley, now Earl of Oxford, and Bolingbroke, were soon trying to get rid of one another. Both were at one in accepting the spoils system to its fullest extent; as Bolingbroke put it, the object was "to fill the employments of the kingdom, down to the meanest, with Tories". Bolingbroke was set on all or nothing. Oxford had drawn up a draft scheme, which still exists, for packing Church and army with his supporters, but he was more cautious and slow-witted than his colleague, in spite of the latter's frantic efforts to whip up his energies. It is now more than probable that Bolingbroke was playing to upset the Act of Succession on the Queen's death, and bring in the Pretender, James Stuart. He was keen witted enough to see that under a German-speaking King, Toryism would become an absurdity, and he knew what mercy he had to expect from the Whigs.

Whatever his schemes may have been, and to such an opportunist it is probable that more than one alternative may have presented itself, they were nipped in the bud. Bolingbroke did at last succeed in getting rid of Oxford, but only after a violent scene at the council board that sent the poor Queen's gout to her head. Before the week

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was over, and before Bolingbroke had had time to consolidate his position, she was dead. One or two bold spirits were for proclaiming James III there and then, but Bolingbroke's nerve was not equal to so great a risk, and he stood passive. "What a world is this," he wrote, "and how does fortune banter us!" Elector George had deposited a list of Whig ministers in a sealed packet, and these proceeded to put forth all the resources of official and unofficial corruption to secure a Whig majority. Toryism collapsed, as its more far-sighted adherents had foreseen, like a pricked bubble.

The politics of Anne's reign form a sordid prelude to a sordid epoch. To talk seriously of either Tory or Whig principles gets more and more difficult as time goes on. Bolingbroke was about right when he said, in effect, that private and party interest came first, but that some considerations of patriotism or principle might exercise a minor influence on the politicians. The Whigs wantonly prolonging a murderous war and the Tories persecuting without even the excuse of honest bigotry are not parties but factions in the worst sense.

The whole atmosphere of politics was low and base. Statesmen like Harley and Godolphin, journalists like Defoe, changed their principles with their interests. The pamphlet literature of the time is certainly brilliant, but of a singularly unsatisfying nature. Controversialists like Swift were not, even ostensibly, trying to find the truth, but to bludgeon everybody on the other side and everything they did. The sordid game was played with merciless rigour. We know how Swift, a priest of God, could drag poor, distraught Mrs. Masham from her son's deathbed to her task of currying favour with the Queen. The triumph of a party meant the proscription of its enemies. An inconvenient satire could bring a journalist to the pillory, and the Tower was a recognized lodging for defeated statesmen. Even Marlborough had to take refuge on the Continent after his victories, and Bolingbroke probably just saved his head by a timely flight from Whig vengeance.

7

THE SKIN GAME OF COMMERCE

The conditions of life, among civilized peoples, and nowhere more than in England, were being transformed in a way that was little comprehended at the time, and even to this day has failed to attract the amount of attention it has deserved. It is not surprising,

therefore, that even the shrewdest contemporary minds failed to adapt themselves perfectly to the changed environment.

The root of the matter was that civilized man, to an ever increasing extent, was producing more than he had immediate use for. Not more than was needed, for the advantages of civilization were shared out among a small minority, but more than was immediately consumed by those fortunate enough to get hold of it. There was, in fact, something to put by, usually in the convenient form of money. The natural instinct of imperfectly civilized men was to follow the example of the unprofitable servant, and wrap it up in a napkin, or rather, hoard it in a strong box, as was the common practice of most families even in Restoration times. A better way than this had been discovered even in the Judaea of A.D. 30, and as wealth accumulated and internal security increased, so the opportunities increased of laying out the five talents in order to make more talents.

In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the uses of a homogeneous medium of exchange were still imperfectly understood, and it is not surprising that money and credit should have been treated as if they were not ordinary human makeshifts, but talismans or djinns of unlimited potency.

Money was regarded with a superstitious reverence as if it were a thing apart, the only kind of wealth worth having, and as if the whole object of governments and nations were to have as much of this particular commodity as possible. Spain had tried the theory in its crudest and stupidest form, and had made strenuous efforts to keep her stores of gold and silver from the Indies within the limits of her own frontiers, efforts that were so far successful as to inflate prices to the point of killing Spanish commerce and manufacture, and eventually ruining the nation. But the modified form in which the theory was adapted in England was more plausible. For there are undoubtedly occasions when a sufficiency of the circulating medium is of quite special importance. If not the be-all and end-all of commerce and industry, at times of transition from a barter to a money and from a money to a credit economy, it may have an importance of its own as a stimulant, though too much of it may act as a dangerous stimulant, to business enterprise.

The theory or, to put it more fairly, the tendency of thought most in favour, was that which regarded the business dealings between any two countries as an attempt to shift money from one side to the other. Thus if in our dealings with any country we exported goods to the value of a million pounds and imported others

to the value of two millions, we should have sent a million pounds out of the Kingdom, and be a million down on the balance. One commodity, which happened to be the medium of exchange, was singled out as if it, and it alone, counted in the sum of transactions, though it would, in fact, have been quite as reasonable, at normal times, to have estimated the results of trade by a balance of linen or brandy. To what results this fallacy could lead was amusingly demonstrated by Hume, writing in the middle of the eighteenth century :

"The writings of Mr. Gee struck the nation with a universal panic, when they saw it plainly demonstrated, by a detail of particulars, that the balance was against them for so considerable a sum, as must leave them without a single shilling in five or six years."

And yet, as Hume points out, though twenty years, with an expensive foreign war, have elapsed, England has somehow contrived to get on very well in defiance of Mr. Gee and his statistics.

We have called this a tendency of thought rather than a theory or dogma, because seventeenth century writers on economics were, as a rule, practical men of affairs and not doctrinaires, and the rigidity of their theories was softened in varying degree by their practical commonsense. But the peculiar fallacy of thought that underlay the idea of the balance of trade was blended with another, which was that of the French minister Colbert and his system. Trade between nations was not regarded as an exchange of benefits but as a duel, the winner being whichever combatant ended up with a surplus of gold and silver. It was the business of government to divert trade from those channels which yielded an unfavourable balance and to guide it towards countries that sent us most money and least goods. As it was expressed by John Mun, a merchant who had, during the reigns of the first two Stuarts, made his fortune in the Near and Far Eastern trade,

"The ordinary means to increase our wealth and treasure is by foreign trade, wherein we must ever observe this rule : to sell more to strangers yearly than we consume of theirs in value"

The trade most denounced by believers in the Balance was that with France, which was supposed to result in a dead loss of many hundred thousand pounds annually. Samuel Fortrey, who appears to have been both a merchant and a courtier, and a pamphlet from whose pen, in 1668, made a considerable stir, asserted that every year we were suffering a dead loss of "no less than one million six

hundred pounds a year in our trade with France, and cited as his authority a secret and sinister report supposed to be in the possession of Louis. Eleven years later a number of city men who had submitted an exact profit and loss account to the Lords Commissioners of a commercial treaty with France, worked out the adverse balance at something a little short of a million. This outcry against France was not untinged by political motives, the Whig party being that of hostility to France. It is not surprising, therefore, that when anti-French feeling was at its highest, in 1678, the Commons should have passed a measure prohibiting altogether a number of the chief imports from France, a measure that remained in force till the reign of James II.

It was, then, especially the Whigs who were committed to the idea of the Balance of Trade, to commercial war with France, and that policy of protection which is somewhat vaguely known as the Mercantile System. There was much in this system that is at least defensible. It aimed, as indeed the Tudor policy had aimed too, at the sedulous nursing of British industry. The interests of consumers were sacrificed in one branch of industry after another, to foster production. It had taken centuries to build up a native cloth manufacture, and to end the dependence of England on the Low Countries for finishing the product, but at last it was done, even if the Long Parliament had to challenge Holland by prohibiting the export of raw cloth. From the nascent cotton trade, for a long time confined to fustian made half of cotton and half of linen, Indian competition was carefully excluded. In general the principle was not only to regulate the tariff so as to produce a favourable balance of trade with each country, but also so as to give the maximum of employment to British hands. Nor were the requirements of national security, in a strong population and a sufficiency of war material, ever lost sight of.

How far this policy was successful will probably always be a subject of contention among experts. The fact remains that, whether on account of it or in spite of it, British commerce did flourish exceedingly while the Mercantile System lasted, and production advanced with sure and rapid strides. But the danger it most involved was in the sordid and selfish spirit that accompanied it. The narrow view of trade which conceives of one nation's gain as another's loss, the perpetual struggle to weigh down the balance on one's own side, was fatal to any generous and idealistic view of international policy. Nations were like cardsharps in a Western

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saloon, all trying sedulously to cheat, and with hands never far from their hip pockets. This was bad enough where other nations were concerned, but it was ruinous when applied to our own fellow subjects and dependents. England's treatment of Ireland was that of a tough who insists on playing with an unarmed man whom he knows to be at his mercy, and so grasping was her spirit that she did not hesitate to turn a penny by squeezing Protestant Ulster. In Bengal the tyranny of her merchant governors created a record even in that land of many oppressions. And in America, where the sole hope for British rule was in the loyalty of our colonists, we tried to deal with them on business principles, and it went hard, but they bettered the instruction.

In justice to the Whigs, and to the protectionist system which they made peculiarly their own, it must be admitted that they had no monopoly of materialism. The Tories were generally opposed to the struggle with France, and produced a series of writers—notably Nicholas Barbon, son of "Praise God Barebones"—who qualified in varying degrees the Balance of Trade fallacy, relying on the example of Free Trade Holland, and adumbrating the truth that imports are paid for by exports. And yet of all the clever pieces of sharp practice that sullied our policy during the eighteenth century, England's part, under Tory auspices, in the Peace of Utrecht, is perhaps the most conspicuous.

8

A CREDIT ECONOMY

The latter part of the seventeenth century saw the development of a business organization characteristically modern. The surplus wealth of the country, which was now rapidly increasing, began to seek opportunities for employment. The hidden and unfruitful hoards that prudent men were wont to accumulate against a rainy day began to go out of fashion—it was more profitable to invest. The Dutch, with their Bills of Exchange and their highly developed banking system, had shown the possibilities of a credit economy, and the mere fact that there was wealth to dispose of created a demand for its fruitful employment.

But in order that people may be induced to part with their treasured hoards, credit is necessary. Credit, as the name implies, is nothing more nor less than faith, and faith, on the stock exchange no less than before the altar, is the substance of things hoped for,

the evidence of things not seen. The modern miser finds as much pleasure in gloating over his pass-book as his spiritual ancestor in counting the coins in his strong box, and in fact considers his money much safer in the bank, though well aware that only a small part of the money which the bank holds for its clients has any concrete being except in the imagination of the faithful. But at the time of which we are speaking, credit was far from reposing on the firm foundation it does to-day. Macaulay cites the instance of Sir Dudley North, a gentleman of the old school who believed in keeping his money in his own house, a belief in which he was confirmed by his having once entrusted some of it to a Lombard Street man who broke. Charles II repudiated his debts to the goldsmiths, and even the security of the National Debt was threatened by the prospect of a Stuart Restoration. The Tory party was so gravely suspect in the city that, at the time of the Tory reaction in Anne's reign, the Governor and directors of the Bank begged, though vainly, of the Queen not to dismiss her Whig ministers. And, at best, the House of Commons was notoriously corrupt, and frauds on the exchequer were more than suspected.

Nevertheless credit was steadily increasing, even to the point of credulity, and the foundation of the Bank had a wonderful effect in heartening timid owners of money to take the plunge of investment. Along with the growth of faith went the perfecting of the organization by which faith might be made effective. In this work the Jew, by virtue of his inborn aptitude, plays a part whose importance can hardly be overrated. Cromwell's re-admission of the Jews into England, as the result of Manasseh Ben Ephraim's mission, was tacitly connived at by the government of Charles II. The Jew was, in fact, wanted so urgently that neither laws nor regulations could keep him out. Sir Josiah Child, governor of the East India Company and a distinguished economist, urged that they might be naturalized, and despite all laws to the contrary, they succeeded in getting represented on 'Change. Lucien Wolf¹ says that at this period they controlled more of the foreign and colonial trade than all the other alien merchants in London put together, and Addison writes of them as "the instruments with which the most diverse nations converse with one another and by which mankind are knit in a general correspondence".

The figure of the great Jew financier, on whom governments depend to solve their monetary difficulties, now comes into prominence.

¹ Quoted in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, article *Jews*.

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Among the chief financiers of the time of Charles I and the Commonwealth was the great Jew Carvajal, who is said to have imported silver to the value of £100,000 yearly.¹ Some of the most prominent Sephardim families sent representatives to England in the train of Charles II's Portuguese Queen, and there was another considerable Jewish influx from Amsterdam at the accession of William III. In the two wars with France that ensued, a part curiously similar to that of the Rothschilds in the Napoleonic struggle was played by Sir Solomon Medina, or, as he was better known, the Jew Medina. This man, who was William III's banker, and was knighted for his services as army contractor, found it worth while, in the next reign, to put an annual tip of several thousands of pounds into the ever gaping pockets of Marlborough, in return for which he received first-hand information that probably enabled him to recover it many times over by dealings on 'Change. The next in succession is Sir Manasseh Lopez, and following him Sampson Gideon, a financier who rendered invaluable services to the governments of Walpole and the Pelhams, and who is described in the Dictionary of National Biography as "a man of remarkable amiability and generosity".

By William III's reign the mechanism of modern credit had been thoroughly established, and lists showing the prices of shares began to be regularly published. It was, in fact, a time of brisk and vigorous business enterprise, and every sort of scheme was floated for the possible or impossible employment of capital. One of the most familiar figures of the time is the projector or, as we should now call him, the company promoter. He is described by Samuel Butler, in the reign of Charles II, as "an artist of plots, designs and expedients to find out money, as others hide it, where nobody would look for it . . . The chiefest and most useful part of his talent consists in quacking and lying, which he calls answering of objections and convincing the ignorant". Defoe, writing in the year of Queen Anne's accession, with the avowed object of exposing such fraudulent practices, takes a more balanced view of the situation, and admits; that among a multitude of sharks honest projectors of genuine schemes are also to be found.

The fact is that speculation and stock-jobbing—the word had just come in—was as yet a pioneer and little understood industry, and the Exchange attracted as many shady adventurers as the Australian gold mines of the nineteenth century. It is only when a profession is established and its functions understood that it is

¹ Sombart, *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, p. 51.

possible for a tradition of honour to grow up within it such as pervades the modern bar or stock-exchange. Already some of the artifices, not necessarily dishonourable, of modern speculations were becoming familiar. Dr. Scott¹ tells us how bear operations and options had already become common, and how Sir Josiah Child and his son Francis had a regular express service from the South of Ireland to give them first warning of news from India. The Jew Medina, as we saw, went one better when he bribed the Commander-in-Chief at the front to act as his newsagent, and his compatriot, Sir Manasseh Lopez, succeeded in netting a prodigious haul out of a false report of the Queen's death. Nor were the Gentiles much behind in commercial "slimness", for when the Old East India Company was fighting for its life against the New, it deliberately engineered a run on the Bank as a move in the game.

All this time the structure of British business was being built up at a prodigious rate. This will be evident if we study Dr. Scott's² figures of the capital invested in joint stock companies. About the time of Elizabeth's accession this was somewhere in the neighbourhood of ten thousand pounds. By 1695 the figure had risen to five millions—in a dozen of years the five millions had become ten, ten years later still it had risen to twenty, and only three years later, at the height of the South Sea Boom, the nominal capital invested in these concerns stood at the prodigious total of fifty millions, not much less than a seventh of the total estimated wealth of the country.

It must not be imagined that the progress was even. On the contrary, it involved a series of more or less violent fluctuations—booms and depressions following on one another's heels. The drain on the national resources caused by William III's struggle with Louis XIV showed itself in a debt of seventeen and a half millions, adverse exchanges, the suspension of cash payments by the Bank and the necessity for a thorough recoinage. Towards the end of the Spanish Succession War there was another heavy slump, which was only ended by the prospect of peace and the Tory scheme for paying off the debt.

Nevertheless the figures we have cited tell their own tale of rapidly increasing commercial activity. There is good reason to believe that towards the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, both England and France had temporarily

¹ *Joint Stock Companies*, vol. i, p. 358.

² *Op. cit.*, vol. i, *passim*.

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succeeded in realizing the ideal at which they so sedulously aimed, and were importing more of the precious metals than they paid out. This theory was first put forward by Herr Wernher Sombart,¹ and it certainly seems borne out by Dr. Scott's figures, so far as England is concerned. The three sources of this monetary stream, according to Herr Sombart, were the immigration of rich Huguenots, many of whom brought their fortunes with them, the influx of Dutch and Portuguese Jews, and the "favourable" balance of the export trade. This last item Herr Sombart attributes to the Dutch trade, the Spanish trade after our differential advantages under the treaty of Utrecht (which were perhaps not so considerable as might have been expected), and the famous Methuen Treaty concluded with Portugal in 1703, which acted as a pipe by which the coin of Brazil, at the rate—so it was computed—of fifty thousand pounds weekly, was passed to England.

Now the result of any large increase of money is to create a demand for its profitable employment, and hence to provide a golden opportunity for the speculator and company promoter. And it is certain, whether or not we go the whole way with Herr Sombart in his explanation, that this period witnessed a fever of speculative activity without example or precedent, culminating in France in the Mississippi Bank ramp, and in England in the boom and crash of 1720.

The history of this extraordinary outburst of human folly is complicated in the extreme, but it was the product of one simple fallacy on the subject of credit. The discovery of how to conduct vast transactions, with no more formality than the transfer of a little written or printed paper, made men rush to the conclusion that they had discovered a new talisman. But whatever may be true of religion, there is nothing more certain in business transactions than this, that faith, or credit, without works, is dead. Wealth cannot be called into being by a stroke of the pen, and credit that is not based on solid foundations of wealth and industry is a bluff, which is bound sooner or later to be called.

It is the neglect of this truth that accounts for the collapse of Law's ~~Vast~~ schemes in France and of the contemporary South Sea Bubble in England. John Law was a clever Scottish adventurer, but a born plunger and megalomaniac, who succeeded in getting control of French finance shortly after the death of Louis XIV. He had dazzling schemes for relieving France of the crushing debt

¹ *The Quintessence of Capitalism*, p. 312 et seq.

bequeathed her by "*le Roi Soleil's*" wars. Unfortunately the sole foundation of this splendid superstructure was the profit to be derived by trading with the new colony of Louisiana, which happened to yield no dividends worth speaking of. The greatness of the crash was proportioned to the blindness of French faith in Law's promises.

In England the same ignorance and credulity led to very similar results. When the Tories came in, after the Sacheverell affair, they found themselves saddled with a large and unpopular Whig debt, mostly in the form of annuities. This, despite the fears of the city, they did not dare repudiate, but the shallow intelligence of Oxford was struck by the possibility of paying it off by a smart piece of finesse. In common with many of his countrymen, he saw visions of unlimited wealth to be derived from the trade with Spanish America, and accordingly turned to the South Sea Company, which was formed for trading with all lands lying between the Orinoco and Tierra del Fuego. The bargain he struck was to the effect that the company, in return for certain privileges, should take over part of the debt, for which the government would pay them a rate of interest lower than that which they would themselves have to pay to the annuitants, and decreasing after a term of years. It was the company's hope to get the creditors to exchange their annuities for the company's stock, which was deliberately inflated to an enormous premium, so that a hundred pound share would extinguish an annuity capitalized, say, at three hundred. In this they were, at first, conspicuously successful.

The Tory ascendancy died with Queen Anne, but the scheme had fired the public imagination, and not only the Whig ministers, but even the King took it up. The means by which the ramp was maintained were complex, but the principle was the same. The company would make itself responsible for first a part and then a whole of the national debt it ; would not only do this on most disadvantageous terms, but it was even ready to offer a bribe to the government of over seven millions for the privilege of obtaining them. Nor was this by any means the only bribe, for the crash, when it came, exposed a system of corruption extending even to Cabinet ministers. The whole scheme was, in fact, a gigantic swindle, for the profits of the Spanish trade were insignificant in comparison with the company's promises and liabilities, and were still further reduced by the war that broke out with Spain in 1717. Those who kept the thing going must have calculated on getting safely out with their plunder before the crash came.

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The shares went up and up, until in 1720 they topped the thousand. Meanwhile a veritable madness had seized the nation. Men who had bought up South Sea Stock trebled and quadrupled their capital before they sold out; cool, experienced hands like the Duke of Marlborough and Sir Robert Walpole made sensational profits; a way had been discovered of getting rich quick, and everybody who had money to dispose of, many with lands to sell or mortgage, rushed into the market to plunge with it into any scheme that offered the prospect of quick returns. Companies of any and every sort were formed to meet the demand, companies for fattening hogs, for importing jackasses from Spain, for furnishing funerals, for extracting oil from radishes, and one even for an object not to be declared, but which was soon, on the disappearance of the promoter, too painfully apparent. A complete pack of cards was made with a different bubble company depicted on each of their fifty-two faces.

The pace was too killing to last. The South Sea Company, with shares at a thousand and dividends practically nil, could not, in any case, have lasted long. But it precipitated its own fall by taking legal steps to smash some of the lesser swindles. This was a fatal indiscretion, for it had the effect of shaking confidence. The shares, monstrously inflated, slumped with catastrophic rapidity; the credulous multitudes who had invested their all in South Sea and other bubble stock, found that their all had turned, as if by some black magic, into bits of unmarketable paper. A roar for vengeance went up that shook the throne, for George I had been governor of the company, and among those involved in corrupt practices were his hideous German lemans.

The government collapsed; the Chancellor of the Exchequer was expelled the House for "most notorious, dangerous and infamous corruption", one minister is believed to have committed suicide, and the two heads of the government were only acquitted by a majority of three. It was a fearful revelation of the depths to which political morality had sunk. Finally Sir Robert Walpole, whose section of the Whig party had, luckily for himself, been excluded from office, and who had done exceedingly well out of the ramp, was called in to clear up the mess. This he did with ingenuity and commonsense, remitting obligations to the government which there was never any prospect of getting paid, and recovering for the wretched shareholders some moiety of their vanished capital. It is satisfactory to record that the Directors, who had safely landed their gains before the crash came, found themselves compelled to

disgorge by an act of retrospective legislation, and their plunder was restored, as far as possible, to their victims.

So ended the first and greatest of commercial panics, and the system of credit, though still imperfectly understood, was never again, not even during the railway mania of 1847, made subject to such crude abuse. For good or ill, a credit economy had come to stay.

9

THE UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN

The period of transition between the Revolution and the Hanoverian succession was marked by events in Scotland and Ireland of a strangely contrasted nature. It would perhaps be an exaggerated but certainly a plausible statement that the best and worst events in our history were respectively the free Union with Scotland and the treacherous enslavement of Ireland effected by the Penal Code. The one brought a union of hearts so complete that it is difficult for anyone nowadays to imagine the possibility of separation, the other left a legacy of hatred and revenge that casts a shadow over the hopes not only of the British Commonwealth, but, to some extent, of civilization itself.

And yet, to all appearance, there was no reason why events should have taken such a different course in our two sister nationalities. When William III landed at Torbay, it would have been difficult to decide whether the sentiment of national independence burned more fiercely in Irish or in Scottish breasts. The Irishman certainly had the heavier tale of wrongs to recount, but the Scot was by no means without his own score against English aggression, and he had, what the Irishman had not, the proud consciousness of having maintained his independence of England at the sword's point. The sentiment of "Scots wha hae" was by no means the invention of Burns, but was as old, and older than, that minstrel of Bruce and Berty, John Barbour. There is little doubt that "with wisdom and Christianity, England could have forged a chain between herself and Ireland, as strong as that which now binds her to Scotland. But in her dealings with Ireland she has been neither wise nor Christian.

Why should have been this contrast between England's Scottish and Irish policies? Partly the cause may be sought in differences of temperament and natural sympathy, partly in the fact that whereas

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England was fain to bargain with Scotland, she had Ireland at her mercy.

The Lowland Scot had enough English or Northumbrian blood in his veins to give him a certain bond of understanding with his Southern neighbours. He was, almost of temperamental necessity, a Protestant, though a Protestant of a more logical and thorough type than the comparatively easy-going Anglican. He was energetic, efficient, commercial. But the Irish Celt has ever been a strange and incomprehensible being to the Englishman. His incontinence of imagination, his unreliability, the dream world in which he loves to take refuge, are things calculated to arouse suspicion and antipathy in the English mind. And, worst of all from the point of view of the seventeenth century Englishman, he was a Papist, perpetually on the *qui vive*, so it was supposed, to subject freeborn Englishmen to the yoke of any tyrant who might arise at Whitehall, and of the Triple Tyrant who was perpetually plotting death and torture from his fastness among the Seven Hills. As the most popular of all political songs made the Irishmen say :

“ Now de heretics all go down,
Lillibullero ! Bullen-a-la !
By Chrish and Saint Patrick de land's our own !
Lero, lero, etc.”

Perhaps the most unfortunate circumstance of all in our relations with Ireland was that there had never been anything remotely corresponding to an Irish Bannockburn. Massacres there had been and troublesome guerilla warfare, but no prominent instance in which an English army had taken a fair and square beating from Irishmen. The most deadly of all hatreds is one that is tinged with contempt, and such a hatred the English cherished for the “ wild Irish ” who were perpetually defeated and yet remained obstinately unconquered in spirit. It was different with the Scots, to whom the English Parliament had recently offered humiliating concessions in the hour of need, whose invasion of England had brought down the personal government of Charles I, and whose intervention had turned the scale in the first Civil War. And the Scots, it must be remembered, had intervened on what was, at least formally, the constitutional side, whereas an Irish army, whether raised by Strafford for Charles I, or Tyrconnel for James II, was the last resort of encroaching Royalty.

The English Revolution of 1689 had placed Scotland in a position of formidable independence. The Restoration had seen the Episcopal Church and Liturgy set up, and the terrible Presbyterian Kirk was

reduced, for the time, to the position of a proscribed and persecuted sect, like the various bodies of English dissenters. But the Church was too closely identified with Divine Right to be a safe support for a Parliamentary King, and William III had not long been on the throne before the Kirk was restored to its old predominance as the established Church of Scotland.

There followed a period during which it might have seemed that the two halves of the island were heading for inevitable separation. The Scottish Parliament had never before been so strong nor so assertive of its rights, and an intense and bitter nationalism was rising through the Lowlands. Such Cavalier loyalty as had centred round the House of Stuart was now all for the King over the seas, and the loyalty of the Scottish Whigs for a Dutch sovereign was but tepid. Perhaps the most original Scottish thinker of this time was a little dried-up laird, of unsullied honesty and atrocious temper, called Fletcher of Saltoun. This man had been of the most uncompromising Whiggism, he had come over to fight for the Duke of Monmouth against James II, and had had to retire from the expedition owing to his haste in pistolling a brother officer with whom he had had a difference of opinion over the use of a charger. When he came back to Scotland under the auspices of William III, it was not to support him or any other monarch, but to work for an independent Scottish republic, and he used the whole of his powerful influence to weaken the English connection.

But what was the determining motive of almost all politics of this time was not religion nor national sentiment, but the sheer covetousness of this world's goods. That motive had begun to affect Scotland as well as England, not altogether to her disadvantage, for it diverted her thoughts, to some extent at least, from the burning of witches in this world and souls in the next. The commercial situation provided the most powerful grievance of all against England. For Scotland was, after all, a separate nation, which happened to have the same King as her neighbour, and this situation England had no hesitation in exploiting to the full. Scotland was as yet a poor and backward country, her towns were small and her manufactures undeveloped, so that it was in the power of England to freeze her out by a policy of ruthless protection. By the Navigation Act Scotland was cut off from the lucrative colonial trade, and by the customs barrier from profitable intercourse with England.

The close of the century was marked by a commercial disaster which demonstrated once and for all how deadly to Scottish trade

was the jealousy of Englishmen, and what a handicap it was to the Scots to be ruled by one who was to all intents and purposes King of a hostile nation. The Bubble spirit which looked for immense returns from trade in distant seas, came to Scotland before it swept over France and England. A great Scottish company was to be formed, at first with the object of trading with the Indies, and the scanty capital of the Northern Kingdom was poured into a scheme so agreeable to national pride and private cupidity. But the Scottish adventurers found themselves headed off everywhere by English jealousy, and the influence of their own sovereign. When William had made it clear to the authorities at Hamburg, which the company had hoped to make its headquarters, that he not only discountenanced but was actively hostile to the scheme, it became evident that the Indies were barred to Scotland.

Then, in an evil hour, the projector, William Paterson, conceived the idea of planting a Scottish colony on the Isthmus of Darien, which he took to be the nodal point of the world's commerce. Scotland went mad over the project, the national canniness was thrown to the winds, the country was stripped bare in order to plant three successive expeditions on a pestilential swamp within the Spanish sphere of influence. Everything went wrong; English colonial governors displayed a brutal indifference to the wants and sufferings of these Scots, and at last the Spaniards, in overwhelming force, came and finished off what the fever had left. Few indeed of the adventurers returned home; Scotland had been bled white for no advantage whatever.

It was this Darien fiasco that brought matters to a head between England and Scotland. The Union of Crowns was evidently an impossible arrangement from the Scottish point of view, so long as it merely succeeded in saddling Scotland with a monarch actively hostile to her interests. The accession of Anne, though she was personally more agreeable to Scottish sentiment than her predecessor, did not ease the situation. The Scottish Parliament soon made it clear that on her death they had no intention of holding themselves bound to the Hanoverian Succession, and extorted the royal assent to an act which gave them the choice of any sovereign who would preserve Scotland's independence of England. It only needed the death of a by no means healthy woman to undo the work of the past century, and, in all probability, to revive the old Franco-Scottish alliance, which would certainly have had the effect of keeping England too busy at home to allow of her overseas expansion. Meanwhile,

Scottish nationalism, inflamed not only by the memory of Darien but by that of the massacre of Clan Macian at Glencoe, a typical incident of Highland warfare but one in which the English government was implicated, had risen to a pitch of unprecedented bitterness. An English merchant captain and two of his company were executed on a trumped-up charge of piracy for no better reason than that they were Englishmen. The prospects of Union might well have seemed hopeless.

But in this seemingly desperate situation statesmanship and good will triumphed as they have seldom triumphed in history. In spite of misunderstanding and legitimate grievances on both sides of the Border, the more sensible and far-sighted members of both nations saw to what a disaster they were drifting, and determined that if by any reasonable arrangement it could be avoided, that arrangement should be made. After all, the Protestant interest bound them together, if only the Scottish mind could be relieved from the fear of prelacy and an Anglicized Church, and Scotland would have much to gain if the doors of English and colonial trade were opened to her. Besides, Marlborough's victories were a glory in which Scottish sentiment would be proud to share, and did not raise the prestige of a French alliance in popular imagination.

The sins of the English Whigs, and they are many, may well be condoned in view of the wisdom and tact which they displayed in handling this supremely important question. Without any pretence of haggling, they aimed consistently and with clear purpose at arriving at a large and generous settlement by which the two nations could be bound not only formally, but in heart and spirit. Two strong teams of commissioners were appointed, consisting of the most distinguished men of each nation favourable to a settlement, and they accomplished their work in astonishingly short time and almost without friction.

The effect of what they did was to annihilate the Border in temporal matters, but to establish it, as long as Churches should endure, in things spiritual. They made the revolutionary discovery that men could get on very well together, and yet differ in their methods of worshipping God. When the traveller took the road northward from Berwick-on-Tweed, he passed from under the auspices of a parson to those of a minister, and found the change, at least on six days of the week, quite tolerable. Church and Kirk were, in fact, to gang their ain gaits and wallop their own niggers for the future.

But it might have seemed an impossible task, in the inflamed state of Scottish feeling, to induce an ancient Parliament to transform itself into an insignificant group of political hangers-on at Westminster. But Parliamentary institutions had never struck any deep roots into Scottish soil, nor had Parliament played the conspicuous rôle in Scotland that it had in England. It was only after the accession of William III that it became a serious debating assembly, and ceased to delegate its powers to a committee. Even then, it could not rival the influence of that democratic and intensely national body, the General Assembly of the Kirk.

The root of its failure is, we believe, to be found in the fact that English law, which is the life of English Parliamentary institutions, had failed to hold its own in Scotland. The Parliamentary instinct was not there, and the plant of constitutional development withered as it had done everywhere else under the blighting influence of Roman law. The Scottish mind was too logical to adapt itself to the tenacious cult of established right and precedent, and Messrs. Dicey and Rait¹ have shrewdly pointed out that patriotic Scots, such as Hume, Sir Walter Scott and Carlyle, have seldom displayed either sympathy with or comprehension of Parliamentary institutions. Scots have delighted to dwell on the romantic loyalty of chieftains to a sovereign or the dour faith that redeemed the narrowness of Presbyterianism, but few of them, unless, like Macaulay, they have been more or less Anglicized, could understand the veneration that Englishmen entertain for the name of Hampden.

It may truly be said that nothing in the life of the Scottish Parliament became it like the leaving it. Opposition to the treaty, as concluded by the Commissioners, was intense, and it was even stronger outside the walls. The balance in Parliament was held by a middle group nicknamed the "squadron volante", and these threw in their decisive weight on the treaty side. There were, of course, the usual riots by which disgruntled nationalism is wont to relieve its feelings, but the treaty was passed, never to be rescinded. Its full advantages were not immediately apparent; a number of Scottish merchants, taking the advantage of the transition to circumvent the English customs, managed to flood the market with cheap goods, and, what was more serious, the Scottish textile industry suffered gravely from the full blast of English competition. It was only after the generation that had made the treaty had passed away, that its positive advantages began to be reaped, and Scotland

¹ *Thoughts on the Scottish Union.*

was started on her career of industrial prosperity. Perhaps it was not the least of the benefits she derived that, by the appeal from the Scottish Court of Session to the English House of Lords, the influence of the English Common Law was again brought to bear on Scottish Jurisprudence.

10

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF IRELAND

It might seem incredible that the nation that so triumphantly solved the problem of its relations with Scotland should have failed so shamefully and completely in its dealings with Ireland. All that matters in that wretched story is briefly told. The Restoration had not, on the whole, been a bad time for Ireland. Expediency had impelled the triumphant Cavaliers to a settlement which left the Roundhead adventurers in possession of most of their ill-gotten lands, and a policy of ruthless greed was inaugurated in the steps which England took to kill by legislation the all-important Irish cattle trade. But Ireland had her woollen industry to fall back upon, and under the rule of Ormonde, one of the noblest Cavaliers of the old school, her religion, if not formally tolerated, was, except during the hysteria of the Popish plot, generally winked at.

It was, however, the Catholic James who ensured the ruin of Ireland. This time the Popish plot was a real one, and England knew it. The man whom James selected to carry out his policy and eventually made Lord Lieutenant under the title of Earl of Tyrconnel was a reckless Irish adventurer, whose brother, the Catholic Archbishop of Dublin, had died in jail during the scare of the plot. Tyrconnel went about his work of preparing the triumph of Rome with the thoroughness but not the discretion of a Strafford. The figure of the wild Irishman who was to appear in arms to subvert English liberty and religion now became a veritable bogey, and with the deposition of James, all shadow of pretence was thrown off. The first thing that Louis XIV, whose persecution of Huguenots was still fresh in the English mind, did, was to send James, with French aid, to establish himself in Ireland with a view to making this eventually a secure Catholic base for the reconquest of England.

Two things now happened exactly calculated to inflame English indignation against Ireland. A Parliament met in Dublin, composed almost wholly of Catholics, which, although it showed itself capable of both sense and tolerance, was carried away by an unhappy though

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easily understandable spirit of revenge. The whole settlement of land, to which, in the course of a generation, the country had shaken itself down, was reversed by a stroke of the pen, and an iniquitous and indiscriminate Act of Attainder was passed in which the lists of those ordered to return at once or suffer penalty of treason was not even promulgated. James grumbled that this had been rammed down his throat, and had enough honour left in him to reject a modest proposal of Louis's representative, the Comte D'Avaux, for the massacre of all Protestants in Ireland.

The second stimulant of English feeling was the siege of the Protestant garrison of Londonderry which, although the government was in no hurry to relieve it, focussed the attention of the English people by its sheer length and heroism, and in Ulster, ever since, has formed the basis of a veritable romance of Protestantism. Men who had no bowels for the wrongs and sufferings endured by Papists were profoundly moved when they heard how men of their own religion had kept on hoping against hope for relief to arrive, how the brutal enemy commander had driven poor Protestant countryfolk to starve under the walls in order to extort surrender, how the relieving ships had at last appeared, and how a cry of anguish had gone up from the garrison when one of them had grounded. And then followed a landing and an easy victory by William in person over a Irish army that sought, on the Boyne, to bar his southward march to Dublin, and a final battle of Aughrim, where the Irish, with victory in their grasp, fled in panic on the death of their French commander. English sentiment towards Ireland was, however unjustly, tinged with that cold ruthlessness that is born of contempt.

After Aughrim, the last hope of Ireland lay in the army which had taken refuge behind the walls of Limerick, a town which had already been distinguished by the bloody repulse of the Dutch King himself from before its walls. This time it was besieged by one of William's compatriots called Ginkell, and the situation was a critical one as, though the garrison did not know it, a strong French expedition was on its way to retrieve the situation. Ginkell wisely judged it best to end the war in Ireland by conceding terms to the Irish people as a whole, in return for the surrender of their army. The effect of this Treaty, about which there has been a good deal of not very creditable quibbling, is abundantly plain to any man of honour or impartiality, and it was that the Catholics should be restored to the position and rights they had held in the reign of Charles II. But feeling had been embittered beyond the point at which honour

counts in the affairs of nations, and to the everlasting shame of the English Parliament and nation, it was decided to regard the Treaty of Limerick as a scrap of paper, and the Irish as a conquered people to be stamped into the dust, plundered and persecuted, with a scientific thoroughness more worthy of the Old Testament Jews than of a Christian people.

The sickening story of the series of Acts known as the Penal Laws has been told so often that there is no need to do more than briefly allude to its more salient features. The Catholics were harassed and persecuted in every possible way. The law was turned into an instrument of minute injustice ; in almost every transaction of life the Catholic found the scales weighed against him ; he was not allowed to educate his children in his own religion ; by pretending to be a Protestant an undutiful son could make him a tenant for life ; if he died his children were torn away from their Catholic relations and handed over to a Protestant guardian ; should he own a horse any Protestant who liked could ride off on it by simply giving five pounds in exchange. All ecclesiastical dignitaries and regular priests of the Catholic religion were liable to transportation. The Catholic was, in fact, something worse than an outlaw, he was, if we may coin the expression, an anti-law. When we hear of the proverb that the laws of Ireland are made to be broken, we must remember how long the Irish people were governed by a law which would truly merit the censure, applied by the English to the old Brehon law : " A damnable law that is no law, hateful to God and man."

Such was the covetousness of English policy that, in its lust to smash every Irish industry except those directly serviceable to Britain, it had not even the consistency to keep its hands out of Protestant pockets. By suffocating one industry after another and by cutting off Irish trade from the colonies and from the East, Britain was pressing no less hard on her own Protestant garrison than on the Catholics. To crown all this stupidity, the religion of this garrison was frowned upon little less than that of the Catholics themselves. *Even the Toleration Act of 1689, by which the English Dissenters had obtained relief from the worst provisions of the Clarendon Code, was not extended to Ireland. As a consequence of these religious and material handicaps, sturdy non-conformists, in their thousands, emigrated abroad, and their descendants helped to stiffen that army of Washington which was to humble England's pride in the dust.

Ireland now entered upon a long period of misery. The Catholic peasantry, deprived of all incentive to profitable industry, sank into idleness and squalor, content for the most part to keep themselves alive on any terms whatever. The Catholic landowners, a dwindling minority with no security of tenure, tried to make quick profits on their land by turning it to pasture, and thus the hands that might have found employment in tillage were left idle. Recurrent famines swept over the island, one of them at least comparable to the Black Famine of 1849. Smuggling, now an honourable attempt to evade iniquitous laws, was practised on a vast scale; secret societies, murderous and cruel, were the natural products of such a soil. Gradually and unperceived, the last vestiges of the old Celtic culture flickered out; even the language began to fall into disuse.

And yet the Irish clung with a passive and unconscious heroism to their nationality, to their very soul. Perhaps the conquerors were not really anxious for conversions—a helot is for many purposes easier to deal with than a free man—but whether this was so or not, the Irish continued to support their priests, and in illegal hedge schools the old Irish love for learning found such satisfaction as it could. Emigration was not so common among them as among the Protestants except for one purpose, always dear to an Irishman, that of fighting. Gentlemen and peasant, they went abroad to France and, indeed, anywhere that military employment could be obtained. The population of Ireland at the time of the Revolution was something less than a million, and it is computed that, in the next sixty years, not far short of half this number took service under the *fleur de lys*. It was these men who, with cries of revenge for the treachery of Limerick, charged home on the devoted English column at Fontenoy, few of whose members, it may safely be asserted, had ever heard of the treaty or its violation. But such is ever the logic of revenge, even of just revenge.

THE PASSING OF MYSTERY

When John Locke was acting as the first Lord Shaftesbury's philosophic mentor, a little party of friends assembled in the chambers allotted him by his patron at Exeter House. They had been discussing some subject without getting very much further, when Locke startled the company by the profound suggestion that before going on with this or any other discussion it would be as well to

take stock of their own understandings, in order to find out what the human mind was qualified to deal with, and how far its processes were valid as a criterion of truth. This resulted in Locke's jotting down some rough notes on the subject, out of which, taking his time and with characteristic caution, he built up, in the course of some twenty years, his most considerable philosophic treatise, the *Essay on the Human Understanding*.

That this should have been done at all was more important than Locke's way of doing it. The Whig philosopher was, in fact, carrying on to another stage the mental process begun at the Renaissance. The man-centred universe of the Middle Ages was still farther undermined, now that the godlike apprehension which had hitherto been taken more or less as a matter of course was itself called in question. The possibility that man might be looking at the world through distorted glasses, or that his ready-reckoner of logic might not even be applicable for the most important uses, was fraught with revolutionary possibilities. Not that Locke himself aspired to turn the Universe any more than the State inside out. In philosophy as well as in politics he was a typical Whig, respectable, compromising, non-committal. He had an aversion that was perhaps constitutional from pushing any train of thought to its logical conclusion, and thus he was continually blinding his eyes to consequences that bolder spirits were quick enough to see, and accept.

No useful purpose would be served, nowadays, by following Locke in his distinctions between primary and secondary qualities of objects, or between sensation and reflection, which is not sense but "very like it", as the causes of ideas. These flimsy barriers have long ago been swept away; they were beginning to disappear even during the philosopher's lifetime. The impetus that Locke had given to thought was scarcely affected by Locke's own efforts to check it. And he occupies a position whose importance can hardly be overestimated, representing as he does the culmination of one movement and the beginning of another. For he gathers up into his philosophy the spirit which had found expression in the Royal Society during the last half of the seventeenth century, and he may truly be described as the father of that French "Enlightenment" which was to transform the eighteenth. For the French mind has nothing of the Whig in it, and its clear-cut logic made short work of Locke's respectabilities. To Condillac, the psychologist, there was no nonsense about something "very like" sense as a secondary

cause of ideas; knowledge was sense and nothing else, and the human mind a machine for registering sense impressions. As one of the idealogues of Napoleon's day put it, "To think is to feel."

With the passing of Locke and Newton the leadership of the world's thought, as far as any definite meaning can be attached to so vague an expression, passes to French minds. The almost sacred enthusiasm which fired the little group assembled in Gresham College burns dim indeed during the cold times of Walpole and the German Kings. It is, however, a matter of indifference that where one plants another should water, provided that flower and fruit appear in due season, for the glory and benison not of this man or nation, but of all mankind.

It was not only in France that men were quick to convert Locke's Whig philosophy into the most drastic of Radicalism. However bold he might be in his suggestions, Locke had never wavered in a species of cold devoutness peculiarly his own. He was careful to reason himself into the certainty of what he called a God, but which the plain man would be rather inclined to characterize as the Supreme Conclusion of the mathematics. For all his tolerance he would have persecuted anyone who, not believing in this God, refused to be so great a liar as to say he did. He was also ready to swallow revelation and the Church, and, like Newton, he could drive an edifying pen along scriptural paths.

But there was a young literary freelance called Toland, who, being an Irishman, had less relish for the respectabilities of the mind, and proceeded to deduce consequences from Locke's speculations which proved exceedingly shocking to Locke, who hastened to repudiate any connection with so inconvenient a disciple. Locke had, however, himself written a treatise with the significant title *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, and Toland was only following with somewhat greater freedom the same line of argument when he produced a small volume with the following long title:

"Christianity not mysterious, or a treatise showing that there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to reason or above it: and that no Christian doctrine can be properly called a mystery."

The conclusion from which the Whig philosopher had tactfully receded was thus proclaimed by the Irish freelance in all its naked impiety. To the Caesar of reason to which Locke had appealed, Christianity must go. It was, in fact, a theory of nature and conduct like any other theory, and might be right or wrong—Toland had at least enough prudence to allow it to be right. To him God was a

spirit and to be worshipped in spirit, and not with mysteries and priestly ceremonial, about the pagan origin of which he shrewdly anticipated the conclusions of modern criticism, though without the modern critic's wealth of evidence.

The ecclesiastical doves were fairly fluttered by this daring assault, and official Christianity could find no better way of repudiating the jurisdiction of reason than by persecuting the man who appealed to it. His book was consigned to the flames by the verdict of a jury, who modestly confessed that they could not understand a word of it, and therefore prudently concluded that it must be something extremely dangerous. Pulpits were furiously belaboured by their outraged occupants, until it became inadvisable for respectable folk to be seen conversing with Toland in the streets. He was obliged to flee from his native Ireland, a triumph for the Church militant on which pious Doctor South comments to the Archbishop of Dublin in the following terms :

"Your Parliament presently sent him packing, and without the help of a *fagot*, soon made the Kingdom *too hot* for him."

This incorrigible Irishman, whose affection for orthodoxy strangely failed to be increased by such methods of persuasion, actually throve on the advertisement that such attentions procured for his subsequent publications.

Toland is the first and perhaps the most incisive of a group of thinkers whose activities extend over about half a century, and are known by the name of Deists. Their views were not wholly original even in England, for they had been anticipated to some extent by that very gallant Jacobean gentleman, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, nor were they by any means a united band like the Tractarians of the nineteenth century. Their general tendency was to substitute a natural for a revealed religion, to cut away from Christianity one after the other all its supernatural props, and to leave only a vague entity called God, which somehow or other contrived to weigh down the scales on the side of righteousness. "Christianity as old as the Creation," the title of a work by Tindal which came to be known as the *Bible in Deism*, is perhaps the best concise summary of its principles.

The attack on orthodoxy was made from all sorts of angles. Anthony Collins set himself to demolish the argument founded on the miraculous fulfilment of prophecy ; William Wollaston poured irreverent ridicule on the alleged Gospel miracles ; Thomas Morgan showed a Voltairean disposition to question the morality of the Old

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Testament ; Peter Annet turned the searchlight of criticism on to the resurrection itself. And yet Deism must, on the whole, be acknowledged to have failed. Towards the middle of the eighteenth century it had become a spent force, and as its protagonists died off they left no one to carry on their work. In 1790 Burke could write of them, in the spirit of an advocate, but not altogether without justice :

“ They repose in lasting oblivion. Who, born within the last forty years, has read one word of Collins, and Toland, and Tindal, and Chubb, and Morgan, and that whole race who called themselves Freethinkers ? Who now reads Bolingbroke ? Who ever rend him through ? Ask the booksellers of London what is become of all these lights of the world.”

The true explanation of this failure would, however, have scarcely been palatable to that great opponent of all revolution, political or religious. For the weakness of the Deists consisted less in their having gone too far, than in their having not gone far enough for their own purpose. For, one and all, they were anxious to make believe that they were running with the hare of orthodoxy at the same time that they were hunting with the hounds of freethought. For this it is hard to blame them. The law was still terribly severe upon freethought, and in 1698 was reinforced by a statute specially directed at the new subversive doctrines, and imposing a penalty of three years' imprisonment on a second offence. Thus a direct premium was put not upon belief, but dishonesty, and the Deists were reduced to proving that in spite of appearances they were really the most respectable Christians of all, and that their criticism proceeded out of a pure love of Christianity. There is no doubt that some of them, at least, were sincere in their professions, if only from a subconscious bias in favour of the things most appertaining to their temporal peace.

The work of our Deists was, to a large extent, unnecessary, since the French thinkers of the *Éclaircissement* were destined to do it so much more thoroughly. We could produce no such drastic rationalists as Diderot and his group of encyclopaedists, no such ruthless criticism as that of Voltaire, no psychology so uncompromisingly materialist as that of Helvetius and Condillac.

The age of Queen Anne was, on the whole, one of boundless self-complacency. The English navy ruled the seas unchallenged,

the army was a partaker in victories the like of which had never been heard of since Agincourt, money was accumulating in almost unhealthy profusion. And it seemed as if a new age of light and reason had already dawned to which every other age was, by comparison, barbarous. Literature was honoured as never before; statesmen did not disdain to solicit the friendship of authors, and a literary dictator, like Addison, might aspire to the hand of a Countess. The coffee house had become a place where ideas were freely exchanged and where intellectual cliques might foregather. A new type of periodical, represented by the *Tatler* and *Spectator*, diffused an atmosphere of enlightened civility, and the art of journalism, fraught with such vast and dangerous potentialities, found its first and most brilliant exponent in Daniel Defoe, whose nimble pen was at the service of any cause that it paid him to write up.

There is an unmistakable tendency among the men of this time to look upon themselves, their country, and their age, and pronounce all three very good. This is the serious message that lies beneath the delightful insouciance of Pope's *Rape of the Lock*, his smile is one of conscious superiority, and the humour lies in the incongruity of modern polite activities being described in terms suitable to a ruder and less polished state of civilization. Even Homer, before he can be made acceptable to this society, must have his native roughness smoothed away and be forced to appear in a garb of neatly rhymed and scanned iambs, for all the world as if he were a Red Indian chief frilled and bewigged for a royal levée.

We can perhaps best realize what manner of gentlemen and ladies flourished at the beginning of the polite century from a study of their tombs. They are veritable monuments of self-importance, often dwarfing everything else in the church. There they stand, with perhaps an urn or a skull between them, on the one side a portentous big-wig, on the other his lady, both on their eternal dignity, and without the least attempt to look Christian or even amiable. They lived respected, as you are very likely informed, and provided you keep up that respect for their effigies, you are welcome to speculate that there must have been very disagreeable old gentlemen on the earth in those days. "And why, pray," they seem to reply, "should we condescend to be anything else for your benefit?"

The very church is expected to accommodate itself to the "Family". What once have been the chapels of saints are now

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reserved for the squire and his party. In West Peckham Church, in the Maidstone district, you will see how the North East chapel has been transformed for the benefit of the great house hard by, shut off with delicately carved woodwork, and provided with curtains that could be drawn during the sermon, and under cover of which the squire could compose himself to sleep, by his own fire or, alternatively, make an unperceived escape by a thoughtfully provided private door.

Perhaps the philosopher who most perfectly expresses the feeling of polite London Society in this so-called Augustan age is the third Earl of Shaftesbury, a grandson of Charles II's most formidable adversary, the founder of the title. Even had his talents inclined that way, the grandson would have found no scope for the close designs and desperate expedients by which the grandfather had earned the name of Achitophel. The cause of the oligarchy against the Crown had triumphed; the rich magnates, of whom the third Shaftesbury was one, had entered into the possession of the kingdom, and like Leo X with the Papacy, they had only to enjoy it.

Accordingly we find in Shaftesbury the urbane self-assurance of a class whose privilege it is to give the law not only in the State but in the realms of intellect. Not unnaturally he anticipates the conviction of Doctor Pangloss that all is for the best of all possible worlds—from the point of view of himself and his fellow-magnates. There was something to be said for this. The culture that he expounds in a series of lucid and never tedious essays is that of the great gentleman, and it must be admitted that he, at least, gives no encouragement to British insularity, reminding his countrymen that they have still a long way to travel before they have shed their native rudeness. But Shaftesbury has no doubts whatever that to him and to other people of equally refined taste the line between rudeness and culture is fixed and known.

"One who aspires to the character of a man of breeding and politeness is careful to form his judgments of arts and sciences upon right models of perfection. If he travels to Rome, he inquires which are the truest pieces of architecture, the best remains of statues, the best paintings of a Raphael or a Caraccio. However antiquated, rough or dismal they may appear to him at first sight, he resolves to view them over and over, till he has brought himself to relish them, and finds their hidden graces and perfections" . . . Caraccio !

The cultured man will, however, resolutely deny himself the enjoyment of anything that hails from India or Japan, or is executed

in the French or the Flemish style. And if anyone is weak enough to find pleasure in a nankeen vase or to prefer a Rubens to a Caraccio, he must reflect on the dangers of forfeiting forever his good relish.

"The art itself," remarks his Lordship sapiently, "is severe, the rules rigid."

Shaftesbury only illustrates the disposition that is common to most English writers of his time, to regard their culture as something final and almost static. The world, or at least the only part of it that counted, had ceased to be barbarous, and its scorn of the past was only tempered by the still powerful influence of Spenser, of Shakespeare, of Milton, and even of Chaucer, about whom Dryden had written discerningly, and who appeared in editions of 1687 and 1721. But these mitigations did not alter the tendency of Augustan England to regard its polish as the final achievement of civilization. The figure of Addison dispensing laws to his little senate and politely attentive to his own applause is symbolic of his age.

This intellectual and aesthetic pride constituted a danger to religion more deadly by far than the most searching criticisms of the Deists. Shaftesbury himself has too much good taste to denounce beliefs that he has too much good sense to take very seriously. He calmly suggests that the Jews would have been better advised had they substituted a little good-natured raillery for the clumsy expedient of crucifixion. Any form of too violent emotion, of enthusiasm—to use a favourite expression of that time—was scouted as a mark of ill-breeding. The wits who assembled in the coffee houses knew better than to give themselves away by exposing their emotions, as the Elizabethans had done. It is not surprising that the finer emotions soon began to perish by atrophy. A deadly blight descended upon poetry; the serious drama expired in the sonorous ranting of Addison's *Cato*. ("O liberty! O virtue! O my country!"), and irreligion became the fashionable talk of men who were too polite to care very much whether they were saved or damned.

How thin was the veneer of this culture it is hardly necessary to remark. Charming as it was in many of its manifestations, it was confined almost exclusively to London; in the country districts there were squires who could only read with difficulty and whose language was a hardly intelligible dialect. Witches had not yet ceased to ply their unholy activities, strange and even pre-Christian customs lingered on in remote districts, the devil had not ceased actively to haunt Dartmoor, and in the Isle of Man they still hunted

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the wren for Robin the Bobbin and Jack of the Tan on Christmas Eve. Even in London the streets were unsafe at night by reason of gangs of fashionable young gentlemen, who made it their sport to torture and gorge out the eyes of innocent passers-by, to roll women down hills in tubs, and to practice even more unpardonable outrages at their expense. Dean Swift has lifted the veil from the grossness of habits and conversation even of polite people in this age of self-conscious politeness.

Dean Swift, at any rate, was under no illusions about his age. He looked out upon it, with his clear and merciless vision, and found it about as bad as it could be. He was a man singularly deficient in constructive ability, and in the days of his greatest influence he did no more than abet the worst schemes of the sordid faction to which he had attached himself. But as a destructive critic he was deadly, and had a message for his age that might have turned the course of history had it only been understood.

His masterpiece, *Gulliver's Travels*, is an indictment, not only of his countrymen, but of the human race itself. He was appalled by the stupidity with which the powers and energies of mankind were turned into perverse or suicidal channels. The moral of the book is that of Goethe's Mephistopheles,

"Life somewhat better might content him
But for the heavenly light that thou hast lent him,
He calls it reason, thence his power's increased
To be far beastlier than any beast."

"The bulk of your natives," remarks the King of Brobdingnag to Gulliver "appear to me to be the most pernicious race of little odious vermin that Nature ever suffered to crawl upon the face of the earth."

It would have been well if, with the enormous increase of human power that was to come in the eighteenth century, men had been able to ask whether, with their habits of mind and notions of civilization, they were fit to receive it. Dean Swift would have answered, emphatically, that they were only providing themselves with the means of drifting to the devil at an accelerated pace; there must be a mental and spiritual as well as an Industrial Revolution if mankind was to survive. But by the time that the need became urgent, Dean Swift was dead, and Gulliver had passed, with Robinson Crusoe, into the category of amusing and instructive literature for the young. Mankind favoured the view of Shaftesbury, that civilization was on the whole an excellent thing, and God a genial power or potentate who could be trusted to make things come out right without undue fuss on the part of His creatures.

CHAPTER III

THE PROSE AGE

1

THE ECLIPSE OF ROYALTY

WE now pass from a period of transition and conflicting ideals to one of comparative stagnation, or at least of the calm which characterizes some broad and level reach of a river, which flows with a sure but hardly perceptible motion. The struggle with France was settled for a generation; that between Divine Right and oligarchy had ended with the complete triumph of the latter, and this not so much on the merits of the case, as owing to what we can only describe as an overwhelming run of bad luck against monarchy. The people themselves, if we may draw any conclusions from the difference between the London mobs of Sacheverell's and Strafford's times, had certainly not weakened in their partiality for their Sovereigns, but no throne can prosper unless its occupants conform to a certain standard of acceptability.

Since the Restoration England had been governed by what was practically a Frenchman, then by a Roman Catholic, next by a Dutchman, and after him by an uninspiring respectable housewife. But the nadir of monarchy was reached by the accession of a German, whose one merit was to have been a fairly capable commander, but who was a boor, a snob, and almost certainly a murderer, who cared nothing for the interests of his new Kingdom, to which he greatly preferred his Electorate, and who had to talk to his ministers in dog-Latin because he could not understand English.

With the accession of such a monarch as George I it was clear that all was over with monarchy, as monarchy had been understood by the Tudors and Stuarts. But so strongly had the tide been flowing against the Crown that it is at least doubtful whether one of Anne's sons, supposing him to have survived and to have been a King of ordinary parts, could have retrieved the situation. The work of the Revolution was inevitably to transfer the executive from the control of the Crown to that of a party, though neither William nor Anne had been content to recognize this as constitutional practice. Anne's

very triumph in getting rid of her Whigs had but substituted the rule of one faction for that of the other.

Even before her death the reins of power had been silently withdrawn from her hands. She had never ceased to preside at the meetings of that inner council of ministers which had developed within the old Privy Council, and over this even George I, with his dog-Latin, continued to preside. But where ministers are all of one way of thinking, or have interests in common of which the Sovereign does not partake, no power on earth can prevent those of them who dominate their party councils from meeting together in secret, and reducing the deliberations held in the Sovereign's presence to a pre-determined formality. Given a party ministry, government by a party committee, or, as we now call it, a cabinet, follows as inevitably as night follows day.

George I had come in practically as a Whig nominee, and so long as the only alternative was, as most Englishmen would have put it, a Frenchified Papist, it was inevitable that the Whig party should hold the reins of power. For King and people alike there was no practicable alternative to the rule of the Whig bosses, so long as these could hang together. But even so, we must beware, as always in dealing with English institutions, of too sweeping generalization. The Crown, though it had lost the key of the position in the control of its ministers, still retained a good deal of power and prestige. For when a party has obtained so sweeping a victory that its power is not seriously threatened from without, it is seldom that its members contrive to hang together very closely, and this may give the Crown an opportunity to throw in its weight in favour of this or that minister with decisive effect. The first split in the party brought into power that section of the Whigs which was headed by the two Lords, Sunderland and Stanhope, who followed the King to Hanover and humoured him in his Electoral policy. And even the great Sir Robert Walpole had reason to tremble at the advent of a new and probably unfriendly sovereign in George II, and was fain to avail himself of the friendly support of Queen Caroline. Not only the King, but even the King's mistress could exercise such influence as to make her favour a lucrative source of income.

Except for the coming into operation of the Act of Settlement, with its provisions reinforcing those of the Bill of Rights, the Crown retained its power formally unimpaired. In reality the Whig cause, that of an oligarchy though not altogether of a class, had triumphed so completely that the Crown had sunk to such unconsidered trifles

of power as the complaisance or disunion of its ministers might afford. For the first time, perhaps, in our history, the demise of a sovereign is an affair of such minor importance as hardly to ruffle the political surface. A dapper and strutting German has stepped into the shoes of a boorish and surly one—that is all. What royalty had been, and what it had become, is best realized from two pictures reproduced in Professor Pollard's *Evolution of Parliament*, each of a speech from the throne to the assembled Houses. In one Queen Elizabeth sits alone on a raised dais within whose sacred area not a Leicester nor a Burleigh dares to intrude; in the other little George II sits on the same dais, but this time quite a number of figures are crowding round the throne in the most familiar and matter-of-course way. So much for Divine Right !

It must not be imagined that this degradation of the Crown from its old dignity and prerogative was accepted as final by those who clung on to the Tory tradition. But the allegiance of the Tories was divided just where the sentiment of Divine Right was strongest, it centred not round a Hanoverian usurper, but round a legitimate sovereign of the Stuart line. Oxford, in particular, was a hotbed of Jacobite sentiment, eupeptic Fellows passed their port-glasses over the water-bottle when the King's health was proposed, and as Green informs us in his delightful *Oxford Studies*, "the 'freshman', who arrived at Oxford with a heart full of loyal traditions . . . saw the few Whigs outlawed, discountenanced, and jeered at, scouted by the society of their college, disqualified for preferment, visited with the utmost severity on the most trifling breach of discipline." All over the country there were squires who professed loyalty to James III, and in Lancashire, where they were particularly strong, some of them, both during the "fifteen" and the "forty-five", were ready to give their lives for the cause, but as a general rule, their professions were not to be taken much more seriously than Squire Western's desire to see "twenty-thousand honest Frenchmen" landed on our shores.

A more practical line was taken by Bolingbroke, who had bolted to France to escape the vengeance of the Whigs, had joined the Pretender and got snubbed and dismissed for his pains, and at last been permitted to return home through the tolerance of his opponents. He now saw clearly enough that the Tories, in supporting the Pretender, were putting their money on the wrong horse, and accordingly he sought to place a new and reconstructed Toryism at the service of any member of the House of Hanover with sense

enough to see its advantages. The sermon was preached, for want of a better disciple, to the emptiest and stupidest of them all, that Prince Frederick, of whom a lucky tennis-ball relieved the country.

Bolingbroke's idea was that the King should frankly accept the constitutional limitations imposed by the Revolution, and seek to establish his power on a basis of popular support. He saw in what the weakness of party government consisted. The ministry were the representatives of one faction, whereas the King, by virtue of his office, stood for the nation. Let the King, says Bolingbroke—who, by the way, had been a most unscrupulous party boss in the days of his power—let the King take full advantage of this position. Let him come forward as a patriot, let him resume his constitutional prerogative of choosing his ministers, and choose them solely for their fitness, without any regard for the calculations of party wire-pullers. Against such a King no party will be able to stand up, the business of government will be efficiently performed, prosperity and contentment will smile on the land, and the throne, secure in the support of the people, will be established more firmly than ever.

Bolingbroke was a bad man, but a very clear-sighted one, and his idea of a patriot King was one that had every chance of success, given a sovereign capable of carrying it out. For he aimed at bringing the practice of the constitution into line with its theory, of making it what such competent observers as Montesquieu and the founders of the United States constitution imagined it to be already. The King, under Bolingbroke's scheme, would have wielded much the same powers as an American President nowadays. But the patriot King, when he came, turned out to be a mere George III, who made at least enough of a success of the scheme to show its practicability, and incidentally managed to bring himself and his Kingdom to the brink of ruin.

2

OLIGARCHY IN THE SADDLE

Under the first two Georges the country was not governed by the King but by the Whigs, and during the twenty years that followed the pricking of the South Sea Bubble its real ruler was that massive and good-humoured Norfolk squire, Sir Robert Walpole. Never was man more representative of his time. Though he had no gleam of sentiment or poetry in his nature, though his moral standard was no more delicate than his conversation, there was yet

a largeness and sincerity about the man that stamps him authentically as a hero—a prose hero. He was greedy of power, so greedy that he would suffer no colleague of conspicuous ability alongside of him in the ministry; he was unscrupulous in retaining power, he was by no means above feathering his own nest, and yet under his auspices the nation was about as wisely and prosperously governed as the conditions of the time would allow.

Walpole was thoroughly imbued with the materialism of an age that measured a nation's welfare by the prosperity of its commerce. But this was at any rate an advance on the ideals of military glory and religious uniformity that had deluged Europe in blood to so little purpose. Walpole had no high-flown enthusiasm on the subject of national honour, and he was never more scathing than when he was denouncing the cant of patriotism in others. It did not greatly perturb him, even, when the Spaniards started shelling Gibraltar, he was not going to be hustled into an unprofitable war by such a trifle, though when the Ostend company of our dear ex-ally, the Emperor, threatened to become a serious competitor to our trade, he did certainly contemplate war as a last resort. By the sacred ideal of the European Balance of Power he was stolidly unmoved. A great war, that of the Polish Succession, in which the French got Lorraine and a Bourbon Naples, obviously called for our intervention. But Walpole contented himself with the reflection that this war had been the death of fifty thousand men, but not of one Englishman. The various people whose interest it was to unseat him might, and did, rave themselves hoarse about the minister's lack of patriotism, and his bartering away the fruits of the great Duke's victories.

Walpole was not the man to be frightened or bullied into departing from what seemed to him to be the dictates of commonsense. At the same time he was by no means disposed to make himself a martyr to what he conceived to be the ideally best policy. When he would have reformed our fiscal system by introducing free storage of goods in bonded warehouses at the ports, he gave way to the unscrupulous agitation that his enemies raised against it. "This dance will no further go," was his comment. He was even ready, when the time came, to be pushed into a war with Spain, of which he thoroughly disapproved, rather than resign office. If Parliament and the country chose to insist upon a bad policy, that was their own business, and he must make the best of a bad situation. A good steward is not bound to resign because his master issues foolish orders.

The cornerstone of Walpole's system was his devotion to the Protestant succession. This he was determined to maintain, whatever else happened, and it was not without reason that George II burst into tears on parting from him. It is not often that we can think of pathos in connection with Walpole, but there is surely no more touching incident than that of the fallen statesman, dying of an agonizing malady, and yet being driven up to London, when every bump of the wheel was torture, to advise his sovereign in the hour of crisis and rebellion. Walpole thoroughly realized that it was in the best interests of his cause to keep the country out of adventures and to allow her to increase steadily in material prosperity—the first two Georges could never be a source of inspiration, but their continuance on the throne might easily become indispensable. This was exactly what proved to be the verdict of public opinion when the Stuarts made their last desperate bid for the throne in 1745. The country had no affection for its German King, but it had no wish whatever to get rid of him.

Walpole, by what he did and what he refrained from doing, guided Britain through a period of peace and solid prosperity. He simplified the tariff, winked at colonial evasions of our fiscal restrictions and, Whig though he was, gratified the Tory squires by reducing the Land Tax. He had no taste for abstract principles; the Dissenters, for instance, who were one of the supports of the Whigs, had to be satisfied with their position of civil inferiority because Walpole did not believe in making trouble unnecessarily, but they were, in practice, left alone. He had no idea of going to the root of constitutional and social problems; of the causes that were already operating to drive the peasant off the land and squeeze out the yeomanry it is probable that he neither knew nor cared, still less did he anticipate the enormous change in human conditions that was to be brought about by the increase of mechanical power. The contest with France for dominion overseas, which was only in abeyance, never troubled his head; it was enough for him to keep up friendly relations through his entente with a kindred spirit, Cardinal Fleury. He was content, like the typical member of the stock exchange, to carry on till next settling day, without taking too much thought for the morrow.

His power did not long survive the peace he had kept. The jealousy which led him to get rid of any colleague at all likely to prove a rival, had driven the ablest politicians into an opposition made up of Jacobite Tories and Whigs of all shades, united by nothing but

their hatred of "Robin". The Queen's death had robbed him of his most valuable ally, and the Spanish war, into which he had been forced against his judgment and which he waged without heart, rendered his position plainly impossible. These were the straws on the surface, whose drift told of the spiritual tide that had begun to flow against him and that which he stood for. For discreditable and humiliating as was the whole agitation for a mercenary war against a weak opponent, we may detect in it the first stirrings of that great reaction, which, in its later manifestations, we know as Romantic, against a commonsense and prosaic way of life.

Englishmen were vaguely conscious of needing something more inspiring, more charged with colour and emotion, than the earth-bound practicality for which Walpole stood. As yet their strivings after the new ideal were lacking in depth and delicacy, the eighteenth century trying to put off its drab garments of practicality and clothe itself with passion was at first as clumsy as a bear trying to dance. An immense amount of windy bombast was expended on the subject of patriotism, and with the prudence that nearly always tempers such fervour, great care was taken to find a conveniently weak enemy, with enough riches to give patriotism some chance of paying its way. The plain fact of the matter was that the trade with Spanish America had never quite come up to expectations, and our worthy smugglers and slave-traders had a way of falling foul of the Spanish revenue officers. The outrage, that in such cases turns every non-combatant's heart to steel, was duly forthcoming. A certain Captain Jenkins, of somewhat doubtful antecedents, laid on the table of the House of Commons an ear which he alleged to be his own (according to some accounts this was safely nestling beneath his hair), and which he said had been cut off by some villainous Spaniard, though, according to another account, an English pillory had been the stage on which the tragedy had been enacted.

"I commended my soul to my God and my cause to my country," said Captain Jenkins, and a roar went up for loot and vengeance that not even Walpole could disregard.

But when Walpole had been driven from office—and he contrived, contrary to all expectation, to fall on his feet—matters were certainly not improved by the advent of the patriots to power. The Whigs, of course, continued to rule the roost, but the party was in a state of decomposition, and during the fifteen years following the fall of Walpole our political history is a record of personal intrigues between different magnates, whose principles were usually comprehended

in a desire for power and for the loaves and fishes of office. Never was there a time more completely lacking in ideals, seldom one in which the country was governed with such woeful insufficiency.

Of the making of books about these men and their doings there is no end, but their historical importance consists mainly in what they failed to understand and to do. While they were playing at being statesmen, the country was drifting. It is perhaps too early to speak of a prime minister in the modern sense, but of the four successive politicians who came to the head of affairs the first was the

" Old, dull, important lord,
Who at the longed-for money board
Sits first, but does not lead,"

and was called the Earl of Wilmington, but of whom not much else is worth remembering; the second was that laughing dilettante, who became Earl of Granville, and whose Hanoverian leanings and itch for Continental adventure ought to have landed our King and army in a pro-French Sedan on the Neckar; the third was Henry Pelham, a fairly competent bureaucrat of Walpole's school, and a stolid materialist; and lastly Pelham's brother, the Duke of Newcastle, whom no amount of historical whitewashing will depose from his pre-eminence as the most doddering and undignified nincompoop to whom the government of a great nation has ever been committed.

Newcastle's correspondence remains at the British Museum to damn him, with its ever-forthcoming fulsomeness, its muddle-headed failure to grasp the simplest point, and that peculiar ignobility for which there is no perfectly happy English word, but which is exactly hit off by Dante's "*basso*". If, however, Newcastle was amazed to discover that Cap Breton was an island, and was incapable even of understanding the advice for which he fawned on the Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, there was one branch of political art of which he was a past master. He was a matchless wirepuller; the lower and more dirty the task in hand, the more did his ability rise to meet it. Walpole was supposed—falsely—to have said that every man had his price, but this was so much the cornerstone of Newcastle's faith in human nature that he kept a tariff of his fellow politicians, with the price of every man's soul neatly docketed for use. And yet it is the one good thing we know about Newcastle that, by some strange paradox, he had not his own price. It was for his party and not his pocket that he prostituted honour and dignity. So far was he from making politics pay that he ended his career a comparatively poor Duke.

Government by oligarchy was now at its height; Parliament was a close corporation of rich men, many of them, if they were Commoners, the nominees of men still richer than themselves. The King was reduced to a cipher and the Pelhams brought him to heel when he showed some signs of independence in his choice of ministers, by threatening to resign in the hour of crisis, when the Highland clans and Prince Charlie were threatening London. Corruption and her twin sister incompetence resigned supreme. The Glorious Revolution was fully consummated, the whole effective power of the State was in the hands of Parliament, and the result was . . . Newcastle!

3

AN AGE OF ARTIFICE

Such an arbitrary division of time as that comprehended by this or that century might seem to be wholly valueless for historical purposes. And yet popular phraseology, in speaking of the eighteenth century, is referring to a phase of human development of unusual distinctness and importance. Naturally when we talk in this sense, we are not referring to any exact period of time, and if it were necessary to define it, we should take the eighteenth century as covering the years between the death of Louis XIV (or in England of Queen Anne) and the outbreak of the French Revolution. It is to this period that Carlyle is referring when he talks of the "swindler century". It is, in Europe, an epoch of much stability in domestic politics, of a vast superficial complacency, and of revolutionary activity beneath the surface. To regard it from another point of view, it falls between the age of the Grand Monarch and the triumph of the Romantic movement.

Of the outward and visible eighteenth century the true spiritual father was Louis XIV. Civilized Europe, from Lisbon to St. Petersburg, was trying to realize the ideal of culture and well-being that had had its birth at Versailles, and this in despite of the fact that the Versailles of Louis XIV had ceased to exist, and what had come into the place of its large and ceremonial magnificence was a court and a nobility in a state of luxurious decay, divorced from every kind of reality and posturing gracefully down the thickly carpeted path at whose end was the guillotine. But from the upper class of Europe, now at the zenith of its power and security, all these things were hidden. What Rome was to the medieval Christian, Versailles

was to the ladies and gentlemen of the eighteenth century, a spiritual centre, so far as the word "spiritual" can be used at all of that godless time.

Such a thing as religious sentiment, of any intensity, would have been highly improper in such a *milieu*. Here in England it was probably a sense of humour that prevented us from following the German precedent of representing Christ in a wig, but it was considered the height of praise to record on a lady's tomb that she was "pious without enthusiasm". Even that was more than could have been said for many of the comfortable Whig bishops who flourished under the aegis of Walpole.

Despite the fact that Christianity—*soi disant*—was everywhere the official religion, the eighteenth century spirit represented a veritable triumph of Antichrist. In intellectual and polite circles, Christianity was less a belief than a convenience, an excellent expedient for keeping the lower class as well as their betters in their proper places. The Deist Collins admitted that he sent his servants to Church in order that he himself might be neither robbed nor murdered, and Gibbon was only slightly accentuating the opinion of his time when he laid it down that all religions were equally true in the eyes of the people, equally false in the eyes of the philosopher, and equally useful in the eyes of the magistrate. Christianity at its best was a creed of human brotherhood and of equality in the sight of God, and we have seen with what a very real democracy it informed the feudalism of the Middle Ages. The eighteenth century ideal was, more or less unconsciously, a reversion to paganism. In France, where it achieved its purest expression, a gulf was fixed between the aristocrat and the *canaille*, and even the *bourgeoisie*, as profound, spiritually, as that between the Greek citizen and the Barbarian slave.

The privileged minority, which was all that counted in its own estimation, was aiming at the goal to which Aristotle had pointed, in so far as it existed in order to live well, though its conception of life's possibilities was anything but Grecian. Nature was, to the Greek, a thing to be developed and perfected; his very gods were transcendently human men, naked and unashamed. But to the exquisites of the eighteenth century, nature was the arch-enemy. Life was to be fashioned in accordance with an enlightened will, and the more consciously artificial it could be made, the more perfect it would become. Thus the eighteenth century had conceived of a conquest of life, a noble and necessary ideal in itself, but one which

it rendered impossible by the narrowness of its application and its perverse breach of continuity with nature.

When Louis XIV, after glancing at some pictures of Teniers, exclaimed: "*Enlevez moi ces grotesques!*" it was no blind Philistinism that impelled him. The spectacle of common people engaged in their common avocations really disgusted him as much as certain passages of Rabelais would disgust a modest woman of our own day. And Louis XIV was closer to reality than the men who came after him. His Versailles has a real if pompous dignity. The furniture of Boulle, though overloaded often with decoration, does not cease altogether to be furniture, like those Louis Quinze chairs whose distinguishing characteristic is "little ease", and those various articles of domestic uselessness whose motto might well be "*Noli me tangere*".¹ The delicious frivolity of Lancret's triflers in silk or Boucher's alabaster goddesses, the apple-green and Dubarry-rose vanities in Sèvres porcelain, the light jest with which even death is robbed of its sting and defeat of its disgrace—all these things testify to a life divorced and cut off from reality.

And there was cruelty in this trifling—the almost innocent insensibility to which the sufferings of those without the pale are as unreal, and much less interesting than things acted on the stage. France might starve without affecting one detail of the polite nothingness that was all in all to Versailles. One day a poor madman tried to stab Louis XV, and an afternoon's amusement was provided for the court by a programme of tortures, carefully arranged to correspond with those of Ravaillac, who had, long ago, murdered Henri IV. This afforded the ladies a touching opportunity of displaying the new humanity that was coming into fashion with the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Four horses were at last attached to the prisoner—he proved tough, the whip had to be used, and the ladies exclaimed, "*Oh, les pauvres chevaux! Les pauvres chevaux!*"

We are aware that this is but the outward and most conspicuous aspect of the eighteenth century, and that the French noblesse displayed a thoroughness of artificiality that no less logical upper class could rival. But all over Europe, except where the Turk still maintained the rule of the Crescent against the Cross, it was the hey-day of the privileged few, distinguished from the many over whom

¹ This aspect of Louis Quinze furniture has been dwelt on by March Phillipps in his *Works of Man*. This author, so far as I am aware, nowhere pointed out the significant contrast with English furniture.

they held sway by a sedulously inculcated convention of polite living. Outside the pale ignorance and brutality were rampant.

There are, of course, gaps in this exclusiveness, even in France. The eighteenth century was the golden age of the adventurer, the man with no principle save that of making a career by his brains. Such was Casanova, son of a Venetian actor, by turns gambler, *abbé*, scribbler, rake, and spy; such were those two arch-magicians, the obscure Italian and the Portuguese Jew who created themselves Counts Cagliostro and Saint Germain; such, in England, was Beau Nash, the uncrowned King of Bath, to whose behests the greatest in the land were fain to bow. And the eighteenth century, with that honour for individual talent which was one of its redeeming features, could find scope for the more enduring gifts of a Voltaire, a Diderot, a Johnson, a Reynolds. Its well-bred fastidiousness was at least more favourable to true genius than the indiscrimination of a twentieth century mob, debauched by cinema and journalesque.

Thus it came about that the eighteenth century fostered the seeds of its own ruin. Voltaire, the acid of whose criticism prepared the whole structure of an artificial society for collapse, Rousseau, whose disciple in action was to be Robespierre, all the humanists of the new enlightenment, were alternately persecuted and fêted; despots competed for their friendship, to them the noblest threw open their doors. When the crash came, when the Bastille had fallen, the pink of the noblesse furnished some of the most liberal advocates of reform. Such men may not have known what they did, they may have played with ideas as children with new toys, but at least it cannot be charged against them or their age that they were insensitive to ideas.

4

THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS

It is a comparatively easy task to appreciate the leading part played by France in the creation, and eventual overthrow, of that narrow and aristocratic social system by which the eighteenth century is most clearly distinguished. To describe the English attitude is a task of more difficulty, and to comprehend it in any clear cut generalization an impossibility. There is one sense in which England may be said to have succumbed, like the rest of Europe, to the spirit of the age. The polish of fashionable London and Bath may have been of somewhat inferior quality,¹ but was not essentially

different from that of Versailles. Throughout the century the oligarchy, which the "Glorious Revolution" had put into power, was tightening its grip on the nation; Parliament was becoming less and less representative and more and more autocratic. It would be possible for a one-sided critic to consider the whole century as one of steady decline from the comparatively generous ideals of Locke and Somers to those of the Eldonian Tories, from the rude prosperity of roast beef and plum pudding to the sordid misery of the new factories and despoiled countryside.

But there is another and perhaps more vital sense in which we may consider England's part in the eighteenth century to have been one of unacknowledged but steady resistance to the prevailing spirit, and the struggle with France to have been one not only of fleets and armies, but of ideas. For something England possessed that France had never had, and never desired to have, that which from Plantagenet times supplies the distinctively English element of our history, and runs through it like a guiding thread. This, which had kept the rule of the Tudors in legal bounds and had proved too strong for Stuart Divine Right, now prevented what Disraeli knew as the Venetian Oligarchy from achieving a final triumph, and England from going the way of Venice. For even the eighteenth century was not strong enough to extinguish the tough spirit of the Common Law which is the life of the Constitution, that obstinate clinging not to abstract justice, but to concrete rights and liberties as by law established.

The Whig Revolution may be regarded with equal truth in the light of a triumph for oligarchy and that of a triumph for law. No one will be tempted, at this distance of time, to regard English law in the eighteenth century as a conspicuously rational or humane system. Indeed, there is sometimes a temptation to regard it as an engine of brutal tyranny. Parliament, which had now got the whole government of the country under its control, sought to bring the law into harmony with its interests by constant legislation. Where there was but the most rudimentary government staff, much had to be done by statute that would now be a matter of administrative routine, and eighteenth century statutes were both complex and verbose. Too often they were savagely biassed in favour of the class that enacted them.

Thus was built up a Draconic criminal code, directed especially to the protection of property, and denouncing the penalty of death where nowadays a short term of imprisonment would meet the

severest requirements of justice. Batches of victims, men and women, regularly provided public entertainment by their last agonies, and even as late as 1816, when Romilly was moving the third reading of his bill to abolish the death penalty for shoplifting beyond the value of five shillings, one poor little fellow of nine was under sentence of death for this very offence. On the other hand, the law evinced a toleration that might be thought sympathetic towards crimes of brutality and violence. The blackest injustice passed unrebuked and almost unnoticed. Innocent men, acquitted at their trial, might be consigned to a living death because they could not pay the fees demanded by the ruffians who had charge of the prisons. Debtors for comparatively small sums were herded sometimes with common criminals till death or even starvation put an end to their miseries. And the justices of the peace, who exercised an almost despotic sway in their counties, were frequently petty tyrants, ignorant of any law whatever, and chiefly concerned with keeping the poor in a state of due submissiveness to their betters.

In view of these facts, it may seem paradoxical to speak of the Common Law as being in any sense a bulwark of English liberties. And yet there is good reason for affirming that now, as in Tudor times, it was the law that alone stood between England and despotism, nay more, that the spirit by which it was informed was that which enabled England to expand beyond her petty limits into a Commonwealth of Nations the like of which the world had never yet seen.

It is no insignificant fact that during this century England began to get the reputation, even amongst other peoples, of a home of ordered liberty. It is remarkable to what an extent the French humanists, who prepared the way for the Revolution, were influenced by English ideas. Against this tendency not even the animosity engendered by a great national struggle could prevail, and it was remarkable that when, in the middle of the century, France was suffering an unexampled series of defeats, intellectual circles in Paris were pervaded by a veritable *Anglomania*.

A young Frenchman, of humble birth and with the hypersensitive rebelliousness of spirit that is sometimes engendered in delicate children who grow up in mutual antipathy with their fathers, landed on our shores in the year 1726. The name by which he was to be known to posterity was Voltaire, and he came smarting under a sense of humiliating injustice. He had snubbed a young nobleman who had insulted him, for which he had been caned by that nobleman's

servants, and when he had had the impertinence to demand the satisfaction due to a gentleman, he had been clapped into the Bastille, without any pedantic nonsense about *Habeas Corpus*. When he had cooled his heels for six months, he was generously released, and told to clear out of Paris. Voltaire was too much of a Frenchman and too much imbued with the Latin tradition of administrative despotism, ever to sympathize with the stubborn individualism of English law and constitutional principles, but he could very keenly enjoy their effects, and appreciate the unwonted atmosphere of free speech and discussion in which he found himself.

Contrasting England with Rome, he observes that the fruit of civil war was slavery in the latter but liberty in the former. "The English nation," he says, "is the only one in the world that has managed to control the power of its Kings by resisting them, and which by repeated efforts has at last established that wise government where the prince, all-powerful for good, has his hands tied for evil; where the lords are great without insolence and without vassals; and where the people shares without confusion in the government." He adds yet higher praise, especially remarkable for that hard age, when he describes the English people as being not only jealous of their own liberties, but of those of others.

Voltaire is particularly struck by the just and equitable system of taxation in which everybody contributes according to his means, by the will of his elected representatives, and from which nobody is exempt. "The peasant," says Voltaire, who had seen a very different state of things in France, "has not his feet destroyed by wooden shoes, he eats white bread, he is well clothed, he has no fear of increasing the number of his stock nor of covering his roof with tiles, because his taxes would be raised next year."

This is high praise, and perhaps too rosy a picture, but Voltaire is one who is entitled to be listened to with respect, and his eulogy of English institutions is even surpassed by that of the witty and learned Montesquieu, who saw in our system of laws and government the ideal pattern for a free state, though he is careful to qualify this opinion by stipulating that it is to the theory and not necessarily the practical working that he refers. Montesquieu especially praises the separation of powers by which the executive, legislative, and judiciary bodies are kept independent, and a permanent check on each other. Any dabbler in Constitutional history is of course able to demonstrate that no such separation ever has existed or could exist in practice. But there is enough truth in Montesquieu's estimate

to give it value. The separation between executive and legislature had been a fact of the Constitution for two centuries until the Revolution, and the independence of the judiciary, if not so complete as Montesquieu thought it, was real enough to provide a strong bulwark for the liberty of the subject.

The clause in the Bill of Rights, by which judges were made practically irremovable, enormously strengthened the hands of the law not only against Kings, but against ministries. It enabled Chief Justice Pratt ¹ to defeat such an act of administrative tyranny as the issue of general warrants. And it also contributed to the formidable power exercised by judges of so interpreting the endless new statutes as to weave them harmoniously into the general fabric of the Common Law.

An even more valuable privilege, and one especially valued by Englishmen, was the independence of juries. Bushell's case had settled once and for all the right of juries to return any verdict they chose, and though so great a legal authority as Lord Mansfield was inclined to restrict their privileges in the matter of libel, giving the jury the right only to decide on the fact of publication and not on the alleged libellous nature of what was written, public opinion was dead against him and his decision was eventually reversed by statute. The hanging power of judges was likewise curtailed by juries persistently declaring the value of goods stolen, irrespective of the facts, as less than the fatal five shillings. Blackstone was only voicing the feeling of all Englishmen when he referred to the right of trial by jury as "the most transcendant privilege that any subject can enjoy or wish for".

The third pillar of liberty, as by law established, was the subject's freedom from arbitrary imprisonment as secured by the writ of *Habeas Corpus*, a process that had been defined and strengthened during the brief Whig triumph in the reign of Charles II. How jealously this safeguard was cherished is shown by the debates in Parliament in 1758 on a Bill to extend the application of the writ to men impressed for the services, which was indeed thrown out on the advice of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, but on the plea that the Bill as it stood was rather calculated to curtail than to advance the liberties of the subject.

It is evident that, with all its defects, the law was a very present bulwark of English liberties, and was a constant preventive of oligarchy from degenerating into sheer arbitrary despotism. The great

¹ Afterwards Lord Camden.

gild of lawyers possessed something of the power and independence that had belonged to the Church in the Middle Ages, and, like that Church, provided the easiest ladder which by a comparatively poor man, a Mansfield, an Eldon, a Thurlow, could rise to the highest dignity. The law might be honeycombed with abuses and clogged with delay, but it was at least the master of its own soul, and had a life and independence of its own. It was so little of a respecter of persons, that when Lord Ferrers brutally murdered his steward, his own peers, in spite of a very plausible defence on grounds of insanity, sent him to the gallows, and all his noble blood could not save him from the indignity of being dissected like any common footpad.

It is one of the paradoxes of this time that, despite every appearance to the contrary, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the great majority of Englishmen in their belief that they lived in a free country and under a constitution well-nigh perfect. Even fastidious aristocrats like Horace Walpole talk quite seriously about Whig principles of freedom, though posterity is rather tempted to talk of the Whig practice of corrupt oligarchy. The corruption and the oligarchy were all too genuine, but the freedom was genuine also, after its kind, and its citadel was the law.

Even at the height of the eighteenth century oligarchy, it produced some striking decisions in the English Lawcourts. It was Lord Northington who, reversing a previous decision by Lord Hardwicke, laid it down that as soon as a man sets foot on English ground he is free, and Lord Mansfield who declared the state of slavery to be so odious that nothing can support it but positive law. An even more remarkable decision of the same great lawyer was in the case of a Minorcan patriot who had sued General Mostyn, the English governor of the island, for damages, Noll Bluff, as the general was called, having taken upon himself to imprison and banish the poor man on the ground that patriotism, though admirable in an Englishman, would injure our commercial interests if it were encouraged in Minorcans. Lord Mansfield vindicated the principles of British justice, by ruling that an action for damages lay against this red-coated apostle of Empire.

The commons might be enclosed, the people degraded to pauperism and driven into factories worse than jails, but trial by jury and Habeas Corpus remained, or were only suspended as an avowedly temporary expedient, and in the darkest times of reaction the constitutional spirit of ordered liberty smouldered unquenched, with

hope for the future. And this strangely inconsistent spirit of liberty had an influence far beyond the land to its birth. It was the soul of the United States Constitution, it tempered and ennobled our rule in India, it gave its distinctive character to the British Commonwealth of Nations.

5

THE CULTURED MINORITY

The oligarchy of the eighteenth century was thus unable to conquer, however far it might drive below the surface, that which was most essential in the English spirit and Constitution. In spite of corruption, in spite of plunder, in spite of the steady depression of the poor man's status and prosperity, there is a fundamental difference between the elegant absentee landlords who courted the smiles of Pompadour and made it a point of honour to be past masters of court ceremonial, and the Whig aristocrats who wasted their sustenance in political intrigue and talked of the Bill of Rights and *Magna Charta*.

It is the comparatively small class, which constituted fashionable society in London and at Bath, which is most in the limelight at this time, and which reaped the richest fruits of the Revolution. It is they who set up a standard of culture modelled to a large extent on that of Versailles, who delighted in surroundings as elegant as their manners, whose patronage fostered the second great school of English portrait painting, and who built for themselves mansions of classical stateliness if not of classical chastity of proportion. Outside this class stretched the wide vista of the squirearchy, men who only came to town on occasional legal business and who remained to a large extent unaffected by urbane standards, and of the rich middle class who had scarcely, before the coming of the East India "nabobs", showed any notable disposition to break down the barriers of wealth and breeding.

If we want to realize what manner of folk were those who set the standard of taste and governed eighteenth century England, we should do well to visit the town in which their ideal of life is recorded for all time in fair, white stone. We refer, of course, to Bath, which was, so many centuries before, the fashionable centre of Roman Britain, and was only in the seventeenth century beginning to regain its old fame as a watering place, a large village of mean streets and villainous accommodation. It was Queen Anne whose patronage made Bath the centre of fashion it was to remain

throughout the eighteenth century, and the slopes that crowned the Avon were clothed with a new city fashioned by two architects of genius, the elder and younger Wood, and fostered by the generous enterprise of Ralph Allen, one of the best type of eighteenth century gentlemen, a man of business and a philanthropist, gifted in both capacities with something of the old Greek virtue of magnificence. Allen's beautifully placed mansion of Prior Park, the masterpiece of the elder Wood, with its conscious yet refined dignity of aspect, forms a fitting crown to the pride, pomp and circumstance that is Bath.

To walk about these streets and crescents and to surrender one's own spirit to their still living message, is to realize better than any history can teach, what the governing class aimed at, what it stood for, in the eighteenth century, and what it was that gave it an enduring quality that the French noblesse so conspicuously lacked. It is not an aspiring architecture, like Gothic, nor luxurious, like that of Venice in the decline, nor merely frivolous, like the Rue de Rivoli. There is in it something of aristocratic reserve and perhaps heaviness of imagination, that repels sympathy. The satisfaction it inspires is derived first and chiefly from its complete self-sufficiency, a confidence in its own strength and rightness that is too sure to be assertive. These lines and curves of buildings stand as firm on their foundations as the hill itself, with something, perhaps, of the old Roman *gravitas*. Men who could build thus may have had little poetry in their composition, and have been strangers to introspection, but they possessed a massive concentration of purpose that make the old baths of Aquae Sulis, recently discovered and to some extent restored, no inharmonious addition to the pleasure city of a later imperial race.

It is this impression that we everywhere derive from eighteenth century architecture before it loses its distinctive character under the softening influence of the Romantic movement. Everywhere we behold the same deliberate seriousness of purpose, the same feeling for the essentials of construction. It is not only to the mansions of the great that we have to go for proof of this. There is, significantly enough, practically no cottage architecture of the eighteenth century—the time was past when poor men could be provided with habitations possessing a soul of their own. But often, in some remote country parish, next to a Gothic church rich with the mingled aspirations of centuries, rises a four-square, red-brick parsonage, the very embodiment of comfortable, unpretentious worldliness.

Or walk with open eyes through some part of London, say Bloomsbury or Westminster, where it is still possible to study eighteenth century street architecture, and mark the same strength and the same almost stolid complacency.

The tradition of Wren lingered on, but Wren's delicacy of handling was no longer there. Indeed the almost religious cult of science for its own sake, the delight in the attainment of the maximum of result with the minimum of effort, which had fired the energies of the Royal Society, was dying down. The taste of the early Georgians was for massiveness; they delighted in bold, and even pompous effects. The man who carried this principle almost to the point of extravagance was Vanburgh, the designer of the Duke of Marlborough's Blenheim House, and for whom Pope composed the epitaph:

"Lie heavy on him, earth: for he
Laid many a heavy load on thee!"

Indeed it was the besetting sin of architecture, during the first half of the century, to run not only to weight but to pretentiousness, and this was aggravated by the too common tendency of noble amateurs to dictate to their servants the architects just what they should or should not do. As a result we get such petrified freaks as Mereworth Castle, in Kent, put up by Colin Campbell on the model of an Italian palazzo, admirably designed to shield the inmates from whatever rays of the winter sun might happen now and then to shine, and to keep the house cool and dark from the first September mists to the last spring frosts. That poor Campbell, when he had a free hand, could build well and truly, may be seen from the admirable parish church that he put up in the neighbouring village. But then the dignity of the Almighty was not a thing to be so strenuously insisted upon as that of the local lord.

James Gibbs, a Scotsman who studied in Italy, is the true successor of Wren, and indisputably the best of a group of fine architects. His masterpiece of ecclesiastical architecture, St. Martin's in the Fields, is a bold and aristocratic piece of work that looks scornfully on the mean little dome of the National Gallery beneath. Its massiveness is perhaps apt to lie a little heavy on the spirit and it is as innocent of religion as the pyramid which Wren's pupil, Hawksmoor, made instead of a steeple for St. George's, Bloomsbury, and crowned with the effigy of the far from saintly George I of England and Hanover. But to see the best of Gibbs's work it is necessary to go to one or other of the old Universities. The Radcliffe Library at Oxford, and, in a less ambitious style, the Fellows' Buildings in

King's College, Cambridge, show the eighteenth century spirit at its best, at once sincere and decorative.

It is in English furniture that the contrast between the English and French ideals is most plainly apparent. The English upper class loved to surround themselves with beautiful things, but they wished at the same time for something useful, for a visible adjustment of means to ends. It is only necessary to compare Chippendale furniture with what was being turned out at the same time for the Court of France. There is certainly a delicacy in Chippendale's work that was lacking in the somewhat ponderous Dutch style that came in with the Revolution ; he lived long enough to experiment in sham Gothic ; he tried his hand at every sort of style, but even at his most ornate he never ceased to be, first and foremost, an honest workman at his trade of cabinet maker—his furniture was for use first and for show afterwards.

About the men who ruled England at this time and set the standard of taste there is at least something of this spirit. Lord Chesterfield, who is sometimes taken to be the typical *flaneur* of society, and who introduced into our language the words *etiquette*, *friseur*, and *persiflage*, insisted on his son making himself acquainted with the politics of every country he passed through, and was himself a keen politician and an admirable Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. Horace Walpole, that born trifler and dilettante, nevertheless followed every move of the political game, as the nine volumes of his memoirs are enough to show. As for Newcastle, he would have been a fool in whatever country he had happened to be born, but we may reasonably conjecture that a French Newcastle would have been an altogether different kind of fool, one whose fortune and petty ingenuity would have been devoted to ends infinitely more trivial than that of advancing and maintaining the Whig cause. Corruption, lack of sympathy, brutal insensitiveness to ideals were rife enough among the English magnates of the eighteenth century to bring England to the brink of ruin, but even at their worst, these men were not wholly out of touch with reality nor incapable of solid work for their country.

So remote are we from the point of view of these men and their age that we are sometimes apt to overlook a good deal of solid but uninspiring virtue. We see the brutality everywhere rampant, we note the general coldness of sentiment and religion, and are apt to forget that the period following the Revolution may be said to have witnessed the rebirth of organized philanthropy in England.

It was for the most part a patronizing and lukewarm attempt of a class consciously superior to improve the conditions of a lower kind of human animal with which it owned little in common. Some of it took a form too officiously tyrannical to be dignified with the name of grandmotherly. Numbers of worthy persons were ready to placate the Almighty by persecuting any unfortunate barber or publican caught violating the taboo that He was supposed to have placed on the first day of the week, or by whipping the Magdalenes with whom He had been pleased to associate on earth, until, in the genial formula of the time, "their backs were bloody." These most Christian censors were largely drawn from the commercial and even the shopkeeper class.

And yet we should be displaying hardly less intolerance were we to dismiss the whole of this singularly prosaic philanthropy as a mere sham. In the solid and deliberate fashion of the time much was accomplished. The charity schools, for which collections were levied at various praying societies that sprang up, gave a smattering of education—one designed to give the pupils just enough knowledge to make them useful to their future employers—but they were a move in the right direction. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, a genuine effort to cope with the prevailing irreligion, was incorporated in 1701. Subscriptions were constantly being raised to alleviate every known form of human misery, and "every hand is open to contribute something". Between rival hospitals competition for funds was often acrimonious.¹

The noblest monument of eighteenth century charity is the Foundlings' Hospital, which was conceived in the great heart of Captain Coram, the bluff, kindly sailor who could so wisely provide for the needs of others and yet was so careless of his own affairs as at last to be reduced himself to subsisting on charity. For this Hogarth, another kindly soul, whose very pencil became a rod to chastise cruelty, painted some of his best pictures, while Handel conducted concerts and contributed an organ. There were not a few gentlemen of like spirit with Captain Coram. Edward Colston, whose name is to this day honoured in his native city of Bristol, died, full of years and good works, in 1721, a high Churchman and a Tory of the narrowest school, a little touchy, perhaps, about his dignity, but a friend of man on the most munificent scale. Perhaps the most moving work of contemporary sculpture is his recumbent effigy by Rysbrack in All Saints' Church, the strong features suffused

¹ Dr. Johnson in *The Idler*, no. iv.

with a light of beautiful pity. We have only to mention the names of James Oglethorpe, who founded Georgia to provide a refuge for poor imprisoned debtors, of Ralph Allen, the "man of Bath", who was as lordly in giving as in building, of John Kyrle, the "Man of Ross" in Herefordshire, whose philanthropy Pope has immortalized, of philosophic Bishop Berkeley, with his plan for making Bermuda a centre of religion and learning, and of Doctor Johnson himself, the representative Englishman of the century, whose charity to the most unprepossessing objects was not the least heroic trait of an heroic nature. There is no commoner sight in an English parish church than a board recording the various legacies to charitable objects bequeathed by men and women of this most prosaic time in our history.

Take it for all in all, the first half of the eighteenth century witnessed a certain slight but perceptible refinement of manners, at any rate in the upper class. Two judgments from such keen observers as Goldsmith and Johnson show that they neither of them had any doubt on this point. Goldsmith, in his life of Beau Nash, casually remarks concerning that adventurer's feat of riding naked through a village on a cow, that this, which was then thought a harmless frolic, would now be looked upon with detestation, while Johnson, relating, though with incredulity, the story of a revolting joke practised by some young rakes on the corpse of Dryden, remarks, in his most authoritative style :

"Supposing this story true, we may remark that the gradual change of manners, though imperceptible in the process, appears great when different times, and those not very distant, are compared. If at this time, a young drunken lord should interrupt the pompous regularity of a magnificent funeral, what would be the event, but that he should be jostled out of the way and compelled to be quiet ? If he should thrust himself into a house, he would be sent roughly away ; and, what is yet more to the honour of the present time, I believe that those, who had subscribed to the funeral of a man like Dryden, would not, for so small an accident, have withdrawn their contributions."

6

THE MOB

Refinement and even civilization, below this upper crust of gentility, were sadly to seek. All accounts concur in depicting this as a time of considerable material prosperity and almost unqualified

spiritual degradation among the poorer class of the community. We hear abundant talk about roast beef and plum-pudding, about the free-born Englishman, particularly as contrasted with the half starved, frog-eating, "French dog."

Whatever else the lower class Englishman may have been, he was, at any rate in the towns, endowed with an almost aggressive independence. Even the servant wenches seem, if we may trust Swift and Defoe, to have displayed a spirit calculated to horrify a mistress of to-day, and the levy of tips, or "vails", as they were called, was a form of blackmail that was the terror of poor visitors to great houses. It is from Fielding, himself a magistrate, that we derive the most vivid information concerning the ways of the mob which he styles, not without reason, the fourth estate of the realm.

From this acute, though certainly not sympathetic critic, we derive an impression of popular manners which is borne out by abundant contemporary testimony, and not least by the pictorial satire of Hogarth. The average man of the people seems to have been a coarse and aggressive rough, with a strong sense of his own independence and rights as an Englishman.

"It is very usual," says Fielding, "when a carter or drayman is civilly desired to make a little room, by moving out of the middle of the road, either to the right or the left, to hear the following answer:—'D—— your eyes! who are you? Is not the road, and be d——d to you, as free to me as to you?'"

St. James's Park, on a Sunday evening, was, for some reason, considered by the people to be their exclusive pleasance, and woe betide the unfortunate lady of fashion who presumed so far to transgress mob law as to promenade therein! The bargees and watermen on the Thames were a peculiarly aggressive fraternity, a smartly dressed person being liable to a deluge of Billingsgate and even to be deliberately run down. It was a bargee who called forth from Johnson his immortal retort:

"Your mother, under pretence of keeping a bawdy house, is a receiver of stolen goods."

Another engaging habit of the mob consisted in insulting funerals, that of George III's mother being hailed with delighted huzzas, and the room in which Lord Baltimore had lain in state being sacked the moment the body was removed.

One of the most potent factors in the degradation of the common people was the steady deterioration in the quality of their drink. In the sixteenth century everybody, from the Queen to the peasant,

had drunk good, full-bodied ale, not only a drink but a food, a builder of strong bodies and healthy minds. The seventeenth century had seen this largely replaced by beer, a less sustaining and gloomier beverage, whose effect was less to exalt than to dull the five wits of the drinker. But it was only in the reign of George I that gin began to be distilled in sufficient quantities to be a common beverage, and the effects were disastrous. The concoction acted as sheer poison both to the body and the mind, and led to a fearful increase of crime and misery. In vain Parliament endeavoured to check the mischief. In 1736 an act was passed, in the teeth of Walpole's opposition, to strangle the distilling trade by prohibitive duties, but the people did not choose to obey it, and when they had thoroughly made up their minds on a subject, it was generally useless to legislate. The act was evaded, and by the middle of the century the figures of yearly consumption had reached the appalling total of eleven million gallons.

Nothing is more remarkable, in fact, than the general atmosphere of lawlessness in which free Britons of this time revelled. Such a thing as an effective police force had not come into existence, nor does it seem to have occurred even to the ruling oligarchs to create one. In an old print of Billingsgate we see a picture of a highwayman riding through the market waving in triumph a stolen jewel box. Indeed these worthies not infrequently might be seen riding about with their followers in the light of open day. The elaborate duties that were imposed under the mercantile system were, to a large extent, evaded by organized smuggling, a trade which has acquired a certain posthumous halo of romance, but was really in the hands of ruffians who would stick at nothing in its pursuit. The fate of any unfortunate revenue officer or informer was frequently too horrible to contemplate. In one celebrated case two of these were entrapped at an inn, and were tortured to death—one of them after a confinement of some days—with a thoroughness worthy of Red Indians.

The brutality of the populace was, in fact, unrelieved by the least spark of human feeling. No amusement was so popular as that of watching an execution, and its piquancy was increased when the chaplain's last ministrations on the scaffold were accelerated by a shower of stones and mud. Before the Foundlings' Hospital was instituted, the spectacle of babies exposed to die in the streets was quite common, and only appeared extraordinary to so sensitive an observer as Captain Coram. To dumb animals the brutality

of man was something that even now we prefer not to think about, and we confess that our pleasure in turning over the leaves of a Hogarth is considerably marred by the fear of accidentally lighting on one horrible incident in the life of Tom Nero. Even Horace Walpole was revolted at a general massacre in 1760, under a panic fear of rabies, of the London dogs :

“ One drives over nothing but poor dead dogs ! The dear, good-natured, honest, sensible creatures ! Christ ! how can anybody hurt them ? Nobody but those Cherokees the English, who desire no better than to be haloo'd to blood : One day, Admiral Byng, the next, Lord George Sackville, and to-day, the poor dogs ! ”

Fielding was not exaggerating when he spoke of the mob as the fourth estate. The London mob, which had, for centuries, acted in an irregular way as the representative of English democracy, and had more than once succeeded in imposing its will on the constituted authorities, was still as formidable as ever. It was they who rallied to the support of Sacheverell, and fairly terrified the Whigs who wished to make an example of that singularly insignificant windbag ; it was they who called halt to Walpole at the height of his power, and even went so far as to molest him personally ; it was they who roared for the blood of Admiral Byng.

Disgruntled politicians appreciated the power of the fourth estate quite enough to see the advantage of stirring it up in their own interests. At the time of the Gin Act some Jacobite gentleman had the brilliant notion of distributing enough of the beverage to move the populace of London to rise against a dry and usurping government.

No one can fail to note the contrast between the power exercised by the mob during the reigns of the first two Georges, and its comparative impotence by the close of that of the third, when, in despite of misery and desperate resentment from end to end of the country, Castlereagh, Liverpool and their colleagues were easily able to suppress every attempt at a rising. The key to this problem is to be found in a sentence of Fielding's, which is remarkable for the clearness of its insight :

“ There are two sorts of persons of whom this fourth estate do yet stand in some awe, and whom consequently, they have in great abhorrence : these are a justice of peace and a soldier.”

It is, in fact, the red coat of the British regular soldier that has been the danger signal for King Mob. And that coat had come under an enduring suspicion since it had clothed the backs of the devout

gospellers who, under Cromwell's major-generals, had held the country under martial tyranny. The constant denunciations of standing armies, and exhortations to rely on the almost useless militia, sound strange enough in the mouths of the doughtiest patriots, and even of the elder Pitt at the beginning of his career. The poor regular, who had fought so gloriously under Marlborough and was to prove his worth at Fontenoy and Minden, was not in the most happy position. Treated like a slave, subjected to a ferocious and merciless discipline (though mild as judged by Russian or Prussian standards), he was the object of a good deal of obloquy among his fellow citizens. And such was the universal distrust of military tyranny that, in spite of the Riot Act, it was not till the reign of the third George that we have an instance of the troops firing on the people.

So that, for the greater part of the century, the Fourth Estate, as represented by the London mob, formed a powerful, though unrecognized check on the power of the oligarchy, as represented by Parliament. It cannot, however, be said that the use the people chose to make of this power showed them to have been in any way capable of governing themselves or the nation. There had been a time when they had been capable of enforcing a reasoned policy, as when they frightened Charles I into signing the death-warrant of Strafford, and gave their steady support to the Long Parliament until, in their Trained Bands, they turned out to the relief of Gloucester. But during the eighteenth century, their action—apart from that of the Lincoln mob who, in 1727, successfully rioted against the removal of the spires from the Western towers of their Cathedral¹—was generally merely blind and brutal. Bigotry was one of their strongest passions, and the obsession of the Popish Plot had created an evil precedent. It was a sad fall from Pym and the Bible to Divine Right and Sacheverell, and thence to No Popery and Lord George Gordon. In 1753 there swept over the country an epidemic of the strange mental disease known as Anti Semitism, the immediate cause of the outbreak being a modest Bill to permit the naturalization of Jews. Not in London only; but all over the country, people went mad with excitement and looking after dire things to come, and the Jews were in some strange way connected in the popular mind with the wooden shoes worn by the French peasants. "Do I not hate them, O Lord, that hate Thee?" wrote one devout Christian, while others

¹ In 1808, the restorers did succeed in perpetrating this vandalism, apparently with unbroken heads.

demonstrated their devotion to their Master by ostentatious pork banquets.

Walpole was a particular *bête noire* of the mob. The opposition to his Excise scheme, though nominally a demand for a free breakfast table, was much more of a pro-smuggling agitation, and four years later Demos was almost as powerfully exercised at the prospect of losing his gin. The agitation for a war with Spain, which set all the London bells ringing, was the jingoism inspired by the prospect of loot and a weak enemy.

It was at the beginning of George III's reign that mob violence rose to a climax. Lecky has collected several instances of the kind of thing that was becoming normal among the brutalized and gin-sodden populace of London. The theatres at Covent Garden and Drury Lane were wrecked because of an attempt to raise the price of seats; the coalheavers, who were on strike, besieged a certain Captain Green in his house for nine hours, eighteen of them being killed, and though the Captain got away when he had exhausted his ammunition, his sister was shortly afterwards dragged out of her house and murdered; the Spitalfields weavers also on strike, who had had two of their number hanged for destroying the looms of blacklegs, amused themselves for about two hours by stoning the informer to death; men exposed in the pillory were on more than one occasion killed by the ill-usage to which they were exposed, while, in compensation, an attempt made to rescue a man sentenced for the agreeable crime of rape at least succeeded in delaying his execution till eight in the evening. And yet even as late as 1765, when the weavers, furious with the Upper House for rejecting a measure for the protection of silk, tried to terrorize the Peers, and even to storm the mansion of the great Duke of Bedford, the redcoats, though called out, did not venture to fire.

Matters came to a climax in 1768, the first time, curiously enough, for many years that the mob, by any stretch of imagination, may be said to have had some right upon its side. This was over the attempt of George III's ministers to persecute John Wilkes, a witty and fascinating scoundrel who, somewhat incongruously, was made to figure as a democratic hero. It was perhaps a sound instinct that made the mob overlook the character of the man, and see only a course of shameless tyranny, an attempt to strain the law to crush one whose real offence was that of having made himself obnoxious to the statesmen in power.

The Fourth Estate had every reason to resent the encroachments

of the other three, and the attempt to make Parliament what it was fast becoming, an assembly dominated by a handful of magnates, sitting in secret and so averse from the influence of public opinion that it refused even to allow its debates to be published. Wilkes had published in his paper, *The North Briton*, a criticism of the King's Speech, or rather, the official manifesto of his ministers which the King had to read. Thereafter every means, fair or foul, were employed by the government to smash Wilkes.

A crack shot named Martin was put up to kill him in a duel, and all but succeeded. Wilkes fled to the Continent, was outlawed, but came back after five years as game as ever, to stand first for the City of London, for which he was rejected, and then for the county of Middlesex, for which he was repeatedly elected, and repeatedly thrown out of Parliament in defiance of the electors' will. Lord Sandwich, the arch lecher of his day, compared with whom Wilkes was a Galahad, now had the impudence to rake up some smutty production of his old bottle-mate's private press in order to get him laid by the heels for obscene and impious libel.

The judges throughout this crisis acted with an independence characteristic of the English Bar. Pratt, who decided on the illegality of General Warrants issued by ministers, and Mansfield, who reversed Wilkes's outlawry on a technical point, but sentenced him to twenty-two months' imprisonment and a fine for seditious libel and blasphemy, appear to have acted neither in the interests of ministers nor in fear of the mob, but with an honest desire to interpret the law as they understood it. Indeed Mansfield, a naturally timid man, when the mob surrounded his court shouting for Wilkes and liberty, broke off in the midst of his decision to make one of the noblest declarations of judicial independence of which we have any record :

"None of us . . . had anything to do with the present prosecution. It is not in our power to stop it, it was not in our power to bring it on. We cannot pardon. We are to say what we take the law to be. If we do not speak our real opinion, we prevaricate with our own conscience."

But the mob's point of view was different. At the best of times, respect for the letter of the law was not their strong point—they only saw the fact of tyranny. For two days London was on the verge of revolution. Houses of various unpopular magnates were attacked, members of Parliament mobbed, the windows of the Mansion House smashed. But the government had its back against the wall and were, at long last, determined to use the redcoats against the people.

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The Riot Act was read, and a whiff of musket shot settled the accounts of some half dozen rioters and wounded more. A young man, believed to be innocent, was killed by a Scottish soldier who had pursued into a house some one else who had been pelting him with brickbats. The decisive step had been taken, and for awhile the result was in doubt. The indignation of the populace was at boiling pitch, the very loyalty of the troops was doubtful; Mansfield was talking of a revolution within ten days unless something firm were done. But the government and military had decided once and for all to stand no more nonsense from mobs. The Scottish soldier, when acquitted of murder by a jury, was presented by his colonel with thirty guineas on behalf of the government, and a general order was issued by the Secretary of War thanking the soldiers, and promising them protection on any future occasion of a similar kind.¹

The spell was now broken which had withheld the government from employing powder and ball against rioters, and the power of the Fourth Estate, as represented by the London mob, was fatally impaired. It was, however, necessary by one terrible example to prove how completely the tables had been turned since the days of Walpole's Excise Bill. This time it was not liberty that the mob came out to uphold, but the most degraded intolerance. An act had been passed to relieve the Catholics from some of the petty persecutions from which they had suffered so long. This was enough to unchain the blackest devils of Protestant fanaticism, and in 1780 a riot took place more terrible than any that London had witnessed for centuries. To such heights did the piety of the mob rise that they burnt down Newgate and let loose all the criminals, and amid other acts of violence they burnt the furniture, pictures, library and priceless manuscripts of Lord Mansfield, who was known to have done justice on behalf of a Catholic some time previously. After some days of terror, the authorities took decisive action; a sufficient force of troops arrived on the scene and shot down the rioters right and left. There were at least 450 killed and wounded, and the power of the mob was broken, only to revive on the eve of the first Reform Bill.

7

RULE BRITANNIA !

Whatever defects our own more sensitive intelligences may discover in the eighteenth century, it was a time when the majority

¹ See Lecky, *England In The Eighteenth Century*, vol. iv, pp. 319-322.

of Englishmen were profoundly satisfied with themselves and their country. Never had there been so much talk and cant of patriotism, and its shameless abuse led Doctor Johnson, himself the most sturdy of patriots, to describe patriotism as the last resort of a scoundrel. The Duke of Marlborough's victories had confirmed John Bull's belief in his own superiority to foreigners in general and to Frenchmen in particular. It was, indeed, no uncommon experience for a Frenchman to be insulted in the streets on account of his nationality, and then challenged to fight if he showed the least resentment. The rude prosperity of the English lower classes was contrasted with the poverty and frog-eating that were supposed to prevail the other side of the Channel. Even Hogarth, who was well enough acquainted with the seamy side of English life, contrasts the burly and well-fed appearance of the English soldiers with that of the half-starved scarecrows who dare to think of invading our shores.

The state system of Europe during the eighteenth century was scarcely calculated to inspire any very exalted ideal of patriotism. Most of the Continental states were centralized despotisms whose sovereigns used them as pieces in a game of chicanery. To remove a neighbour's landmark, or to score an advantage over him by any means, fair or foul, was the object of the tortuous diplomacy, of the ever-shifting alliances, that figure so largely in the history of this time. Seldom had European politics been less the expression of any general or constant national aspirations ; the horrors of war would be let loose to provide comfortable principalities for the relations of a strong-minded queen or to avenge a too ungallant inuendo about a harlot. When the states were not openly at war, they were engaged in a commercial struggle which was regarded by all concerned as an international beggar-my-neighbour.

It is not surprising, under these circumstances, that the swelling and boisterous patriotism of early Georgian times has bequeathed little of literary value. This was certainly not due to any lack of goodwill on the part of authors. They waxed lyric on the slightest provocation, they were never tired of asserting the monopoly of Britannia in the rule of the waves, they could dissolve in raptures about triumphs that nowadays are considered more fit for bluebooks than anthologies. Young, the somewhat depressing author of *Night Thoughts*, was prolific of economic ecstasies, and the return of George II to England in 1729 moved him to a long poem entitled *The Merchant*, consisting of a Prelude, five Strains, a Moral, a Close, and a Chorus, all in honour of trade and the House of Hanover. He becomes

positively breathless at the combination of two such inspiring themes :

“ Trade, Britain’s all, our sires sent down
With toil, blood, treasure, ages won,”

is his interpretation of our history, and he continues :

“ Swear, by the great Eliza’s soul
That trade, as long as waters roll—
Ah! no; the gods chastise my rash decree :
By great Eliza do not swear;
For thee, O George, the gods declare :
And thou for them. Late times shall swear by thee ! ”

One or two patriotic songs have, however, achieved immortality, doubtless by virtue of the full-blooded assurance that accompanied their eighteenth century lack of introspection. *Rule Britannia* and *God Save the King* are both products of this time, and we have *The Roast Beef of old England*, and—to celebrate the “ wonderful ” year, 1759—*Hearts of Oak*. They will always awaken an echo in the breasts of those who like their patriotism ready-made and egotistic, without any nice intellectual or moral qualifications. England is the greatest and richest and most powerful nation in the world, the mere fact of belonging to her gives us a comfortable superiority over outsiders of less fortunate nations, and as she is always in the right the question of my country right or wrong does not arise. The patriot is the man who merges his individual in a collective egotism, who cultivates a Catonic virtue in order that his country may rob, profiteer and swindle by his aid with the better success.

This was undoubtedly the rule of English patriotism, but it must be conceded that even at its beefiest and most thick-skinned, the age was capable of producing noble exceptions. Bolingbroke himself, whose intellect was capable of apprehending that which his conduct too frequently belied, laid it down that patriotism should be founded on great principles and supported by great virtues, and that he who would live for his country must identify himself with his country’s highest ideal. This, to Bolingbroke’s mind, is the maintenance of liberty, and though it is no doubt his immediate object to get even with Walpole and the Whigs, Bolingbroke is taking his stand for the principle the neglect of which was to lose us America. A more respectable authority is Bishop Berkeley, who, in a series of noble aphorisms, shows that before a man has any right to call himself a patriot he must first be good, that patriotism is, in fact, as high and holy a thing as religion itself.

One of the most notable features of this age is the practically

unanimous way in which its more sensitive spirits, born out of due time, react against it. If to the average man all was for the best in the best of all possible Englands, to a minority—say—of one in a myriad the age was everything that was bad. And as this minority comprised the most sensitive and eloquent spirits of the time, it became vocal in a continuous stream of Jeremiad and lamentation over the degeneracy of the times. Sometimes this attitude is implied rather than expressed by a thick and dogged gloom such as luxuriates in the atmosphere of Young's *Night Thoughts* and Blair's *Grave*. Sometimes it expresses itself in the form of satire and denunciation, of which Pope set the example in his *Moral Essays*. So long as Walpole remained in power, it was the fashion to load all the sins of the time on to his ample shoulders, but things seemed to be improved very little by his fall.

It is, of course, by no means inconsistent with the most fiery Jingoism to abuse and blackguard the whole mass of one's countrymen by way of demonstrating one's affection for one's country. The cry of degenerate England was raised by none more lustily than the patriots who were trying to push England over the brink of a foolish war with Spain on behalf of Captain Jenkins and the smugglers. Poets who laid about them furiously at the expense of Spain could not refrain from landing one or two blows of the tomahawk on the tough pate of John Bull, for the good of his soul.

Apart from this merely conventional stuff, there is sufficient evidence that in the opinion of those most competent to judge, all was not well with England. The philosophers Hartley and Berkeley are both agreed as to the lowering of ethical standards and the decay of virtue constituting the gravest of all possible dangers. To Fielding, the successes of the Highlanders in the "forty-five" seemed like a direct judgment upon English wickedness. And it is evident that Hogarth had eyes almost exclusively for the vice and brutality he saw around him, the feeling that we get from his pictures being usually one of profound relief that we were born into any age and country rather than eighteenth century England.

All these discontents with the times find concentrated utterance in the "inestimable Estimate", as Cowper sarcastically called it, of a literary clergyman named John Brown. This Estimate, which created something of a sensation on its appearance, has since been dismissed with an unjustly summary contempt because Brown wrote it in the opening year of the Seven Years' War, in which Britain was to gain such splendid success. The book is, however, despite

one or two eccentricities, on the whole an interesting and not unbalanced criticism which touches on genuine faults, and is so far from unrelieved denunciation as to make generous allowance for our still remaining virtues, the most important being that self-same love of liberty, to foster which, Brown, like Bolingbroke, would have the patriot devote all his dearest energies. "In the reign of James II," he says, with a fine grasp of essentials, "Great Britain was free, though a despotic prince was on the throne. At the time when Caesar fell, Rome was still enslaved, though the tyrant was no more."

What troubled Brown about the condition of England was no more than had attracted the attention of more famous and considerable men before him—the irreligion and materialism that were everywhere rampant, the artificial effeminacy of upper-class manners that we had picked up from Versailles, and the selfishness and corruption that were sapping the vital energy of the nation. These were real dangers, and the triumph over France, which was even more affected by them, did not end them, nor prevent them from bringing England to dire disaster some fifteen years later.

8

CHATHAM AND VICTORY

The long and prosperous peace which (leaving out of account one or two minor contentions) England had enjoyed under the House of Hanover, had produced the usual effect of such mercies on an unblooded generation in the shape of a vague desire for excitement and carnage, preferably at the expense of an opulent and weak neighbour. Such an ideal opponent the patriots had discovered in Spain, a pompous old dotard—so it seemed—among nations, who had only to be knocked down with all possible heroism in order that we might run licensed hands through his pockets. This hopeful plan was frustrated less through any recovered prowess of Spain, than through our own muddling, corruption, and unpreparedness. The war did indeed start with the capture of a Central American trading centre by a political Admiral, a feat which is still commemorated in Portobello and Admiral Vernon inns, but an attempt to repeat the performance at Carthage ended in half the expedition dying of fever, and the incompetence of the "brave and happy Vernon" being demonstrated to the world. The war dragged on for some years after this, but the heart had gone out of it, and nothing of much interest occurred beyond Admiral Anson's voyage round the world.

A more formidable opponent than Spain had to be reckoned with, and it must have been obvious that, with English and French ambitions clashing all over the world, these powers, in an age when great issues were decided not by reason but by force, would sooner or later come to fighting it out. Both in the East and the West, France was making a powerful bid for Empire. The Peace of Utrecht, in spite of England's territorial gains, had left matters undecided in North America, and, ever since, the French had been making headway. Hopelessly out-numbered as they were, they had yet the advantage over our disunited and often disloyal colonists, in intelligent direction and the discipline, almost, of a military garrison. The French colonies had, in fact, the pick of the gentry, men who preferred to get away from the enervating atmosphere of the court, and strike out a line for themselves and France in a world of reality. The same thing happened in India, where the showy and pushing bourgeois governor, Dupleix, re-discovered a secret which had long ago flashed on the mind of his compatriot Bernier, who had practised medicine at the Mogul court, namely, that the mastery of India might go to him who first introduced Indian troops to European discipline.

While England was making vain attempts to plunder the decrepit Spanish Empire, a confused, shifting, and unprincipled war had broken out among the continental sovereigns owing to the fact that France and Prussia, both of which had solemnly guaranteed the intact succession of the Austrian domains to the girl queen, Maria Theresa, lost no time in taking advantage of her youth and sex to scramble for their plunder. Into this war England eventually drifted, and found herself once again face to face with her old adversary, France. But such mighty protagonists as *Le Roi Soleil*, Villars, Marlborough and Eugene were no longer to be found, and indeed the one combatant who knew just what he wanted and was desperately in earnest, was the sinister Frederick the Great of Prussia, who, now on one side, now on the other, fought and plotted for every inch of land that by fair means or foul he could add to his dominions.

This War of the Austrian Succession, as far as England and France were concerned, amounted to little better than marking time ankle deep in blood. Neither at home nor in distant seas was either combatant capable of striking a decisive blow. From the very first, it ought to have been apparent that England had a winning advantage, could she but devote her whole energies to using it. France neither could nor would devote her main attention to expansion overseas. She faced on two fronts at once, and while her right hand wielded

the sword against her continental foes, she had only her left free to grasp the trident. On the other hand, in spite all the safeguards devised against such a contingency, our German King's Electorate of Hanover was like a millstone round our necks, and laid upon us a moral obligation to divert resources to its defence.

This necessity of defending Hanover came within an ace of involving us in disaster. Lord Carteret, subsequently Lord Granville, who held the reins of power for a brief period, was a brilliant amateur diplomatist who won the King's heart by being an out and out pro-Hanoverian. As a result of his schemes, a mixed Anglo-Dutch-German army, commanded by Lord Stair, and accompanied by George II and Carteret, attempted to bring off a strategical coup by dividing a French army in Bavaria from one marching to its support. As a result, the whole force was pinned and surrounded in the valley of the Necker, and if the French Generals had understood their business would have been destroyed. As it was, the allies succeeded in fighting their way out and getting clear away, abandoning their wounded, in what was known as the victory of Dettigen.

The war then settled down on orthodox lines in Flanders, and the French, having found a commander of genius in Maréchal de Saxe, gradually made good their hold on the country. They were assisted by a strange and romantic diversion, when Charles Edward Stuart, grandson of James II, landed in the Scottish Highlands and roused a certain proportion of the clans to fight for him. With a mere handful of wild Highlanders he occupied the town, but not the castle of Edinburgh, destroyed in ten minutes the scratch force of recruits that was all that could be brought against him, and dashed Southward by the Carlisle-Lancashire route as far as Derby. It was the romance, almost, of a fairy tale, seen for a moment against the sordid background of the pudding age—the Highlanders, whose dervish rush could strike panic into hard-bitten English veterans, were gentlemen in a sense that few of the old knights errant had been. As they went by, the people lined the roads without fear to watch the unaccustomed show, nor did the Highlanders offer them harm. The end was inevitable; Charles Edward's undisciplined generals refused him the one slender chance he had of rushing London; English veterans were hurried back from Flanders, and the clans were followed up North and shot to pieces at Culloden. The rebellion was drowned in blood and the Highland menace removed once and for all. But the French, to whom Charles Edward had been a mere pawn in their

Flanders game, had secured their object by getting the British regiments sent from Flanders to Scotland.

Elsewhere the war ran an inglorious and indecisive course. An invasion of a nearly undefended England was defeated by a Channel gale; in the Mediterranean our chance of smashing the Toulon fleet was lost by the insubordination, or worse, of the second-in-command and certain captains, and the man to be cashiered was the unfortunate Admiral, who had contrived to fall foul of the politicians. In India the French turned us out of Madras, and in Canada we seized their fortress and naval base of Louisberg on Cap Breton Island at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. An inconclusive peace with France and Spain brought matters back to much the point they were before the war, the French, with amazing ineptitude, letting slip from their grasp the rich prize of Flanders.

The next round could not be long delayed and, indeed, the muskets and scalping knives got busy in North America without any formality of declaration. This time France was not only fighting for her Empire, but shortly became involved in an alliance with Austria, Russia, and the minor German states, to crush, once and for all, the power of Frederick the Great, who, with a morality not markedly inferior to that of his neighbours, was imparting an element of inconvenient reality into the finesse and artifice of international politics. England found herself committed to the support of this seemingly doomed ally, who yet, in spite of overwhelming odds and overwhelming disasters, managed to hold his own against a Continent in arms and maintain, to the last, his ill-gotten gain of Silesia.

Even in the few years since the last peace the French aristocracy had been going down-hill, and Versailles had touched its nadir of glittering degeneracy. How far this decline had gone was shown when the main French army in Germany ran like hares before a third of their number of Prussians, a disaster which, as Napoleon quite correctly divined, sealed the fate of the Bourbons among a people enamoured of glory. But at the beginning of the war it was an open question whether England herself, with the egregious Newcastle at the head of the ministry, was much better off than her adversary. Readers of Brown's *Estimate* must, as one disaster after another was recorded, have asked themselves whether after all the gloomy parson had not understated the case. Our naval base at Minorca fell at the beginning of the war, and the Admiral of the Mediterranean Fleet, Byng, a selfish and spiritless officer who had tamely thrown up the attempt to relieve it after the pretence of an action at long range,

was justly and properly condemned to be shot on his own quarter deck,¹ though the indecent eagerness of ministers, who ought to have joined him, to use him as a scapegoat, has ever since put a certain amount of sympathy on his side. In America the French, perfectly united and gallantly led, started by getting the best of it in spite of their inferior numbers. To crown it all, the army which, under that royal and bloated butcher, the Duke of Cumberland, was defending Hanover and covering the flank of our ally, collapsed, and, to the infinite indignation of Cumberland's peppery little uncle, George II, concluded a shameful capitulation at Clostersevern, which seemed to extinguish the last faint spark of hope for Frederick.

The change of success that followed is one of the most dramatic in history, the more so because, in so far as the expression can ever be used with propriety, it appears to have been the work of one man. The character of William Pitt, subsequently first Earl of Chatham, is one that, like that of Cromwell, has always proved a subject of contention for historians, every one of whom, in so far as he produces an intelligible portrait at all, throws on the canvas such a Chatham as his spirit is capable of conceiving. There is, unfortunately, an unconscious desire in the breasts of ordinary mortals to bring to a common denomination with their own those few exceptional spirits, sympathy with whom would demand a painful elevation of mind, and who are apt to suggest a subconscious echo of Iago's,

"There is a daily beauty in his life
That makes mine ugly."

Thus a biographer's account of a base or commonplace Chatham or Cromwell may tell us less of the biographee than of the biographer.

There is certainly something about Chatham's personality to which, however little we like the word, no expression applies quite so well as "miraculous". A power seems to have emanated from him whose effects we could hardly have believed possible, were they not on the most circumstantial prosaic record. A corrupt and Philistine House of Commons trembled beneath his glance. One member, a Colonel, once got up to attack him as he was walking out of the House. Pitt, as he then was, turned round and looked at him. The Colonel hesitated, stammered, and sat down. On another occasion some

¹ The Articles of War had been stiffened up. There had been too many incidents in the last war like that of Captain Savage Mostyn, who had been hooted out of Portsmouth dockyard for refusing to engage the enemy, and subsequently jobbed into the Comptrollership of the Navy. Nothing of this sort happened after the example that was made of Byng, which did, in the most literal sense, encourage the others.

member laughed on Pitt's beginning a speech with the word "sugar". Pitt slowly repeated the word three times, and then asked if anybody dared laugh at sugar now. It is more than probable that if any other member, at any period of the Commons' history had tried a similar method of disposing of a laugh, the whole House would have been in uncontrollable agonies for the next five minutes. As it was, no one stirred, the humour having quite departed from sugar.

The secret of Chatham's personality is, we believe, to be found in his face, which, once beheld in portrait or marble, stamps itself unforgettably on the mind. The chiselled, hawk-like features, the enormous nose, the deep-set, glowing eyes, all bespeak a nature in which the will and vital energy are abnormally developed. Such natures are tormented by a superabundance of power for which no ordinary circumstances ever give them scope—it is like a fire which, if it does not burn up the world, must burn themselves. But we must not scan them too closely for moral scruples or intellectual consistency. It is only in books that the hero finds the straight path open to genius; in actual life he is, more often than not, presented with the choice of flickering out virtuously or making some sort of a moral compromise. The choice is seldom a conscious one.

The young Pitt, like Napoleon, started his career with all the odds against him. He had neither birth nor riches at a time when these were all in all to the aspiring statesman. His one chance was to attach himself to the group of young patriots who were beginning to make a stir by baiting Walpole. Between these two men, the phlegmatic, humorous old cynic, and the glowing young idealist, there was a natural antipathy that was bound to find expression. Walpole's policy of peaceful and prosaic commonsense seemed to Pitt nothing less than treason, and, as for Walpole, he was capable of paying a compliment to the power of this noisy young man by growling, as he deprived him of his commission, "we must muzzle this terrible cornet of horse."

The cornet of horse had yet twenty years of strenuous endeavour before his genius found that scope to which he instinctively felt it to be entitled. During all these years he was involved, to a greater or less extent, in the sordid maze of political intrigue, out of which he emerged, in spite of unworthy connections and occasional lapses from consistency, wisdom and common fairness, with hands surprisingly clean and honour unsullied. That he, a poor man, should scorn to accept the lucrative and recognized perquisites of his office of paymaster of the forces was, by the standards of the time, an almost

quixotic gesture of political purity. For the love of country, which with too many of his associates was merely a convenient cant, was with him a religion. He lavished on England all the passion of which his mighty nature was capable; as some men delight in loading their brides with costly jewels, so did he desire to see England adorned with splendid possessions and opulent with the fruits of trade. To express the greatness of his devotion he strains the resources even of *his* eloquence.

Chatham was a Whig; for the dry pages of Locke he cherished a reverence which is surprising in a man of his ardent temperament. But unlike the peers and placemen to whom Whiggism was a means to patronage and class-ascendancy, Chatham's imagination was capable of realizing the element of democracy that was latent therein. Without the slightest leaning towards social reform, he was yet capable of courting and capturing the support of the people, and this at a time when Parliament was tending more and more to become a class oligarchy. For his patriotism was not of that imperfect but all too common order that limits its aim to the mere externals of wealth and dominion. He loved England not only for what she achieved, but for what she was. It is true that every political hack had abundance of lip-service to the Constitution and liberty, but to Chatham the Constitution was a priceless heritage of ancestral wisdom, whose very soul was liberty.

He had little patience with the legal subtlety that would have dwelt merely on the forms of that Constitution, and gradually stifled the reality. He may have had no more historical knowledge of Magna Charta than the rest of his contemporaries; it was to him a sublime myth and John's barons as much the creatures of imagination as the traditional St. George. But he was speaking the very language of the Constitution when he said of them in one of his great speeches in the House of Lords: "when they obtained from their sovereign that great acknowledgement of National rights contained in the Magna Charta, they did not confine it to themselves alone, but delivered it as a common blessing to the whole people. They did not say 'these are the rights of the great barons' or 'these are the rights of the great prelates' . . . No, my lords, they said, in the simple Latin of the times, *nullus liber homo*, and provided as carefully for the meanest subject as for the greatest. These are uncouth words, and sound but poorly in the ears of scholars, neither are they addressed to the criticism of scholars, but to the hearts of free men."

Chatham has been described by his latest biographer as an opportunist. This is a vague and facile word, and may find some superficial colour in his compromises with Newcastle or his dealings with George II's mistress, efforts at all costs to find scope for his genius in the service of his country. But there was never a statesman who in all essentials was more thoroughly a man of principle. The doctrines of the Whig Revolution, which he had imbibed in his boyhood, were his guide throughout life, and he only differed from his contemporaries in treating them as living principles, capable of unlimited development. Never did he lose sight of the fact that the social compact is made by the people and for the people, that the Constitution is made for the whole body of free men and not they for the Constitution. Hence he was always looking beyond the walls of Parliament to the people themselves, as the substance of which even the Commons themselves were, or ought to be, the shadow.

"What, my lords, are all the generous efforts of our ancestors . . . reduced to this conclusion, that instead of the arbitrary power of the King we must submit to the arbitrary power of the House of Commons? . . . Tyranny my lords is detestable in every shape, but in none so formidable as where it is assumed and exercised by a number of tyrants. But, my lords, this is not the fact, this is not the Constitution."

Long before the words were uttered, the people had discovered in William Pitt the man of their choice, and under the wand of his magic influence, succeeded for once in asserting the power that was slipping from their hands. When things were at their blackest at the beginning of the Seven Years' War, they insisted on having Pitt, although the King, not without some just cause, detested him, and his fellow politicians had little use for an upstart who was not prepared to play the game according to the rules. But when his first brief ministry was wrecked by a combination of wirepullers, an outcry went up for his recall that neither King nor Parliament could withstand. "It rained 'gold boxes,'" conferring the freedom of city after city on the popular hero. And so Pitt, though he was forced to make terms with corruption by turning over the dirty work of his government to Newcastle, got the chance he had confidently awaited of saving the country.

The titanic energy that was the driving force of his career was by no means inconsistent with the most minute application to points of detail. He had, in fact, studied for years every problem with which

he now had to deal, and his correspondence shows the care and balanced judgment which he brought to bear even on the minor tasks of his administration. But the magic of his personality was all the more potent for the exactness and economy of its application. The nation, sunk in apathy and, as some had plausibly maintained, in degeneracy, roused itself as a strong man out of sleep. From being unable to defend its own possessions or support its ally, it had found the secret of victory, and began to rain a succession of knock-down blows on its amazed and almost paralyzed adversary. The very generals and admirals seemed to take fire from Pitt's genius and, indeed, there is one most significant story of how this extraordinary man's presence was capable of producing an exhilaration almost akin to drunkenness. It was when the young Wolfe, one of Pitt's happiest selections, went to dine with the minister before going out to take up his command of our forces on the St. Lawrence. Though Wolfe had been strictly abstemious during the meal, after it he amazed even his host by flourishing his sword and walking about the room calling himself Hannibal and Caesar. And yet Wolfe was one of the most brilliant and accomplished men of his time.

With such furious yet forethoughtful energy was the war carried on, that two years after the darkest hour of Cumberland's Closterseven surrender, the bonfires were blazing, night after night, for the most astonishing series of victories recorded in our history. Pitt's plan was, in its outlines, simple. It was to exhaust all the energies of France on the Continent, and while she was bleeding to death, to annihilate her sea communications, and fall with overwhelming force on her isolated garrisons overseas. Very cleverly did he, once the opponent of any Hanoverian adventure, contrive, with the expenditure of comparatively small British forces, to keep the French busy in Western Germany, and at the same time to immobilize as many enemy troops as possible by striking now at one point, now at another, of the French seaboard. Hawke and Boscawen successfully accomplished the naval part of the programme, the former dashing after the French fleet through a gale and uncharted rocks with a light-hearted gallantry that had suddenly become natural to English commanders.

The fate of the French overseas, cut off from the possibility of reinforcements, and attacked with the relentless energy that England was now putting into all her operations, was inevitable. The Marquis de Montcalm, as fearless and reproachless a gentleman as ever fought under the lilies of France, put up a heroic resistance, but the odds were

now overwhelming, and he met his equal in Wolfe. The French Dominion of North America, which had threatened to pin the English colonies to the strip of land between the Alleghanies and the coast, was wiped off the map. Her African and island settlements it was easy to capture. And in India John Company had discovered, in Robert Clive, a genius scarcely inferior to that of Chatham himself. Here, also, England swept the board, and not only did we end the war with the Company an Indian power and masters of the rich province of Bengal, but we so defeated the French, capturing their main stronghold at Pondicherry, that they ceased henceforth to count seriously in Indian politics, though they were allowed to retain a few unfortified factories, and by no means relinquished their ambitions.

Spain came into the war, only to receive a rude lesson in the difference between the England of Walpole and that of Pitt. Pitt would have anticipated her by destroying the treasure fleet, and it was the refusal of the cabinet to support him in this step that led to his resignation. But the impetus he had given to our national energies outlasted his removal, and Manilla in the East and Havana in the West were rapidly added to the list of British conquests. But by this time England was getting tired of war, surfeited even with glory. Pitt's expenditure of the nation's money was on the same grandiose scale as his military operations, and people marked with alarm the unprecedented figures of the national debt, and the fast and furious rate at which they were increasing. So that the peace, concluded by Lord Bute's incompetent administration, though it left England on a towering and even dangerous pinnacle of glory, let off both our enemies more lightly than either had any right to expect, France retaining her fishing rights on the Newfoundland coast, her foothold in the West Indies, and some factories in India. But in North America and India the hands of England were free from serious rivalry by European powers. The boasts about Britannia ruling the waves had come true ; neither in the East not in the West had any rival been able to stand up to her. She had become not only an imperial power, but, *par excellence*, the imperial power. It remained to be seen what she would make of these opportunities.

There was little in the record or spirit of eighteenth century England to show any measure, of fitness for the vast responsibilities

of a world-wide Empire. Deep down in her soul, it is true, glowed or smouldered that spirit of liberty which was ultimately to become the life and justification of her rule, but the heavy frost of eighteenth century materialism had fallen upon it and overlaid it with a hard crust of selfishness. Even from the great mind of Chatham the old Adam of materialism was not quite expelled; wholly devoted as he was to England's greatness, and sensible as he was of her traditions of free government, he does not seem to have thought out thoroughly the problem of what the Empire ought to stand for in regard to other nations and to subject peoples. As far as the Anglo-Saxon stock was concerned, he desired to see a great and prosperous people, governed on Whig principles interpreted in so generous a sense as to make them better fitted to the name "liberal". The British Isles he desired to knit in bonds of sympathy; he pushed forward the scheme, first suggested by the Duke of Argyll, of converting Highlanders from rebels and raiders into the loyal soldiers of King George, and if he did nothing to strike at the roots of Ireland's slavery, he at least tried all he could, within the limits of the existing system, to remove her grievances.

Chatham's genius was, indeed, vast enough to illuminate every subject upon which it shone, and there is no doubt that it was sensible to the new and humane influences that were already beginning to transform the spirit of the age into something which, if not stronger, was at least sweeter. But even he was not strong enough to shake off the mental limitations of his time. It was beyond him, even, to appreciate the commonsense, as well as the Christianity, in the plea of the Duke of Bedford, that in arranging terms with a defeated France we ought to do as we should be done by. Here Chatham's very strength was his weakness. The Titanic energy, unlocked by the opportunity of the Seven Years' War, was not lightly to be checked or guided into other paths. Having once got his adversary down, his instinct was to beat the life out of him, to render him incapable of ever giving trouble again. Having once started to conquer territory, we must not let go an inch of it. Pride of Empire had, in fact, become an obsession with him, and made him capable of urging his countrymen to plunge into a fresh war with Spain over some dispute in the remote Falkland Islands too trivial to be worth recording.

This imperial megalomania made him blind to dangers which had been perceived by men in every other respect his inferiors. He did not allow for the certainty that, as in the times of Louis XIV and Philip II, the overweening greatness of one power would create a

tendency in the rest to combine against it. And he frankly disbelieved in the forboding that the real test of our Colonial system would come when the danger from Canada and the West had vanished, and the need of protection which had bound the colonies to the Mother Country was removed. However liberally he interpreted it, he was fundamentally a believer in the Colonial system of the eighteenth century, and does not seem to have considered that the complete overthrow of France would, even with the wisest statesmanship, have the effect of straining this system almost to the breaking point.

It is only in recent years that anything like adequate justice has been done to England's part in her dealings with her American children. The control over trade which she exercised has been represented as a tyrannous or at least a one-sided system, in which the unfortunate Americans found their trade hampered and their manufactures nipped in the bud, solely in the interest of the mother country. It has fallen to one of our most distinguished modern economists, Professor Ashley,¹ to examine these charges in detail, and the conclusion at which he has arrived is that, on the whole, the benefits of the system were real and mutual, and that England was ready to make as substantial sacrifices as she imposed, in order that the Empire might be, as far as possible, a self-sufficing unit. Of course it was impossible for such keen traders as the Americans not to suspect, with however little justice, that where one of the partners had absolute control of the business, arrangements would be biassed, to a greater or less extent, in that partner's interests.

But those who argue the question of the Old Colonial system on purely economic grounds are in danger of missing the most important point about it. England had no doubt ordered her relations with the colonies on a reasonable and probably a sound business footing, but it was the fatal weakness of the system that it placed the Empire on a business footing alone. With the deeply ingrained materialism of the eighteenth century, England valued her colonies for just as much as she could make out of them, and the colonies returned the compliment. Prior to the Seven Years' War, sentiment on either side had been conspicuous by its absence, the highest to which the patriotism of the ordinary Englishman could rise culminating in panegyrics on the increase of trade and treasure. Of any deep bond of affection uniting the mother to the daughter communities, that bond which Burke was to characterize as lighter than air and stronger than iron, the prosaic spirit of England under her first two Georges

¹ In *Surveys Historic and Economic*, pp. 309-335.

could not so much as conceive. It is even said that in William III's reign an Attorney-General, who was asked to prepare a charter incorporating a religious college in Virginia, had exclaimed, on being reminded that Virginians had souls: "Souls! Damn your souls! Plant tobacco!"

Nor were the colonies any less material in their sentiments towards the Mother Country. They had adapted themselves fairly comfortably, though not without a good deal of occasional friction, to the easy restrictions of English sovereignty, because it suited them fairly well economically and above all because they needed the might of England to protect them from the formidable threat of encirclement by France, not to speak of the ever present danger of Indian raids. But separated as they were from England by the whole distance of the Atlantic voyage and almost cut off from any communication with friends at home, it was only natural for them to drift further and further apart in sentiment from a country which few of them had seen, and which was known to them principally by the restrictions that it from time to time imposed on them.

Ever since the first settlement the colonies had been getting more and more alienated from England in blood, in sentiment, and even in language, for the Yankee dialect was beginning to take forms surprisingly familiar to us to-day. Numbers of emigrants came over, particularly from Germany, who sensibly diluted the British blood that ought to have been thicker than water. In the North, the New England colonists, who had fled from intolerable conditions in England to enjoy the privilege of making conditions equally intolerable for those who disagreed with them in America, had never had any particular temptation to wax sentimental about the connection with England, and indeed, long before the final disputes that led to the Revolution, had given plain evidence of their willingness to cut the painter if provoked too far. The old Puritan spirit, in all its intense earnestness and gloomy bigotry, persisted into the eighteenth century with little less strength than in the days of the pilgrim fathers. There was a gulf wider than the Atlantic between the typical Massachusetts man, and the stolid English governing class to which any form of religious enthusiasm was an exhibition of bad taste verging on insanity. The old loyalty to the throne which had been genuine and ardent in Virginia in civil war times had, meanwhile, gradually faded almost out of memory, and in fact, no colony proved stronger for independence than that of George Washington.

A development had taken place of ominous but little

comprehended import, in the fact that while England had contracted her government into a privileged and corrupt oligarchy, the colonies had realized the democratic ideal to an extent unknown in Europe. However the governor and council of each province might be appointed (and in more than one instance they were elected), the real power resided in the hands of assemblies genuinely representative of the whole body of freeholders. These assemblies showed themselves adepts in applying the power of the purse, and the wise governor was he who refrained from kicking against the pricks of popular authority. The colonies did, in fact, order their affairs pretty much according to their own inclinations, except in so far as concerned the regulation of imperial trade. That they accepted English regulations in the main, gives, as Professor Ashley shrewdly suggests, reason to believe that they were not very hard hit by them.

Confronted with this situation, Walpole had dealt with it according to his own worldly wisdom. He realized that the best way to avoid trouble with the colonies was to leave them alone, and to let matters glide on comfortably in the old grooves. Even when an act was passed for the plausible object of making the colonists buy Jamaica instead of French West Indian molasses for their manufacture of rum, he quietly allowed the act to become a dead letter. But Walpole's policy of keeping out of trouble with the colonies also involved keeping out of trouble with the rest of the world. At present they cost us little, but nobody realized better than Walpole that great wars are followed by the presentation of great bills and the question of who is to foot them. He, the child of this world, was instinctively (for it was not his habit to formulate principles of policy) wiser in his generation than that child of ardent genius, Chatham.

Had not Chatham been intoxicated with the glory of England, he must have perceived that victory itself would create a situation incomparably more difficult than that created by the threat from Canada, a problem to which the wisest statesmanship would find itself at a loss for a solution. The two wars with France showed how very little there was either of loyalty or common purpose among the colonists. Had they showed one-half the determination of the handful of French settlers, whom they outnumbered by ten to one, they must have crushed them easily. Good work (particularly in the capture of Louisburg in the first war) was certainly accomplished here and there by the levies of whom a fair number were ultimately raised in various proportions by different colonies.

But our soldiers found themselves starved, profiteered off, and continually left in the lurch by the very people they had come to defend. The work of Wolfe and Amherst would certainly have been anticipated had not individual Americans sedulously kept the French resistance alive and their own pockets at bursting point by furnishing the enemy, at a price, with munitions and supplies, a form of traffic which the Home authorities had the utmost difficulty in suppressing, and whose very suppression was regarded as a grievance by these honest traders. And even in the presence of the most imminent danger, nothing could persuade the colonials to combine for any united action whatever. A scheme of mild federation for purposes of defence, that was proposed and carried by Benjamin Franklin in an assembly of delegates that met in 1754 to treat with the Indians, was thrown out by every one of the colonial assemblies to whom it was referred. It was fairly evident, too, by the marked slackening of colonial efforts, that once the French were out of Canada, there was an end of interest in the war as far as Americans were concerned.

This then was the situation created by the Peace of Paris—the supreme danger that had threatened the colonies of encirclement by France had vanished, once and for all, thanks mainly to British seapower, British blood and British money, that had been poured out like water. The most that they had to get out of England the Americans had already secured—the French were gone. But the bill for this deliverance, a staggering one according to the notions of that time, was chargeable to England. And the victors in the Seven Years' War were confronted with the almost universal and always unexpected discovery that dazzling conquests very seldom bring security in their train. The French people, even the Versailles courtiers, were not of the stuff that accepts defeat without preparing sedulously for *la revanche*. Besides, though the French were gone, the Indians were still prepared to dispute the possession of their hunting grounds, and it was not long after the war that one of the most formidable of all Indian risings, provoked by the profiteering and land-grabbing of the Westward-expanding colonists, broke out under a chief called Pontiac. In short, taking all considerations into account, there could be no return to the piping times of Walpole—a garrison of ten thousand men must be maintained in America.

The mere fact that individual colonists were constantly encroaching on the Red Man's hunting grounds, and thereby involving the Mother Country in an expenditure of blood and treasure in which its beneficiaries did not propose to share, had the indirect effect

of creating another American grievance that was resented as bitterly as the trade regulations. For the home government, spurred to an already determined course of action by the struggle with Pontiac, took what seemed to everybody at home the obvious and statesman-like course of fixing the boundary between the two races on the watershed between the Mississippi basin and the rivers flowing westward to the Atlantic, a boundary to be enlarged not by land-grabbing and violence but by peaceful and regulated purchase.¹ Incidentally the right of disposing of these lands furnished one of the few means that England possessed of making money out of the colonies, and recouping some small part of her outlay on their account. But for all that, the attempt to set limits to the westward expansion of the white man was the policy of Canute, and the waves were soon breaking angrily about the monarch's feet.

More and more insistently it began to be asked—who was to foot the bill? The sobriety that follows the intoxication of war had descended upon England, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, one Francis Dashwood, whose connoisseurship of women, wine, and blasphemy did not extend to finance, not only applied the whip of taxation, which had to be done, but applied it in so stupid a way as to produce something like an incipient rebellion among the cider growers of the West Country. Under these circumstances it must have seemed outrageous that the groaning taxpayers of England should be expected, as a matter of course, to go on finding the whole expenses of American deliverance in the past and American safety in the future. And yet what was to be done? Was it likely that the people who had refused to combine to defend themselves, even in the presence of the enemy, would now come together to do the straight and generous thing by the Mother Country? Was it likely that the men who had supplied the enemy, for gain, with the sinews of war, would hail with much enthusiasm the idea of supplying England, at a loss, with the means of defence? And, supposing that the colonials could by no means be persuaded to contribute of their own free will, was it likely that communities so jealously sensitive of their own privilege of taxing themselves, would for one moment submit to dictation on this subject from an English ministry?

That English statesmen met the situation with appalling

¹ Is it proper, asked George III in one of his private memoranda, that this nation should be at the charge of maintaining forts and garrisons when the Americans contribute nothing to their maintenance?

ineptitude ought not to blind us to the fact that the problem was as well-nigh insoluble as any problem could well be. Chatham had the most hopeful solution when he sketched, in private, a scheme similar to that of the Union with Scotland, of uniting England and America in a common Parliament. One wonders whether, assuming the obvious physical difficulties of this plan to be overcome, this idea would have particularly commended itself to those assemblies that only recently had thrown back the scheme for a defence congress into the faces of their delegates, and who were quite shrewd enough to be aware that federation was only an honourable stepping stone to increased taxation, or whether the sheer magnetism and force of will of that extraordinary man might not, under favourable circumstances, have accomplished the miracle of miracles. . . .

It would be as futile as it would be offensive to hold a brief for America against England or England against America of the eighteenth century. The situation had arisen, almost inevitably, as the result of principles common to both. So long as the only motives of association were pride of power and lust of gain, so long as the implied contract between England and America reposed upon no loftier a basis than that of a mere business speculation, it was certain that whenever it paid one partner to dissolve the partnership, that partnership would be dissolved. To England's plea that she had delivered America at the price of blood and treasure, America might quite fairly reply that the mother nation had done all this, not for the daughter's *beaux yeux*, but as a speculative investment in the hope of advantages to come, in exactly the same spirit in which the daughter now proposed to set up house on her own account. As for honour, kinship, and the rest of it, that was not a matter of business but of sentiment, and as to the place of sentiment in practical politics, both were agreed.

It was the nemesis of the eighteenth century spirit that the colonies, in the time of their maturity, should break away as the old Greek colonies had done, or like the young of men and animals in their season. Something nobler than self-interest must kindle the idealism to which the life of a people is more than meat, and its benison to humanity than power. But such wisdom would have been foolishness to the men of the eighteenth century. The beginnings of Empire were selfish and even sordid. If we were fair to America, it was not because we loved her, but because it paid us—the tragedy of Ireland showed what would be the fate of a people

whom we considered to be absolutely at our mercy. The first result of our glorious victories in India had been that John Company, that was out as a corporation for maximum dividends and whose servants were out to feather their own nests at the expense of John Company, fastened like a malignant vampire on the fair province of Bengal, and fleeced and oppressed its unhappy inhabitants with a thoroughness that would have put to shame an Allah-ud-Din or a Tughlak Shah. Nor did the Christian people of England and America hesitate to rear the fabric of economic prosperity on the sufferings, that baffle imagination, of multitudes of unoffending negroes, men, women and children, who were dragged from their villages to undergo the horrors of the Middle Passage, and, if they survived, of hopeless, life-long slavery. For this blood-guilty prosperity, America at least has had to pay a heavy reckoning—and the end is not yet.

With what grace could England demand from her colonies the things that are Caesar's, when both alike had long forgotten to render the things that are God's—self-sacrifice, vision, imaginative sympathy! It has ever been what is low and material in both peoples that has planted the seeds of discord between England and America, and even now delays the union, not of political machinery, but of heart and soul, that is among the highest hopes of threatened civilization.

CHAPTER IV

THE EMOTIONAL REVIVAL

1

THE ROMANTIC DAWN

THE cultured materialism of the eighteenth century never was able to obtain so exclusive a sway, even over the class to whom it most appealed, as to exclude the possibility of a reaction. There was never a time, however large the wigs and however exacting the conventions, when stirrings of the spirit somewhat unhappily nicknamed "Romantic" might not have been apparent. The figure of Sir Roger de Coverley, for example, is thoroughly in harmony with the as-yet-unformed Romantic tradition. But such manifestations are, for a long time, too scattered and casual to possess very much significance. It is not till the fourth decade of the century that we can speak of any widespread tendency to challenge the sceptical and complacent philosophy that was assumed as the basis of educated thought and discussion.

The eighteenth century had pinned its faith to a one-sided, and therefore unscientific rendering of human nature. It had, in fact, treated man as if he were solely a thinking and not at all a feeling animal. When it was absolutely necessary to deal with so universal and primitive a passion as love, the polite and therefore the right thing to do was so to conventionalize its expression that it ceased to excite any emotional reaction whatever. Thus we hear of "lively transports", "endearing charms", and "pleasing flames" without the least disposition to be either warmed or transported—the whole thing has become as much a game as the "courted", "engaged", "banns up", and "married", of the Christmas party card table. The men of the eighteenth century showed an almost inquisitorial thoroughness in eliminating from life anything in the least likely to excite their emotions. The beauties of the open landscape, of mountainous or ocean scenery, were not allowed to exist, the spectacle of anything wild or uncultivated was merely disgusting, as showing that here the civilizing touch of man had yet

to be applied. In the same way the whole time between the fall of the Roman Empire and the Classical Renaissance of the fifteenth century was looked upon as an interlude of barbarism, more or less under the influence of priestly swindlers.

But, at least among peoples so vigorous as those inhabiting Western Europe, it is impossible to set a seal on the whole of human emotion without its sooner or later finding itself an outlet. Increasingly, towards the middle of the century, we perceive signs of a spirit the exact opposite of that which we are apt to associate distinctively with the eighteenth century, and everywhere in revolt against it. As yet the revolt is fitful and sporadic, and the aristocratic culture of the time is still, for the most part, proof against it. But the progress of the new spirit is not to be judged by the grotesqueness and even absurdity of its earliest manifestations.

"Sentimental" is the word one most naturally applies to these firstfruits of what we must, for the want of a better word, call the Romantic spirit. The blind urge towards tenderness and passion, towards a warmth and colour which the true eighteenth century was incapable of supplying, had as yet no forms of its own through which to express itself, and strove, awkwardly and incongruously, to adapt the conventional forms it found ready to hand. The new wine not unnaturally played havoc with the old bottles, and spilt itself in wild gush and bombast.

We can see something of the new spirit in tomb architecture, particularly in the sheer sensationalism brought into vogue, towards the middle of the century, by the naturalized Frenchman, Roubillac. The peace of Westminster Abbey is not proof against the noisy dispute between Time and some other allegorical figure on the tomb of Field Marshal Wade, nor the apparent efforts of General Hargrave to divest himself of his shroud beneath a toppling wall. Nor is any shilling shocker capable of vieing with the Nightingale tomb, on which an agonized husband tries in vain to protect his young wife from the dart of a grinning skeleton, who emerges from the vault beneath, a device that is plausibly reputed to have made a burglar drop his tools and bolt incontinently out of the Abbey. A taste for horrors is a sure accompaniment of Romance, and Roubillac is of the kindred of Wiertz in painting and Edgar Allen Poe in literature. Even in country churchyards the tombstones of this time are more prolific than ever of skulls and crossbones, not to speak of more ambitious ventures like one at West Malling, where a fat cherub blows his trumpet into the face of a struggling corpse.

It was an incipient Romanticism that started the ridiculous agitation about Captain Jenkins and his ear, and the rest of our grievances against Spain. It is easy to show that, so far as we can talk of a right and wrong in the matter, Walpole was right in urging his countrymen not to burn their fingers in an unnecessary broil with Spain. But the real weakness of his position was not that there was anything wrong about his arguments, but that the country was experiencing a vague yet unmistakable boredom with the whole system of caution and money-making for which he stood. It wanted the coloured and passionate things of life, military glory, the sacking of strange towns and the spoils of golden argosies, and it was ready to listen to any thundering bombast that gave promise of something more exciting than a comfortable balance of trade at the end of the year and perhaps another penny off the land tax. All that was emotional in the English nature had begun to cry out against the intolerable commonsense of Sir Robert and his system.

It was just about this time that a successful printer, already well advanced in middle age, and seemingly the last man from whom anything out of the commonplace might have been expected, published a book that was destined to be a landmark not only in English but in European literature. The elderly printer was called Samuel Richardson, and the title of his book was *Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded*. It is a long and leisurely account of the trials undergone by a good young servant girl in the defence of her honour, and of her ultimate union in lawful wedlock with an eminently desirable young gentleman. It is a book which very superior people profess to be able to read with enjoyment to this day, but which we have never yet beheld out of its place on their shelves. Such as it was, however—and its power of minute observation and frequent insight into character are not to be denied—it took its own generation by storm, and its success was even eclipsed by that of its seven-volume successor, *Clarissa Harlowe*, a young lady of the longest drawn pathos and respectability.

Richardson's novels attained no less of a vogue on the other side of the Channel, and this English influence feeds the stream of thought that is ultimately to sweep the French upper class down the tide of Revolution. It was almost exactly in the middle of the century that Jean Jacques Rousseau was to fling his startling challenge at eighteenth century culture by asking whether the primitive savage might not after all represent a nobler type than the educated and refined gentleman. It was not Richardson's placid way to

thunder challenges of this kind. Very decorously and unobtrusively, he put the eighteenth century aside, by taking for heroines a common kitchen wench, like Pamela, and a middle class Miss of no special attractions, like Clary Harlowe, and by treating his function as a novelist as that of a specialist in the emotions. His rival, Fielding, who leaned to the old, plain-sailing view of human character, was quick to perceive the challenge, and the first of his great novels starts as a skit on Pamela. The issue between Fielding and, still more decidedly, Smollett, on the one hand, and Richardson on the other, is whether the novel is to be a straightforward account of what people do, or an exhaustive analysis of what they feel.

The discovery of the sick soul was no monopoly of the novelist. It was in 1738 that John Wesley, an unbeneficed clergyman of missionary aspirations and boundless energy, who had just returned from the new colony of Georgia, underwent the experience of conversion, and placed himself at the head of a movement that was destined to kindle some of the old fire, long dormant, of Puritan enthusiasm. In spite of the scandalized disapproval of the official clergy, this new Christianity spread like wildfire among the poorer class. It was its strength that its appeal was almost entirely to the emotions. It was enough to convince the sinner that he had hitherto been in a state of potential damnation, and that he could now enter into one of secure and blissful salvation. "Oh, the wrath to come," the preacher Whitefield had cried to his terrified audience, "the wrath to come!" and if even worldlings like Chesterfield were capable of being mildly thrilled, it is no wonder that poor and ignorant people were often thrown, literally, into convulsions.

A greater contrast could not be imagined than that between Wesleyanism, or Methodism as it was called, and the calm and subtle arguments by which philosophic bishops like Butler and Berkeley sought to persuade a presumably educated audience that Christianity had after all a solution for the riddle of the Universe more satisfying than that of Deism. "A horrid thing, a very horrid thing, Sir," was Butler's retort to John Wesley's claim of direct inspiration. Where the new evangelists tried to think, their arguments were generally childish and the spirit in which they were urged too often ill-tempered and unchristian. John Wesley himself was gloomily superstitious and bigoted, and his attitude towards all amusements, however innocent (and he would not have admitted that the word innocent could apply in such a connection) was that of Gilbert's Sir Macklin, who

" Could in every action show
A sin, and nobody could doubt him."

One of his most eloquent sermons is a counterblast to that new-fangled Chinese decoction called tea ! The programme of instruction devised for some wretched schoolboys on whom Wesley got the opportunity to experiment was one from which play and holidays were rigidly excluded, and in which the whole time from four in the morning (the hour of rising, summer and winter) till bedtime, was devoted to one awful round of cramming and godliness. It is comforting to think that Wesley's rules were turned to a dead letter by the negligence of the staff, and the evangelist himself discovered that, in spite of all his efforts, the general tone of the boys remained obstinately Satanic.

The best of Wesleyanism is undoubtedly contained in its hymns, and if the movement had left nothing else but the "*Jesu lover of my soul*" of his brother Charles, which must have brought comfort to tens of thousands of storm-tossed hearts, it would fairly have justified its existence. Scarcely less powerful is the appeal of Toplady's "*Rock of Ages*"—it was the same Toplady, by the way, who characterized John Wesley, in a pamphlet, as "an old fox tarred and feathered", to which Wesley's Christian counter-barrage of "chimney sweeper" and "exquisite coxcomb" seems inadequate. The growing sympathy of the new emotional spirit with nature is shown by the circumstances in which this hymn is said to have been composed, for the idea of the cleft rock was suggested by one in Toplady's own West Country parish at Blagdon, under which he had taken refuge from a passing storm.

What principally distinguishes new Methodism from old Puritanism, is its lack of the Old Testament fighting spirit which had made the gay riders of Rupert like stubble before the swords of the Ironsides, and had set Colonel Rainborow laying down the law as to the right of every "he" in the land to have a voice in his own government. There was never a less democratically inclined person than John Wesley himself, a born disciplinarian and a stickler for the letter of the law. Coming to Jesus was, with the Wesleyans, a personal and spiritual affair ; to have obtained shelter in the Rock of Ages was happiness here and salvation hereafter. There was no particular reason, in the nature of things, why the movement should have taken on this peaceful complexion, unless it is to be sought in the fact that such persecution as it encountered was never sufficiently severe or organized to arouse the flame of resistance.

But in the whole Emotional Revival of the eighteenth century we shall find a certain lack of strength and virility as its besetting weakness.

Some aristocratic observers of the revival were not slow to detect a dangerous democratic tendency in the idea that everybody's soul was of equal importance before God. "This religion," said one great lady, "is highly improper, it teaches the wretches to crawl above their sphere." Her alarm was, as far as her own century was concerned, groundless. If Wesleyanism taught poor people that they had souls, it quite failed to teach them that they had rights, and probably had no small effect in diverting their interests and energies from the channels into which another very different type of revivalist, Jean Jacques Rousseau, was guiding the passions of Frenchmen. It was only in the nineteenth century that the spiritual democracy of Wesleyanism triumphed over the anti-democratic bias imparted to the movement by its founders, and that the little chapel communities, especially of miners, became hotbeds of advanced political doctrine.

While Methodism was yet in its infancy, a deeper though less audible chord was struck from the soul of William Law, a non-juring clergyman, who had acted for a time as spiritual guide to both John and Charles Wesley. He is most celebrated for a rather gloomy manual of devotion whose purport is sufficiently explained by the title "*A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*", in which Law expresses his contempt for not only the pleasures but also for the scholarship of this world. But what, in the very midst of the eighteenth century, is his truest title to fame, is not this popular and almost commonplace appeal, but the fact that in some of his less known writings he may be said to have brought the mystical view of religion back to England.

He was a diligent student of that master initiate, Jacob Boehme, and the result of his investigations was to convince him that all the argument about form and dogma that employed so woeful a proportion of pious energies was mere vanity and illusion, and that religion was nothing more nor less than the art of love. "You have the fullest proof," he pleads earnestly, "in what your salvation precisely consists. Not in any historic faith, or knowledge of anything absent or distant from you, not in any variety of restraints, rules or methods of practising virtues, not in any formality of opinion about faith and works, repentance, forgiveness of sins or justification and sanctification, not in any truth or righteousness that you can

have from yourself, from the best of men or books; but wholly and solely in the life of God, or Christ of God, quickened and born again in you." Nor does Law leave us in any doubt as to that in which the life of God consists:

"Love," he beautifully says, "is the Christ of God . . . Through all the universe of things, nothing is uneasy, or unsatisfied, or restless, but because it is not governed by love."

Here we breathe an atmosphere calmer, more serenely spiritual than that of Methodism, with its barnacle coating of superstition and its noisy quarrels about the trivialities of dogma. But Law was ahead of his age in this conception of religion, and his mystical writings remained unmarked—dumb witnesses to what heights the Emotional Revival of the eighteenth century, even in these its early days, was capable of transporting one receptive spirit.

For the rest, the Emotional Revival was too vague, too elusive a thing, to merit any such definition as is implied in the expression "the Romantic movement". It is apparent as a gradual change of atmosphere, and it would be a futile inquiry whether this or that prominent figure in life or letters is to be classed as a child of the old or of the new age. In Chatham the Romantic spirit seems striving to clothe itself in the forms of the eighteenth century, and the result is that almost grotesque magnificence of phrase and pose that make honest Macaulay characterize him as lacking in simplicity. James Thompson supplies an instance of one who is, in the main, a correct and uninspired poet of the "classical" school, but whose verse is here and there lit by a gleam, if not of pure, at least of genuine inspiration caught from nature herself. But such is the tyranny of the eighteenth century that, before the coming of Blake, inspiration is almost afraid to clothe herself in her proper and self-appointed forms—the best of the poets, even Collins and Gray, are hampered by the strait waistcoat of correctness that it seems unthinkable to discard. All but their most inspired lines have a strange quality of coldness and distance, they are further from us than the Elizabethans and Carolines.

And yet the movement, if we may give it so definite a name, was all the while going forward, and, elusive though it was, working a decisive transformation in the spirit of the nation. Men's eyes were opened to things that had scarcely been suspected before. The Middle Ages grotesquely, fantastically, loomed out of what had, but recently, been a deliberately forgotten past—a time, not of thought, at least in the perspective of the eighteenth century,

but of faith and loyalty, of coloured and mysterious adventure. The countryside, and most especially where it was most uncultivated and barren, took on an air no longer of savageness but of beauty, and was found responsive to certain hitherto unsuspected yearnings of the human soul. A new spirit of tenderness and humanity, feeble at first, but gradually accumulating strength, began to melt the hard frost of the eighteenth century. Strange things became suddenly obvious to a few sensitive souls—that the slave trade had spiritual disadvantages that might overbalance its material gains, that the condition of our jails was a scandal and the severity of the law an outrage, that even animals had feelings to be respected, and a score of similar discoveries. We must not over-estimate the magnitude or swiftness of the change that was taking place, but such as it was, and with all its weakness and lack of direction, it is scarcely too much to say that the highest hope for the future was in its triumph.

2

THE MYSTICISM OF PANGLOSS

We have already had occasion to remark upon one aspect of the eighteenth century, and particularly of eighteenth century England, that was destined to be of great importance in shaping the revolution in human affairs that was in full swing towards its close. In spite of many artificial conventions, it was yet an age of adventurers, of great individualists carving out their own destinies and those of their country. The founding of our Indian Empire was hardly more than an incident in the commercial operations of the East India Company, and was largely due to the genius of one of its subordinate officers, Robert Clive. The future Australian Commonwealth was made possible by the enterprise of Captain Cook, one of the noblest in the long line of English adventurers. The spirit of commerce was impelling vigorous minds to explore every avenue to wealth and prosperity; there was no co-ordination of purpose nor any end in view except for each man to snatch any advantage he could in the general competition.

This was thoroughly in harmony with the philosophy of the time. Nothing is so characteristic of the eighteenth century as a vague and cheerful mysticism—if the term can be applied to anything so stolidly prosaic—to the effect that all was, if not entirely for the best in the best of all possible worlds, at least so ordered by the

Deity as to work out tolerably right in the end. The eighteenth century God was not an indwelling principle, nor an omnipotent and omnipresent Being about everyone's path, spying out all his ways, but a somewhat nebulous power that could be invoked to explain what would otherwise have been inexplicable and to join up, as it were, the loose ends of the universe. He was the God who, according to the faith of improving novelists like Richardson, saw to it that virtue was rewarded and vice punished; He was the "Jehovah, God or Lord", who so arranged matters as to justify Pope's comfortable assurance that "whatever is, is right"; He was, again, the convenient power that Berkeley invoked to give an assurance of reality to an otherwise illusory universe begotten of the thought of each individual thinker.

Such speculations and such a Deity may seem harmless enough until we look a little closer into the consequences they involve. It is not an unreasonable conclusion that, where God or nature may be trusted to guide human affairs, in the mass, to some vaguely desirable conclusion, any human effort to master or control the situation is likely to prove useless, if not positively mischievous. "Look after the pence and God will take care of the pounds" was the spirit in which mankind was prepared to face the enormous transformation in the conditions of life that was shortly to be accomplished. *Laissez faire! Laissez passer!* Full speed ahead all round! Providence was working, through human effort, to great ends. The best we could do was to let her work unimpeded.

This strange belief in a power, indifferently described as God or nature, controlling the larger issues of human activity and thereby superseding human effort, had not a little to do with determining the philosophy of Adam Smith, whose *Wealth of Nations*, given to the world in 1776, had an immense influence over thought and policy during the most momentous economic transition of our history. Smith had already established his reputation by a treatise on the Moral Sentiments, in which he had pinned his faith to a God of the most genial eighteenth century type, who so ordered His universe as to produce the maximum of happiness all round, and with those benevolent intentions all that we had to do was to fall in harmoniously. This philosophic optimism is less explicitly postulated in *The Wealth of Nations*, and Smith, despite Buckle's opinion to the contrary, was too well-informed and judicially minded to hang his whole system on a chain of deductive reasoning. But the idea of a natural, and therefore beneficent order of things, is obviously

at the back of his mind, and is largely responsible for the conclusions at which he arrives, the general effect of them being that the State, as representing collective human effort, ought to stand aside in all but a few exceptional instances, and that God or nature has some mysterious alchemy by which the selfishness of every individual man will, if allowed free play, work together more effectively for the common good than the most strenuous altruism.

We have, then, to realize two facts of the utmost importance about England at the opening of that period of headlong transition known as the Industrial Revolution: firstly, that there was an immense amount of individual energy seeking to realize itself through commercial channels; secondly, that the general opinion of the time held this energy to be a good thing in itself, and one which, given free play, would undoubtedly tend to the common good. To give each man's selfishness its head and to trust to God and the chapter of accidents, was the utmost of which humanity, in the mass, believed itself capable. Certainly the attempts of the State to regulate commerce gave some ground for believing that the less it interfered in economic matters the better.

3

SINEWS OF PROGRESS

The tremendous advance in man's power over nature that proceeds with steadily accelerating pace during the second half of the century, and dwarfs into insignificance the wars and political convulsions that fill so large a place in history, might easily have been anticipated by anyone capable of reading the signs of the times. What was lacking to the progress of invention was not so much brain power, as the economic conditions in which brain-power could find scope and stimulation. The idea of the steam engine was as old as Hero of Alexandria, an effective stocking frame had been invented in the reign of Elizabeth, but such inventions had hung fire because the time was not yet ripe for them. It is necessary for mechanical progress to march on a broad front; it is no good for instance to have a power-loom unless you can spin yarn rapidly enough to feed it; a railway will be impracticable before you have abundant supplies of coal, and before you have attained a certain proficiency in the smelting and manufacture of iron. Above all, to use any of these inventions successfully you must have a liberal backing of capital.

We have already seen how the comparative prosperity of England, with her unique commercial position and her absence of land frontiers, had led, up to the time of the South Sea Bubble, to a steady accumulation of capital—that is to say of wealth in the possession of individual owners in excess of their immediate needs—and how, with the growth of this excess wealth, the opportunities for profitable investment had grown too. The collapse of the South Sea ramp, as well as of Law's Mississippi Bank, had taught an elementary if necessary lesson that capital, if it is to bring in permanent profits, must do real work in creating fresh wealth, and can in no way be increased by the inflation of shares on the stock exchange. The lesson, though it was far from being finally digested, never had to be repeated again in so crude a form; the peaceful years of Walpole's administration were a time of steady and solid progress, and if the wars of the forties had the effect of all wars in wasting wealth, we were at least in a more favourable position than our principal rivals on the Continent.

Some idea of the extent of our material progress may be gathered from the figures quoted in the most recent edition of Porter's *Progress of the Nation*, figures which have the sanction of that greatest of all statistical experts, Sir Robert Giffen. Between 1720, the year of the South Sea collapse, and 1750, the population is estimated to have increased by half a million to seven millions, while the amount of the nation's capital had advanced from £370 million to £500 million or from £57 to £71 per head of the population. In the next half century, according to the same estimate, the amount of that capital was to be trebled, and its amount per head of the population considerably more than doubled.

Making every allowance for the wide margin of error that is natural in such statistics, we are at least safe in affirming that there was a large amount of disposable wealth seeking any profitable outlet, as well as an invisible fund of human energy keenly intent on seizing every opportunity for getting rich. A scientific spirit had long been abroad that had suggested unlimited possibilities of man's command over nature. But for a long time science had shown little disposition to harness herself to the chariot of commerce. The first members of the Royal Society, on the whole, had displayed a singularly pure enthusiasm for knowledge for its own sake, and utilitarian motives had played little part in their proceedings. This pure enthusiasm, however, had gone the way of most other enthusiasms during the Pudding Age, and the leadership of European science departs from England with the passing of Wren, Newton,

and their peers. Respectable British work is done throughout the century in enlarging the frontiers of human knowledge, but there are no British names to compare with those of Linnaeus, Euler, Buffon, Laplace and Lavoisier in what we may describe as the realms of pure science.

It was in the strictly utilitarian sphere that the most striking English work was to be accomplished during the eighteenth century. A new generation of practical scientists arose, men whose whole energies were bent on the attainment of some lucrative result, and who were, as a rule, of limited education, and sometimes almost illiterate. "Rugged Brindley," for example, could never learn to spell to his dying day, and Arkwright, the "old shaver", made strenuous efforts in his prosperous years to teach himself how to write decent English. Many of the greatest inventors were practical workmen, who were shrewd enough to hit upon ways whereby labour could be shortened. The idea of the spinning jenny, for instance, came to James Hargreaves, originally a carpenter and weaver, by the accident of a spindle falling on the floor and continuing to revolve, which set Hargreaves thinking out the idea of a multiple spindle, spinning several threads at once.

4

THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION

This spirit of inventive enterprise was by no means the monopoly of workmen and mechanics. The English upper class of the eighteenth century was distinguished from the devoted French aristocracy by nothing so much as its enterprise and business ability. The name of the Duke of Bridgewater will forever be associated with the improvement of inland water communication; but it was most of all in the business of agriculture that the average English nobleman or squire found scope for his energies. The traditional open field system of cultivation, whatever its advantages in maintaining the freedom of the cultivator, was, from a productive standpoint, hopelessly out of date, and with its wasteful and antiquated methods, was a barrier against any sort of progress. Nor were the small cultivators and yeomen, who eked out an exiguous livelihood with a minimum of capital and education, likely to depart from the traditional methods, even if they could have afforded to do so. The impulse for improvement must come, if it was to come at all, from above, and come it did. From quite an early date in the eighteenth

of contention, and all the money that was lavishly poured out in bribes did not succeed in forcing an admission from the Irish Commons that money bills could originate anywhere but with them. But progress, under such handicaps, was painfully slow, and even such loyal Irishmen as Henry Flood had little sympathy with the unrepresented Catholic majority, so bowed down that they had hardly the spirit to resent their chains. The hard-living, duelling and money-scattering landowners treated them like dogs, flogged them out of their way, and, in their capacity of justices, systematically refused them any redress. No wonder "blarney" became one of the Irishman's principal accomplishments.

But the nemesis of tyranny was at hand. The British government, in its stupid greed, had made the almost incredible blunder of alienating its own Protestant garrison in the North. The Penal Laws pressed nearly as heavily on Dissenters as on Catholics, and the Toleration Act passed on William III's accession was not even extended to include Ireland. For an industrious community, largely of Scottish descent, the fiscal laws that clogged trade and stifled industry were peculiarly galling. And when England's necessity created Ireland's opportunity, the strange spectacle was seen of Protestant Ulster, despite the memories of Londonderry, standing in the van of Irish liberty.

As the struggle against America and a Europe either in arms or in armed neutrality strained England's resources to the utmost; Ireland had to be depleted of regular troops and was practically defenceless to a French invasion that might come at any moment. Under these circumstances it was only the dictate of patriotism and commonsense for Ireland to organize her own defence by enrolling an army of volunteers. This army was at first exclusively Protestant, and though after some time Catholics were admitted to serve, it remained under Protestant command, and expressive of the Protestant will. Its commander was a Lord Charlemont, one of the most charming and cultured of eighteenth century noblemen, and scion of one of those great Planter families that had received plundered land of the O'Neills, and whose head had been murdered by an O'Neill in 1641.

The volunteers, once formed, were naturally in command of the situation. Ireland, as represented by her Protestant aristocracy, faced England with a sword in her hand. Her leaders were men of genius and statesmanship, who knew how to turn the situation to practical advantage. This situation was not at all unlike that with

which George III and his ministers had already been confronted in America, and even that most obstinate of monarchs might well hesitate before embarking on two wars of independence at once. The question of England's commercial tyranny had been a burning one for some years, and even Lord North's government might have had the sense to make concessions had not the English and Scottish manufacturing towns raised a howl about their interests being imperilled. Ireland had, at the time, answered by a very effective "swadeshi" boycott, but now she had a better argument, which was lucidly stated by placards attached to two cannons—"Free Trade or This!" It so happened that England was getting quite as much as she wanted of "This" in other fields, and so she kindly conceded the measure of elementary justice that she had so long withheld.

But the volunteers had not done. The Parliament had, for thirty years now, been feeling after independence, and the time had come to take it. England, forced to a disastrous peace, humiliated and almost bankrupt, was passing through a phase of hearty reaction against any attempt to impose her will by force overseas. Her new Whig rulers included men of sincerely liberal principles, and they made the best of a bad business by conceding generously and without reservation the full demands of the volunteers and the Irish Parliament. The independence of that Parliament was absolutely recognized, and the only formal tie that bound Ireland to England was supplied by their common sovereign. That single-hearted patriot and superb orator, Henry Grattan, who might at this juncture have been called the uncrowned King of Ireland, passed between the volunteer ranks to the Parliament House to salute the dawning of Ireland's freedom. "I am now to address a free people," were his words, "I found Ireland on her knees; I watched over her with paternal solicitude; I have traced her progress from injuries to arms, and from arms to liberty. Spirit of Swift, spirit of Molyneux, your genius has prevailed! Ireland is now a nation. In that character I hail her, and, bowing in her august presence, I say *Esto perpetua!*"

CHAPTER V

THE LAST STRUGGLE WITH FRANCE

I

SENSIBILITY AND VISION

IN one of his most inspired sonnets, Wordsworth calls before our imagination a fallen tower—

“That in the morning royally did wear
Its coat of weeds, but could not even sustain
Some casual shout that woke the silent air,
Or the unimaginable touch of time.”

We are reminded of this image when we think of how the splendid French court and aristocracy, that had set the tone to eighteenth century culture, came crashing in ruin. “Oh how suddenly,” says the Psalmist, “do they consume away, perish, and come to a fearful end!” Pity and terror will always dwell on the events of those five years between the storming of the Bastille and the crash of the knife that cut short Robespierre’s yell of agony. But to the historian, the French Revolution is but the noisy and almost inevitable outcome of forces that had long been at work throughout the whole of Western Europe, and which continued their onward movement with comparatively slight acceleration.

No such catastrophe testified to the working of these forces in England. To all outward appearance the course of our history, at a time when thrones and systems were collapsing throughout Europe, was one of victorious reaction, and even when a great constitutional change did, at long last, come, it was in the form of the 1832 Reform Bill, which merely transferred part of the power wielded by the aristocracy into the hands of the bourgeoisie, perhaps a useful but scarcely an inspiring piece of work.

None the less it will be found that changes were going on beneath the surface in England, as momentous in their consequences as any, and that England can show as rich a harvest of creative beauty as any other country. The fact that she did not plunge into the horror and bloodshed of violent revolution does not prove that she was lacking in ideas, but rather that her ideas were too deep-rooted

in the soil of her past to be easily upturn. "The loud blast," says Thompson—

"that rends the skies
Serves but to root thy native oak."

The French monarchy and its dependent aristocracy were built upon the sands of bureaucratic despotism, but the British Constitution was founded, for good or ill, upon that rock of centuries, the English Common Law.

When the storm of the Revolution burst upon France, the Emotional Revival had proceeded far enough with us to have profoundly affected the outlook of educated men, and even touched the lives of the people. Dr. Johnson died in the year after the younger Pitt's accession to office, and his death was like the passing of an epoch. Massive commonsense was giving place to sensibility; it would be hardly exaggerating the transition to say that the rediscovery was made of man's soul. Johnson's psychology was of the most simple and obvious. To him there was nothing mysterious about human personality; "Thou knowest the commandments," would have summed up his message of salvation. A man's whole duty was to conform, earnestly and sensibly, to the precepts of established morality, to fear God, to honour the King and all who were put in authority under him, and to labour manfully in whatever station of life it should please God to call him, without indulging in treasonable cant about liberty, or drivelling about the complexities of his soul. Johnson had something of an inquisitor's eye for any sort of mysticism, ecstacy or enthusiasm, and he trounced them with resounding severity when he detected germs of them in the poetry of Collins and Gray. The muse herself must conform to the dictates of commonsense.

But now the current was flowing with ever increasing force against Johnson and all that he stood for. Whitefield and the Wesleys effected their spiritual revolution by discovering that man had not only a soul, but a sick soul in need of a divine physician, a foul soul to be cleaned in sacrificial blood, a lonely soul crying out for a lover. And William Cowper, whose soul was congenitally sick, discoursed of its malady and its cure in verse instinct with a greater intensity of feeling than any which eighteenth century England had as yet produced. In the secular sphere, the work of Richardson in the analysis, or rather the intuition of character, was taken up by that strangest of clergymen, Laurence Sterne, who in his *Namur* veteran, *Uncle Toby*, has created a character whom to read of is to

know, and to know is to love. A scarcely less lovable figure is the almost Christlike Dr. Primrose in Goldsmith's *Vicar of Wakefield*.

A new atmosphere of tenderness and compassion was beginning to pervade life and literature. Goldsmith's *Deserted Village* threw a light on the process of enclosing commons, of joining house to house and field to field in the interests of scientific agriculture, which had probably never dawned on landlords and legislators :

" Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey
Where wealth accumulates and men decay."

Cowper's hypersensitive spirit was cut to the quick by any tale of injustice or cruelty, and he denounced, now with lofty indignation, now with burning scorn, the iniquities of the traffic in slaves that brought prosperity to Liverpool merchants and luxuries to well-to-do breakfast tables. But there was food enough for pity without crossing the seas. In 1783 the Reverend George Crabbe, who had gone through the mill as a day labourer and therefore harboured no pastoral illusions about a happy countryside, depicted the life of a typical English village in colours of such naked realism as to make almost intolerable reading. Merrie England, the country of roast beef and plum-pudding, with her increasing prosperity and swelling commerce was, seen from this new standpoint, no better than a sordid Hell.

But it was not only to mankind that the new-found sympathy of the Emotional Revival was extended. We have already seen how Hogarth had opened his great heart to the sufferings not only of his fellow men, but of the very animals. The tendency in Christian Europe (with one or two beautiful exceptions, like that of Saint Francis) had been to regard animals as creatures without souls, and therefore cut off from brotherhood with man. There was no legend comparable to that of all the animals weeping for the death of Buddha ; Christ's care for the sparrows passed almost unnoticed, whereas Paul's query, "doth God take thought for oxen?" was evidently one of those to which, as the Latin Grammar says, an answer is expected in the negative.

But now the spirit, if not the letter of Christianity, was being extended to embrace all God's creatures, even in default of our present knowledge that these creatures are in very truth and blood our kinsfolk.

"My uncle Toby," says Sterne, "had scarce the heart to retaliate on a fly," and having caught one which had been tormenting him cruelly at dinner, "Go," says he, lifting up the sash and opening

his hand as he spoke to let it escape, "go, poor devil get thee gone, why should I hurt thee? This world surely is wide enough to hold both thee and me."

Christopher Smart, a poet of much importance in his day, was able to understand the tragedy of a captive eagle, and Cowper was the friend of every animal that breathed, except perhaps one surly old bull, who caused him such perturbation of mind that he got its owner to have it taken away. Even Horace Walpole, we have seen, was fond of dogs and indignant at the panic cruelty of a rabies scare. And the heart of the great Unromantic, Samuel Johnson, was yet large enough to have a warm corner for cats—did he not lumber round in person getting oyster suppers for Hodge, "a very fine cat indeed?"

But for sheer warmth of sympathy for everything that breathed, none of these men quite reached the intensity of Robert Burns, by whose genius the prosaic and rather sordid life of the Scottish Lowlands became invested with all the beauty of romance. He could not even deny a warm corner in his heart to the Devil, or believe that he could really find pleasure in hearing the squeals of "poor dogs" like the by no means sinless bard. Perhaps the very wildness of his own life widened the scope of his charity, for he was equally attracted by the pious and God-fearing cotter, and the "randie, gangrel bodies", who bartered their rags for an evening of drink and lechery. For animals he had an understanding tenderness more manly than that of Cowper. He knew what it was to be torn with anxiety for the life of a favourite lamb, and to burn with compassionate indignation at the sight of a wounded hare. But Burns, if he expressed what was best in the Emotional Revival, shared also in its weakness, that lack of moral fibre which was the handicap of the Romantic spirit both here and abroad. The author of *The Cotter's Saturday Night* was not above the pornography and treacle of *The lass that made the bed to me*, not to speak of certain cruder if less nauseating efforts that are not published in collected editions.

The scope of Romantic sympathy was not confined to flesh and blood. If the destruction of a field mouse's nest by his plough made Burns—

"truly sorry man's dominion
Has broken nature's social union."

he was not less grieved when the coulter turned down a mountain daisy, for the brave and unassuming life thus untimely cut short, finding in the sister flower's fate the image of his own. The attitude

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of the earlier eighteenth century towards nature had been one of somewhat contemptuous patronage; any description of her must be in the most abstract and formal terms, as if familiarity with her were something almost indecent and certainly vulgar. All this was now changed, for if to the passionless intellect nature is something to be improved out of existence, to the warm heart she was a perpetual source of refreshment and consolation.

There were two ways in which nature appealed to the hearts of men. To some, she was lovable not for her own sake, but by the human emotions she typified. Thus by Coleridge the masses of white cloud vapour, driven by the winds across the sky, were endowed with a tameless caprice, and made the types of liberty. Streams murmured because they were sorry, and the poor nightingale was never allowed to utter a note expressive of anything but the most profound pessimism, frequently aggravated by pressing his (or rather her, for nightingales were tacitly assumed to exist only in the female gender) breast against a thorn. It was under this guise that nature had almost always appeared to the Elizabethans, to whom the rose smelt not of itself but of a lady, and who heard the cuckoo, from every tree, poking rather indelicate fun at married men.

But the conception of the brotherhood, and in the true, democratic sense, the equality of all living and even inanimate things, anticipating as it does the doctrine of evolution, may almost be said to be the discovery of the Emotional Revival, at least as far as Europe is concerned, for the conception had long been implicit in the Hindu philosophy and in its offshoot, Buddhism. It was the discovery of such men as Burns in poetry and Turner in painting that nature could be loved not only for man's sake, but for her own.

"He prayeth best who loveth best
All things, both great and small."

It was the discovery made by the Japanese artist, Kano Motonobu, that to paint anything successfully was to be that thing—thus, when he would set about painting a crane, he would pass the night standing on one leg, and entering, as far as possible, into the crane's feelings. As the Emotional Revival proceeds, this conception of nature begins to gain ground, at any rate among the greatest spirits. Perhaps it is a result of the humiliation of man, which we saw was one aspect of humanism, that he should sink his pride to brotherhood with the worm, and the very clod of clay, to whom Blake gives so eloquent a voice:

"We live not for ourselves.
Thou seest me, the meanest thing, and so I am indeed."

My bosom of itself is cold and of itself is dark ;
But He, that loves the lowly, pours His oil upon my head,
And kisses me, and binds His nuptial bands around my breast,
And says : 'Thou mother of my children, I have loved thee,
And I have given thee a crown that none can take away.
And how this is, sweet maid, I know not, and I cannot know ;
I ponder and I cannot ponder ; yet I live and love.'

The new-found sympathy, that took all nature for its province, was not neglectful of past ages. The eighteenth century culture had been nothing if not exclusive. So far were the fine gentlemen of Versailles and their imitators convinced that they had discovered the true way of life, that they were consistent in treating less polite ages—the whole of the past, that is to say, with the exception of classic antiquity—as merely brutal and barbarous. Gothic was in those days a term of contempt. Certainly England, with her not wholly unfortunate freedom from logical consistency, had been, at the worst, less intolerant than her neighbour towards the times of faith and energy. Dryden, who had done more than any other man of letters to effect the transition to the eighteenth century standpoint, had at the same time been a warm and discriminating admirer of Chaucer, and Addison had gone on with the good work of keeping alive the glory of at least the most prominent national classics. Sir William Temple, though a champion of the "classics" against the "moderns", had gone to the origins of Nordic literature in translating the death song of the Viking Ragnar.

When, therefore, the Emotional Revival came to exploit this rich field of the past, it found the soil already, to a certain extent, prepared. In the reaction from the colourless rationality of the prose age there was a wild and often uncritical rush to satisfy long starved emotional cravings by ransacking the treasures of the past and, on occasion, counterfeiting them. Readers of Jane Austen, who had no patience with this kind of thing, will remember how, at the end of the century, the bookstalls were lurid with genteel dreadfuls about black magic and bloody chambers, so that poor Catherine Morland, on her visit to General Tilney, saw nameless horror in cabinets and uxoricide in washing-bills. Chatterton, a poor boy of Bristol, saturating himself in the fifteenth century in that most sumptuous of all parish churches, St. Mary Redclyffe, burst on the world with a galaxy of poems that ought to have been written, if they were not, by a monk called Rowley. James Macpherson, whose fate was less tragic, in creating what he professed to transcribe as the poems of Ossian, caught at least some portion of the dreamy opulence of the old Celtic bards, though Dr. Johnson, who liked Celts as little as he did

forgery, purchased a peculiarly big stick to deal with Macpherson in case of possible necessity.

The man who distilled the pure essence of the Emotional Revival, in whom it attained its most complete and unalloyed manifestation, was William Blake, who lived almost unknown and whose genius was only discovered long after his death—that lyric passing, as he himself expressed it, “into another room,” after making the rafters ring with the hymns that burst from his escaping soul. Blake’s revolt against the correctness and Johnsonian commonsense of the eighteenth century was so uncompromising and, at times, so extravagant, that prosaic people have had some difficulty in deciding whether he was or was not in his perfect mind. It is a controversy into which we shall not enter, nor shall we moot the further question whether, if Blake were mad, it would not be better to be mad than sane. It is certain, however, in the light of our present knowledge, that much of what Blake, in his later years, took to be the direct inspiration of spirits was—with all due respect to commentators of voluminous solemnity—a trick of automatic writing for whose explanation there is no special reason to invoke ghostly assistance.

It is with Blake, the busy, capable man and the master craftsman in two arts, that we are here concerned, and we shall beg leave to premise that his work is of most value where it speaks straight to the heart, and comparatively negligible where it has to be worked like a Chinese puzzle to a solution. It is as a poet, and not as a Kabalist that he ought to be judged, and it is often a simple matter to make out the general sense even of his “prophetic books” without reference to a “Who’s Who” of all the symbolic bogies that run riot in his imagination. It is in words of lucid simplicity that he arraigns the spirit of his time and points out a better way. He considers that the poetry of the Johnsonian age lacks inspiration, “the sound is forced, the notes are few”; he sees England fallen away from her former goodly estate to an old age in which the arts are frozen and commerce settles on every tree. He has a yet more horrible vision of the “chartered streets” of London, with marks of weakness and woe depicted on every face, with the starving veteran’s sigh running “in blood down palace walls” and the youthful harlot’s curse blighting the “marriage hearse” with plagues. The effects of expanding trade and industry are as dreadful to him as they were admirable to economic bards of the previous generation.

His remedy is to transform the human mind by forsaking

uninspired reason, which he personifies in the terrible figure of Urizen, the "father of jealousy", and to give free rein to the passionate intuition whence alone springs delight and wisdom. This he proclaims in such memorable phrases as "energy is eternal delight", "everything that lives is holy", "the soul of sweet delight can never be destroyed", "the road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom".

This energy, or passionate intuition, fulfils the same place in Blake's thought as the categorical imperative of the moral law does in Kant's, only Blake's ideal is less austere and formal, more completely a product of the Emotional Revival. It leads him to carry all the tendencies of that revival to their extreme conclusion. So completely does he mingle his spirit with all around him that he attains to the point not only of loving his neighbour as himself, but of admitting to neighbourhood the very flies and clods. Not Cowper, nor even Burns, with all their love for innocent fellow-creatures could have coined a couplet of such poignancy as :

"Each outcry of the hunted hare
A fibre from the brain doth tear."

and though the skylark's song was to call forth the most inspired strains of Wordsworth and Shelley, even they could not surpass the burning directness of appeal that informs such lines as :

"His little throat labours with inspiration, every feather
On throat and breast and wings vibrates with the effluence divine.
All nature listens silent to him, and the awful sun
Stands still upon the mountain looking on this little bird
With eyes of soft humility and wonder, love and awe."

Blake, who, whatever may have been the eccentricities of his method, was the most consistent of men to his guiding principles, could not fail to be a champion of liberty in the broadest sense, a far broader sense than most men would dream of attaching to the word. He would see men and women happy in the full development of their powers and capacities for enjoyment, he crowns liberty with love, because by love alone can the soul break the shell of selfish jealousy. "Can that be love, that drinks another as a sponge drinks water?" Love is not love that binds the freedom of its object. God is love, love is liberty.

"And trees, and birds, and beasts, and men behold their eternal joy,
Arise, you little glancing wings and sing your infant joy!
Arise and drink your bliss, for everything that lives is holy!"

It is not surprising that with these views Blake saw first in the American revolt and then in the French Revolution types of the liberation that he sought. It is difficult to know, amid the vast, cloudy images that he conjures up, whether he is symbolizing political

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abroad, but diverted the hostility of the British working man from a domestic to a foreign foe. But then there is little evidence that the working man, in the mass, did regard his landlord or employer as an enemy, however justifiable we, in light of the facts, might elect to consider such hostility.

There is this that distinguishes the English squire and manufacturer from the French seigneur—with all their faults and tyrannies, they were known to their dependents and commanded their respect. Even the Lancashire master cotton spinners, ruthless and close-fisted as they generally were, were of the same class as the men they employed, speaking the same accent and in perpetual contact with them. Anyone who knows the Lancashire temperament—and the same is more or less true of other new manufacturing districts—will realize the cheerful and democratic recognition of success, particularly in the matter of acquiring what is known as “brass”. The fact that the boss, or “’ard Bob” as he is more probably styled, has made his own pile, proves that he has successfully accomplished what every one of his employees wishes he could do for himself. The presumption is that in a world where natural selection is instinctively recognized as the basis of morality, “’ard Bob” is the best man and respected accordingly. It must be remembered that this was before the limited liability system had deadened the personal touch.

As for the squire, it is certainly possible to establish a case that his dependents were little better off economically than those of the seigneur. But there the resemblance ends between the two. The seigneur, from the peasant’s point of view, was at once a stranger, an oppressor, and a drone. He was rarely seen; he would have scorned to know the faces of his peasants or the difference between oats and barley; he was no more than the licensed robber who extracted money and services—often humiliating—for which he did nothing in return, and in his public capacity he and his order were reducing the country to the verge of ruin by refusing to shoulder the burden of taxation. Accordingly when the opportunity presented itself of sacking the château of the Marquis de Carabas, Jacques Bonhomme saw no valid reason for refusing to take it.

Very different was the atmosphere that emanated from the squire’s hall. Whatever else they might be, the great majority of squires were thoroughly conversant with their business of agriculture and stock-raising, and the best of them were men of energy and ideas who applied scientific methods to their task of making two blades

of corn grow where one had grown before. Nor had any word been coined in English to render the exact sense of *canaille*. Even at the worst times, there was a tie of sentiment which united the squire both to his neighbours and his dependents. The tradition of Sir Roger de Coverley was by no means extinct, and when, in 1821, Maclean wrote his admirable, jog-trot epic of a typical old English squire, he concluded with a dance of all the villagers in the servants' hall :

" For the squire ever liked all around him to see
With broad happy faces and hearts full of glee."

The very tradition that has grown up round the figure of the old-time squire is not without its significance. And if those very able but somewhat one-sided writers, Mr. and Mrs. Hammond, lay stress on the words that often greet us in French official reports, " This lord is at law with his vassals," they should in fairness have added that it would have been possible to say, in England, " This squire"—Coke of Norfolk is a case in point—" works with his labourers, and this Duke plays cricket with his gardener."

For no survey of English country life would be adequate that failed to take account of sport. The country gentleman was, like Squire Western, as keen a sportsman as he was an agriculturist, and the one was almost as strong a tie as the other between him and his people. This was the golden age of foxhunting, a sport that brought together everyone in the district with a horse to ride—those in the neighbourhood of the meet would open doors and bottles to those who had hacked over, on the previous day, from remote districts. A fine orgy would take place in the evening after one of the prodigiously long and leisurely runs then in vogue, often at the house of the principal nobleman or squire of the district. The punch would be stirred with a fox's brush, and the Duke of Northumberland once went so far as to eat a fox's head, devilled. Apart from its influence in promoting neighbourly feeling among the landowning class, fox-hunting gave employment to a great number of hunt-servants and grooms, and must have made as powerful an appeal as it does now to the sporting instincts of the English yokel. When the chorus goes round of " the traitor is seized on and dies ", " the happy domestics ", we read, " recovered from their fatigues, become inspired by the general joy and instinctively join in the chorus." A marked contrast, this, with the sister sport of shooting, which was thoroughly a class amusement, and protected by game laws of a fiendish severity recalling the old Norman forest laws.

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Boxing was another sport patronized impartially by all classes, and by some held to be a valuable national institution, both as keeping up a manly, English spirit, and delivering us from the Continental horrors of the knife and stiletto. Knight, in his *Principles of Taste*, was scarcely exaggerating the general sentiment when he described boxing as "perhaps the only security now left, either for our civil liberty or political independence". Fighting with fists was as much the accomplishment of the gentleman as of the rough, and it was no uncommon thing for the former to offer the latter the honour of bodily combat. Frederick, Prince of Wales, William Windham, the statesman, not to speak of John Keats, were heroes of such encounters. The frequent big prize fights were the delight of Johnny Raw no less than of the buck and Corinthian.

It was during the eighteenth century—in the South Eastern counties principally—that the most distinctively English of all games, cricket, began to take a hold. As early as 1723 we have the evidence, in an itinerary of the second Earl of Oxford, that club cricket was being played between places as remote from each other as Dartford and Tonbridge, and in 1740 we find Chesterfield, of all people, exhorting his son to excel all other boys in cricket as well as in learning. The democracy of a game which then, as now, brought butchers and baronets together on terms of equality is recognized, not approvingly, by a writer in the *Gentleman's Magazine* in 1743. But the spirit of the game was too strong to be quenched by snobbishness. It was in 1777 that the great match was played in which the Hambledon Club took on All England and defeated them by an innings and 168—when the Duke of Dorset, captain of the England side, went in first with Lumpy, "a bit of a smuggler" as well as the finest bowler in England, and was bowled for a duck by Farmer Brett. No incident shows to better advantage the spirit of sportsmanlike comradeship than that of the violin presented, with carriage paid, by this same Duke to the fiddler and batsman, John Small, and the return gift of two bats to his Grace, with the carriage likewise paid by the donor.

Such incidents may seem below the dignity of history, but no record of English country life that confined itself merely to the statistics, important as these are, of food prices and pauperism, and failed to take into account the whole spirit of that life as it must have appeared to one who lived it, would be anything but incomplete and misleading. It may be argued that such alleviations as we have described were merely the gilding on the pill of misery, but even so, the fact that the pill was gilded is of the utmost practical importance.

During the long war with France it is remarkable how little evidence there is of serious disloyalty among the still preponderant agricultural community. Even in the towns such discontent as there was was sporadic and did not assume dangerous proportions till the peace. This may be cited as a miracle of patience or passivity, but it cannot be ignored.

Never, at anyrate, was there a class with less conviction of sin than that of the squirearchy who were the backbone of our resistance to France through these long years. It was a class that prized, and indeed deserved, no epithet so much as that of "manly". It delighted in producing such heroes as the famous Jack Mytton, who regularly drank six bottles of port a day besides incredible quantities of brandy, and who, by his dare-devil and hardly sane feats of sportsmanship, earned the nickname of "Neck-or-nothing". This class was perpetually in the open air, when not drinking or sleeping off a muscular debauch, and with the close of the eighteenth century began to lose much of its intellectual leaven, though a tradition of scholarly culture was still maintained in the greater houses. It furnished Wellington with his officers and the Tory Government with its majority. It was losing, not only in numbers but in thinking capacity, to its rival, the growing middle class of the towns. Nevertheless, we have no warrant for characterizing it as unpopular.

3

CONSTITUTION VERSUS REVOLUTION

We have yet to take account of the main element of stability in Pitt's England, that furnished by the Constitution itself or, in the last resort, by the Common Law which is the soul of that Constitution. Never had Englishmen been more conscious of this heritage of theirs, from which the most profound thinkers of the Continent had not withheld their admiration. In 1765 had appeared the first volume of a veritable epic of English Law in the shape of Blackstone's *Commentaries*, the most popular and influential, though perhaps not the most erudite, of all the long series of English law books. Blackstone, though he did not claim that they were incapable of improvement, wrote of the law and Constitution as a lover, "of a constitution so strongly raised, and so highly finished, it is hard to speak with that praise which is justly and severely its due:—the thorough and attentive contemplation of it will furnish its best panegyric."

It is in no illiberal spirit that Blackstone expounds the principles of a law whose most important function it is to guard the liberties of Englishmen, which consist, primarily, "in the free enjoyment of personal security, of personal liberty and of private property." But Blackstone's adoration of the law made him too ready to regard it as something complete and perfect, to defend all existing institutions and even abuses for no better reason than because they existed. This of course was clean contrary to the spirit of the English Constitution, which, in spite of its invariable habit of seeking justification in precedent, had in fact been a continuously growing and improving organism.

It is here that we encounter the dividing line in English political thought, now that the old issue of the Crown versus Parliament passes out of date. In spite of George III's dishing of his Whig enemies, the Crown was a spent force. The idea of the patriot King had failed to materialize from the sheer inability of the Hanoverian dynasty to produce one. George III was only powerful for mischief; his two successors had not enough character to be powerful for anything. The Constitution and the Revolution Settlement commanded the lip homage of both parties. It was when it came to fixing the boundaries of this common ground that there was scope for disagreement. The new Tory tended, with Blackstone, to regard established institutions as fixed and sacrosanct, to hold that any attempt seriously to reform the Constitution was to fly in the face of ancestral wisdom. He was inclined to outwhig Whiggism in upholding the letter of the Revolution Settlement, and deified the very Whig fathers whom his own fathers had impeached. The new Whig, on the other hand, regarded the Revolution as something still going on, and he conceived that he was best honouring the principles of Locke and Somers by keeping the Constitution, as they had done, abreast of the times. There were, of course, almost as many different shades of Whiggism as there were Whigs, but the broad distinction between a static and a dynamic Constitution was what divided the party of Pitt from that of Fox.

On the extreme left of Whiggism were to be found a mixed assortment of root and branch reformers, the spiritual descendants of the old Levellers, who had begun to take the name of "Radicals". The principles of these men were those that had long before been formulated by the ironside Colonel Rainborow, that "the poorest he that is in England hath a right to live as the greatest he", and, most important of all, the right to choose the men by whom he shall

be governed. This opinion was strongest among that Dissenting community to which Rainborow had belonged and for which he had died. Prominent among these new Levellers were the Unitarian, Priestley, the most distinguished scientist that England then possessed, Dr. Richard Price, an economist who believed the salvation of the country to depend on Parliamentary reform, and "the father of English Radicals", Major Cartwright, a typical old sailor, very bluff and kindly, with a religion of his own based on the Bible, and a belief in universal suffrage and annual Parliaments, which he reiterated with a monotonous obstinacy that at last gained him quite a considerable influence.

The abuse on which all reformers concentrated was that of Parliamentary representation. A haphazard and ridiculously small minority formed the ostensible electorate, and a great many of the seats were recognized private property. This was the pass to which nearly a century of oligarchy and lip homage to the Revolution had reduced Britain, and her most enlightened statesmen were agreed that some way ought to be found at least of mitigating the scandal. The younger Pitt had inherited the cause of reform from his father, and was its ardent champion on his first entrance into Parliament. But the weight of ministerial responsibility and a Tory majority soon lay upon him heavy as frost, and a few years of office were enough to make him veer gradually round to the static and conservative view of the Constitution which was Blackstone's. He helped to sharpen the militant Radicalism of nonconformists by refusing to make an end of the intolerant legislation against them, and in 1792 he turned savagely on those still progressive Whigs, who continued to advocate the very reform of Parliament for which he had himself stood in the ardent dawn of his career.

Pitt was, according to his lights, a sincere patriot; like his father, he believed that he had the power to save the country, but his ideas, prematurely stunted by responsibility, moved in a much narrower circle. He could play the game of eighteenth century politics with consummate ability; he had already, by sound administration, nursed back Britain to solvency at home and prestige abroad, and he desired nothing better than a free hand to play the game according to the recognized rules. He was therefore, at first, rather pleased than otherwise at the outbreak of the French Revolution, and was more interested in his squabble with Russia about a remote and unpronounceable fortress, than in the upheaval that was shortly to convulse Europe. The Whigs, on the other hand, were at first

inclined to welcome the Revolution as a surrender of a despotic government to their principles, and it was this that inspired Fox to characterize the storming of the Bastille as the greatest and best event that had ever happened. There was, at the outset, little alarm, much complacency and a certain amount of Utopian enthusiasm over the events in France.

All this was rudely changed by Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution* which, published in 1790, burst like a thunder-clap upon the national indifference, and precipitated the regrouping of Whigs and Tories into what were in fact, if not yet in name, two new parties of Conservatives and Liberals. The party man in Burke had, of late years, been more *en evidence* than the statesman, and his glorious injustice (if the two words may ever be conjoined) in the Warren Hastings affair, was followed by a frothy virulence on behalf of the Prince Regent's Divine Right to govern Whiggishly, that induced some observers to doubt whether Burke's mind might not be giving way. Despite his liberal opinions about the treatment of dependencies, Burke, like Palmerston after him, was an aristocratic reactionary in home affairs, and most of his high-sounding phrases about liberty amounted, in practice, to the liberties, in the old sense, of magnates like Newcastle and Burke's own employer, Rockingham. When the Revolution broke out he was much less inclined to sympathize with it than Fox, and with his extraordinary if somewhat perverse power of intuition, was quicker to take the alarm than Pitt.

Burke was a Romantic of the Romantics; it was perhaps the splendour of Indian civilization more than the lies of Francis that had first moved him against Hastings, and now the terrible tragedy, which he foresaw with weird accuracy, that was to overwhelm a royal family and aristocracy long the acknowledged fount of European civilization, filled him with pity and terror. His sensitive heart could not bear the spectacle of cruelty, and his poetic imagination seized at once on the concrete tragedy of Marie Antoinette, "that elevation and that fall," as he wrote with the tears of sincere sensibility streaming down his cheeks. What provoked him to his terrible anti-revolutionary Philippic was a sermon preached at the Old Jewry by that dour, non-conforming veteran, Dr. Price. The sermon, in itself, was not particularly offensive or out of the ordinary, being a balanced and somewhat academic disquisition on the rival claims of the love of humanity and the love of one's country. But the old democrat, who already felt himself approaching his long

home, could not refrain from frothing over into a *nunc dimittis* anent the diffusion of knowledge, the rights of man, and the two revolutions, both glorious, that he had been spared to see. This outburst had the effect on Burke of a lighted spark on a powder magazine.

He burst forth with what, with all its faults, is one of the world's masterpieces, both for the beauty of its expression and the depth of its principles. So far as the proof of the pudding is the eating Burke must be allowed to have gauged the situation more accurately than his opponents, who united in predicting a peaceful and bloodless course for the Revolution. Burke not only foresaw in effect, but in astonishingly correct detail, the whole course that the Revolution, then in its confident and idealistic beginnings, was actually to take through bloodshed and ruin at home and war with every civilized power, to its culmination in a military dictatorship. Burke, in fact, saw clearly as far as Napoleon, and the greatest fault chargeable to him was that he neither saw beyond Napoleon, nor what Napoleon stood for.

The great principle upon which Burke took his stand and of which he gave a more sweeping and masterly exposition than any other political philosopher before or since, was that which the biologist calls organic continuity and the British historian constitutional government. Political institutions are parts of a living though invisible body and can no more be destroyed and refashioned at will than Aeson, in the Greek tale, could be made young again by being sliced up and boiled in a cauldron. A nation cannot cut itself loose from its past because, in the deepest sense, it *is* the past, because though, in the sight of the unwise, its sons and daughters seem to die, their works and their spirit live after them; because the England of Burke's day and of our day is really but intangibly different from what it would have been if Cromwell and Alfred, if the meanest labourer or household drudge, had never existed. A country consists of all its people, those living, and those dead, and those yet to be.

To what end has this country, this communion of souls, come to exist? Burke's answer is magnificently complete. It is a partnership in all art, in all science, in every virtue and in all perfection. Thus is the old fiction of a social compact sublimated out of recognition—Burke has said the last word on that subject and, in fact, little is heard of it after his time. The gap between the narrower and the more universal love is thus bridged :—

"Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place."

Unfortunately, there is another side to Burke's Reflections not so pleasant to dwell upon. For Burke was throughout his career afflicted by that strange duality of nature which seems almost inseparable from the Romantic spirit, and hardly capable, except perhaps in his attitude towards the American Colonies, of formulating any great principle in the abstract without degrading it by some perverse application in the concrete. He had championed the cause of English liberty in the interests of the Whig oligarchs, he had expounded the doctrine of a free empire in order to compass the ruin of an innocent man, and now he had written the noblest essay in political philosophy since that of Aristotle, only to bolster up a system of outworn tyranny.

If Burke had had as much knowledge of biology as anyone who reads may acquire to-day, he would have known that the essence of life consists in its power of adaptation. Once an organism or a species has lost its power of adapting itself to circumstances, it is already partially, and will soon be wholly dead. But Burke would not see this about the British Constitution. Instead of regarding it as something perpetually adaptable and growing, he treated it, in practice, as if it were perfect already and in no need of improvement. He followed up the Reflections by a lengthy appeal from the New to the Old Whigs in which he had little difficulty in showing that most of the old Whig Fathers were of a thoroughly conservative tendency, who would have been gravely scandalized at anything connected with Jean Jacques or the National Assembly, or even their degenerate successors of the Foxite persuasion. This was all as true as it was irrelevant. Burke was formulating the principles of life in the cause of death. His advocacy at least succeeded in that it brought the whole issue of petrification against progress to a head. There was a perfect deluge of replies, nor was the championship of democracy the monopoly of one sex. Mrs. Macaulay, Dr. Johnson's *bête noire*, had her fling, and so did a remarkable young schoolmistress called Mary Wollstonecraft, in a spirited vindication of the Rights of Man, following on a more famous vindication of those of Woman, which opened a vista of emancipation

hitherto scarcely regarded by the doughtiest apostles of freedom. The Whig Lawyer, James Mackintosh, whose own enthusiasm for the Revolution was soon to fade in the red light of the Terror, put the case with imperturbable commonsense against Burke's Jeremiad, and Priestley replied to Burke in a series of reasoned and courteous but rather dull letters, whose gist is sufficiently indicated in one of the opening sentences: "You appear to me not to be sufficiently cool to enter into this serious discussion."

All of these replies put together did not focus as much attention as the downright onslaught of Thomas or, to give him his somewhat uncivil nickname, Tom Paine. This man had sprung from the sturdy East Anglian nonconformist stock that had, in former years, been the backbone of the Roundhead cause. And Paine, despite the odium of infidelity that clung about him, never ceased to be a non-conformist at heart, a Quaker, as he was reminded in no friendly spirit when a member of the French Convention. He was a Puritan in his plain determination to get to close quarters with the truth, and to let nothing, however sacred or venerable, stand in his way. In this he was the exact opposite of the romantic Burke, who loved what he called the decent drapery of life, and deplored the barbarous system, born of cold hearts and muddy understandings, in which a King was only a man and a Queen a woman. To Paine's mind a King was a man like any other, and under the same necessity of justifying his existence, a man, too, in the sense that he was entitled to justice and pity, as this freethinking Quaker did not hesitate to maintain, on behalf of Louis XVI, at the imminent risk of his own life.

Paine was too much of a zealot to keep his hands off idols. He had lent his sword as well as his pen to the cause of American independence, and had recrossed the Atlantic full of republican enthusiasm, a thorough-paced Leveller. But so deeply religious a man could not assail the shams of politics without going on those of dogma, and his *Rights of Man*, which was his reply to Burke, was followed by his *Age of Reason*, written just before Robespierre consigned him to the prison from which the only exit, for the vast majority of victims—though not, as it happened, for Paine—was to the guillotine. This book he concludes with a sentence of terrible earnestness: "He that believes in the story of Christ is an infidel to God."

Martin Luther had started the Reformation by declaring that he would submit to no authority but that of Scripture, and Paine

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was only continuing his work when he declared that he would submit to no authority whatever, not even Scripture, that could not justify its claims at the bar of reason. People stood aghast when his Puritan bludgeon fell first on the Crown and then on the Gospels. The arguments about the true interpretation of the Constitution and fidelity to the Whig Revolution were brushed contemptuously aside. Paine cared nothing for Whig principles and less than nothing for the Constitution—the very word was to him meaningless cant. But as Milton had looked for the rising of a noble and puissant nation, once she had shaken off the last relics of her Babylonian thralldom, so did Paine look forward to a happy and enlightened mankind, freed from every time-honoured illusion and guided only by the reason that God has planted in every man's breast, for Paine's Puritanism, iconoclastic as it was, stopped short at getting rid of God.

Practical East Anglian that he was, he was not content to remain a visionary, but must needs get his proposals formulated in pounds, shillings and pence. They were enough to make even the most progressive Whig gasp with horror. For Paine was a root and branch social reformer; he would have wiped out pauperism and unemployment, he would have had an old age pension for those who needed it after the age of fifty, he would have provided funds for educating poor children, he would have given free relief to destitute families, and he would have found the money to do it by a steeply graded income tax which, starting at 8d. in the pound for the first £500, absorbed altogether every thousand after the 23rd. Of course he would have abolished royalty, the peerage, and privilege of every description.

Thomas Paine proved as great an asset to the anti-revolutionary cause as Burke himself. Their combined effect was to frighten respectable people out of their wits with anything remotely democratic. No matter how carefully a Whig gentleman might dilute his principles, he could not rid himself of the usually quite unjust suspicion of being in some way on the side of Tom Paine, whom devout imaginations had transformed into a fiend incarnate. Even the advocacy of what had but a short time ago seemed the most moderate of reform proposals, was now considered to be the thin end of the Revolutionary wedge.'

Accordingly it required a good deal of moral courage for a progressive Whig to stick to the advocacy of his principles as if nothing had happened, and it was inevitable that a considerable proportion of the party should take the alarm, that Burke had sounded. Party

loyalty was dangerously strained when, in 1792, a promising young aristocratic politician, Charles Grey, formed a society, the Friends of the People, to promote Parliamentary Reform. But it needed the spectacle of the Terror and open war with France to produce a definite split. In 1794 the Duke of Portland, who had once been the figurehead of the Fox-North coalition, transferred the weight of his mediocrity to the party of stagnation and a firm line, and with him went a considerable section of the Whigs. Fox stood firm for a liberal interpretation of the Whig creed, and so, to their credit, did some of the magnates, including the ducal head of the House of Russell, and the Earl of Stanhope, a name honourably associated during that century with the cause of progress and enlightenment.

4

ENGLAND JOINS THE LEAGUE OF DESPOTS

There is this to be said in defence of the French Revolution, that the violent and bloody courses, into which it degenerated, were the direct response of French Republicanism to the menace of armed rebellion leagued with foreign aggression. So peaceable was the constitutional government in its opening phase, that Pitt was able to secure an important point in the game for England because, when Spain claimed rights over the West coast of what is now Canada, and was prepared to back them by war, France flatly refused to honour the family compact between the two branches of the House of Bourbon, which bound her to stand in with her ally. Spain, thus left in the lurch, found herself obliged to back down. The Legislative Assembly was, at this time, glowing with pacific and brotherly sentiment. Had the Revolution been allowed to take its normal course, it is conceivable that the idealistic and moderate elements might have prevailed.

But the lords of eighteenth century civilization were fated to accomplish their own tragedy. First the provocation came from within; the King tried to conquer Paris and Paris stormed the Bastille; the King's officers at Versailles tore down the national cockades, and the mob fetched the King back to Paris. Then the tragedy became international; the aristocrats emigrated to foreign courts seeking the help of foreign arms; the French royal family was in active intrigue with brother potentates; the King made his position impossible by slinking off to join his real friends and having to be fetched back again. Then, when foreign armies began to

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assemble on the frontier, the mob broke into the King's palace ; when the Prussian commander threatened Paris with military execution, they stormed that palace ; when the invading armies seemed to be carrying all before them, the home front was made secure by a massacre of suspected reactionaries ; when France was confronted by Europe in arms, she responded with the Terror ; and when victory relaxed the tension on the frontier, the head of the chief terrorist dropped off as easily as if it had only been kept on his shoulders by pressure of the enemy.

Burke is fairly chargeable with having done his considerable best to bring about the very evils he predicted. His romantic imagination had been taken by the idea of a crusade—it was as an “ anti-crusade ” that he had viewed our support of the Turk—and he aspired to play the part of Peter the Hermit in urging the sovereigns of Europe to stamp out a fire that would otherwise spread till it had consumed them all. Unfortunately, like most devout Royalists, he had reckoned without his sovereigns. It was to the very dregs of humanity that he was making his appeal. The grand, philosophic despots of the eighteenth century were now only represented by Catherine of Russia, a genial old polyandrist who thought as little of extinguishing a people's freedom as she did of deflowering a grenadier's virginity. The rest of the crowned heads were too half-witted and too blindly selfish even to combine in their own interests, still less to end the troubles of their unhappy cousins at the Tuileries. There was other work on hand than that to which Burke's simple faith would have urged them. Poland had already been incompletely partitioned by the despots of Prussia, Russia and Austria ; it only remained to finish her off and share out the effects. It suited Catherine's book very well that her fellow criminals should have their hands full with suppressing the Revolution, while she was grabbing as much as possible of Polish soil.

While Prussia and Austria, who hated and distrusted each other for the best of reasons, were slowly screwing up their courage to crusading point, with the blessing of Burke and the benevolent sympathy of Catherine, Mr. Pitt was content to mind his own and his country's business, and continued in the path of sound administration and cautious diplomacy, quite unperturbed by the eloquence of Burke and the woes of Louis XVI. So confident was he of peace that as late as 1792 he publicly anticipated fifteen years of it, and was economizing on national defence. It was no concern of his what government there might be in France, so long as that government continued to play the

game according to the rules, and did not remove its neighbour's landmark. When the ill-paid and well-flogged mercenaries of the Kings began to goad French democracy to ever wilder and more bloody excesses, feeling in England ran high, and diplomatic relations with France were strained almost to breaking point.

But the breaking point did not come until the French committed themselves to a course of action that threatened England's interests at their most vital point. By an international treaty Holland had acquired the right to close the navigation of the Scheldt, and thus to stifle the commerce of Antwerp. The French, whose armies had burst into Belgium and were preparing to attack Holland, treated this restriction as unnatural and contrary to the Rights of Man. Pitt knew nothing about these rights, but he did know about the sanctity of treaties, and, when the French proposed to treat this one as a scrap of paper, he regarded it, as he would have if a king and not a regicide Convention had been the aggressors, in the light of a *casus belli*. His attitude was characteristically English. He cared little one way or the other about the questions of high philosophy that agitated Burke and Paine. In private conversation, according to Lady Hester Stanhope, he even admitted that Paine was in the right, but "what am I to do?" To encourage such opinions would mean bloody revolution. As a statesman his business was not with abstract right but with the concrete rights of England, and these he would maintain though the Heavens fell and Hell were let loose. It has ever been the nature of British policy to react by war against aggression in the Low Countries. The Jacobins of the Convention aspired to make all things new; Pitt was merely making the orthodox move in a game centuries old.

Once the issue was joined and we were committed to an alliance of Kings against the Republic, it would have been well for the country had Pitt listened to the advice of Burke, or even followed the example set by his own father in the Seven Years' War of flinging the whole force of the nation against the enemy in a series of relentless onslaughts. Burke would have had the allies sink all their differences and strike, without thought of their sectional interests, right at the heart of the enemy. It would have been well for them if they had done so. But neither Pitt nor the leagued despots could grasp the fact that a new situation had arisen that put the old, eighteenth century game completely out of date. By every one of the rules the Republicans ought to have been beaten. They were opposing raw levies against the highly disciplined and scientifically led troops of their enemies;

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they defied every principle of sound finance ; they had a great part of their own country, the cream of its blood and culture, in arms against them. But they had behind them what their enemies as yet lacked, the impetus of a great idea, and that was decisive. It was hard to beat troops who, when routed all along the line, could be rallied to victory by the mere singing of the Marseillaise. Most wars, if sufficiently prolonged, resolve themselves into conflicts of moral forces, and moral force was at present on the side of the Revolution.

Against this, what had the allies to oppose ? The despots and petty princes of the Continent were conspicuously lacking in ideas of any sort except of the most petty and personal, and their troops marched to the slaughter without patriotism and without a cause, because it was their trade and because the habitual line of least resistance lay in doing what one was told. The Frenchman was burning to think of a " horde of slaves, of traitors, of leagued Kings " daring to threaten his new won freedom and the sacred right of every nation to be governed as it chose. And this national fervour was focussed and directed by one of the world's greatest organizing geniuses, Lazare Carnot, an officer of engineers, who, while his colleagues were busy intriguing and guillotining, was conjuring hordes of willing soldiers out of the soil, and hurling them on the invaders with an energy worthy of Chatham. In a surprisingly short time these levies had blossomed into war-hardened veterans led by the ablest officers in Europe. With the generals it had to be neck or nothing, or—to be more accurate—neck or everything, for even an incomplete victory brought the commander to the *Place de la Revolution*.

It may well be asked what our England was pulling in this galley of despots. With all the abuses of her oligarchy and the increasing misery of her social conditions, she had a soul and a patriotism as genuine, though not as actively volcanic, as that of her opponent. She had gone into the war of necessity, but without any sort of enthusiasm. Public opinion was aghast at the proceedings of the Jacobins, as it would have been at any spectacle of cruelty and extravagant violence, but not to the extent of burning to smash the Jacobins in order to restore the Bourbons. Burke's idea of a crusade found the average Englishman lukewarm. He would, like Pitt, have been willing enough to have left the French alone if the French would have left him alone.

Some anonymous critic of the South African War described our part in it as " absent-minded ". This is precisely the description we

should give to the conduct of the war against France by Pitt and the man who most influenced him, that clever but unprincipled adventurer, Henry Dundas. Unlike his father, Pitt could not make up his mind, or rather his soul, to win. He seemed to have no clear purpose whatever, and the idea of Dundas was to secure as many points as possible in remote and unessential fields. A wretched contingent which was all that could be raised, was sent to take part in combined operations from the Low Countries, but none of the allies had the remotest intention of playing for anything but his own hand, and just when a combined effort was all that was needed to open the road to Paris, the British force was diverted to the unnecessary and unsuccessful siege of Dunkirk. This it was not only forced to abandon, but the French commander was, not without reason, guillotined for failing to destroy it altogether. Thus led, the professional armies of the alliance were in no condition to resist the wild onslaughts of Carnot's Marseillaise-drunken levies, and next year the British forces were lucky enough to escape, in parlous condition, from the inevitable *débacle*.¹ In the South, with the assistance of the French counter-revolutionaries, the allies were at one time in possession of the all-important naval base of Toulon, but let it slip from their grasp without even securing or destroying the French fleet there. In the West we succeeded, by way of a diversion, in sending a gallant party of French gentlemen to certain death at Quiberon Bay.

Our superiority at sea was overwhelming, but we failed to make any intelligent use of it. Lord Howe, on the 1st of June, 1794, won a tactical victory, which he did not follow up, over a French fleet which was successful in covering the arrival of grain from America. Pitt and Dundas could think of no better way of employing our troops and sea power than by securing the French possessions overseas. The result of these efforts was disastrous. It was easy enough to capture the French West Indies, but the difficulty was to hold them against revolting black slaves and the deadly yellow fever. Mr. Fortescue gives our losses in the West Indies alone, to the end of 1796, as 40,000 dead and as many more discharged as unfit for service, more than the whole losses, from all causes, of Wellington's army during the Peninsula War. One battalion perished to a man.² Such were the fruits of half-hearted and absent-minded war.

¹ After participating, at Turcoing, in a wonderful attempt to combine the operations of five different forces, in the palmiest tradition of Austrian staff work. Our contingent, having penetrated furthest, suffered most.

² See Vol. 4 of his *History of the British Army*.

It is remarkable that Pitt, who had for so long refused to take the Revolution seriously, should, once we were committed to war with it, have been more concerned about safeguarding the home front than beating the enemy. We can well understand the alarm that this terrible and unprecedented annihilation of a governing class caused among the same class in a sister nation, an alarm that was fomented by all the eloquence of Burke, who, as he drew near to the grave, grew less and less philosophic and more and more declamatory, at one time throwing on to the floor of the House, with an apocalyptic gesture, a revolutionary dagger made in Birmingham. But Pitt's cool head and steady nerve ought to have been proof against such terrors. What was really extraordinary about the English proletariat, considering the extreme misery that everywhere prevailed, was that it should have been so insensitive to the call of the Marseillaise. Even in the great industrial centres the mobs rioted not for but against the new champions of liberty. At Birmingham they sacked the house of Priestley, destroying his library and scientific appliances, at Manchester they expressed their loyalty by similar rough methods, and it was an exquisitely Gilbertian situation when the wealthy Earl of Stanhope (who was, like Priestley, a scientist of distinction) had his London mansion wrecked by the poor men whose rights as against his own class he had had the insolence to champion. Even when destitution and repression drove the mob to pelt the King on his way to open Parliament in 1795, the cry was not for liberty and the Rights of Man, but "Peace! Peace! Bread! Bread! No Pitt! No famine!"

It is not, however, altogether to be wondered at that our national game of hunting for the Hidden Hand should have been carried on with peculiar zest. Revolutionary principles made a certain appeal to liberal-minded members of the upper class, but where they took the strongest hold was among what we can best designate as the lower middle class, clerks and tradesmen with just enough smattering of education to make them susceptible of ideas. It was among these that the most famous of many reforming societies was formed by the shoemaker Hardy, the Corresponding Society, as it was called from the rather futile but—to nervous patriots—hair-raising correspondence that it had carried on, before the war, with genuine revolutionaries across the Channel. Most of these societies were frankly constitutional, though their rendering of constitutional principles was often as extravagant in its liberalism as that of Burke and Pitt was hidebound and reactionary.

Under these circumstances it is tragic that the sometime reformer Pitt should have abandoned himself to what, with our present knowledge of the facts, we can only describe as groundless panic. There was a flaw in the man's nature that was no doubt the result of his prematurely stunted youth. He had an incurable *penchant* for intrigue; ever since his dishing of Fox's Whigs he had been the most accomplished wirepuller in England. He maintained a perfect army of spies, and his underground machinations were so magnified in France that "Pitt's gold" was the explanation worthy Jacobins at once sought for any untoward happenings. But it is the fate of those who deal in plots to be obsessed by the fear of plots,¹ and there really were some legitimate grounds for alarm for anyone not possessed of an equanimity based on an understanding of the British character.

Even to this day it is not easy to determine the influence of secret societies on the development of the French Revolution. A passion for a rather theatrical secrecy had been incidental to the Emotional Revival, and by no means all of its manifestations had been of a revolutionary tendency.² But for those who like to diagnose the Hidden Hand whenever starving men adorn the lamp posts with those who bid them eat grass, or desperate men kill those whom they suspect of being in league with a victorious invader, there is plenty of food for speculation in the fact that the regicide and fratricide Duke of Orleans was Grand Master of the Masonic Grand Orient, and in trying to trace a connection between the political clubs of Paris and the mysterious Illuminati of Bavaria. There is no doubt that Pitt was fully apprised of every breath of rumour, and how ready public, or upper class opinion was to fasten on to any suspicion of this kind is shown by the success of an agitated book, dedicated to Burke's friend Windham, and written by Professor John Robison, who, as a clear-headed and meritorious scientist, ought to have known better. This book, entitled *Proofs of a conspiracy against all the religions and governments of Europe carried on in the secret meetings of Freemasons, Illuminati and Reading Societies*, was published in 1797 and quickly run through four editions.

Anything less suggestive of the conspirator than the plain and, as a rule, transparently honest men whom the government singled

¹ There is no greater believer in the power of secret societies than ex-Kaiser William II of Germany.

² Readers of Tolstoy's *War and Peace* will recall his account of the craze for freemasonry among the young aristocrats of St. Petersburg.

out as traitors and Jacobins in disguise, it would have been hard to imagine. Poor Hardy, whose wife, about to become a mother, was frightened into her grave first by the brutal circumstances of his arrest by Bow Street runners, and then by the mob attacking her house to celebrate Howe's qualified glory of the First of June, was as John Bullish a type (save for John's cant) as could be found anywhere. But the government had begun to scent Jacobins in the most innocent people and Jacobinism in the most moderate opinions. The red terror in France was answered by a white terror in Great Britain. It became a crime so much as to suggest that the Constitution was capable of improvement, to advocate the very views that Pitt himself had championed but a decade ago. So much as to own, still more to lend a book by Thomas Paine, was to court the pleasures of a trip to Botany Bay.

Pitt sought to secure his position by suspending the Habeas Corpus Act, which was the same thing as putting the country under a mild form of martial law. But the Constitution that he would have killed by petrification, and which he so grievously abused, was yet strong enough to preserve the last liberties of Englishmen, and to prevent the White Terror from being stained with the blood of men whose love for England was as noble as, and more understanding than his own. The government sought to get Hardy and certain of his associates not only under lock and key, but hanged, drawn, and quartered for treason. Luckily Hardy was defended by Erskine, one of the ablest and most liberal members of the bar, before a Judge who, though his sympathies were certainly with the prosecution, was not unworthy of the impartial traditions of the Bench. The jury were picked Tories, but they were Englishmen, and had the tradition of fair play and the Common Law in their blood. Hardy was acquitted, and so were Horne Tooke, a witty though undignified clerical philologist, and Thelwall, a merely indiscreet lecturer. Then the defenders of the Constitution gave up; the Constitution had held firm against their defence. Far otherwise was it in Scotland, where the traditions of Roman Law provided no safeguard against the sadistic terrorism wielded by judges like Lord Braxfield and directed by politicians like Henry Dundas.

In England liberty, though not killed, was certainly scotched. The more extreme democratic societies were stifled, but the liberal Whigs, who would probably have been the next victims had Hardy and his friends gone to the scaffold, survived to maintain the elastic view of the Constitution that was its sole hope of survival. The part

played by these men cannot be described as altogether admirable ; often it was factious and in the worst sense unpatriotic, for there was much about Fox's conduct, especially after French Republican ardour had turned to naked militarism, which suggested that he was more concerned to see Pitt beaten than England victorious. But these men were able to see—what Pitt was not—that fighting along with a gang of despots to put another despot on the French throne was criminal lunacy. They were for frankly conceding the right of the French to choose their own masters, they would have had us recognize whatever "*de facto*" government was in power, and make the best terms with it that we honourably could. Never did the best of them allow the bitterness of war to extinguish in their breasts the humane and reforming sentiments engendered by the Emotional Revival.

5

THE REACTIONARIES

If Pitt and his colleagues were uncertain what they were fighting for, it cannot be said that England herself was much better resolved. The invective of Burke had certainly a profound effect in alarming and shocking the country at the spectacle of Jacobinism, but his merely negative affection for the existing order of things was not of the kind to inspire crusades. He represented a phase of the Emotional Revival that was already passing out of date. The young Romantics, and particularly the famous trio, Wordsworth, Southey, and Coleridge, were intoxicated with the wine of liberty, and in such an ardour of love for a soon-to-be-regenerated mankind, that they were more concerned to see the Republicans victorious than their own misguided countrymen.

Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
And to be young was very heaven !

The Romantic spirit had become fully conscious of itself, and ran to the wildest extravagances in its efforts to cast off the filthy garments of the eighteenth century and clothe itself with imagination. Tenderness became gushing, simplicity that of the nursery, a sense of humour was conspicuous by its absence. Neither Wordsworth nor Coleridge was as yet sufficiently disciplined to give adequate scope to his genius.

It was the precise opposite of this spirit which was voiced in 1797-8 by *The Anti-Jacobin*, a magazine which was founded by some young Tories for the purpose of expressing the national opposition

to Revolution principles. Though by the time it was started its knights were riding atill at a dead or dying bogey, *The Anti-Jacobin* fulfilled an important function in voicing the kind of opinion that reactionary gentlefolk, not only of that time, but ever since, have held with regard to threatening democratic tendencies, and which they endeavour, with varying success, to propagate among the community at large. The Englishman, as they depict him, is a good fellow, who loves his King, his Constitution and his country, and is ready to make any sacrifice in their defence. He is satisfied with things as they are, and has too much commonsense to bother his head with schemes of social betterment, which turn out to be windy humbug. The Jacobin or democrat is, for all his fair talk about humanity and the rest of it, an ill-conditioned knave, equally hypocritical, cruel and mean. Meanness is, in fact, a vice with which *The Anti-Jacobin* is particularly fond of branding its opponents, from the friend of humanity who refuses the needy knifegrinder sixpence to the Whig Dukes who try to get out of paying their taxes.

But *The Anti-Jacobin* has a deeper significance than this somewhat obvious reaction against imported democracy. It was the manifesto of the dying eighteenth century against a new order of ideas for which it cherished a profound contempt. It was a challenge not only to the Revolution, but to the whole Emotional Revival of which the Revolution was a by-product. The net of satire was flung wide enough to take in Goethe and Schiller, at their most extravagant, but it was upon the English Romantics that the keenest criticism was directed. Southey, the most obvious butt of them all, came in for a merciless drubbing, but neither Coleridge nor Charles Lamb was allowed to escape. The new sensibility was ruthlessly sacrificed, and George Canning was not above a backhander at the new fellow-feeling for animals. There is, in fact, a peculiar hardness about the whole tone and teaching of *The Anti-Jacobin*, that is suggestive of the aristocrat and still more of the parvenu. The lips of these brilliant young men seem to be perpetually curled in a sneer. The mere fact of a man's aspiring to be an idealist seems a sufficient reason for condemning him :—

“ Reason, philosophy, fiddledum diddledum,
Peace and Fraternity, higgledy piggledy.”

The Anti-Jacobin was the most celebrated, but it was not the first attempt to enlist Tory sentiment against revolutionary and democratic principles. A strange champion of aristocratic culture had previously arisen in William Gifford, who had served as a farm

hand and shoemaker's apprentice, and whose miserable youth appears to have jaundiced his disposition. This man had, in two satires, called the *Baviad* and the *Maeviad*, trounced the small fry of Romanticism in the shape of a precious clique, largely feminine, which had dabbled in revolutionary sentiment and acquired the nickname of Della Cruscan. A trend of opinion was started, which was to survive Jacobinism and *The Anti-Jacobin*, to the effect that any departure from consecrated forms, any revolt against present authority or harking back to an earlier tradition, was something not quite worthy of a gentleman, that a light and scholarly touch was the hallmark of good breeding, and that there was something more than a little vulgar about any display of emotion or sensibility.

But it was not among the gentlemen and gentlemen's hangers-on of the Tory connection that the true spirit of the eighteenth century achieved its final and most satisfying triumph. It was in an obscure country parsonage that a modest and anonymous young lady, Jane Austen, was writing those half-dozen novels which hardly condescend to strive against the new-conquering Romanticism, but quietly and with smiling good humour put it aside. Anyone of these books might have borne the title "*Sense and Sensibility*", an opposition which just expresses all that Miss Austen stood for, and all that she despised. Excess in anything, and particularly in the display of emotion, aroused her instinctive aversion. She herself was the best practiser of what she preached; she hardly ever indulges her readers in anything remotely approaching to what would now be described as a strong scene; she has a delicacy towards her characters that refrains from intruding on their strongest emotions; we can imagine her disgust could she be aware of the familiarity of those journalistic pundits who refer to her as "Jane". To eliminate the animal, to seek and ensue the civilized attributes of restraint, urbanity and—to use her own favourite word—sense, was what she aspired to and, in her own writings, achieved. But hers was a swan song. The young lions of Toryism were more and more obviously, as time went on, trying to revive a spirit which had passed away and which was not theirs. Their touch became crude, their temper brutal. But it would be a pardonable exaggeration to say that the eighteenth century came to perfection and died in Miss Austen.

ENGLAND AGAINST FRENCH MILITARISM

By the time *The Anti-Jacobin* was launched, the struggle with France was already entering on a phase to which Anti-Jacobinism was irrelevant. What Burke had foreseen, and what he and his crowned crusaders had helped to bring about, was already becoming an accomplished fact. The republican enthusiasm for liberty, equality and fraternity died hard—it seemed at one time to have taken a new lease of life—but dying it was, and something more formidable as well as more familiar was set up in its stead. The clumsy and insincere alliance, which English gold had been poured out by the million to keep alive, had produced its inevitable effect. It had proved powerless to crush the Revolution, but menacing and provocative enough to change peaceful idealism into bloody tyranny, and an undisciplined rabble into the most formidable army in Europe.

In 1796 it became evident that the last and worst of Burke's predictions might be realized. A young general of dazzling genius led a ragged and hungry army along the Mediterranean coast into Northern Italy, knocked the Sardinians, who had joined the alliance, clean out of the war, and then scattered three successive and superior Austrian armies before a whirlwind of victories. His name was Napoleon Buonaparte. Prussia had already got tired of kicking the French porcupine, and employed her jackboots for the more congenial purpose of stamping the life out of Poland's prostrate body. In 1797 Napoleon had finished with the Austrians in Italy, and his invincible army was hustling Austria's last hope, the Archduke Charles, along the road to Vienna. The Emperor realized the good sense of agreeing with his adversary whilst he was in the way with him, and thus the terrible alliance, which had been going to flatten out the Republic after the manner of a certain steam-roller of later date, tumbled to pieces, and England was left alone.

The safe and easy war which Pitt had anticipated against a disorganized and bankrupt opponent had now developed into a struggle no less formidable than that in which we had been beaten almost to our knees in the days of Lord North's administration. Exactly the same set of European allies were now in the field against us, for Spain and Holland were now on the side of France, and if we had no longer our own colonists to fight, we were engaged with a France beyond all comparison stronger than the already tottering kingdom of Louis XVI. It was, indeed, stronger than the

France against which William III and Marlborough had waged so prolonged and doubtful a struggle, for the armies of the Directorate were holding the Rhine line, and the corrupt government at Paris already commanded a European empire to which the "*Roi Soleil*", in his rosiest daydreams, had hardly dared to aspire. If we had been unable to effect anything of value with half Europe for our allies and a good part of France in rebellion, what prospect had we of standing alone against the furious counter-offensive of which we must bear the brunt alone?

But in losing our allies and the advantages with which we had begun the war, we had gained something that was of more value than all of them. We were fighting for an intelligible and righteous cause. So long as England had been a mere accomplice of despots in the suppression of liberty, her blows had been vague, feeble, ineffective. So long as the French troops had been fighting in the spirit of the Marseillaise against the bloodstained knife of tyranny, it was as if the God they denied had gone forth before their armies and bidden their enemies be scattered. But now the sons of liberty were themselves becoming liberticides. No Corsican bandit ever did his business more thoroughly than Napoleon, wherever he went in Italy. And then, in 1798, the French committed a crime that horrified even their best friends. The knife of tyranny, grasped in Republican hands, was plunged up to the hilt in the blood of free Switzerland. Nobody any longer could be under the illusion that we were fighting a people rightly struggling, or struggling at all, to be free. It was time for John Bull to defend his rights and his liberties against a tyranny as merciless as that of Alva, and more ambitious than that of Louis XIV.

The Romantic enthusiasts for freedom were not long in finding this out. It was in 1798, under the influence of the Swiss outrage, that Coleridge traced the process of his own disillusionment in the grand Ode to France which was then called *The Recantation*. To Coleridge's metaphysical mind, liberty had never been the simple and obvious conception it had been to some of his fellow-enthusiasts. He had first found, somewhat illogically, the types of liberty in the clouds, forests and waves, then his imagination had fastened on France, whom, despite her excesses, he trusted to compel the nations to freedom, conquering only by her happiness. But France had played Judas to freedom, and reduced herself to the level of the Kings. Coleridge's final verdict on the Revolution is that

"The sensual and the dark rebel in vain
Slaves by their own compulsion."

Wordsworth, whose austere, Cumbrian spirit had justified the killing of Louis XVI and rejoiced in the defeat of British troops, now devoted all his ardour for liberty to the cause of his own country. He turned against the French with all the bitterness of a disappointed idealist, and his voice was like a trumpet calling Englishmen to maintain their liberties.

1797, the year which saw the Romantic spirit come into full blossom with the composition of Wordsworth's and Coleridge's *Lyrical Ballads*, also saw England at the nadir of her fortunes. The distress was terrible, and so desperate was the financial situation that the Bank had to suspend cash payment. It was by contrary winds and bad seamanship that the French had been prevented from wresting Ireland from our grasp. Worst of all, our fleet, whose command of the sea alone stood between us and ruin, broke into mutinies at Spithead and the Nore. Our last ally had dropped out, and we were fighting Spain and Holland as well as France. Fortunately our fleets were enabled to inflict smashing blows off Cape St. Vincent upon the Spaniards and off Camperdown upon the Dutch, and the immediate danger to our shores passed away.

Confronted with this awful crisis, Pitt rose to the height of his character. Wirepuller and reactionary as he had become in home politics, and criminally incompetent as he had proved in the conduct of the war, he confronted the peril in the true spirit of his father. Not for one moment did he lose his belief in England's ability to come through victorious in the end. Throughout the worst hours, he not only preserved his equanimity but even his gaiety, and there is surely no more remarkable spectacle than that of the unapproachable Prime Minister pausing from his task of saving the country to contribute to a rollicking Anti-Jacobin squib a verse about Rogero starving, through the malice of Kings and priests, on water gruel, far from the University of Gottingen. His blunders, and they were many, may be forgiven Pitt when we remember these two facts; he convinced the country that he was, like his father, the one man who could save her, and he convinced the French that he was the most formidable of their enemies. He received the high compliment of being solemnly voted, by the Convention, an enemy of the human race.

Pitt's eloquence during the war was not the least of his saving attributes. It lacked the imaginative appeal of Chatham and Lloyd George, but it was instinct with the quiet and reasoned confidence of a patriot, strong in the justice of his cause. While he was at the

helm, there could be no question of defeat or surrender. The unemotional, businesslike way in which the King's government was carried on, may have been irritating enough in the first easy stages of the war, but when ruin stared us in the face and the odds mounted against us, this quiet persistency with which England pursued her normal way began to take on something heroic. Jacobins and Napoleon might bluster as they would, but neither the Premier nor the nation saw any reason to be hustled. Of the many noble and inspiring things said by Pitt we need only instance two of the most famous and characteristic—"Let us continue to hope till events compel us to despair"; "England has saved herself by her exertions, let us hope that she will save Europe by her example." In these the whole spirit of the man is revealed.

Apart from the advantage of a good cause and a firm leader, England held two winning cards in her hand. The hideous new towns that were springing up in the North and Midlands, the vampire machinery that sucked out the lives of myriads who tended it, were producing a constant stream of marketable commodities which in turn drew wealth into the country to provide the sinews of war, and while the condition of the poor was going from bad to worse, the effects of the new scientific agriculture and enclosure of commons sufficed to prevent England from being starved out. Then, again, we held the command of the sea. The French navy, unlike the army, never properly recovered from the effects of the Revolution and our admirals were usually able to pin the enemy fleets to their harbours and to prevent them from becoming our rivals in seamanship.

Napoleon, with the extraordinary obtuseness that he displayed on any subject antipathetic to his genius, was throughout his life grossly ignorant on this subject of sea power. After his triumphant return from Italy he first allowed himself to toy with the chimerical idea of an invasion, and then to be decoyed—much to the relief of the already apprehensive Directors, who were only too glad to get rid of him—into an eccentric operation in Egypt. By good luck, his fleet and transports obtained a strategic victory over no less an opponent than Nelson, by arriving safely at their destination and taking Malta on the way. But Nelson had his revenge when he caught the French fleet in Aboukir Bay and all but annihilated it. Napoleon and his army were thus virtual prisoners, and an attempt to push Northward into Syria was frustrated by the long arm of British sea-power at Acre. There was nothing for it but for Napoleon to abandon

his army and make the best of his way to France. The proud army that had ignored sea-power remained to be mopped up at leisure by an English force, assisted by one from India.

It was largely Napoleon's mistake and Nelson's victory that had the effect of calling into being another of those European coalitions on which Pitt placed such reliance. But France could only be beaten by the spirit of the peoples, which had yet to be aroused, and not by the mercenaries of the Kings. This Coalition commenced victoriously, but the first successes only brought out the mutual hatred of its members, and gave Napoleon, on his return, a chance to turn out the discredited Directorate and concentrate the government and resources of France in his own hands. After that it was a comparatively simple task to shatter the Coalition at Marengo. Again England, whose own attempt at a military diversion in Holland had ended not only in disaster, but capitulation, found her allies dropping away and herself isolated. An attempt to revive against her the Armed Neutrality of Northern Powers, which had been the last drop in her cup of misfortunes during the American War, was frustrated by Nelson's destruction of the Danish Fleet at Copenhagen, and the assassination of the Tsar Paul. Then in 1802 a new and thoroughly incompetent British Government—Pitt having resigned on the question of Catholic Emancipation in Ireland—patched up a temporary peace which surrendered most of our conquests, and left France supreme in the Low Countries. This, of course, proved merely a brief interlude in the war, which was resumed next year.

One favourable effect of the peace, in which we had conceded nearly everything and France hardly anything, and of its swift and inevitable rupture, was to unite the country as never before against Napoleon, who outraged English feeling unforgiveably by making prisoners of some ten thousand harmless English travellers and residents in France. He next proceeded to concentrate his Grand Army on the Picard coast for the invasion of England, a theatrical menace that never had the slightest chance of materializing so long as our fleets held command of the sea. But if Napoleon was so blind to the value of sea-power, or so confident in his own grandiose combinations as to imagine that he could obtain command of the Channel even for forty-eight hours, it is not surprising that people in England should have taken the threat of invasion with extreme seriousness, and indeed the prospect of having the fair fields of Kent and Sussex overrun by such past-masters in the art of pillage

as the French troops was not alluring. Napoleon was said to have pointed out to them, with an obvious significance, that English women were noted for their beauty, and vigorous pens were not lacking to anticipate in minutest detail the horrors of invasion.

But fear was not the predominating note of the tremendous outburst of patriotism evoked by the supposed peril. The old contempt of Englishman for Frenchman had by no means weakened, and it was the impertinence rather than the frightfulness of "little Boney" that moved Englishmen to hearty wrath or to amused contempt. We see him depicted by the coarse pencil of Gillray as a frog bursting himself in the effort to swell to the size of the English ox, or as a ridiculous little man at whom big King George is staring through a microscope. Innumerable were the patriotic ballads in which John Bull invited "Boney" to "come and be damned", John Bull, no longer a cloth merchant, but a sturdy yokel depicted, with unconsciously cruel irony, as well-fed. The roast-beef of old England, which only a minority of Englishmen had now any chance of eating, was much to the fore in these appeals. Sometimes the note was one of sentimental trust in our tars and volunteers or of affection for the "good old King", more often it was mere full-mouthed bluster of the kind which was considered "manly". But it served its purpose of pulling the nation together and diverting attention from domestic oppression and misery to the task of beating the enemy. There was, for the time, no more talk of secret societies and the Rights of Man.

The Romantic leaders had now thoroughly shed their sympathy with France, and came forth into the front rank of patriots. Even Blake so far condescended to notice mundane affairs as to paint stupendous twin allegories of Pitt, his calm features crowned with an aureole of golden light, guiding Behemoth through the flame-litten gloom of carnage, and of the nude hero, Nelson, controlling Leviathan. Southey swung round to a Tory fervour as crude and sentimental as his previous Jacobinism. Coleridge hastened to argue away his cosmopolitan theories and to set up patriotism in their stead as a necessary accompaniment of manhood. But it was from Wordsworth that the threat of invasion struck the brightest sparks of inspiration, and never was his genius so flawless as in the poems and sonnets which were more or less directly connected with the crisis.

Wordsworth, though he had now come to love his country with all the strength of his soul, was no blind patriot. Even at the height of his enthusiasm for England he could bring against her a terrible indictment, and a sonnet, in which he admits that if anything good

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were destined for Egypt, Greece, India or Africa, England would step between, concludes with

“ Oh grief that Earth's best hopes rest all with thee ! ”

But his affection is only the greater from its being that of “ a lover or a child ”. He had visited France during the peace and come to the conclusion that whatever might be amiss with England, her enemy was far more abject, not only in physical but in spiritual desolation,

“ equally a want of books and men ”,

and in Napoleon himself he could see only one of the meanest of mortals raised unworthily to supreme power. Wordsworth believed that

“ by the soul

Only, the Nations shall be great and free ”,

and he exhorted England to raise her own soul to the height demanded by her function as a “ bulwark for the cause of men ”. He pined for the spirit of Milton ; in 1805 he penned his austere *Ode to Duty*, and the year after, with the memory of Nelson in his mind, drew the character of the Happy Warrior, the man who is equal to every emergency, because his law is reason and his prime care his moral being. It was in the strength of this philosophy that Wordsworth called upon his countrymen to sink their differences in the resolve for victory or death.

Patriotism expressed itself in more tangible form than words ; volunteers flocked to the colours in hundreds of thousands, Pitt himself taking his turn at drilling them. These volunteers would probably have been useless enough in the field, owing to their complete lack of discipline, and it must be remembered that volunteering was frequently a convenient way of avoiding the much harder service in the militia. All along the threatened coast sprang up the squat Martello Towers which are still a feature of the landscape. Elaborate plans were made for evacuating and wasting the country before the Grand Army's advance.

But the Grand Army never came, and was never likely to come, so long as our admirals knew their business. In naval circles there was not the least nervousness about invasion. Everywhere the French fleets were closely blockaded, and Admiral Mahan, in a famous passage has described how “ those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked, stood between it and the domination of the world ”. That is a true and inspiring reflection, but it must not be forgotten that these ships were, by every account that has come down to us, little better than floating hells, manned

by the press gang, by jail delivery, and by every expedient by which poor men could be compelled or cajoled to a life from which the imagination shrinks. Torture and semi-starvation were the lot of the men who saved England, and any attempt to escape was visited by the ghastly punishment of flogging round the fleet, which was usually the same thing as beating to death. In no respect was the gap between the privileged classes and the poor so manifest as in the army and navy—the Black Prince would never have dreamed of treating his archers nor Cromwell his Ironsides as the seamen of Trafalgar and the soldiers whom romantic Napier describes as fighting with such majesty in the Peninsula were treated, day in and day out, as a matter of course, by the gentlemen who commanded them.

Napoleon, again in alliance with Spain, tried a desperate naval gamble which began with his Mediterranean fleet slipping out of Toulon into the Atlantic. This move was eventually frustrated by the careful strategy of the British Admiralty. Meanwhile Pitt, whom the general voice of the country had recalled to the helm, succeeded in his favourite expedient of forming an anti-French coalition, but Napoleon, who at last recognized that the game of invasion was up, made a lightning march from Boulogne to the Danube and fell with annihilating might on the nearest of his new enemies. It was the shattering of this coalition that broke the iron nerve of Pitt. He had been cheered a little by the news that Nelson had caught the principal French and Spanish fleet feebly trying to enter the Mediterranean, and had utterly overthrown it off Cape Trafalgar. But when he heard of Napoleon's crowning victory of Austerlitz the steadfast statesman, still in the prime of life, turned his face to the wall and died murmuring "my country! how I leave my country!"

Alike in his love of England, but in every other respect a contrast to Pitt, was the supreme naval genius who died in the hour of victory off Trafalgar. Nelson, or Neilsen—for he was sprung of true East Anglian Viking stock—was as much a man of the Emotional Revival as Burke or Coleridge, and while he was a supreme product of its genius, he partook in no small measure of its weakness. Outside the scope of his own calling, his thought was so crude as to be almost childish; he cherished a sentimental Toryism that expressed itself in a passionate hatred of the French nation, and allowed him to act the part of tyrant and hangman for tyrants at Naples. If it is pleasant to think of his asking his flag-captain for a kiss on his deathbed, it is less pleasant to think of his prostituting his own and his country's good name for the kisses of Emma,

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Lady Hamilton. But as a sailor, he was what Wordsworth's best sonnets and odes would have been if translated into terms of action. The Romantic spirit produced nothing nobler than the prayer that he wrote on the morning of his death, in which he not only prays for a great and glorious victory for the benefit of England and Europe in general, but also—what is more remarkable at such a time—that humanity after victory might be the predominant feature in the British fleet. To his duty, the duty hymned by Wordsworth, he was wholly devoted, and he succeeded in communicating his spirit to those who served under him. His captains, as he truly remarked, were a "band of brothers". As a fighter he had grasped the secret, which Chatham had possessed but which his son never acquired, of being all out to win. Nothing short of annihilation would satisfy him; he concentrated on the business of victory at sea with as overwhelming a determination as Napoleon on land. And with the British ships and seamen, as with the Grand Army, the rest followed.

7

WHEELS OF VICTORY

The struggle with France turned Europe into a cockpit for a generation. Armies marched backwards and forwards, entering every important capital in turn. The manhood of the nations was drained by conscription, and when so many were wanted in barracks it was no time to build factories.

In England alone was it possible for the ordinary citizen to regard the war with the detachment of a spectator. His battles were fought by professional armies on alien soil. He considered himself as mightily patriotic if he evaded the militia ballot by a little playing at soldiers among the volunteers. Sport as usual might have been taken for the motto of the squires, business as usual for that of the self-made manufacturers. And business thrived all the more in proportion to the crippling of our Continental rivals. It was not far short of the literal truth that England was becoming the workshop of the world.

It was in textiles, and particularly in the comparatively new cotton industry, that the most striking advance was made. Our oldest manufacture, that of wool cloth, which was more bound by time-honoured methods and regulations, lagged in the wake of its younger rival. Even in cotton the adoption of the new machinery and particularly of the power loom, was a more gradual process than summary accounts of the Industrial Revolution might lead us to

suppose. It was only by slow stages that the old domestic workers were forced out of their cottages into the factories, and the most sweeping transformation of all was destined to follow the advent of the railway. The victory over Napoleon was that of a country still mainly agricultural.

But when all allowances are made, the advance was striking enough to constitute, even by the time of Waterloo, a phenomenon unprecedented in history. We have only to contrast the 3 million pounds of imported cotton in 1781, the year of York Town, with the 19 millions of 1793, our first year of the Revolutionary War, and the 132 millions of the bumper year 1810, when Napoleon's Continental System was at its height, and Europe lay at his feet. In the darkest time of all, between the Naval mutinies of 1797 and the overthrow of the second anti-French coalition in 1800, these imports of raw cotton almost exactly doubled, owing to Whitney's invention of the saw-gin, which for the first time enabled us to utilize cotton from America. No other industry could rival such figures as these, but the general rate of progress may be partially gauged by the fact that the official combined value of imports and exports in the year of Waterloo is about twice that of 1796 and four times that of 1783, though the depreciation of the pound renders these figures somewhat less striking than would at first appear.¹

When a nation is fighting for its life, all other considerations have to yield to the supreme object of beating the enemy. Judged by this standard, the Industrial Revolution was a heaven-sent windfall. But from a higher standpoint than that of immediate necessity, it may well be questioned whether it was not a supreme misfortune that a time of such vital transition should have been one in which attention and energy were almost wholly diverted from the supreme, constructive necessity of adapting our civilization to a revolutionary change of conditions.

It is hard to blame our governing class. When Napoleon's privateers were taking merciless toll of our shipping, when Europe was being strangled into one vast boycott of our goods, when taxation was rising from an annual figure of under 19 to one of over 71 millions, it was not surprising these worthy gentlemen should have been content with pulling through victoriously and letting domestic problems solve themselves. The French Revolution had opened a path of association in their minds between reforms and guillotines. And the blind faith that by flinging the reins on the neck

¹ See Cunningham's *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, Appendix F.

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of competition we should induce God, or the natural order of things, to come to our rescue, was thoroughly in harmony with the comfortable eighteenth century philosophy in whose atmosphere such minds had been formed.

Thus it came about that the firstfruits of man's increased command over nature were a misery and degradation such as it would be hard to parallel at any time in our history. It is not that the worst horrors of factory life could not be matched by instances of sweating and tyranny during the first half of the eighteenth century, but the more or less sporadic brutality of a brutal age is negligible in comparison with a system affecting vast and increasing masses of the population, and destined to alter the whole complexion of national life.

8

IRELAND TO THE ACT OF UNION

The situation that the triumph of the Volunteers had created in Ireland was one that might well have appalled the most liberal-minded of English patriots, for it could hardly fail to eventuate in complete Irish independence, the undoing of centuries of conquest and the placing on England's flank and sea-communications of what might only too probably turn out to be an active enemy. At present all this was masked by the fact that though the Irish Legislature was nominally independent, it was representative of a Protestant and Anglicized minority, and was amenable to governmental corruption. The executive was appointed by the Crown, which meant the English Ministry, and it did not represent the wishes of the Irish Parliament.

This, so long as it lasted, was a fairly comfortable state of things, but that it could be a permanent arrangement the slightest knowledge of English history would have shown to be impossible. The control of the purse must always, ultimately, place the executive at the mercy of the legislature unless the executive has sufficient power behind it to override law and Parliament at once. To trust permanently to corruption was to build on the sand. Sooner or later the rising tide of Irish patriotism must break down the barriers of religious ascendancy; sooner or later Ireland must be governed by an Irish ministry, responsible to the Irish nation, with complete control of home and foreign policy, and only the person of the Sovereign in common between her and England. And it soon became apparent that even this bond of union might be snapped, since when George III

went mad, the Irish Parliament promptly asserted its right to give full royal powers to the Prince Regent, though these were withheld in England. There was obviously no reason why Ireland should not some day assert her right to a King of her own choice.

It must therefore have been obvious that the arrangement of an independent Irish Parliament and an English executive could not be permanent, and must either eventuate in an independent Ireland or a resumption by England of some, at least, of the powers that the Volunteers had compelled her to relinquish. Perhaps the wisest, and certainly the boldest and most generous view of the situation was that of the Whig left wing, as represented by Fox, who would have frankly conceded to Ireland the utmost measure of liberty, who would have rejoiced in her being governed by Irish notions and according to Irish prejudices, in the faith that, as he expressed it, "the more she is under Irish government the more she will be bound to English interests."

To the anxious and opportunist patriotism of Pitt, the youth crushed by the awful responsibility for England's destinies, this simple policy of abandoning all control over a people embittered by centuries of wrong and of trusting to their generosity seemed too desperate a gamble. The intensity as well as the narrowness of his English patriotism made him regard with unconcealed apprehension the rebirth of patriotism in Ireland. He had no clear-cut solution of the problem, and his desire was to proceed cautiously with as much generosity as was safe, and not to despise the aid of corruption in maintaining England's power and safety. Pitt's aims may have been lower than those professed by Fox, but he at least pursued them with single-hearted devotion. To his practical mind, the most effective tie between a free England and a free Ireland would be one of trade, and he was ready to assent to a series of proposals that passed the Irish Parliament for mutual concessions amounting to a permanent economic union.

Unfortunately the short-sighted greed of the English manufacturers, which had stood in the way of any mitigation of economic tyranny so long as England had had Ireland at her mercy, was by no means lessened by the fact that the predominant partner had been brought to reason by the threat, "Free Trade or This!" Even before the proposals could be submitted to the Parliament at Westminster a dismal, dogged howl of "pockets in danger" had gone up to Heaven. What was worse still, Fox and his Whigs, seeing the opportunity of scoring over their youthful supplanter, threw their

high principles to the winds and sedulously pandered to the basest passions. Fox, of all people, argued that if Britain conceded so much to Ireland she would never have any more to concede, and spoke up in favour of a jealous, insular, protective policy. Meetings of protest were held all over the country, and Pitt found himself faced with a situation similar to that which had confronted Walpole when the agitation against his excise scheme had convinced him that "this dance will no further go". He accordingly bent to a storm that threatened to sweep him from office, in so far as to amend the proposals in a way that was held by the Irish Parliament to constitute a derogation of Irish sovereignty. Accordingly the whole scheme fell through, and Pitt's great effort after a working arrangement with a free Ireland had failed. Henceforth he seems to have lost heart and to have leant more and more to the side of those who, like the great Anglo-Irish lawyer, Fitzgibbon, held that safety demanded the ruthless assertion, at all costs, and by all means, of English supremacy over Ireland.

It was the rejection of these commercial proposals that was the real turning point in the adventure of a self-governing Ireland. A harmonious partnership had failed to eventuate, and sooner or later the will of a little nation to be free must be crushed by the force and backsheesh of an England that felt her very existence involved in the unity of the British Isles. Nevertheless the days of Grattan's Parliament, as it was called, must be reckoned as the brightest that Ireland has known since the shadow of English power first darkened her skies.

It was unfortunate that the triumph of a free and armed Ireland had not been consummated by the reform of that Parliament itself. The Volunteers wanted to crown their victory by a measure of Parliamentary reform which, though it was aimed at stopping corruption, failed, thanks to the sturdy prejudices of Lord Charlemont and the eloquent Flood, to include Catholic Emancipation. But no Parliament cares to be reformed by the threat of military force, and the dictatorship of the Volunteers was felt to be a menace to constitutional liberties. Accordingly Parliament would have nothing to do with the resolutions which Flood presented to it, and the Volunteers, thus decisively snubbed, felt their power gone and ceased henceforth to count as a political force. Thus Ireland was not only saddled with a corrupt and unrepresentative Parliament, but the sword with which she had won her freedom had dropped from her hand.

With all these disadvantages, Grattan's Parliament succeeded in accomplishing wonders for Ireland during its brief tenure of power. Since it had no control over the executive, its reforms could only be accomplished by statute, but even in England of the eighteenth century, the legislature had controlled the most trivial and transient affairs in this somewhat cumbrous way. The Dublin Parliament, whatever its faults may have been, was one of the most intensely vital assemblies of which it is possible to conceive. Eloquence attained a level of fantastic and exuberant splendour. Invectives of unmeasured violence were hurled across the floor of the House by gentlemen who would light-heartedly face each others' fire at twelve paces next morning (it was not etiquette to hesitate over your aim), and would be all the better friends for it afterwards. "I have here some excellent pills to cure a cough," once remarked Sir Boyle Roche, producing a handful of bullets for the benefit of members who were stifling his periods in the time-honoured Parliamentary fashion. One is inclined to suspect that all this quick-witted impetuosity was not unconnected with that instability which has ever been the besetting weakness of the Celt. It would have been well for Ireland if the most glorious bursts of Irish eloquence less frequently bore such titles as "Flood's invective against Grattan" and "Grattan's invective against Flood". Irish patriots have too frequently been each other's worst enemies.

For all that, Grattan's Parliament legislated vigorously, even brilliantly. The constitutional edifice was crowned by bringing Irish into harmony with English practice by a Mutiny Act valid for two years only, and by making the judges irremovable except by Parliament. The tyrannies of the Penal laws were one by one removed, and Catholics were put on the level of their fellow-citizens in all but the eligibility for important offices under the government and seats in Parliament. An immense stimulus was given to Irish trade and industry by a strong protective system worked in the interests of Ireland. She was now able to speak in the gate with her economic rivals, England included, and to provide a reasonable measure of security for capital invested in Irish industry. In almost every department there was an industrial boom; the linen trade advanced by giant strides; cotton struggled bravely forward in the teeth of Lancashire competition and dumping; Irish fishermen carried on their craft on both sides of the Atlantic; brewing received a mighty impetus; the lovely glass of Waterford not only acquired a European fame but was sedulously copied by the best foreign manufacturers.

Above all agriculture, which is the real key industry of Ireland, was stimulated powerfully by careful protection and encouragement. The amount of waste land that was reclaimed made it possible for the cattle trade to be maintained, while the yield of agriculture was multiplied many times over and—what was not of such good omen—population and rents multiplied, too. Ireland, however, did not take kindly to the Industrial Revolution; only in the cotton industry—and that imperfectly—was any serious attempt made to adopt modern improvements; no great manufacturing towns sprung up, nor was the Irish mist thickened by the smoke of innumerable factory chimneys.

Nevertheless, whether we appeal to the dry evidence of statistics—so ably marshalled by Mr. George O'Brien—or the eloquent encomiums of patriots in Parliament, this time of Irish freedom was one of unexampled prosperity. Perhaps the greatest benefits of this were reaped by those possessing capital, but, to quote Mr. O'Brien's authoritative summary, "while the condition of the labouring classes did not progress as rapidly as that of other sections of the community, it was by no means stationary. This is proved by (a) the increased taxable capacity of the peasantry, and (b) the increase in the average consumption of imported commodities."

It was fitting that this brief effulgence of Irish freedom should have seen Dublin at its greatest splendour as a capital. The time of Grattan's Parliament was also that of the architect Gandon, who was to Dublin what the Woods had been to Bath. The two glories with which his genius adorned the Liffey, the Custom House and the Four Courts, have been reserved for the patriots of a later generation to burn and shell to ruin.

But the glory was all too short-lived. It had not the elements of permanence, and a corrupt and Protestant Parliament could not for ever strike the balance between English sovereignty and Irish freedom. A change was bound to come, and was hastened on by the repercussions of the French Revolution. It was in the Protestant North East that Republican principles took the strongest hold, and Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man* was especially popular in Belfast. There emerges at this time a young Irishman called Wolfe Tone, of a peculiarly dangerous type, recklessly brave, entirely free from scruples, burning with an inextinguishable hatred of England and imbued with Republican principles very different from the aristocratic loyalty of men like Grattan. This Sinn Féiner in everything but the name was instrumental in founding a Society of United Irishmen,

at first mainly Protestant in composition and aiming at a union of all creeds and a thorough-going Parliamentary reform, but tending more and more, as time went on and the government frowned on their activities, towards naked republicanism and an independent Ireland.

The government at home and in Ireland was now faced with a problem of the utmost delicacy. Should it pursue the bold and liberal policy of securing the loyalty of Ireland by admitting her Catholic majority to full political equality with their Protestant neighbours? To keep them in permanent subjection might be to drive them into the arms of their old allies the French. But to admit them to the franchise and to Parliament might be to give over Ireland to the rule of those in whom centuries of wrong had planted the bitterest hatred of England; it might mean having a hostile and practically independent Ireland on our flank in the great European struggle. The Irish Parliament, the privileged representatives of a privileged class, were more obstinately Protestant than Pitt and his ministers, who so far leaned towards a Liberal policy as practically to force on them a measure which gave Catholics the vote, but not the right to sit in Parliament.

To a minister less opportunist in his methods than Pitt it would have been apparent that having proceeded thus far along the road of Catholic Emancipation, it was not only illogical, but too late to draw back, that a condition of things in which a Catholic electorate was compelled to choose representatives of another religion was too patently absurd to end in anything but further concession or disaster. And in 1795, little more than a year after the reform of the franchise, it did indeed seem as if full emancipation were about to become an accomplished fact, for Earl Fitzwilliam, one of the most liberal of the group of Whigs who seceded to the Government party, was sent over as Lord Lieutenant to carry, as the Catholics confidently expected, this policy to fruition. But Fitzwilliam's instructions were vague and he had against him all the corrupt influences of Protestant ascendancy; he mortally offended the powerful Beresford connection, and tactlessly invited the enmity of that most formidable of the reactionaries, the Chancellor Fitzgibbon. The ministry left him in the lurch and he was recalled, amid the lamentations of an Ireland that saw the cup of emancipation dashed from her lips. Henceforth conciliation was doomed.

Meanwhile an ominous fissure was beginning to appear between the Catholic majority and the Protestant garrison in the North East.

Catholic Emancipation had an ugly sound for men whose privileged position depended on their monopoly of political power. They saw themselves faced with the prospect of being at the mercy of an overwhelming majority, whom they despised and who did not love them. The republican jubilation with which they had hailed the fall of the Bastille changed to horror when the Revolution disclosed its true nature, and a new-born loyalty to England sprang up in answer to the threat of a French landing in Ireland. The United Irishmen were now a powerful and dangerous secret society of republican Levellers, and excited nothing but hostility among an oligarchy who were fast beginning to discover that their interests as well as their affections were bound up with the English connection.

The tragedy hastens to a climax. The land hunger of the Catholics, now stimulated by the repeal of the Penal Laws, excited the fears and inflamed the hatred of the Protestants; the old Cromwellian formula "To Hell or Connaught" was revived; a competition of outrages ended in a pitched battle of the "Diamond" in Armagh, between Protestant "Peep o' Day Boys" and Catholic "Defenders", and as its immediate sequel the first of the Orange Lodges was formed. The two nations of Ireland, which English oppression had forced into a temporary union, were now torn asunder, not again to be united.

Nothing was left but the arbitrament of the sword. England was fighting for her life and Ireland was working up for a rebellion. Troops were employed to terrorize the country and lived at free quarters on the inhabitants. Torture and outrage were the order of the day, and the noble Abercromby who, as commander-in-chief in Ireland, tried to restore decency and discipline, was forced to resign and was superseded by the ferocious Lake. The rebellion broke out prematurely, a pitiful, sporadic affair, stained by fearful cruelty and suppressed with a cruelty more fearful still. The old Volunteers, who had ever behaved with chivalry of gentlemen, were succeeded by a Protestant yeomanry who behaved like savages. Germans were imported to give the Irishmen—and women—a taste of their methods of war. Ireland was bludgeoned into submission and lay helpless, but with an inextinguishable bitterness in her heart.

There was now only one solution of the difficulty fraught with the least hope of success. To leave Ireland under a free Parliament, with an electorate the majority of whom hated England worse than the French did, would now have been plain madness. But to have behaved as France, or any other Continental power would have done in the

same circumstances, to have sent that Parliament packing and imposed our rule by force of arms, was so contrary to all English traditions as to be unthinkable even to the most violent reactionary. Even in the worst days of the eighteenth century, England had tyrannized by law, had respected the forms of Ireland's freedom and not openly treated her as a conquered province. The English Parliament had solemnly confirmed the full liberties granted to Ireland in 1782, it had expressly abrogated its own powers of taking them away. Therefore whatever policy was to be pursued, the assent of the Irish Parliament must somehow be secured. But if one thing could be more certain than another it was that that proud and brilliant body would not, of its own unbiassed choice, vote away its own existence.

The policy which Pitt now determined to put through was one that had been freely mooted for several years past. He would not take away the rights of Irishmen to send representatives to a free Parliament, but it should be to the Parliament at Westminster and not that of Dublin—the whole British Isles should, in fact, be treated as one self-governing unit. So far as constitutional logic is concerned, there was nothing more undemocratic in the idea of an Irish minority being outvoted in a Parliament of the United Kingdom than in the then existing supremacy of a Protestant Parliament in a Catholic island, or in what would certainly sooner or later have eventuated—the complete domination of a Catholic majority at Dublin over a Protestant minority. A legislative union seemed the one way of escape from the impossible situation that had existed since the triumph of the Volunteers. Pitt sincerely hoped that it might be for the good of all parties in Ireland. It would, in the long run, be the safeguard of the Protestants against the inevitable Catholic Emancipation, and as for the Catholics, it would remove the great objection to that reform which, according to Pitt's intention, should be the immediate sequel to the union.

Among the Catholics, and particularly among the hierarchy, the project of Union—on the understanding that Emancipation was to follow—did receive a good deal of support, and was certainly not felt as any intolerable grievance. But the Protestants, who were afterwards to make the maintenance of the Union a matter of life or death, were almost solid against it, and in the Irish Commons the members who really believed in it might almost have been counted on the fingers of one hand. When the scheme was first put before them, despite all the fair and foul means that the government could

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employ, the bill was thrown back in their faces, amidst general rejoicing.

But Pitt was not to be put off so easily. Master wirepuller as he was, and sincerely convinced that what he proposed was vital for the safety of the nation he was piloting through a long and exhausting war, he went calmly about overcoming the resistance of the Irish Parliament in the only way he could possibly have done so, by bribing it into assent. It was certainly not pleasant for a patriot and a gentleman—and Pitt was both—to condescend to such work, but nations fighting for their lives cannot always afford to dispense with the plea of the end justifying the means. The dirty business was efficiently and successfully accomplished and the odium of it has fastened on to a talented young politician, of Scottish-Irish stock, now rising into fame, and the chosen instrument of Pitt's policy—Lord Castlereagh. Poor Castlereagh, an honourable and humane man, who devoted his great abilities to the service of England and worked himself out of mind and life in her cause, possessed one of those temperaments to which that of almost every Englishman is antipathetic. His intellect was ruthlessly logical, without a tinge of sentiment or a salt of humour, and he concealed his feelings under a well-mannered reserve that never for a moment thawed. If corruption was, in his opinion, the right and necessary course, he would go about it without any fuss or sentiment. His colleague in the business was the Lord-Lieutenant Cornwallis, a typically English soldier and country gentleman, but Cornwallis, though he had his hands just as deep in corruption as Castlereagh, saved his face with posterity by grumbling and sentimentalizing about the part he had to play. Castlereagh, who omitted to make this trifling sacrifice to the gods of John Bull, will probably go down to the end of time as the villain of the piece.

The bribes were taken, and the Irish Parliament voted itself out of an existence which that vote went far to prove its unworthiness to enjoy. It was now time to give the Union the best, and in fact its only chance of success, by crowning Pitt's policy with Catholic Emancipation. But in the tragedy of Ireland it seemed as if nothing was ever fated to go right. The arch-reactionary Fitzgibbon, now Earl of Clare, who had powerfully supported the Union, was furious at the idea of its being coupled with Emancipation, and poured poison, not for the first time, into the ears of the obstinate old King, who had always abhorred the idea of Emancipation, and was now persuaded that by granting it he would be violating his coronation

oath. Unfortunately this contention, which was supported by the Archbishop of Canterbury, was by no means unpalatable, and the fault lay in the unchristian and bigoted declaration that every sovereign was forced to take on assuming the crown. To George's simple ideas of honour an oath, thus solemnly sworn, was to be obeyed in the spirit and the letter, and not to be honoured in the breach for any reasons of State, however cogent. When Dundas urged that the ministers would take the responsibility, the King scornfully repudiated what he called "Scotch metaphysics".

Accordingly the poor old man, with the shadow of approaching insanity already darkening his counsels, opposed with a passionate doggedness the ministerial policy. Pitt, who had certainly come to an honourable understanding with the Catholics, even if he had given them no explicit promise about Emancipation, had not the heart to force matters to extremities against his old master, so he salved his conscience by bringing to an end his long term of office, and he was followed in his resignation by the two chief agents of his policy, Cornwallis and Castlereagh. The cup of Emancipation was thus again dashed from Ireland's lips, and though the poor, exhausted country was sunk in an almost unprotesting apathy, the chance of making the Union a success was gone forever. But Ireland was not so helpless as she seemed. She was fairly and would one day be more than fairly represented at Westminster, and so considerable a minority of members as she sent was bound, once it became Catholic and national, sooner or later to impose its will by holding the balance of power between English parties.

9

THE WAR OF ATTRITION

After Trafalgar the struggle with Napoleon enters on a new phase. The threat of invasion has, for the time, lost its terror; England has decisively established her command of the sea. On the other hand, the shattering of the Third Coalition at Austerlitz has given France an overwhelming military superiority on the Continent and to all appearance established the power of Napoleon upon impregnable foundations.

Now, if he had realized it, was the Emperor's opportunity to establish a lasting and glorious peace with his supreme enemy. Such a peace was his for the asking. After Pitt's death a mixed

ministry, predominantly Whig in composition and with Fox at the Foreign Office, came into power. Fox, with the hand of death upon him, cherished two noble objects—peace and the abolition of the Slave Trade. Negotiations were opened on a generous and, as some English patriots might have feared, a ruinous basis. Napoleon was to keep what he had conquered, and not only had he now got such a France as Louis XIV had hardly dared to dream of, but his will was practically supreme throughout Italy and the Catholic South of Germany. But his infatuated materialism grasped at Sicily for his brother Joseph, whom he had made King of Naples. His astonishing ignorance of sea power blinded him to the fact that Sicily would be an even surer death trap for any army or government hostile to England than Egypt had been for the unfortunate troops he had led and abandoned there. Fox, to whom office had brought a sense of responsibility that he had lacked in opposition, clung to Sicily for its worthless yet friendly Bourbon government with invincible obstinacy, nor did he allow himself to be tricked by the astute Talleyrand's efforts to separate us from our ally Russia. And so, with the infatuated folly of materialism, Napoleon wantonly committed himself to a fight to a finish with a power that was bound to wear him down in the long run. For it was now a contest of the sword against the machine, and against the sword the machine was protected by a wooden wall.

What Napoleon's limited vision could see, he saw with extraordinary lucidity. The one way now in which he could touch England was to ruin her trade, and England's trade depended on her markets. England he visualized as a nation of shopkeepers, and if all the customers refused to patronize the shop, that shop would be ruined. He could not wreck the shop, though he had tried, but the customers he could get at and bully into withdrawing their custom. Unfortunately England was now in a position equivalent to that occupied by the only general store in a remote village whose inhabitants are absolutely dependent upon it for the conveniences and even some of the necessities of life. In consequence the strong man, 'who denies access to the shop, is certain to be regarded as a dangerous ruffian against whose orders and person it is in everybody's interest to combine. In these circumstances the strong man must administer such thorough and repeated thrashings to everybody in the village that they will go about hungry and in rags sooner than run the risk of his wrath. Furthermore the strong man must neglect his own business and take the trouble and expense of policing the whole

village, an intolerable strain unless the shop has to close its doors in a very short time.

This is the alternative that Napoleon preferred to that of going without an unattainable and worse than useless conquest. The mad attempt to take England by direct assault had failed like the even madder one to turn her flank in the East. He now cheerfully undertook the task of starving her out by coercing the rest of Europe. He started by half forcing, half bribing, Prussia into a nominal state of war with England, and then, when he cheerfully offered the already accepted bribe, Hanover, back to England as a pawn in his negotiations, he at last goaded the timeserving King of Prussia into war in concert with Russia, annihilated her main army on the Saale as he had annihilated the Austrians the year before on the Danube, and then, after occupying Berlin, pressed forward to a bloody and doubtful campaign on the frozen plains of Poland, a campaign which might have ended his career could Austria have summoned up the courage to fall on his communications. It was from Berlin that he proclaimed his blockade of England, that it was his intention to convert into a European boycott of her goods. The French navy had orders to cease from operations on a grand scale, and devote itself to a ruthless war, largely carried on by privateers, against British commerce.

Meanwhile in what spirit was England facing a situation more alarming than that which had broken the steadfast heart of Pitt? How it struck Wordsworth may be judged from his sonnet in November, 1806.

“ Another year!—another deadly blow!
 Another mighty empire overthrown!
 And We are left, or shall be left, alone;
 The last that dare to struggle with the Foe.
 ’Tis well! from this day forward we shall know
 That in ourselves our safety must be sought;
 That by our right hands it must be wrought;
 That we must stand unpropped, or be laid low.

O! lastard whom such fortetaste doth not cheer!
 We shall exult if they who rule the land
 Be men who hold its many blessings dear,
 Wise, valiant, upright; not a servile band,
 Who are to judge of danger which they fear,
 And honour which they do not understand.”

In face of these noble lines it is astonishing to record that by the bulk of Englishmen the seriousness of the situation was scarcely appreciated at all. The hunger for peace, which had hailed the

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inglorious truce of 1801 with transports of joy, was no longer acute, and Fox's negotiations excited no very fervent interest. Prize-fighting and foxhunting, balls and dinners, went on as usual, and statesmen were more concerned in scoring points in the party game than in getting the better of the enemy. In recent years an immense mass of correspondence has come to light from the archives of the Grenville family at Dropmore, and when we read of the ceaseless petty intrigue that was going on between different factions and personages of importance, the wonder is how under such leadership we could ever have put up a successful fight against the centralized and intensely efficient despotism opposed to us.

The "Ministry of All the Talents", as the coalition was called that now governed the country, did all it could to lose us the war. By its grudging and cheeseparing support it succeeded in driving our last ally, Russia, into the arms of the enemy. It missed a golden opportunity during the desperately contested winter campaign in East Prussia in 1806-7, of turning the scales against Napoleon by sending a British Expeditionary force to the Baltic.¹ Meanwhile it frittered our strength away in petty or mercenary operations that were not even justified by success. It anticipated a more disastrous failure by supporting Russia with a naval diversion through the Dardanelles, which merely resulted in our ships being badly knocked about before they could get out again. It occupied Alexandria and lost it. It was, in particular, obsessed with the notion that we had discovered a commercial paradise in South and Central America—one enterprising manufacturer actually sent a consignment of skates to Rio—and it was not till we had suffered a disgraceful defeat that we realized that it was one thing for Spanish and half-breed colonists to want to be free from the mother country, but quite a different thing for them to want to be part of the British Empire.

When the coming of spring permitted Napoleon to manoeuvre, he had little difficulty in falling on the Russian army and driving part of it into the river Alle at Friedland. A meeting was thereupon arranged between Napoleon and the Tsar at Tilsit, and the two concluded an alliance which laid Western Europe at Napoleon's feet, and made Russia herself an accomplice in the boycott of England. It might have done even worse by giving the Emperor a chance of commanding another fleet capable of challenging English supremacy, for it was part of Napoleon's design to use his overwhelming land power

¹ The strategy that Lord Fisher would have adopted, against Germany, in 1914, under much less promising circumstances.

to possess himself of the Portuguese and Danish fleets. How much of this design was known to the English ministry, a Tory combination that had replaced "All the Talents", is uncertain. Historians have speculated as to the source from which the government ascertained the secret articles of the treaty between Napoleon and the Tsar, and particularly that relating to the former's seizure of the Danish fleet. But among all the documents that have come to light in the interval, there is none that proves such a disclosure ever to have been made. It would not have needed the deductive powers of a Sherlock Holmes to have realized the danger without any disclosure at all.

The foreign office at this time was occupied by Canning, of Anti-Jacobin fame, and upon whom the mantle of his friend and confidant Pitt was generally supposed to have fallen. This brilliant and ambitious man is one of those characters about whom it is customary to indulge either in uncritical eulogy or an equally uncritical censure. A self-made man, he was always something of an adventurer, his restless egotism was constantly impelling him to push his own interests at all costs, and tended at times to sink the statesman in the political schemer. The caddish intrigue that he carried on to get rid of his unsuspecting colleague, Castlereagh, was rewarded—Irish fashion—with a bullet in the thigh. Canning also had some of that peculiar hardness that is associated with the self-made man and, particularly, with the self-made Tory. He was brutal and biting in his opposition, and it is characteristic of him that he was among the opponents of legal protection for animals.

At the same time Canning was, after Pitt's death, the one among all our statesmen who was capable of opposing ideas as well as force to the Napoleonic tyranny. It was not for nothing that he had started his career as the upholder of the British Constitution against Jacobin levellers. He saw, with the intuition of genius, what was at stake all along in the struggle with France. English constitutional principles, born of the English Common Law, were on trial of battle against the centralized despotism, that the Caesars had imposed on their world, and that Napoleon was busy imposing on his. Canning certainly never went so far as to visualize the struggle as—what in essence it was—one between the principles of the Common Law and those of the *Code Napoléon*, or Roman Law. But he clearly saw that the liberties of Europe were at stake, and that the very nature of the British Constitution was to stand for liberties. Men like Castlereagh and, for that matter, most of the Tory ministers,

were as little concerned with liberties as they were with liberty. They were playing the game for their side, for Britain, against heavy odds, and they meant to play it for all it was worth because they were British. It follows that Canning, Anti-Jacobin though he was, could not take the reactionary and inelastic view of the constitution that was now fashionable among his Tory colleagues. More and more did he come to regard it as dynamic and continually developing, more and more did he come to realize that its very spirit was that of freedom.

Canning's worst qualities no less than his genius were displayed in his dealings with the little state of Denmark, upon the information or suspicion of Napoleon's designs upon her small and dismantled fleet lying up in Copenhagen Harbour. Denmark had hitherto honourably upheld her neutrality and professed herself ready still to do so, but Canning had decided that where the safety of England was concerned there was nothing for it but to hack through. Accordingly our unwilling diplomatic representatives were driven, with bullying precipitancy, to demand the fleet, and when this was quite properly refused, the British, who had withheld aid till too late from their ally the Tsar, descended on the devoted capital in overwhelming force and pitilessly shelled it into submission. Castle-reagh, now war-minster, cheerfully proposed to our military commander that he should deliberately find excuse for violating the terms of the surrender in order to achieve the doubtful advantage of leaving our army locked up in the island of Zealand, but this Lord Cathcart, like an officer and a gentleman, refused to do, much to the annoyance of Canning. Judgments on this affair will always differ between those who believe that it is better to violate any standards of generosity or fair-dealing rather than run the least risk, and those who believe that everything should be sacrificed before honour.

The situation now resolved itself into a duel between Napoleon carrying it with a high hand on the Continent, and England carrying it with scarcely less high land on the ocean, a procedure that ultimately involved her in a pitiful, inglorious, and useless war with the United States. But the Emperor, materialist that he was, could not perceive that the war that had brought his armies to the Niemen had lost him more than he had gained. For one thing, he was committed to holding down an unwilling Prussia, and to watching an Austria which was only waiting for the moment of revenge. This compelled him to keep a large army continually in being on his

Eastern front in Germany. For another thing, his Continental System was such an unmitigated nuisance to everybody concerned, that it was only by active coercion or the fear of it that he could get it enforced. The village bully, to revert to our old analogy, was engaged in driving his neighbours away from the village shop.

There was an even deeper sense in which Napoleon had placed himself at a disadvantage. The sentiment of nationality, of the right of every people to choose its own government, had given the French Revolution its invincible *elan*. Armies of men determined to be free had been pitted against the hirelings of Kings, and nothing could check them. But now there had long ceased to be any immediate threat to the safety of France. Her armies were strung out far beyond her borders, living on the country, and imposing an iron yoke upon peoples alien in blood and ideas. As the ardour of the French people, rightly struggling to be free, began to wane, that of her enemies began to awaken. The very Kings, reactionary and unteachable as most of them were, became symbolic of freedom, centres of national aspiration. Even Prussia began to democratize her land system and her armies; even under the shadow cast by the wings of the Hapsburg Double Eagle was the word Fatherland breathed. The national spirit that had all along sustained England was now beginning to spread to other countries, and this, in the vision of those who had eyes to see, gave her a winning advantage.

Such was the vision of Canning. In the newly started *Quarterly Review* he argued that the power of Napoleon depended less on his own strength than on the weakness of his enemies, and that it was time for cottage and palace to unite in a supreme national struggle against his tyranny. Wordsworth, sonnetizing in the Miltonian vein, invoked the spirit of liberty wherever, throughout Europe, it showed signs of awakening. His enthusiasm occasionally exceeded his knowledge of the facts, as when he made a hero out of the mad King of Sweden, but he had the root of the matter, and gave a nobler expression to England's cause, and Europe's, than any other Englishman. He was perpetually dwelling on the inward calm, the fount of strength that belongs to men and nations at peace with and true to themselves.

"O'erweening statesmen have too long relied
On fleets and armies and external wealth:
But from *within* proceeds a nation's health. . . ."

His is the very opposite to the Napoleonic spirit of reckoning power by huge armies and extent of territory. Napoleon himself is to

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him only a foredoomed gambler, who even now, in place of true greatness, possesses but

“ Internal darkness and unquiet breath ”.

Wordsworth had, indeed, divined the weakness of France in a lack of ideas, a “ want of books and men ”, which counted for more in his mind than the power of armies. And, indeed, France, at this height of her visible power, was approaching something like spiritual bankruptcy. Her great series of humanists, who had adorned the eighteenth century, had come to an end, and left no successors but a few obscure materialists calling themselves ideologues. Poetry was but the dregs of the old classic convention. Napoleon’s court had adopted for itself a style of pretentious vulgarity that was as different as possible from the pompous but undoubted dignity that had invested the Versailles of Louis XIV. Gilbert’s Bunthorne was, for once, telling the truth when he averred that

“ The reign of art stopped short in the cultivated court
Of the Empress Josephine.”

England, with her Turner, her Lawrence, her Lake School, even with her Bentham and her Canning, showed that, whoever might have the big battalions, the great ideas were, for the nonce, on her side.

10

THE WAR OF EUROPEAN INDEPENDENCE

In attempting to conquer England by the Continental System, Napoleon had undertaken a task to which his strength was definitely inadequate, and his supreme triumph at Tilsit had started a sequence of events that could only end in his complete overthrow. He could neither leave off fighting nor force a decision. And his eagerness to close every commercial loophole rapidly involved him in fighting and squandering his resources on two fronts at once, and giving England just the opening she wanted for bringing her land power as well as her sea power into play.

Almost immediately after Tilsit, Napoleon found himself committed to operations in the Spanish Peninsula. England’s old ally, Portugal, had a fleet waiting to be seized, and must be bullied into the ranks of England’s foes. Accordingly a French army was hurried to Lisbon, where it found the fleet gone, with the Portuguese court, to Brazil. Having achieved this easy conquest, Napoleon, by a series of disreputable tricks, proceeded, as he thought, to make sure of Spain by putting his own brother Joseph on the throne.

The sentiment of nationality, of which Napoleon was as persistently ignorant as he was of sea power, was now aroused against him with a vengeance, and indeed the most favourable circumstances were created for the two factors to work against him in co-operation since, as every child knows but the Man of Destiny had forgotten, a peninsula is land almost entirely surrounded by water.

There is no end to the literature detailing the events that now brought Napoleon's power crashing down more rapidly than it had arisen. In its essence, the process was one of the utmost simplicity. The constant element of it is the duel—by Napoleon's choice—to the death between his Empire and England, a duel in which England forces her opponent to undertake operations on the Continent, whose ultimate effect is to kindle the spirit of nationality from Moscow to Lisbon, and draw all the nations, and not merely a gang of sovereigns, into one final and irresistible coalition against him.

Assuredly England owed little enough to the vision of her statesmen. From the fall of All-the-Talents, the Tories, with various reshufflings important to the Tapers and Tadpoles of that and subsequent times, remained steadily in office, and did at least represent a fixed determination of the landed upper class to have done with "Boney", and that without an undue amount of fuss or sentiment. But as far as statesmanship was concerned, few of them rose above a respectable mediocrity, with the exception of Canning, who made himself impossible as a colleague by his sharp practice and dangerous as a foreign minister by his determination to be brilliant at all costs, and of Castlereagh, who was as heedless of national sentiment as Napoleon himself and guilty of at least one ghastly blunder as war minister. Of the three successive prime ministers, Portland was a nonentity, and neither Perceval nor Liverpool, though both were above the average of political competence, possessed breadth of vision or force of personality. Nothing approaching the fiery genius of Chatham nor the steadfast grandeur of his son graced our statesmanship; it was something deeper and stronger than any one man could supply that guided us to victory, it was England herself, patient, blundering, almost inarticulate, and yet strong like one of her own oaks with the growth of centuries.

It was Spain that gave England her chance of bleeding Napoleon to death, and it was one that she did not fail to seize, though her statesmen were still capable of diverting her forces to other and disastrous fields. It was soon evident that in what had seemed to him the easy conquest of an effete nation, the Emperor had burnt

his fingers badly. The Spaniards were incapable of forming an efficient national army, but the local juntas that sprung up everywhere in a barren and mountainous country carried on a guerilla resistance that seemed impossible to stamp out and was a terrible drain on French resources; one French army shared a similar fate to that of Burgoyne at Saratoga and the new King could not maintain himself at Madrid. The fire of revolt, kindled in Spain, was not long in spreading to Portugal, and England, now for the first time bringing her sea power effectually to bear on Napoleon's European land power, stepped in and easily disposed of the army that had conquered Portugal, and so found themselves caught, like rats in a trap, on the Lisbon Peninsula.

Even this successful stroke was so clumsily delivered as to cause more disappointment than jubilation at home. Sir John Moore, whom his admitted military genius pointed out as the leader of the expedition was, for reasons other than military, distasteful to the politicians, and the upshot was a change of command twice in twenty-four hours that enabled the French to go home on honourable terms instead of surrendering unconditionally. The popular outcry that followed from a public that did not understand the importance of having secured a base for future operations, came near to wrecking the young general to whose skilful tactics the victory was due, Arthur Wellesley, who had gained no small reputation in India and—what was probably an even more decisive factor in his advancement—was a member of the government and Chief Secretary for Ireland.

This Convention of Cintra furnished the occasion for the noblest piece of English prose that the Napoleonic struggle called forth, in the shape of a long pamphlet by Wordsworth, whose sureness of intuition and sustained loftiness of diction would have assuredly placed it among the classics of the language, but for the fact of its author's allowing his romantic enthusiasm to carry him into one now demonstrable injustice, and more than one error of a too credulous charity, perhaps also from the inveterate habit of mental labelling—Wordsworth being supposed to be a poet and not a prose writer. But we can forget the unimportant controversy that was the immediate occasion of the pamphlet, forget also Wordsworth's not unnatural idealization of the greedy and incompetent Spanish Juntas, and regard it as a veritable call to a crusade, and an inspired appreciation of that which constituted our true strength, and which Wordsworth defines as "the paramount efficacy of moral causes".

Napoleon stands upon a hideous precipice from the fact of his

acknowledging no mastery but that of power. "For present annoyance his power is, no doubt, mighty : but liberty—in which it originated, and of which it is a deprivation—is far mightier ; and the good in human nature is stronger than the evil," and, again, "upon liberty, and upon liberty alone, can there be permanent dependence."

Such language breathed an atmosphere into which few of Wordsworth's contemporaries had wings to soar. All that was most enduring in the struggle against Napoleon, as well as the most exalted rendering of modern Liberalism, is contained in brief but immortal paragraph :

"When wickedness acknowledges no limit but the extent of her power . . . the only worthy or adequate opposition is—that of virtue submitting to no circumscription of her endeavours save that of her rights, and aspiring from the impulse of her own ethereal zeal. The Christian exhortation for the individual is here the precept for nations—'Be ye therefore perfect ; even as your Father, which is in Heaven, is perfect'."

The tragedy of Napoleon's fall proceeded with Sophoclean inevitability. Enraged by the reverses he had sustained at the hands of a despised people, the Emperor determined that they, and any handful of men that unmilitary England chose to land on their shores, should feel the full blast of the thunderbolt that had already destroyed the proud armies of Central and Eastern Europe. Accordingly the Grand Army was assembled behind the Pyrenees to overwhelm the outnumbered, ill-led and ill-disciplined national levies, in one triumphant sweep across the Peninsula. But in order to do this Napoleon had to withdraw the best part of his French troops from the nominally peaceful German front, and thus to give Austria, who was only waiting for such an opening, the chance of mobilizing her reconstituted armies and falling in overwhelming force on the remainder.

Napoleon's rush started by being an even more overwhelming success than he could have anticipated. Without a serious battle, the Spanish armies ran or melted away, the Polish lancers took at the gallop a mountain pass, believed impregnable, that barred the road to Madrid, the French reached that capital almost as fast as their legs could carry them, and, while the Austrian declaration of war still hung fire, the Emperor, who never failed to exploit a success to the utmost, might have swept on to Lisbon. But he had reckoned without the little English army, now at last commanded by Sir John

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Moore, which had penetrated into the middle of Spain and hazarded a daring stroke at the French communications. Whether or not the Emperor's judgment was biased by his fixed hatred of England and his desire to get to grips with that elusive foe, he dropped the completion of his original scheme, and rushed his best troops with frantic haste over blizzard-swept mountain passes, to intercept and annihilate Moore's army. But he was too late, and he arrived at Astorga, his destined point on Moore's line of march, to find that the English had just in the nick of time slipped out of his clutches. Moore's retreat to Corunna, his successful counter-attack and death, are picturesque but comparatively unimportant incidents.

For Napoleon's furious blow had but cleft the air, and his time in Spain was up. At Astorga he received news that convinced him that Austria really meant business, and that he must hurry back to Paris if he meant to save his depleted armies on the Danube. The rush of the Grand Army into Spain had left him worse off than when it was safe behind the Pyrenees. The Spanish armies had melted away, but their guerilla bands, in which their real strength lay, were as active as ever, keeping tens of thousands of Frenchmen dispersed about the country and bleeding Napoleon's strength in the most harassing and interminable of military operations. Above all, England still had her foot firmly planted in the Peninsula, thus compelling the French to keep together a large field army that might have otherwise have been employed in stamping out the revolt. Thus English regulars and Spanish guerillas played into each other's hands.

Napoleon had got back none too soon. His insufficient forces on the Danube had been seriously compromised by incompetent staff work, and it required a supreme effort of his genius to get them out of the scrape and clear his path to Vienna. But now the effect of his Peninsula venture was telling fatally upon him. Many of his best troops, of his most distinguished Marshals, were pinned down to his Western front, and he had to face an army now for the first time inspired by the love of Fatherland with a force, numerous indeed, but largely made up of German auxiliaries and of half-trained boys whom he had driven to the colours by the unpopular expedient of anticipating the conscription. In the early summer All Europe was thrilled by the news that the Grand Army, debouching from Vienna, had after two days' desperate fighting, failed to make good the passage of the Danube.

It was a situation rife with tremendous possibilities, and never

did a more favourable chance present itself for an English stroke that should arouse the whole of Northern Germany to complete the work that Austria had begun. Alternatively, she could have followed Wordsworth's advice, and thrown such a large force into Spain as to have given her a fair chance of driving the French out of it. She did neither. With the selfish and limited, though quite feasible object of destroying Antwerp, the new naval base that Napoleon described as a pistol held at England's head, a grand expedition, the largest that had ever left our shores, was dispatched under the lazy and incompetent politician who bore the name of Chatham. The expedition was too late starting and failed miserably, the army being destroyed by fever in the Marshes of Walcheren, which was the nearest they were ever allowed to get to Antwerp.

Germany did not rise, and by a supreme effort Napoleon managed to crush Austria, but this brought him no nearer the end of his troubles. England, if she had not found a statesman, had at least found a commander. Of Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, estimates and appreciations are legion, but we are inclined to think that the one nearest to the truth is that which divines under that hard exterior a nature naturally not military, but artistic, terribly repressed. One does not easily think of the Iron Duke as the son of one of the leading musicians and song-composers of his time, as a youth one of whose chief delights it was to play the violin—but it was even so with him. In one or two moments of supreme emotion, a sensitive horror of the business in which he was engaged rushed to the surface in a flood of tears. Be the cause what it may, never was there a soldier less enamoured of the romantic or glorious side of war, or indeed of bloodshed of any kind. "Take my word for it," were his solemn words, "if you had seen but one day of war you would pray to Almighty God that you might never again see even an hour of war." It is characteristic of him that when a very old man, and in charge of the military arrangements for suppressing the threatened Chartist riots, he devoted the whole of his energies to avoiding any provocation that might result in bloodshed, and, if the worst came to the worst, to giving the rioters every opportunity of getting away.

He appears to have regarded war as a disgusting but necessary business, in which not choice but a sense of duty had involved him. About it he had no illusions whatever. His Peninsula soldiers he spoke of as the scum of the earth, and instead of idealizing his

subordinates, as Nelson had done, he displayed not the least affection for them during the war nor desire to associate with them when it was over.

Tennyson's obituary ode to the "great Duke" would probably have annoyed him exceedingly, and it is well known how, when a stranger helped him across the road and to a habitually polite acknowledgment replied that he had been only too glad to be of assistance to the victor of Waterloo, Wellington had turned furiously upon him with an adjuration not to be a damned fool.

It was to this entirely unconventional warrior that the task had fallen of sustaining our cause in the Peninsula. He went about it with an utter absence of sentiment, but an unerring eye for the essentials of the situation. He was as alive as Napoleon was blind to the uses of sea power, nor did he at all mind how far or how often he was pushed back, provided he was not actually driven into the sea without the possibility of return. Accordingly his first care was to turn the tongue of land on which Lisbon stood into an impregnable fortress. His second was to provide himself with a transport capable of following and maintaining his army, whereas the French were reduced to living on a barren and hostile country, a fact which prevented them from keeping any large body of troops together for any adequate time.

His third discovery was that of a system of tactics which gave him, with the excellently disciplined troops he commanded, a winning advantage over the conscripts of Napoleon. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say rediscovery, for apart from the fact that the opposition of line to column had been tried with success by General Stuart at Maida, in Calabria, Wellington was only returning to the fire tactics that had rendered the line of English archers, properly handled, invincible during the Hundred Years' War. Of course there was nothing new in linear tactics, they had, in fact, been universal throughout the eighteenth century until the heavy columns of the Revolution, proceeded by clouds of skirmishers, had put them temporarily out of date. In the early nineteenth, as in the fourteenth century, the line itself was no panacea, its success depended on its perfect fire training and on the protection it received on its flanks. Edward II at Bannockburn, like the Prince of Orange at Waterloo, proved how easy it was for an unskilled commander to get the best troops, in line, rolled up and destroyed for want of proper support. And the mere fact that the French, from the day of Vimiero to that of Waterloo, were never able to learn Wellington's secret, is strong

reason for thinking that only with such steady regulars as he commanded would the line have proved anything but disastrous.

Wellington then, to give him the title by which he was shortly to be known, went about the business of bleeding France to death with mathematical precision. While Napoleon had his hands tied in Austria, he manoeuvred one French army neatly out of Portugal, advanced to threaten Madrid, gave a successful display of his new tactics in a defensive battle, and then, having gathered all the available French troops round him, left his wounded behind and got back into Portugal. Next year (1810) Napoleon, now thoroughly sensible of the menace constituted by the British presence in the Peninsula, sent the ablest of his Marshals, Masséna, with an overwhelming army, to drive them into the sea. Wellington, who was quite prepared for this move, retired on his base at Lisbon, and left Masséna to starve helplessly outside the lines which for the last year he had been preparing, and at last to make a disastrous retreat. In 1811, with Napoleon still at the height of his power, there was nothing for it but to go on hammering away with a series of bloody and indecisive actions very distressing to the civilian mind, and waiting for the Eastern front to wake up.

Meanwhile the great attempt to stifle England's commerce, in which all this expenditure of French blood and treasure was being incurred, was being pursued with the obstinate energy that only Napoleon could throw into any scheme on which he had once set his heart. But he had miscalculated his opponent's strength. England had her overseas markets that he could not touch, and so necessary was her commerce to the countries of Europe that all his bullying could not shut it out. He had to evade his own regulations by granting licences to deal in English goods, and he was even reduced to purchasing English cloth for the backs of his own soldiers. Then, in a desperate effort to make his system effective, he had bonfires of English goods lit at various European commercial centres, which did little harm to England in comparison with the collapse it caused in Continental business, and steadily swelled the tide of his unpopularity.

Nevertheless, distress in England was very acute, and in 1811, when Napoleon seemed at the height of his power, she was beginning to be hard pressed. The South American markets, on which she largely depended, had been overstocked, there was a grave dislocation of business, and unemployment was added to the other miseries of the artisan. Gangs of desperate men were abroad smashing the

machinery that they vaguely associated with their troubles. Wheat, of which England, despite the fact that even such unpromising tracts as parts of Dartmoor were forced into tillage, was still unable to produce enough, soared to fabulous prices. But at this very juncture Napoleon, with that capacity for making colossal blunders that went along with his genius, missed his one chance of starving us out by permitting the export of corn to our shores. He appears to have got into his head the old balance of trade fallacy, in its crudest form, and to have imagined that by letting us exchange gold for corn he was draining us of the only sort of wealth that really mattered! Thanks largely to this unintentional generosity we were enabled to live through the darkest hour.

It was not only in her manufactures that England's strength lay. The unseen and—to this day—unappreciated powers of international finance were working on her side. Early in the nineteenth century a Frankfurt Jew called Rothschild had built up a fortune and a reputation for negotiating financial transactions on the largest scale, no less by his sterling Jewish honesty than by his business genius. His sons, working in family alliance as only Jews can, established the business at various European capitals, and the ablest of them all, Nathan Meyer Rothschild, came to England. He was a man justly respected—it was not everyone who could stand up to the Duke of Wellington as he did in 1834, and tell him that he must go with the times or the times would not go with him—and he had an unfaltering belief, on which he was ready to stake his whole fortune, in England's strength and greatness. He rapidly became indispensable to the government, and towards the end of the war all their important financial business with Continental powers was transacted through him. He was, in the latter stages of the Peninsula War, an unseen power behind Wellington's armies. Always pinched by the government for his expenses, Wellington had one day presented them with some drafts that they could not meet, but which Rothschild instantly took up. Henceforth the business of supplying Wellington with the sinews of war was immensely facilitated through his mediumship.

In 1812 the Continental system, which Napoleon could not enforce but which he would not drop, brought its nemesis. The Tsar Alexander could stand it no longer, and the Eastern Front awoke into life again. With the doubtful support of the Central European powers, Napoleon raised an enormous army, less than half of whom were Frenchmen, for something like three hundred thousand of his

best French troops were pinned to the Peninsula by Wellington and the guerillas. With this motley horde he found it difficult to manoeuvre, and impossible to obtain a decision. In his frantic efforts to close with his enemy he pushed further and further through the vast plains of Russia to deserted Moscow. More than half of his army melted away in the advance; practically the whole of the remainder perished in the attempt to get back to Germany. This disaster was the signal for Prussia to shake off her chains and add her forces, now fired with the spirit of nationality, to those of the Tsar.

Napoleon's difficulties had been the measure of England's strength. Wellington started by storming the two frontier fortresses that constituted the gates of Spain, before the French could get together sufficient forces to oppose him, then, advancing into the heart of the country, he overthrew their main army at Salamanca, a veritable classic of tactics, occupied Madrid, and then, having forced the French to abandon Southern Spain in a supreme effort to overwhelm him, retired unperturbably on Portugal. The necessity of reforming his Eastern front now compelled Napoleon to starve his armies in Spain, and the necessity of maintaining his Western front compelled him to rely on masses of raw conscripts, obtained with ever-increasing difficulty. These boys were only able to push the combined Russian and Prussian forces back upon the Bohemian mountains, where an Austrian army was already beginning to assemble awaiting the moment for a possible intervention. It was then that Napoleon consented to a six weeks' armistice, in which all depended on the attitude of Austria, which still remained in doubt even at Vienna.

But Wellington had not been idle. In the spring of 1813 ¹ he had waved adieu to Portugal, and then advancing through Spain he made a masterly use of sea power by shifting his base along the Northern coast as he went. Near the source of the Ebro he closed with the puppet King and his army, destroying it in the most workmanlike way. The French, with the exception of a few isolated forces, were now flying from Spain with Wellington at their heels, and this resounding news, which arrived during the armistice, was probably the determining factor in inducing Austria definitely to throw in her lot with the allies and thus compel the Emperor, with

¹ Even now, when every man, gun, and guinea was needed for Wellington's advance to victory, the cabinet was toying with the idea of diverting forces to Southern Italy.

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forces deficient in quantity and quality, to meet for the first time a combination of the three great Continental despotisms, shortly to be reinforced by the arms and national spirit of all Germany.

There is no need to follow the steps by which Napoleon was forced back from the Elbe to Paris, while Wellington without any sensational victories or dazzling coups, maintained a businesslike, remorseless pressure, forcing his way through the Pyrenees well into South Western France, maintaining strictest discipline and paying for everything he took, diminishing Napoleon's recruiting area and engaging what was now his best remaining army.

It was during this final closing in upon Napoleon that Lord Castlereagh, now foreign minister, came to dominate, with his cold and courtly personality, backed by England's power of the purse, the by no means harmonious counsels of the allies. From the very commencement of the Franco-Russian war, when he had skilfully brought the Turks to a peace with Russia by revealing to them a scheme of Napoleon's for their partition, he had bent all his energies to the attainment of a peace that should bring back France to her pre-revolutionary frontiers. In 1814 he crowned his work by visiting the allied headquarters, and bringing about a formal agreement by which the powers bound themselves to carry on the fight to a finish and listen to no more offers from Napoleon. He was also instrumental in putting pressure on the doubtful loyalty of the King of Sweden—an old marshal of Napoleon's who had joined the alliance for reasons of his own—to supply much needed reinforcements.

So the allies reached Paris, Napoleon was sent to reign over the little Isle of Elba, and the Bourbons came back to Paris. The Man of Destiny had set out to ruin England when he might have had peace with her, and the effort had proved too much for him. What had brought about his fall was the steady, persistent drain on his resources caused by the presence of the British army, working in concert with the guerilla bands in the Peninsula, behind which lay the power conferred by the mastery of the seas, and behind this again the economic supremacy conferred by energy stored up in England's buried forests of the carboniferous age and applied through the machinery of the Industrial Revolution. It is easy to wax sentimental over the majesty of the British soldiers in the Peninsula, but we must not forget that this army was a force of poorly paid mercenaries recruited from the dregs of the population, from the jails and ne'er-do-wells and men whom the starvation, that haunted town and countryside, steeled to face the horrors of a discipline, which

alone—and that not always—could keep them from degenerating into a mob of ruffians. It was not even, as the struggle drew to a close, altogether a British army, for it was to an increasing extent recruited from amongst the Irish Catholics whom poverty and a natural love of fighting—but assuredly not of England—drove into the service. When we talk of the valour of our soldiers—and no doubt it was honourable to men so unfortunate that they should perform such prodigies—we must not forget that when in 1807 Sir Francis Burdett criticized in Parliament the hellish torture of flogging, which we shared with no other army except that of Russia, he only got three members to support him in a modest request for a return of sentences and lashes.

It remains to mention that dramatic episode of Napoleon's return from Elba, the rally of the whole French Army to his eagles, the brief re-establishment and final overthrow of his Empire. It was a hopeless attempt from the moment when the former allies agreed to lay aside their differences and devote all their energies to his destruction. Armies from all over Europe began to muster along the Eastern frontier of France, and the first in position were a composite force under Wellington covering Brussels, and a Prussian army on its left along the line of the Sambre and Meuse. Everybody knows how Napoleon dashed at the point of junction of these two armies, at Charleroi, hoping to divide and destroy them separately, and how this attempt ended on the field of Waterloo.

What the critics of this, the most discussed campaign in the world's history, have failed to appreciate, is the consistency of Wellington's attitude with that which he had maintained throughout the Peninsula campaign. He had an entire contempt for the brilliancies of war, and on this occasion he was staking on the certainty of ultimate victory. Although, had such a sacrifice been demanded, he formally expressed his willingness to throw in his lot with the Prussians, what was evidently uppermost in his mind was his communication with the sea through the fortified ports of Ostend and Antwerp. If he could stand and beat Napoleon in front of Brussels, well and good, but if he was forced back towards the sea, he would keep his army in being and, with overwhelming allied forces mustering to the South, the Emperor would be worse off in Brussels than he would have been behind the frontier.

Wellington's correspondence shows that up to the last moment he did not believe the enemy would venture on so desperate a move as an offensive in Belgium, and, once having embarked on it, he

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thought to his dying day that the best chance would have been a stroke at his right flank, to sever his communications. It was about this flank that he constantly displayed the most sedulous care, and its protection was evidently in his mind when he left a considerable force detached at Hal on the day of Waterloo. So long as the road to the sea was safe, nothing could be lost.

In the final battle, fighting, as he himself said, with the worst army he had ever commanded, he succeeded, in his quiet, businesslike way, in outclassing Napoleon at every point as a tactician. The opposition of line to column, of fire power to mass, was as triumphant at Waterloo as it had been at Poitiers.

Wellington's use of ground in concealing his troops so mystified his opponent that even in the calm of Saint Helena he seems to have had the foggiest idea of what had actually taken place, and he fought like a man in the dark. Finally Wellington's use of both infantry and cavalry was as exactly timed and economical as that of Napoleon was the reverse. The credit of his victory, from a tactical standpoint, is not affected by the fact that, as he probably realized, it would have mattered very little had Waterloo gone the same way as the Prussian defeat, two days before, at Ligny. Certain it is that both that night, when he rode over the field of battle, and next morning, when he went through the casualty lists, the Iron Duke dissolved in tears of revulsion against the horrid argument of human butchery in which he was actively engaged for the last time.

11

THE EVANGELICAL REVIVAL

It is now time to turn from the great struggle that desolated Europe and retarded human progress for nearly a generation, and, casting our eyes back a little, to concentrate our attention on energies more beneficent than those of hounding on ignorant men to each other's destruction. Beneath the wars and revolutions that distract attention to the surface of things, the great Emotional Revival was at work, with its enthusiasm and glowing sympathy marred by its lack of balance and all too narrow intellectual basis.

As might have been expected in England, some of the most important manifestations of this spirit were in the religious sphere. The new Puritanism of the Wesleys, if it had drawn off large numbers of earnest folk from the Anglican communion, kindled an answering revival within the Church itself. The sturdy, commonsense religion

that had sufficed for Dr. Johnson was no longer enough for men whose heightened sensibility made them hunger for a more intimate and passionate experience of divine grace. Accordingly a group of earnest Evangelicals began to leaven the stolid lump of the Anglican priesthood.

This new movement differed from Wesleyanism in making its strongest appeal to the well-born and well-to-do. This was largely due to the fact that among its earliest and most notable converts was William Wilberforce, the close friend of Pitt, whose election by the Yorkshire freeholders in 1784 in teeth of the local magnates had been the most conspicuous event of that famous appeal to the constituencies. He was one of a small group of friends who gathered round two-strait-laced but munificent financiers named Thornton, father and son, and were known as the Clapham Sect. These men, in one respect, were the very opposite of the old Puritans. They were eminently safe and conservative as far as this world's politics were concerned; they leaned towards that school of thought which had prevailed in the Anglican Church ever since the Reformation and treated the powers that be as ordained of God, and to be obeyed accordingly. After the French Revolution the Church greatly gained in favour with the possessing classes by the fact that it came to be regarded, not without reason, as a bulwark against Jacobin tendencies, and the Evangelical movement, backed as it was by such eminently respectable people as those of the Clapham group, accorded with this conservative tendency and profited thereby not a little.

Their doctrine, though the kindly illogicality of the English nature shrank from the terrific extremes of Scottish Calvinism, was sufficiently Cimmerian. Wilberforce, whose *Practical View of the System of Christianity* was the mediocre best that the Evangelical Fathers could produce as a statement of their principles, follows on the lines already trodden by the Wesleys and before them by the Moravian brethren. He roundly challenges the commonsense morality of the eighteenth century; nothing will suffice the true Christian or save him from the utmost tortures that divine malevolence can inflict but a constant sense of his own damnable worthiness—if we may present theology with a much needed expression—and an implicit belief in the efficacy of an innocent Victim's sacrifice in occasionally appeasing the Creator's just wrath with the corruption of His creatures. Nothing less than a whole life, incessantly dominated by the one thought of getting right with God, will suffice.

It follows from this that the earnest Evangelical will be anything

but favourably predisposed towards the joys and amenities of a world which he regards as a sink of corruption. "Yes, my brother," says the Reverend William Romaine, one of the shining lights of this movement, "you may be in health, your body may be perfectly well, but you have a miserable, sinful soul within you, which is infected with all the plague and foul leprosy of original sin, and which has been wounded with thousands of actual crimes. That is your case and," almost superfluously adds this cheerful psychologist, "it is most deplorable." This, be it noted, is obviously intended not for brother this or brother that, but for any and every damned brother. It is natural that the pleasures of such degraded creatures will smell strongly of brimstone to the devout nose, that their comfort and temporal welfare will be of minor importance when viewed in the ruddy light of their probable abode.

Accordingly, even among the well-to-do, the Evangelical movement threw a depressing shadow over life. The perpetual auto-suggestion of a nature every day and in every way growing worse and worse, unless snatched like a brand from the burning, did not conduce to high spirits. And the God of the Evangelicals, however much trembling lip-homage might be paid to His mercy and lovingkindness, was too obviously obsessed by the passions of wrath and vengeance to be anything but an object of fear. It was instinctively felt that His satisfaction with any particular kind of conduct would be measured by its repugnance to the desires and preferences of Old Adam. Accordingly the most innocent diversions were frowned upon. Sunday, being the Lord's day, must be purged of any diversion whatever, and even the services must preserve a holy freedom from guilty concessions to the aesthetic tastes of sinners. Anything connected with the stage was peculiarly diabolical, and we read in the life of a typically evangelical nobleman, the fifth Earl of Darnley, how he refused to sully his eyes with a private performance by Mrs. Siddons, who happened to be a guest of his father's.

How, it may be asked, did an upper class so addicted to paganism and so sceptical in matters of faith come to be so powerfully affected by a doctrine inimical to the more or less legitimate enjoyments that their wealth and position secured for them? The fact is that they had been seriously frightened by the collapse and ruin of the French aristocracy. The eighteenth century aristocratic ideal was like an arch with the keystone knocked out of it. These magnificently self-assured squires and noblemen began to feel that their prosperity

might be built on a quicksand. The first sign of the transition in gentlemen's costume from the colour and variety of the eighteenth to the sombre uniformity of the nineteenth century, is the appearance of the top hat, that cylindrical denial of exuberance and individuality, the one thing that the Anti-Jacobins willingly adopted from the Jacobins.

Respectability was, in fact, beginning to insinuate itself even into the drawing room. The institution of family prayers was of Evangelical origin, and the country churches began to be patronized to an unprecedented extent by the gentry. Now that an evil association had been established between Tom Paine and the guillotine, it was no longer the fashion to sneer at religion. The motto of the infidel sansculottes might be "woe unto you rich", but not even the sternest Evangelical doubted that this earth, though vile, was the proper inheritance of Dives. In some ways, it was maintained, the poor had actually an advantage in being removed from so many temptations to sinful indulgence, and to anybody who sincerely believed in Evangelical principles, it was not cant but the merest commonsense that the importance of keeping a soul from everlasting torture infinitely transcended that of providing decent conditions for a vile body, and a reasonably happy life in this vale of tears.

But the English nature is not completely logical, and, like most products of the Romantic movement, the Evangelical revival was not remarkable for strength or consistency of thought. A few poems and hymns are the only part of its literary output that are of any but a merely historical interest. An uncritical acceptance of the Bible as infallible from beginning to end, an acceptance, equally uncritical, of an assurance of salvation as its guarantee, are neither the causes nor the effects of a critical theology¹. The most grotesque absurdities were taken with grave seriousness. The sport of twisting the Hebrew prophecies in any required sense was one that became extremely popular under Evangelical auspices. The candidature of Napoleon for the little horn of Daniel's celebrated Beast was freely discussed, and of course the Pope did duty for a veritable menagerie of Anti-christian chimaeras.

Outside the fold of the Church, an anarchy² of new sects reproduced on a somewhat milder scale that of the Commonwealth. The Plymouth Brethren exchanged the offices of regular ministers for those of any bore who might be moved to get up and testify—an innovation that proved a sore trial to the founders of that excellent

community. An illiterate woman, called Joanna Southcott, obtained a great vogue as a prophetess and as a sealer of the elect, and announced her immaculate conception of Shiloh. The fact that she died on the eve of her expected accouchement did not prevent her from being the origin of more than one sect, nor of her resurrecting in the form of a certain Mary Boon of Staverton. One of the chief Southcottian apostles was a certain John Wroe, who was circumcised in public, more than suspected of gross immoralities in private, and who died full of years and sanctity as the leader of the "Joannas" or "Beardies".

We must then look on Evangelicism, whether within the Church or without it, less as a doctrine than as an emotional tendency, a part of the great Romantic revival that was stirring Europe. And if this particular manifestation tended to quench the joy and drain the fullness of life, if by constant suggestion of human degradation it tended to degrade it sometimes in good earnest, and if it was very bigoted, provincial and intellectually half baked, it at least produced an amount of good which may fairly be held to have outweighed its disadvantages. In spite of its pre-occupation with sin and a well-nigh implacable Deity, it shared in the philanthropy which was the best quality engendered by Romanticism. And where the Bible is cherished and read, some of Christ's message of mercy and loving-kindness is sure to penetrate.

Wilberforce and his friends were among the kindest and most self-sacrificing of mortals. Their vision was fatally narrow, and they entirely failed to realize the urgency of the problems created at home by the Industrial Revolution; they were naturally conservative and apt to scent a revolutionary tendency in the most obvious measures of social reform. But where they clearly saw their way, they could act with a courage and persistence worthy of all praise. The Evangelicals were particularly revolted by the national disgrace of the Slave Trade. One of their most eloquent divines, John Newton, had himself been captain of a slaver and knew the horror of it at first hand. The struggle against the slave trade was carried on with a noble persistence, not only by the Evangelicals but also by the Liberal section of the Whig party. It was in 1807, exactly twenty years after the formation of the Anti-slavery Committee, that the Whig Ministry of All the Talents, inspired by the spirit of the recently deceased Fox, passed an Act which formally abolished the Slave Trade so far as the King's subjects were concerned, and this Act, though constantly evaded, was followed by another,

promoted by that most unevangelical Whig, Henry Brougham, making the traffic felony. Nor did Britain's efforts end here, for at the Congress of Vienna, in 1814, our representative, the Tory Castlereagh, who had been personally opposed to abolition, sacrificing our interests to our honour, made it a point of the first importance to get abolition recognized by the other nations, at least in principle. It is probable that by sacrificing the slaves and sticking to our own interests we might, by an equal exertion of firmness, have gained some or all of the Dutch East India colonies. But what shall it profit a nation to gain the whole world and lose her own soul?

This was not the only direction in which the Evangelical movement tended towards the betterment of human conditions. John Howard, a devout Independent who was married to an Anglican, passed a long and strenuous career and finally laid down his life in the betterment of prison conditions all over Europe, though it must not be forgotten that, according to Charles Lamb, he actually introduced the barbarity of solitary confinement for children into Christ's Hospital, for which Lamb declares he could spit on Howard's statue.

The Evangelicals can also fairly be credited with much of the enthusiasm displayed for elementary education. True to their principles, souls and not minds were their first consideration, and the Sunday School movement, popularized under the auspices of Robert Raikes of Gloucester, was inspired in the first instance by the educational ideal of good old George III, who wished that every poor child in his dominions should be taught to read the Bible. But nobody can read the Bible without the capacity for reading most other things in the English tongue, and though one is inclined to shudder at poor little half-starved factory children being herded for long hours within school walls—not to speak of a couple of services thrown in—on their one holiday in all the week, there is no doubt that this stern discipline trained such of them as survived to take their part as citizens.

Not only in education, but in every direction was there a marked increase of charitable activity.' If the upper class were jealously concerned to maintain their privileges, they at least, according to their rather dim lights, recognized that they were to some extent the keepers of their destitute brethren. All the many improving childrens' books, dominated by the shadow of an awful and evangelical papa, are agreed on the excellence of doing good, though in a horribly superior way, to the poor. We suspect that even Lady Catherine de Burgh, in her unquestioned domain, must have been a Lady

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Bountiful after her fashion. Those who make villains of any class, and most of all in England, are apt to miss the point of the social tragedy. English ladies and gentlemen were probably more kind-hearted than those of other lands, but like nearly all human beings, they saw facts in the light of their own interests.

Of the influence of the Evangelicals, for good or evil, in the development of the Empire by the impetus they gave to missionary enterprise, we shall speak in due course.

12

THE SEEDS OF SOCIAL REFORM

We must not fall into the error of crediting the Evangelicals, powerful as their influence was, with the whole impulse towards philanthropy and social reform that is manifest at this time. It is part of that Emotional Revival which in England tends especially to find expression through religious channels. In France, on the other hand, humanism and the Catholic religion were in almost invariable conflict, and here at home was a considerable body of social reformers who were anything but religious in the formal sense. The Liberal wing of the Whig party inherited the genteel scepticism fashionable at the height of the eighteenth century, and bridged the transition to nineteenth century rationalism. Fox, Holland, Brougham and Romilly, to instance a few among the leaders, were rather humanists than Christians, and it was the atmosphere of infidelity that was popularly supposed to invest Liberalism that, by reaction, was to start the Oxford Movement.

We cannot make any absolute generalization, but we shall be roughly correct if we say that the Tory party was that of Anglicans, old-fashioned and Evangelical, whereas the Dissenters and Rationalists were generally to be found in some section of the opposition. But all alike were in their varying degrees under the softening and quickening influence of the Emotional Revival, now at its height, and, as we have seen in respect of the Slave Trade, godliness and humanity were able to work together in any good cause.

It is not our intention to examine in detail the various measures of social reform that were either mooted or carried during the strenuous years of the war, and in the hard times that followed the conclusion of peace. The ideal of improving human conditions was all this time inspiring an uphill struggle against the terrified determination not to introduce the thin end of the Jacobin wedge. Even

Pitt had the desire if not the determination to grapple with the general misery, and introduced a comprehensive but thoroughly amateurish measure of Poor Relief in 1796, which, however, met with such a storm of criticism that he was fain to drop it. But the motto of the Tories was generally to sit still and maintain, or even strengthen, the existing system. The boldest of Parliamentary social reformers was the Whig brewer, Samuel Whitbread, an ardent but somewhat unstable idealist, who in 1796 advocated a minimum wage, and, in 1807, a comprehensive reform of the poor law, coupled with a scheme of free, universal education.

A larger, though still exiguous measure of success, attended the efforts of Samuel Romilly, a lawyer, who, perhaps owing to his Huguenot descent, was peculiarly sensitive to Continental influences, and had made a study of the great Milanese jurist, Beccaria, by whose enlightened and humane doctrines almost every criminal code in Europe was beneficently affected. That of England was cruelly severe, the death penalty being imposed for comparatively trivial crimes against property, which, characteristically enough of that class-ridden age, was a good deal more sacred than the person. It was even more severe in theory than it was in practice, and that arch-conservative, Lord Chancellor Eldon, was able to put up an eloquent defence even of the death penalty for horse-stealing, on the ground that in all ordinary cases the judge would not dream of inflicting it, but that it behoved him to have the power of ridding society of an incorrigible rogue. This typically English makeshift had the effect of investing judges with powers of capricious tyranny, and of making juries return deliberately false verdicts in order to save themselves from the reproach of blood-guiltiness. Romilly managed to get the death penalty remitted for thefts from the person, but the forces of reaction took alarm and closed their ranks successfully against further reform during his life, which he elected to end on his wife's death in 1818. But his work survived him and was crowned by the gradual softening down of at least the more clamant brutalities of our criminal code.

This was also a time of marked educational progress. We have already seen how, before the end of the eighteenth century, the Sunday School system was well under way, and in 1802 the State imposed upon factory employers the responsibility of securing at least the rudiments of training for their child employees. But England was already falling behind the best Continental standards. Under the auspices of Frederick the Great, Prussia, while still

exhausted from the effects of the Seven Years' War, had adopted a system of universal compulsory education, and this excellent example had been followed by Revolutionary France. The result was, in both these countries, enormously to strengthen the centralized power of the State, and to give it the same sort of authority that the medieval Church had exercised.

This was natural in countries where the principles of Roman Law prevailed, but England possessed a stubborn individualism, nurtured by centuries of her Common Law, and did not take kindly to such comprehensive levelling. And the difficulty of imposing any adequate national scheme was increased by what has proved the curse of English education—the sectarian bias. Anglicans and Nonconformists were more concerned to get the children brought up according to their particular dogmatic tenets than to make them useful and enlightened citizens. Accordingly we find, at the very opening of the nineteenth century, the educational world torn asunder between the elementary systems of the Anglican, Andrew Bell, and the Quaker, Joseph Lancaster. On the other hand, this very rivalry was a great stimulus to voluntary effort in which the Church, with her greater resources, easily led the way. By 1831 she alone had endowed 13,000 schools educating more than 400,000 pupils.

But a scheme of national education did not yet mature. Whitbread's comprehensive proposals failed to gain acceptance and his mantle fell upon Henry Brougham, a strange blend of genius and self-advertisement, one of those clever but unreliable statesmen who seldom succeed for very long in securing the confidence of an English Parliament or of public opinion. Had he possessed a character proportionate to his talents, Brougham might have proved one of his country's greatest benefactors, for enlightenment was the very soul of the policy he advocated. He was responsible for a famous committee on endowed charities which was appointed in 1816, and in 1820, partly on the strength of its inquiries, he drafted a scheme of national education, which was split on the sectarian rock.

During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, we find no small amount of goodwill to alleviate the ever increasing social evil, caused by abnormal conditions resulting from the Industrial Revolution. These efforts were not only hampered by the timidity that the French Revolution had fostered in the possessing classes, but the would-be reformers had seldom thought out the subject at all thoroughly, and it was generally easy to pick the best-intended schemes, like that of Pitt, to pieces. Even when measures were

passed, like the first Factory Act, of 1802, they too often failed of their purpose and were easily evaded. The very poverty of constructive thought provided a fatally obvious argument for those whose philosophy and interests alike led them to let the whole matter alone, and trust to a chaos of conflicting self-interests to work out the maximum possible happiness of everybody concerned.

No generous mind, even in the most cursory survey, would wish to overlook one of the sweetest and most beneficent results of the Emotional Revival in the extension of legal protection to our brother animals. The English Common Law took no cognizance of any wrongs but those of the human species, and it was hard to convince public opinion that legislation for the benefit of brutes was anything but ludicrous. The new sensibility, however, was doing its work, and more and more were people of education and refinement coming to be of Coleridge's mind that

"He prayeth best who loveth best
All things, both great and small."

The great champion of animals, whose portrait deservedly stands in the board-room of the society he founded for their protection, was Richard Martin, an Irish gentleman of the most attractive type, reckless and high spirited, a very *Mercutio* for pugnacity, who once turned with a diminutive pistol on an infuriated Dublin mob, some thousands strong, and threatened, to their great delight, to destroy every mother's son of them. But Martin's heart was even warmer than his temper, and he had a redoubtable ally in the great Liberal lawyer, Lord Erskine. It is sad to think that the Devil's cause, in this matter, was fought by another chivalrous gentleman, William Windham, who was all for preserving the good old brutal sports of the people from fist-fighting to bull-baiting, and subsequently, with all the resources of eloquent sophism, by Robert Peel. Nevertheless, in 1822, Martin's efforts were rewarded by an act of limited application which, however, he exerted all his powers to make effective, securing many convictions of men guilty of brutality, and then, as often as not, paying their fines because they were poor.

BOOK IV

THE MACHINE AGE

CHAPTER I

THE YEARS OF REACTION

1

THE LEAGUE OF DESPOTS

AT long last—and after how prolonged an agony—the task light-heartedly assayed by the despots of Valmy had been accomplished, the French menace to Europe was of the past, the march to Paris had reached its goal. Europe was at the mercy of the armies that had fought for her deliverance from tyranny. It remained to be seen with what wisdom the victors would avail themselves of so great an opportunity of setting an exhausted and bleeding Continent to rights.

What was it that had triumphed over Napoleon? Surely not mere Anti-Jacobinical reaction—*that* had had its fling with all the odds in its favour, and grievous had been its failure. It was not until the spirit of nationality, the invincible determination of the peoples themselves not to be governed against their will, had been aroused, that the blue armies had been rolled back from the plains of Russia and the mountains of Spain, and Germany, like the strong man bound, had risen and snapped her chains. Nationality had triumphed, but in the name and under the leadership of the associated despots. And these despots were little less afraid of the liberty they had invoked than of the tyranny they had overcome. From their point of view, they had had to call in Satan to cast out Satan, had invoked the spirit of the Revolution to conquer the child of the Revolution. They were wise enough in their generation to see that the spirit of nationality was fraught with mortal peril to themselves, that they must either curb it or it would destroy them.

The three principal despots were by no means on the level of the sorry and half-insane gang that had first opposed the Revolution. The Tsar, despite his complicity in his own father's murder, proved

a high-principled and, on the whole, a lovable sovereign, and the rulers of Prussia and Austria were well-intentioned and God-fearing, if very stupid men. But the three of them, and their heirs after them, were bound together by complicity in a crime, whose nemesis was ultimately to involve their houses and realms in awful disaster. They had enslaved, but not destroyed, the proud and spirited Polish nation. They had torn her asunder, they had wiped her name off the map, but her soul and her will to be free they had not destroyed. These three powers, then, by the very fact that they were accomplices in Poland's crucifixion and fearful of her resurrection, were almost inevitably driven to a partnership in despotism. If that partnership could hold together, the complete triumph of Liberal principles was forever barred. In this fact we shall find the key to the diplomacy of the next hundred years.

These three were the strangest of allies for an England which, with all her lapses, had nevertheless been the stronghold of constitutional freedom, and whose very spirit, enshrined in her Common Law, was the denial of despotism. But it must be remembered that England had kept the flame of her national spirit burning unquenchably throughout the long war, and it was largely by her inspiration that it had been kindled on the Continent. And England, as represented by her governing class, was participating in a mood of reaction against the French Revolution and its principles which was rife throughout Europe.

This reaction was not towards the *status quo* of the eighteenth century and the aristocratic cynicism of Versailles. Not only in England had men discovered the value of religious emotion as a hiding place from the dry light of reason. A school of French writers went so far as to advocate a return to the theocratic supremacy of the Pontiff over the temporal sovereigns. The Romantic spirit had discovered its affinity with the Middle Ages, without at all understanding the element of democracy in the age of chivalry and the schoolmen. Moreover that "*doctor subtilissimus*" the philosopher Hegel, who in 1818 accepted a chair at Berlin University, discovered that the true freedom of the spirit could only be realized in a state suspiciously resembling the Prussian bureaucracy.

If the Tory government of England was swayed by anti-Jacobin sentiment, ten times more so were the three potentates with whom Castlereagh had concluded a twenty years' alliance for the crushing of Napoleon and the safeguarding of Europe from French aggression. But they were, according to their lights, sincere men, and the spirit

in which they dealt with a power which had done them so many injuries and overthrown so many reigning dynasties was by no means ignoble. When they first entered Paris they had been greeted with positive enthusiasm, and having given back France her old dynasty and frontiers, with a fairly liberal constitution, they retired without even compelling her to restore the treasures of art which she had stolen, still less to exact an indemnity.

In the conclusion of peace, and in the subsequent Congress of Vienna, in which every Christian nation of Europe was represented, England's part was a singularly disinterested one. She had made tremendous sacrifices and, in consequence, was loaded with a national debt which Napoleon believed would be too much for her to bear, and France, which had incurred none whatever, might not unplausibly have been supposed to have won the peace. But the men who represented England were above the short-sighted calculations of *Realpolitik*. This was the more remarkable as our all-powerful Foreign Minister was the cold and unbending Castlereagh, whom the advanced thinkers of his own time were at one in branding with the stigma of murderous reaction. But Castlereagh was, by the admission of so uncompromising an opponent as Brougham, pre-eminently a gentleman, and, though almost untouched by sentiment, above the vulgarity of reckoning a nation's greatness by the amount of territory she can daub her own colour on the map, or the amount of money she can put into her purse.

His abstinence was ridiculed by wags who declared that he gave up Java because he could not find it on the map, and that arch-materialist, Napoleon, was dumbfounded at what he considered to be Castlereagh's utter imbecility and ignorance in throwing away conquests that nobody could have prevented us from keeping. But Castlereagh, with an exceedingly acute eye for the map, only insisted on our keeping a few scattered possessions necessary for the safeguarding of our long trade routes, and for the most important of these, the Cape of Good Hope, compensation was actually paid. All our other acquisitions were quietly handed back to their owners. What he did however insist upon was—to our eternal honour—that the other nations should stand in with our policy of suppressing the Slave Trade. And in so doing he was merely giving voice to a public opinion that no statesman could ignore.

It was after Napoleon's restoration, which was acclaimed by the immense majority of Frenchmen, that the danger of a peace of vengeance was most acute. It might well be argued that generosity

was thrown away on a people like the French, and the predatory instincts of the German Powers, and particularly of Prussia, were now fully aroused. It was proposed to saddle France with a crushing indemnity and to cripple her by the deprivation of territories which had been filched by Louis XIV and his successor. The wrong done to Germany by the piecemeal annexation of Alsace-Lorraine cried for redress, in the impartial opinion of Prussia, whose representative had informed Talleyrand at Vienna that might was right and that Prussia did not recognize the law of nations to which he had appealed. The scheme might well have appeared not only just but expedient to England, one of whose ablest statesmen, Carteret, had made it an object of his policy, and she had some reason to regard the power it was now proposed to cripple as her natural enemy. The Cabinet, including the Premier, Liverpool, were strongly inclined towards the Prussian standpoint.

It is therefore much to the credit of our representatives, Castlereagh and Wellington, that they should have stood firm not only against our allies in Europe but against Castlereagh's own colleagues in the cabinet. Wellington was the last man to be carried away by the sentimental violence of militarism—he saw no reason why the mere brute courage of a Marshal Ney should militate against his being shot for aggravated treason and perjury—and as for Castlereagh, his clear intelligence showed him that the only alternative to a generous treatment of France was her total destruction. His words to the Premier¹ are pregnant with wisdom.

“It is not our business to collect trophies, but to bring back the world to peaceful habits. The more I reflect upon it the more I deprecate this system of scratching such a power. We may hold her down and pare her nails so that many years shall pass away before she can again wound us . . . but this system of being pledged to a continental war for objects that France may any day reclaim from the particular states that hold them, without pushing her demands beyond what she would contend was due to her own honour, is, I am sure, bad British policy.”

Had the Prussian statesmen of 1871, or the Entente statesmen of 1919 acted in the spirit of the much execrated “Derry-down Triangle”, how different would the history of the world have been, and how much happier! As it was, backed by the chivalrous Tsar, the generous policy prevailed. Only trifling readjustments of frontier were insisted on; France was mulcted in an indemnity that she easily

¹ Quoted in *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*.

and quickly paid off, and a five years' military occupation was ultimately reduced to three through the powerful insistence of Wellington. Much more than after the Congress of Berlin could England claim to have secured peace with honour, to have stood before Europe not only as a victorious, but as a magnanimous and Christian power.

Due honour, then, must be given to the allied powers for the use they made of their victory over France. Credit must also be given them for a sincere desire so to order the affairs of Europe as to make the curse of war a thing of the past. Projects of perpetual peace were no new thing—the idea had been more than once mooted during the eighteenth century—and in the revival of Christianity, that was part of the reaction against Jacobinism, it was felt that argument by bloodshed was unworthy of Christian powers and of the Lord's Anointed. It was this sentiment that inspired the Tsar Alexander to formulate for the signature of his brother sovereigns the impressive declaration of principle that has gone by the somewhat misleading title of the Holy Alliance, and in which the despots who had divided Poland piously undertook to order their reciprocal relations according to the teachings of our Saviour. Practically alone among all the sovereigns of Christian Europe the Prince Regent refused, on constitutional grounds, to sign what Castlereagh characterized as “a sublime piece of mysticism and nonsense”.

This declaration of principle had nothing binding about it, and the real business of ordering the affairs of Europe was to be accomplished by the continued alliance of the four great powers that had defeated Napoleon, and which, after three years' probation, France was allowed to join. It was provided that from time to time the representatives of these powers should meet together to consult as to their common interests and for the taking of such measures as should be considered “the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations, and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe”. ‘The concert of powers was, in fact, to act as the League of Nations aspires to act to-day.

To understand England's part in torpedoing, as she did, this hopeful and at least partially sincere scheme for avoiding future wars, it is necessary to understand what, in practice, the fraternity of sovereigns amounted to. A settlement of Europe had been arrived at—not without imminent peril of another European war—which was no doubt highly satisfactory to its authors. The Congress of

Vienna, so far as what Byron called the Holy Three were concerned, was a share-out of territory, in which the wishes of the inhabitants were the last thing to be thought of. The Hapsburgs, for instance, in addition to the heterogeneous and centrifugal collection of peoples, nations and languages over which they already exercised an uneasy sway, imposed their paternal offices upon the unappreciative inhabitants of Venetia and Lombardy, while Alexander, under cover of a constitution that he may perhaps have thought was going to work, seized the lion's share of Poland, compensating his Hohenzollern brother by planting the latter's jackboots firmly on the Rhineland and Westphalia, not to speak of half Saxony.

All this was perfectly in accord with the anti-Jacobinical principles for which the Three stood. The doctrine of nationality had been one of the main planks in the revolutionary programme, and besides, once they admitted the right of peoples to choose their own governors, what excuse could they have for denying this right to their own subjects? Above all, so long as Poland remained enchained, so long the three jailers were committed to the championship of despotic principles, however cleverly these might be camouflaged. And the version of Christianity implied in Alexander's manifesto contemplated a relation between sovereign and subject based not upon free choice but upon Divine Right. Let every soul be subject unto the powers that be.

The Holy Three, then, were undoubtedly aiming at peace, but they were aiming at something much more than peace. They visualized a Europe under the firm but benevolent rule of divinely appointed sovereigns vested with practically unlimited powers of control, and putting down any rebelliousness of thought, word or deed with an iron hand. They had their differences, which were acute enough, but the force of circumstances inevitably drew the Three together. It equally inevitably drew England into opposition to the Three and to their project of European stability.

It is of interest to consider the attitude of Castlereagh at this juncture. The most ardent of his apologists will scarcely acclaim him as an enthusiast for Liberal principles—he spoke of Italy's first struggles to be free as an uprising against “mild and paternal” (!) governments—and yet he accomplished more for the freedom of Europe than almost any other statesman of the nineteenth century. This was because, without bothering about theories and systems, he inherited Pitt's tradition of an enlightened patriotism in foreign politics, and because in playing the game for England

he was too clear-sighted to be the victim of any political theory.

From the first he was determined that the alliance for the purpose of defeating Napoleon and preventing any revival of the French menace should not be turned into an instrument for governing Europe in the interests of the Holy Three. By so doing he was, on the one hand, deliberately wrecking the most hopeful scheme hitherto propounded for perpetuating European peace, but on the other he was saving Europe from an euthanasia of despotism; he was—if we look at the matter from the standpoint of an English historian—ensuring that the spirit informing the English Common Law should not perish from the earth, and that Europe should be saved from going the way of old Rome. It is hardly necessary to add that Castlereagh himself cared for none of these considerations, which would no doubt have struck him as “mysticism and nonsense”. His greatness consists in the fact that he never allowed his reactionary opinions to deflect him, as foreign minister, from the pursuit of his country’s sound and traditional policy.

Accordingly, when the next of the great congresses was held, in 1818, at Aix la Chapelle, Castlereagh took an uncompromising stand against Alexander’s proposal to turn the alliance into a permanent association of sovereigns for the guarantee of all existing rights, and therefore for interfering with overwhelming force all over Europe towards the suppression of revolutions. England’s prestige and authority, thus thrown into the scale, had the effect of converting what might have been an effective mutual-insurance league of Kings into an informal alliance of the three principal despots, an anticipation of the famous Dreikaiserbund of the seventies. The next two congresses, held significantly enough at Troppau and Laibach, were, in fact, mere re-unions of the Holy Three at which Castlereagh refused to allow England to be represented by a plenipotentiary. The danger to European liberty had already begun to define itself.

There was good enough reason for these meetings. The people of Naples and Piedmont had broken into open revolt, and here was the obvious opportunity for putting the machinery of a general alliance into action. Castlereagh himself had no sympathy with the rebels, who he thought were revolting against “mild and paternal governments”, and he had no objection to Austria, as principal Italian power, settling the matter on her own account. But he was not going to play the game of the three despots, who had now settled

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their own differences and were thoroughly united under the influence of the Machiavellian and cynical Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor. Castlereagh protested vigorously against the principle of armed interference, as he did also against the Carlsbad Decrees by which Metternich throttled the young democracy of Germany.

The plot was now thickened by a revolt in Spain against her unspeakable King Ferdinand, and a rebellion of Christian Greece against Moslem Turkey. A new congress was summoned to meet in enslaved Italian territory at Verona, and Castlereagh (now Marquis of Londonderry) drafted instructions to our representative in which he uncompromisingly committed him to opposing intervention. But before the Congress could meet, the great Foreign Minister had overworked himself into madness and suicide. His mantle fell on his old duelling opponent, George Canning, who differed from him not in the essentials of policy, but in a cast of mind at once more clear-cut and more philosophic, and in a far greater felicity of expression. Canning had none of Castlereagh's somewhat platonic but none the less genuine desire for European solidarity. A wholesome state of international politics he defined as "every nation for itself and God for us all".

The old Anti-Jacobin had never been a blind reactionary, but had based his opposition to the abstract theories of the republicans upon a whole-hearted love of English constitutional principles, to which, as time went on, he became more and more inclined to give a Liberal interpretation. During the war he had consistently championed our cause as that of the freedom of nations, and he had been fully alive to the importance of fostering the spirit of nationality in Europe. Shortly before taking office he had indeed declared it to be England's duty to maintain herself on the basis of her own Constitution and refrain from partnership in the Continental struggle between monarchy and democracy, but he plainly declared his own sympathies when he wrote in 1823 that between the monarchist doctrine enunciated by the King of France "and its antagonist principle the sovereignty of the people, I should feel myself compelled to acknowledge that the former is more alien to the British Constitution". And his sympathy with the rights of peoples burst out in a flash of splendid eloquence, on the occasion of our dispatching troops to prevent the Spanish, reactionary coercion of Portugal:

"We go," he said, "to plant the standard of England on the heights of Lisbon. Where that standard is planted, foreign dominion shall not come."

The great difference between Canning and Castlereagh was, however, not in principle but in opportunity. Castlereagh's work, though of momentous importance, was not marked by any dramatic stroke or illumined by any declaration of principle that has struck the imagination of posterity. His reserved temperament made him a lover of quiet and unostentatious courses. But even a Canning would not have found, during Castlereagh's period of office, any opening for a stronger line than his predecessor's against the Holy Alliance. England's power and prestige were indeed at their height, but on the Continent, against the military strength of the three despots, she could do nothing. She could not, even if she had desired it, have prevented the enslavement of Poland or the muzzling of Germany or the crushing of Italy, and it is very doubtful whether she could have effectively intervened to keep a French army out of Spain. England's power was on the sea, and there it was overwhelming. Canning no less than Castlereagh realized, that to take a strong line without the power to sustain it, is to invite humiliation. "Our true policy," he laid it down, "has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies, and then only with commanding force."

Thus Castlereagh had perforce to confine himself to abstention and protest, and so long as Canning could not bring our sea power into play he did the same, in spite of ardent Whigs who urged him to fight against French intervention in the Peninsula. But when the Spanish monarchists threatened the liberties of our old ally Portugal, then, indeed, operating from our tried and impregnable base at Lisbon, we did interfere with commanding force.

Canning's great opportunity, however, came when the Holy Alliance attempted to make its power felt on the other side of the Atlantic. The Spanish colonies in South America had broken free from their decrepit mother country, and it was at least hinted at by Alexander's ministers at the Congress of Aix la Chapelle, that the monarchs of Europe should employ something more than peaceful persuasion to reduce them to obedience. Such a policy would have been thoroughly in the traditions of Catherine the Great, and would have conveniently embroiled the Western powers while leaving Russia free to pursue her own line in Eastern Europe. But it was not very seriously pressed, and all that came of it was that Russia obligingly made over to Spain, for a consideration, an armada consisting of a few old ships too rotten to put to sea. A more serious danger was when a French army, acting as mandatory of the Holy

Alliance, marched across Spain to Cadiz to restore the tyranny of the unspeakable Ferdinand VII, and there appeared to be some prospect of France extending her not altogether disinterested activities to what once had been the Spanish Empire in South America. This was a scheme that England not only could but must prevent. It was not only a question of her political principles, but of her most vital commercial interests, for the South American market, important enough to us during the war, had become even more important since, and to allow the Latin Powers to set up the old exclusive system in our faces would have spelt ruin to our manufacturers and destitution to many a workman.

Canning's riposte had the simplicity of genius. So long as the British fleet rode the sea, he was determined that not a single Continental soldier should make the Atlantic passage, but he was minded to achieve his ends by peaceful means. Now, therefore, according to his own splendid phrase, he called a New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old. Our old, revolted colonies of the United States had an even more potent motive than ourselves for keeping kingly hands off America. As early as 1811, Congress, on the recommendation of President Madison, had passed a resolution affirming that the United States could not see without serious disquietude any Spanish territory pass into the hands of a foreign power. The transition was easy from this to the veto enunciated in 1823 by President Monroe, against any extension of the European state system to America without the consent of the United States. This exactly suited England's book; she had no more desire than the United States to see militarist tyranny crushing the new republics—even Castlereagh had in 1815 insisted that Spain should treat her colonies on Liberal principles—and she had an equal interest in keeping open the door for trade. She therefore cordially co-operated in establishing the position of the United States as policeman and predominant power of the American Continent and thus began the rebinding of those invisible bonds, that never ought to have been snapped, between the two Anglo Saxon powers.

The power of the leagued Kings stopped short at the coast, and the Holy Alliance was enclosed by a wooden wall. The natural grouping of the powers was now becoming apparent, if anyone had had the eye to distinguish the temporary and accidental from the enduring tendencies of history. The two Anglo Saxon and Liberal peoples on either side of the Atlantic had already begun to gravitate towards each other, though many circumstances, and above all the

tragedy of Ireland, were to militate throughout the ensuing century against their complete harmony. The rivalry between England and France had also ceased to be a dominating factor of international politics. France had definitely broken with the idea of an Indian or an American empire, and her thoughts were soon to turn towards that expansion into Northern Africa which was to prove so much more fruitful than her old overseas development. Besides, post-revolutionary France in her own way—so very different from that of England—was Liberal at heart, and possessed what was for that time a Liberal constitution, however much her natural tendencies might be masked by the uneasy experiment of a Bourbon Restoration. And France, thanks to the kind offices of the Allies, had no subject peoples over whom to tyrannize.

But over Central and Eastern Europe brooded the seemingly impregnable despotism of the three dynasties, bound by their own past and circumstances to the cause of reaction, however much expediency or the caprice of individuals might induce them to concede in appearance. It was the tragedy of the Tsar Alexander that his Liberal tendencies and aspirations were everywhere thwarted by the necessities of his situation—being a Romanoff he must be a despot or nothing, and there is a legend, none the less significant from being groundless in fact,¹ that the broken-hearted and disillusioned Caesar did at last, through a feigned death, choose the nothingness of a poor hermit's life. The three dynasties formed an invincible stronghold of reaction on one condition—that they did not fall out among themselves. On most points their interests more or less coincided, and they had always their Polish blood-guiltiness to hold them together, but there were two ominous rifts in their friendship. There was the rivalry between Prussia and Austria for the leadership of Germany—an issue that proved eventually capable of settlement by the sword—and the rivalry between Russia and Austria in the Near East, which was destined, at last, to work the destruction of all three.

This Eastern Question had already begun to loom large at the Congress of Vienna, which indeed proved the last of this series of attempts to regulate the affairs of Europe by Congress. Greece had thrown off the fetters of Turkey, and broken into a revolt,

¹ An English doctor attended Alexander's last moments, and his record is conclusive as to his death. The doctor's son, Mr. Sidney Lee, kindly gave me the details. The body was buried privately by the Empress—hence the empty coffin recently opened at Leningrad.

that kindled both Liberal and Christian sentiment all over Europe, and especially in Russia and England, though Metternich, who hated Liberalism and cared nothing about Christianity, only wanted to keep Russia's hands off Turkey, which he did through his sheer personal ascendancy over Alexander till the latter's death in 1825. Canning had an extremely difficult part to play, and played it with consummate skill. He had inherited from Pitt the policy of opposing Russia's advance in the East, even when she appeared in the role of Christian champion. But, unlike Castlereagh, he had an ardent sympathy for the cause of Greek freedom, in which he was thoroughly at one with British sentiment. It was a masterpiece of diplomacy by which he managed to hold back Russia, not by opposing, but by co-operating with her, to bring France, even under a reactionary King, into line with his own Liberal policy, and, by a momentary anticipation of the Triple Entente, to shatter the almost triumphant Turkish and Egyptian tyranny in the harbour of Navarino.

It is true that after his death his work was to some extent marred by the bungling and reactionary diplomacy of Wellington's Tory ministry, but he had given a lead to British policy that was to determine it, at its best, for the next century. A sympathy with freedom all over the world, tempered by a refusal to strike or intervene except with the strength to make our demands effective, and a perfect appreciation of what, with our command of the sea and our diminutive army, we should or could not do ; a hand of friendship to the United States and co-operation when possible with France ; a watchful yet courteous aloofness from the system of politics favoured by the three despots of Central and Eastern Europe—these were the distinguishing features of Canning's policy.

Thanks chiefly to the attitude of England as represented by Castlereagh and Canning, the attempt to provide for the permanent peace of Europe had failed, but the attempt of the leagued despots to veto constitutional government and national freedom by force of arms had been fatally compromised. True, the Metternich system of repressive stagnation still reigned over most of the Continent, but not unchallenged. Teuton and Slav despotism had already found its path blocked by Anglo-Saxon liberties, and the nineteenth century was to see the Latin races come into line on the Liberal side. The stage was already being prepared for the tragedy of 1914.

THE AFTERMATH OF VICTORY

Not for the last time in her history, England made the discovery, after Waterloo, that for a modern civilized power to be victorious in a great war is only a little less unprofitable than to be defeated. The contest had come at a peculiarly unfortunate time. England was going through a process of headlong transition which, under the most favourable circumstances, would have taxed the utmost resources of statesmanship. As it was, thanks to the French Revolution and the monarchist reaction against it, she had for nearly a generation been dissipating blood and treasure, expending the utmost of her strength, in a struggle to the death with a gigantic adversary. Every other consideration had been subordinated to the supreme object of breaking the French will to conquest. Thought, which, in the wholly new circumstances created by the Industrial Revolution, demanded unrestricted play, had been forced into orthodox grooves by what had practically been a regime of martial law. The generous Romantic enthusiasm, which might have centred round the distribution and enjoyment of the kindly fruits of the earth—now vouchsafed in such unprecedented abundance—had mostly burned for the liberation of Europe and deliverance of England by force of arms. And the material energies, which might have made cities beautiful and men prosperous, were poured with a lavish profusion into the business of destruction, or allowed to cancel each other by cut-throat competition.

We have a right to be proud of the bravery of the British and Irish poor we hired to fight our battles, and of the constancy of national purpose that supported us, sometimes single-handed, against the might of Napoleon, but it would be well if we were also to regard the sum total of all this butchery and squalid horror, whether amid the hills of the Peninsula or on the plains of Flanders, as an unmitigated disaster to mankind, if in contemplating in our mind's eye such a tragedy as that of Waterloo, we could follow the example of the Iron Duke, and, if we have tears, shed them. But the tragedy of the war was more profound and more lasting than that of torn limbs and gaping stomachs, of the women of Badajoz defiled by blood-drunken and wine-drunken ruffians, of discipline maintained by torture, of innocent Copenhagen under a rain of death—of these things we can say that they are long over and done with, that a hundred years after it is all the same. What was done

is past and forgiven—what was not done, what was neglected and allowed to drift, has left a nemesis that has darkened over civilization ever since, and may yet prove to be its ruin.

We know that even before the war the prevailing tendency of thought about society was tinged by a vague mysticism of natural harmony, by a more or less qualified belief that things had only to be allowed to drift in order to bring about the best possible conditions. Every man for himself and God for us all! And when the issue with France was fairly joined it was almost too much to expect of practical statesmen that they should not only undertake the salvation of Europe from tyranny, but that they should at the same time embark on a comprehensive reorganization of society to bring it abreast of its rapidly changing requirements. While the war was on, it was not unnatural that those in authority should have concentrated all their energies on maintaining the will to victory and have regarded projects of domestic reform as merely irrelevant or dangerous. Therefore they pinned their faith to the established order of society, and ignored the fact that it was every year becoming more obsolete and out of date.

So long therefore as the nation could be kept going and made to present a united front to the enemy, they were inclined to favour any hand to mouth expedient that would tide over an immediate difficulty and eschewed anything like a comprehensive attempt to grapple with the social problem. They put down combinations of labourers because strikes in war-time are inopportune, and because where two or three poor men are gathered together the seeds of revolution may be sown. They made no practical attempt to regulate the murderous conditions of labour, because the great thing was to quicken production at all costs. Owing to the ever-present fear of famine, the pace of enclosure was speeded up in the Midlands and the Eastern Counties. In 1797, when ruin stared us in the face, it was reported by a select committee that nine million acres of English soil were either uncultivated waste, or cultivated on the old inefficient, common-field system. At a time when it was necessary to mobilize every possible acre in the war against France and famine, it is not surprising that Enclosure Acts should have followed each other more rapidly than ever, and that, in 1801, an act should have been passed for speeding up the process. It is also characteristic of the time that various far-sighted expedients that had been mooted by legislators for the purpose of keeping enclosed land in the possession of the peasantry, never got passed into law. Hand to mouth was

the order of the day, and the hand was the hand of him who joins house to house and field to field.

The most far-reaching of all these wartime expedients had been that which was adopted for meeting the necessity of keeping the poor from actual starvation during this time of necessary stress. Pitt, we have seen, tried his hand at tinkering the Poor Law, but soon gave it up, and as the politicians in Westminster would do nothing, the men on the spot, the Benches of county magistrates, had to hammer out a solution, in characteristic English fashion, for themselves. Accordingly the Berkshire Justices, who assembled at Speenhamland, in Berkshire, in the hungry year 1796, met a situation that was rapidly becoming desperate by the crude socialistic expedient of supplementing wages out of the rates. Their example was eagerly followed all over the country; the wolf had to be kept from the door, and here was one way of doing it. The country was practically in a state of siege, and this amazing instance of justice-made law was putting it on siege rations. The motives were humane, and the poor were kept alive somehow. But there is all the difference in the world between the economics of besieged garrisons and the permanent organization of a great industrial power. The "Speenhamland Act" had come to stay, the justices had obligingly saved the legislators from the necessity of thinking out a system of their own, and the results were disastrous. Wages, of course, now that the rates were always available to supplement them, slumped below starvation point, and in times of distress as many as a quarter of the population of free England would be on the rates—paupers! Self respect was naturally destroyed, all incentive to honest labour was taken away, and the system by which extra money was drawn for all children, including bastards, stimulated a headlong increase in the population, legitimate and illegitimate.¹

So long as the war lasted, so long as England was to a large extent suffering herself, agriculture boomed and the worst effects of Speenhamland were masked. Indeed, as a war measure, it may be said to have succeeded. But when the war was over and the inflated prosperity of the farmer collapsed like a pricked bubble, though Speenhamland may have provided the best temporary expedient for keeping land under the plough, easing the burden on the farmers and providing some sort of employment for the labourers, the plight of the countryside was catastrophic. The ratepayers, many of whom

¹ Though perhaps the effects of this have been exaggerated—see, e.g. Dr. Chapham's *An Economic History of Great Britain*, Bk. I, Ch. 4.

were themselves on the verge of destitution and who were, besides, crushed to the earth by enormous taxation, could not afford to be generous. Relief and wages combined were forced down to the bare pittance necessary to keep soul and body together, and this level was steadily depressed until the countryside of England, which had not so long ago been famed as the land of roast beef and plum pudding in scornful contrast with that of the "skinny Frenchmen", was peopled by gaunt and half-starved wretches shirking about on Sundays—as Corbett puts it—"in ragged smock frocks with unshaven faces, with a shirt not washed for a month and with their toes peeping out of their shoes," droves of slaves, under the arbitrary tyranny of the parish overseer, often harnessed, men and women together, to the parish cart. And yet the squires and big landowners were basking in the noontide of prosperity, trapping and transporting men to preserve pheasants, and spending long days on horseback in the pursuit of vermin.

We can only glance, in passing, at the meanest and most shameful of all the rural oppressions of this time, the scene of which was not the English countryside, but the Highlands of Scotland. Under the influence of the Romantic movement, and particularly of Sir Walter Scott, there was much fine sentiment about clan loyalty, Bonnie Prince Charlie, and so forth. The kilt and tartan, which were now again legalized, became symbolic of

"Old, unhappy, far-off things
And battles long ago."

But the chieftains, whose function as military leaders of the tribe had lapsed since the strong hand of Butcher Cumberland had brought the King's peace into their remotest fastnesses, were by no means sentimental where the main chance was concerned. Poor soil and primitive methods of cultivation might maintain a hardy population in contentment, but as a business proposition it would pay to get rid of the clansmen and turn the whole land into pasturage for sheep and cattle—only in the fullness of the Victorian era did the claims of pleasure demand the replacement of men by deer. Even before the "forty-five", evictions had started in the Isle of Skye, but it was towards the end of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth that the practice became common of the chieftain turning on his tenants and driving them out of their homes, with every circumstance of brutality, to shift for themselves or perish miserably. The First Duke of Sutherland, in the second decade of the century, gained an infamous

pre-eminence by the wholesale eviction of his hapless people, who were forced out when their crops were standing, whose roofs, furniture, and even sick were burnt, some of whom were generously offered allotments on the barren sea-shore, without boats or the money to buy them—nay, a notice was posted on a Church door threatening with eviction anyone giving shelter to those already evicted. The black list of robber and traitor chieftans then and subsequently includes such names as Campbell, Macdonald, Fraser, Cameron of Lochiel, Hamilton, Gordon, and many another whose tartan figures proudly at Highland gatherings to-day, as if the colours of Judas were an honourable distinction.

Such then, was the condition of those who tilled the soil which a generation of warfare had kept inviolate from any but British plunder. If we turn to the towns, to the manufacturing and mining districts, we shall find a condition of things equally revolting to humane sentiment. It was probably more by machinery than by guns that we had won the war, but the price was terrible. The period of transition during which, under more favourable circumstances, we might have evolved a new social order, had seen all our energies devoted to beating the enemy and keeping ourselves from actual collapse. Provided this could be done, that the furnaces could be kept roaring and the wheels buzzing, nothing else counted with those in authority. The new industrial system was allowed to evolve itself, and evolve it did in the most wasteful, slipshod, and cruel of all possible ways.

Even for the employers, the struggle for survival was desperate and the spectre of ruin seldom very far off. Markets fluctuated, booms and slumps trod on each others' heels in the most bewildering way. The course of business was left not, as theorists supposed, to the free play of enlightened egotism, but to the reckless optimism and mad panic that alternate nowhere more disastrously than in the mass psychology of business men. This alternation of slump and boom was no new thing, it had gone on continuously at least since Tudor times, but no one had thought out a financial system for regulating it—the very nature of the evil was hardly realized. The Bank of England, protected from any serious competition by Act of Parliament, occupied a position of dominating importance, and used its power positively to aggravate the evil it might have mitigated. Before the great panic of 1825 when capital was being demanded recklessly for every sort of wild-cat enterprise, the Bank was adding fuel to the fire of speculation by cheapening credit and lowering its

rate, in spite of the fact that gold was being drained rapidly out of the country and its own reserve was diminishing to vanishing point. Then, when the first symptoms of a slump appeared, the Bank sharply contracted its credit and precipitated a general smash. Henceforth the recurrence of a decennial panic became a regular part of our financial anarchy, with untold consequences of misery and unemployment.

With the coming of peace, the freedom of the seas, and the opening of the world's markets, a period of prosperity had been confidently anticipated. Unfortunately the first result was to plunge the nation more deeply than ever into the trough of misery. It was no good having access to markets when the war had drained our customers of the money to pay, and the other nations, which were now trying belatedly to build up industries of their own, were by no means minded to expose them to the full blast of British competition—in Europe and the United States tariffs were rapidly put up against us. Then the government, which during the war had been a huge employer of labour, civil and military, ceased its abnormal destructive activities, and thereby flooded the labour market with idle hands at a time when works were everywhere closing down. The state of hopeless misery into which the country was plunged in the black year 1816 baffles description.

The immense strength of our industrial position and the lead we had acquired in the mechanical arts enabled us to rise out of the trough of depression and to enjoy such prosperity as is indicated by statistics of increasing trade. The increase was not steady, but proceeded by alternate expansion and shrinkage; prices raced up and down; employment was now plentiful and now not to be obtained. Even in the best times the lot of those who were hired to tend the machines was grim enough. There is no need to detail here the oft-told story of the horrors of mine and factory life. Owing to the frantic increase of population, which was doubled in less than three generations, and the influx of multitudes of Irish peasants, who could work and live for next to nothing, the labour market was nearly always glutted, and until 1825 the men were not even allowed to combine to obtain decent terms. As in the country, the workers were forced down to a subsistence level of wages which itself was continually being depressed. The hours they laboured were too long and the nourishment they obtained usually too small to support a normal existence. In the cotton trade it was said that a spinner seldom survived the age of forty. The generations were cut short before their time, and it was perhaps better to die early

than to eke out an existence in which such physical hardship was aggravated by a slavish discipline, and in which even the miserable pittance was cut down by constant arbitrary fines.

Grimmest of all was the lot of children¹ who were herded into the factories almost as soon as they could walk, whose hours were from five in the morning till seven or nine at night, in a steaming and overheated atmosphere and amid unfenced machinery into which the poor little victims often dropped through sheer exhaustion, or imprisoned alone and in the dark down in the bowels of the earth. Every species of cruelty had to be practised to keep them up to the mark; the employer would often wait with a horsewhip in the small hours of the morning to flog the half drowsed infants into their daily Hell, and as the day went on and agonized appeals for the time were heard, conscientious foremen would apply the scourge with ever more industrious assiduity until the bruised and haggard little boys and girls reeled home for a few hours' insufficient sleep, broken by dreams of the day's torture. The parents, where they were not brutalized by their own misery out of all natural feeling, watched with bleeding hearts the sacrifice of their children, but the industrial Moloch was inexorable, it was a choice between Hell and starvation—conscientious overseers would not grant relief to idle hands, however diminutive.

What of the men who swayed the destinies of the nation, the Tory ministers who were now so securely ensconced in office that it seemed that nothing short of a revolution could unsettle them, and under whose auspices these horrors flourished and increased? Were these men king devils of the Hell that was England, selfish and cunning tyrants whose one object it was to maintain themselves and their class in power and luxury? To the frenzied eye of England's most sensitive poet, of Percy Bysshe Shelley, this and nothing less was the fact. Castlereagh, Sidmouth, the Home Secretary, and Eldon, the Lord Chancellor, appeared to him the veritable embodiments, respectively, of murder, hypocrisy and fraud. Never was an estimate of character more absurdly wide of the mark. How well Castlereagh served his country and Europe, even to the death, we know; the Chancellor was an honourable and too painfully conscientious judge besides being a singularly loyal and lovable old gentleman; while as for Sidmouth, the worst that can be said of him is that he was a religious and well-meaning, but abysmal fool. The ministers who had piloted the country to victory in the great war were doing their

¹ For the best account see *The Town Labourer* by J. L. and B. Hammond.

laborious best under circumstances of terrible difficulty, but nothing in their training had fitted them for seeing or feeling the realities of the domestic situation.

For long years they had been obsessed by the spectres of conquest by the foreigner, and of the triumph of Jacobin principles at home ; the existing social and political system had become invested in their eyes with a halo of sanctity, and the mere thought of tampering with it was regarded as treason against our happy and glorious Constitution. Those who advocated any substantial measure of reform, even if they would have gone no further than Mr. Pitt at the beginning of his career, were looked upon as dangerous firebrands, with whom no terms were to be kept. As for the children in the factories and the pauperized labourers in the villages, they knew little more than they could obtain from interested and rose-coloured reports ; their sympathies had never flowed into such channels—having eyes they saw not and having hearts they felt not.

Conscientiously, therefore, they performed their duty as they understood it. The country was seething with unrest and to their excited imaginations was being worked up by agitators for a revolution. They therefore felt themselves constrained to strengthen their hands by maintaining the conditions of martial law in time of peace. In 1817 the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended for a year, and in 1819 a series of measures was passed aimed not only at nipping in the bud any attempt to arm or drill the populace, but also at muzzling the popular press and suppressing the right of free assembly.

Government at last enjoyed the advantage of overwhelming military force. It was Pitt who, less from reasons of military efficiency than his desire to maintain the home front against the Jacobins, had started the practice of housing the troops in barracks instead of billeting them among the people. This system was continued after the peace, and had the effect of widening the gulf between the soldier and the citizen. The old army of Wellington—"the scum of the earth" as he had called it—was now a caste of highly trained mercenaries, engaged for life, saturated with the pride of victorious achievement and regimental tradition, and ready, in the most literal and sinister sense, to "go anywhere or do anything". And there were other forces by which law and the existing order could be maintained, special constables, various more or less reliable bodies of volunteers, and the yeomanry cavalry whose military inefficiency was compensated for by their extreme readiness to prove their prowess against unarmed mobs.

Amid all this array of force the government lacked the one thing most needful of all in a trained and efficient police. As a result they could hardly avoid clumsy and bloody methods of military repression, and for information they were dependent not, as they would be nowadays, on a competent detective force, but on the tales of miserable spies, who often earned their wage by fomenting the very conspiracies they betrayed. In point of fact, the poor were too crushed and downtrodden to strike an effective blow for themselves, and the few feeble attempts they made, whether of their own accord or by the incitement of spies, to compel the redress of their grievances, might have excited pity in the minds of men less obsessed by the fear of revolution than the English ministers. The climax of repression was reached when a vast and unarmed crowd that met peaceably to listen to reform speeches in the neighbourhood of Manchester, was charged by some undisciplined louts of yeomanry on no greater provocation than that of having cheered their arrival. The troopers saw red, and imagined themselves very terrible fellows, riding about, sabreing men and women and chasing the various banners, as if they were so many Lifeguardsmen Shaws capturing French eagles. It is significant that a regiment of Hussars, which was also present, and understood something about real fighting and military discipline, harmed nobody. It is even more significant that the Prince Regent should have been made publicly to thank his heroic yeomen—but then George, by his own account, had been at Waterloo!

It was during the seven years dating from the battle of Waterloo to 1822, the year when Castlereagh died and Sidmouth resigned, that England made the nearest approach to coming under the system of despotism under which the greater part of Europe had fallen after the Congress of Vienna. But with what a difference, even in this darkest and most hopeless hour! There a man might be flung into secret imprisonment, limited only by the caprice of some minister or understrapper, for wearing a round hat, or humming a patriotic song, or doing any of the thousand and one things that might draw upon him the suspicion of the police. Here the Constitution, though blind reaction might stunt its natural development, lived, and the Common Law, grossly though it might be abused, was still its informing spirit. Habeas Corpus might be suspended, but only as a desperate and temporary expedient, as the ordinary machinery of government may be suspended in a besieged city. English ministers—even the most bigoted of Tory Anti-Jacobins—were not of the stuff of which successful despots are made, and the voice of the reformer

insignificance. And it was not only such achievements as the crowning of Newton's work by Laplace, the development of the calculus by Lagrange, the foundation of modern chemistry by Lavoisier and of comparative anatomy by Cuvier, that completed France's work for science during the eighteenth century. She brought science into the interest and parlance of educated men and women ; she infused it into literature and created an atmosphere in which it could thrive as an essential part of culture. And the Revolution, though it parted Lavoisier from his head on the ground that the Republic had no need of *savants*, served in the long run rather as a stimulus than otherwise.

From France the enthusiasm for pure science had spread to Germany, which, though disunited politically, had already begun her wonderful organization of freely co-operating universities. The inspiration of Goethe, who stood in Olympian majesty above the wars and hatreds that agitated ordinary mortals, was of priceless service in directing German thoroughness and German profundity to an end not national but human. On the other hand, the germs of a culture distinctly national were planted, under the stress of Napoleonic tyranny, by the previously cosmopolitan philosopher Fichte.

But England was by no means destined to play the part of utilitarian Martha to the Maries of pure science on the Continent. She had no Academy of Sciences and her national genius was not of the sort that finds academic expression. Her two great universities, as they awoke from their lethargy of the eighteenth century, cultivated an ideal of liberal education in which the specialization of the scientist was suspect as affording an incomplete mental training—few of the great scientists who flourished at the beginning of the century were Oxford or Cambridge men. On the other hand the Scottish temperament, so much more akin than our own to the German, had evolved a system of universities similar in principle to those of Germany, and to be a scientist in Scotland implied always the membership and usually the professorship of a university.

English science displayed all the advantages and evils of extreme individualism. It was quite unorganized ; its pioneers, often very poor men, were dependent upon their own means for carrying on their researches, and there were no orthodoxies and schools of thought to continue their work, which too frequently lacked recognition and publicity. Often the greatest geniuses suffered from a stubborn provincialism that made them neglectful of keeping in touch with

progress elsewhere—Dalton, for instance, the discoverer of the Atom, declared that he could carry his library, of which he had not read half, on his back. British science was more pragmatic, more immediately occupied with the pursuit of practical ends, than tended to be the case either in France or Germany.

To the orderly Scottish mind, this state of things must have appeared sheer anarchy, and the early Edinburgh Reviewers are inclined to speak in tones of unjust disparagement of British as compared with Continental scientific achievement. Britain has tended to produce men of isolated but supreme genius in their special departments, and without any suspicion of national vanity it may be asserted that since the Renaissance the two outstanding landmarks of scientific progress are inscribed with the names of Newton and Darwin. Even apart from her galaxy of inventors, Britain can, at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, claim a record of pioneer achievement second to that of no country whatever. Genius welled from the most diverse and unpredictable sources. What could have afforded a greater contrast than the three great chemists, the learned and republican theologian, Dr. Priestley, discoverer of oxygen, whose library and laboratory were destroyed by an Anti-Jacobin mob who at least agreed with the Jacobins in having no use for *savants*, a scion of the ducal house of Cavendish, and the uncouth and ungainly little quaker, John Dalton.

The spirit of science was, in fact, abroad, despite of the official and academic cold shoulder, and it transcended every distinction of class or vocation. It was perhaps part of the Romantic impulse that drove men to nature, and the line between poet and scientist is almost obliterated in such a typically English genius as that of Gilbert White, the parson naturalist of Selbourne. The scientist may probe patiently by doubt and experiment while the poet conquers by intuition, and yet both are seekers of the same truth which, when perfectly apprehended, is goodness and beauty.

Space forbids us to record the progress made in every department of science by British investigators between Priestley's discovery of oxygen in 1774 and the foundation of the British Association in 1830. But at least some mention is due to one of the most hopeful and least regarded features of this time, the diffusion of scientific knowledge and interest among the working class. This was particularly remarkable among the engineers, a class of men whose practical acquaintance with machinery naturally stimulated the desire for a wider and more

generalized knowledge. In 1800 George Birkbeck of Glasgow had started the course of lectures that developed into the first Mechanics' Institute, and in 1826 the London Mechanics' Institute, under his auspices and those of the indefatigable Brougham, was opened. Mechanics' Institutes played a great part in working class education during the second quarter of the century, though they ultimately developed a tendency to pass out of the hands of the genuine mechanics into those of what we can best describe as the lower middle class.

4

THE HUMAN CALCULUS

Thus, with unprecedented rapidity, man was enlarging his knowledge of and control over the world around and without him. He had now explored the depths of the heavens and had analysed matter into what were then thought to be its ultimate particles, he had unlocked one source of energy in steam and was beginning to discover another in electricity, he was perfecting every day an instrument of exact thought and analysis in the mathematics. Despite the fact that Hutton in England was laying the foundations of modern geology, and Buffon and subsequently Cuvier in France those of biology, the eighteenth century may be described as an age essentially mathematical, dominated throughout by the genius of Newton and conducting its most fruitful researches in the realms of inorganic matter. The science of the living organism was to come to its own in the nineteenth century, culminating as it did in the work of Darwin.

We must not forget that the tendency of thought since the Renaissance had been to concentrate on the knowledge and control of man's environment, or at best man's body, to the neglect of the inner and spiritual man who had almost monopolized medieval interest. If this standpoint be justified, we should look for the most startling scientific developments on the side of mechanics and chemistry, whereas we should expect comparative stagnation in all that concerns the mind, the social organism, and religion. Progress must be conceived of not in line, but in echelon.

Such a method of advance is not without its dangers. Man has not only improved but revolutionized his surroundings. In so doing he has set before himself the choice that confronts every species whose environment has changed, the task, that is to say, of adapting himself to it or perishing. Most species, under similar circumstances, have perished; even the gigantic lizards of the mesozoic age could

not survive some subtle change in the world's climate. Man, not by any outside agency but by his own action in revolutionizing his environment, has put himself in mortal peril, and forced upon himself the necessity of an adaptation, an inward and spiritual revolution, to meet this change of circumstances. But by concentrating on his surroundings and neglecting himself he cuts himself off from his only possible way of escape.

This is not to imply that during the Industrial Revolution no effort was made to effect the adaptation in question, or that the urgency of an inward as well as an outward revolution was unappreciated. We shall doubtless be reminded that this was an age not only of chemists but of political economists, and that the masters of the French Enlightenment, particularly Condillac and Helvetius, had devoted special attention to founding a scientific psychology. But these efforts, however praiseworthy in intention, were cursed with barrenness, they failed to form the basis of any sure or accumulating body of knowledge. The human sciences did not go forward, but progressed in circles, always returning to the starting point. The political economists of the first half of the nineteenth century did indeed build up an imposing edifice of theory, only to have it knocked down and blown to scorn in the second half.

This was no doubt largely due to the fact that the would-be social scientists usually started building their edifice from the top downwards. To understand mankind collectively it is first necessary to understand them as individuals, in other words, a reliable sociology presupposes a reliable psychology. But it was just where man himself was concerned that human knowledge failed to progress. While the other sciences one by one shook themselves free from traditional authority and association with metaphysics, psychology remained obstinately fast in the ruts. The cautious and unbiassed experimentation that had become a *sine qua non* of the more material sciences was allowed to play but a very minor part in that of the mind. Long after Galen had ceased to be an authority on medicine and Ptolemy on the motions of the heavenly bodies, orthodox psychology continued to be swayed by the pronouncements of such ancient worthies as Aristotle.

It was however inevitable that the scientific impulse, that was producing such startling results in other fields, should urge a certain number of thinking men to extend the reign of science over the mind and spirit. But at that time the seriousness, and indeed the very nature of the problem, were hardly realized. Mathematical methods

reigned supreme, and it was seriously considered possible to make a calculus of human affairs.

Such was the life-long aim and—in the opinion both of himself and of a band of enthusiastic disciples—the achievement of an eccentric and lovable old gentleman, endowed with a massive force of intellect and yet with the unpracticality of a big baby, who died at a venerable age and with an immense reputation, in the year of the great Reform Bill, leaving his body to be dissected for the happiness of his fellow-mortals. His name was Jeremy Bentham, and the influence he wielded probably did more to determine the course of English thought on social subjects during the nineteenth century than that of any other man.

Bentham's philosophy is the singularly direct outcome of early circumstances. A naturally puny child, his education was forced on with a monstrous ineptitude of good intention by his parents, so that, at the age of three, the poor little fellow was running home from walks to bury himself in Rapin's History. A mind so prematurely crammed could hardly fail to grow prematurely rigid and inelastic, so that the mature Bentham displayed all the power and all the weakness that characterize the man of one idea. The philosopher in petticoats developed into a weakly and hypersensitive boy, to whom school life was a hell and a subsequent University course purgatory. Bentham therefore grew up a shrinking recluse, but with the physical weakling's desire to compensate for his inferiority by asserting his power with the one weapon of which he felt himself a master—his pen. It is therefore not surprising that he should have passionately reacted against any kind of established authority, and that the mildest and most benevolent of mortals should have proved one of the most brutal and bludgeoning of controversialists.

The direction of Bentham's activities was determined by his father's choice for him of the bar as a profession. His sensitiveness shrank from the rough and tumble of advocacy, and his keenly sharpened sense of fair play between strong and weak made him hate the chicanery and heartless delays of legal procedure as much as he had hated bullying at Westminster. Retiring, therefore, into solitude, and resorting to that one mightiest weapon of which he was master, he set himself to wage uncompromising battle against the whole legal system, and consequently—as so shrewd a critic could not fail to perceive—against the whole constitutional system which had arisen out of the English Common Law. There was nothing petty or ignoble in this lifelong undertaking; it was as if the weak

boy of the school—having undergone some witch's transformation into a mighty athlete—were to have constituted himself the champion of all weak boys against all strong ones. Surely there is no more pleasing instance of what the latest psychology knows as sublimation, than this of the friendless boy growing up into the friend of all mankind.

But emotional reactions are dangerous things when imperfectly understood, and particularly when they disguise themselves as the workings of cold reason. Bentham was strangely like a very different person, Shelley, in his verdict on most existing authorities and institutions. He regarded them with the intense and indiscriminating aversion of the weakling for the bully, and waged war against them in as uncompromising a spirit as that of Prometheus against Zeus. Nothing would satisfy him but to sweep away the whole existing edifice of law and government, and to put in its stead a new heaven and a new earth fashioned after the most exact intellectual calculations. And just as the weak boy, in our fairy tale, might make the first use of his magic transformation to thrash the head of the school, so did Bentham, at the outset of his career, launch an attack of indiscriminating violence against that arch-apologist for the English law and Constitution, Judge Blackstone.

Bentham's repeated assaults on authority and tradition no doubt had a salutary effect as solvents of the blind and panic-stricken reaction that had come to regard the Constitution as something fixed and finished—not to be adapted to circumstances nor allowed to grow under any pretence whatever. Among a group of talented and influential disciples it was common ground that most of our institutions were honeycombed with stupidity, and that the sole test by which they could be judged was that of practical efficiency. It was at least something that while statesmen like Sidmouth and Eldon were hard at work fighting down any sort of change, energetic Benthamites should have been inciting all and sundry to cut the cackle about authority and get ahead with the business of making the world a fit place for men to live in.

Unfortunately Bentham had made the mistake of imagining this desirable task to be infinitely simpler than it was in reality. The very fact that he could have dreamed of constructing a human calculus is enough to convict him of a fatally defective psychology. Few men, probably, had less understanding of human nature than this amiable recluse, and when he sets out upon the uncongenial task of elucidating it, his usual shrewdness appears wholly to desert

him. Anyone perusing his table of the springs of human action, arranged in three neat columns, eulogistic, dyslogistic, and neutral, will be much put to it to comprehend the very meaning of a writer who is usually a meticulous stickler for verbal precision. In these tables—if I may be permitted to quote from my own *History of English Patriotism*—"interests of the purse, of the heart, of the gall-bladder, of the altar, of the bottle, all jostle one another on terms of perfect equality. It would be easy enough for a man of moderate ability and a taste for conundrums, to pass the whole of his leisure in drawing up alternatives to this scheme, all equally plausible, ringing infinite changes on headings and sub-headings and multiplying distinctions even more subtle than those between sycophantism and toad-eating, faint-heartedness and chicken-heartedness, vainness and vanity."

It was not only in psychology that Bentham was lacking. In common with a good many other professed champions of common-sense, he was by no means a subtle or penetrating philosopher, and it would have been well for him if he could have sat at the feet of the old schoolman, William of Occam, and comprehended the full implication of his warning against multiplying entities. For in grasping after something definite and measureable on which to base his calculus, he lit upon the word "happiness", which he took to represent a thing as homogeneous and as easily measurable as the currency. This happiness he regarded as being the supreme good of life, which, in fact, everybody pursues, however blindly and under whatever religious or idealistic pretence. The end of all enlightened legislation is comprised in the formula "the greatest happiness of the greatest number". So eager is Bentham to treat the national dividend of happiness on a business footing, that he admits no distinction, save that of quantity, between the happiness to be derived from reading poetry and that from playing a now forgotten game called push-pin. It will be noticed, by the way, that Bentham's calculus amounts, at best, to no more than an addition sum and the striking of an average.

Now that the utilitarian philosophy—to give it the name John Stuart Mill adopted to replace Benthamite—has passed into history, it is not necessary to demonstrate at length the confusion of thought and the ignorance not only of psychology but even of physiology on which it is based. Now that our view of life is no longer static, like Bentham's, we have come to realize that pleasure and pain are merely the rough means with which nature has furnished us for registering a sense of well-being or warning as of something wrong. On the

pleasure side of the register is inscribed "carry on", on the pain side "leave off". Bentham's supreme aim is to keep the index hand pointing all day long, and under all circumstances, to "carry on", in other words, to improve life by tampering with the register.

And this particular register, like most products of evolution which man has taken over from the animal, is at best a crude and often a misleading guide. So much have the ascetics of all ages been convinced of its inadequacy for human requirements, that they have made a lifelong practice of making the register point to "leave off" and then ignoring the message—in other words, of conquering the old Adam, or old animal, for whose requirements the register was intended. There is a form of delusion, well known to the doctors of lunatic asylums, which exactly realizes the utilitarian ideal so far as the individual is concerned. The patient, who perhaps imagines himself to be God or Charlie Chaplin, will pass his whole time in the exuberant enjoyment of the fact that though his real life may be one of sordid delusion, he has triumphantly nailed the index hand to the face of the register on the rose-pink side of the dial.

Moreover Bentham fell into a fallacy to which men of his sincere goodness of soul are peculiarly liable. He was forced to assume that when once men became quite enlightened, they would see that by promoting the greatest happiness of all they would at the same time be pursuing their own. This would be all very well if you could put it to men in the mass and rely on them to act honestly and with one single purpose for the common good. But put it to Smith or Jones, and he may reply that his own greatest happiness will be best obtained by refusing to play the game, and looking after number one first, last, and at everybody's expense. To pursue the greatest good of mankind is more often the part of the man of sorrows than the man of joy. Nor does it in the least affect either Smith or Jones that their conduct, if pursued by everybody, would spell general ruin. They are content to let other and worthier people sustain the social organism on which they batten, and who, among the utilitarians, shall convince them of sin?

It is hardly necessary to say that neither Bentham nor any of his followers made any serious attempt to put into practice their idea of measuring against each other the amounts of happiness possessed by different individuals. Old John Donne's problem of catching a falling star and getting with child a mandrake's root would appear simple by comparison. Even supposing instruments to be obtained so delicate as to measure the exact excess or defect of nervous energy

the rent of land was on a different footing from the profits of capital, and that while the capitalist was benefiting society as well as himself by making wealth multiply wealth, the landlord was more or less the villain of the piece, maintaining his own monopoly at everybody else's expense.

Such a view was perhaps natural for a middle-class stockbroker, but Ricardo was treading on more dangerous ground than he knew when he formulated his principle of rent against the landlords. For, as Karl Marx was to demonstrate with terrible logic, rent, in the Ricardian sense, is a form of monopoly aimed at by every capitalist. If I invest in land, I stand the chance of my rents being doubled (or falling indefinitely), in exactly the same way as, when I take up shares in a cotton mill or railway company, I want them to appreciate while I sleep, and though I may have bought in at 5 and be drawing cent per cent, the workers will not necessarily be drawing another sixpence a week out of the enterprise. In starting this idea of economic rent, Ricardo and his followers imagined they were arming the capitalist in industry against the capitalist in land; they were, in fact, providing the workers with the most formidable of all weapons against capitalists of all denominations.

The second cornerstone of the classical political economy was likewise a truth of temporary invested with a universal validity. This was the principle of population, formulated in the writings of a philanthropic clergyman called Malthus. It was undoubtedly a fact that during the first forty years or so of the nineteenth century, the people of this country bred children with such unprecedented rapidity as to swallow up the increase of the national dividend, and to keep the average wealth per head, which had increased so greatly during the last half of the eighteenth century, more or less constant. Malthus, who was more of a historian than Ricardo, jumped to the depressing conclusion that every increase of wealth tends to be nullified by an increase of population, and in consequence he was able to pour buckets of the iciest water on dreams of a humanity increasing from age to age in prosperity and enlightenment :

"Slowly comes a hungry people, as a lion creeping nigher
Glares at one who nods and blinks beside a slowly dying fire."

Modern research has gone to show that the classical economists were more aware of the limitations of their theories than has commonly been supposed. But history is concerned less with their personal vindication than with the general effect that their writings produced on the no doubt prejudiced minds of their contemporaries.

And it is in this light that we must read Carlyle's characterization of political economy as the "dismal science". Dismal it certainly was as interpreted by pushing or comfortable members of the capitalist middle class, in justification of a state of things which enabled them to profit by the stunted lives and virtual slavery of their employees. Capital was visualized as the good fairy of industry; it was the capitalist who furnished the wage fund by which the employees were kept alive, which no strike action could increase and which legislative interference could only diminish. The one thing necessary to economic salvation was to give capital as free a hand as possible. Let any measure be proposed for restraining the slow murder of women and children in factories, for enforcing some standard of decency and humanity in industrial conditions, for alleviating the condition of the aged or helpless poor, for mitigating the scandal of absentee landlordism in Ireland, in short, for improving by any human contrivance whatever the existing social order, and it was sure to start some expansively whiskered gentleman, primed with economics and respectability, to cast it out. Popular treatises of an offensive lucidity were turned out, to drive into the stupid heads of workmen the absolute, scientific impossibility of improving their conditions by interfering with the free play of capital. Only put your trust in Mr. Gradgrind and Mr. Bounderby, and something will eventuate that will no doubt be highly satisfactory to these gentlemen.

How far these prejudices were shared by the economists themselves, and how far they were a straining of their teaching to more or less consciously self-interested ends, it is not our province to determine. How deep-rooted they were we may realize from the fact that even so fervent a reformer as John Bright could be as stiff as any profiteer in opposing factory legislation. A cynic might be tempted to remark that the very success of the dismal science is the best proof of its assumption of universal selfishness.

But when all is said against the heartlessness, the pedantry, and the sheer wrong-headedness that either characterized or arose out of the "dismal science", or the "pig philosophy" that lay behind it, it must be admitted that their exponents played the game with consistent fairness according to their own assumptions. For these assumptions comprehended not only the selfishness but the enlightened selfishness of individuals. If the utilitarians believed in allowing a free hand to the capitalist, they believed also in allowing a free hand to the labourer. It was one of the staunchest and most

attractive of the Benthamite group, the ex-breeches-maker, Francis Place, who was mainly instrumental in securing the repeal of Pitt's law forbidding the workmen to combine in their own interests. Bentham himself, whatever he thought about social reform, was a "whole-hogger" about political reform, and if his followers doubted whether the people would do themselves any good by interfering with capital, they may at least be said to have advocated the best remedy for whatever limitations they may have possessed, by putting the decision in this momentous matter into the hands of the people themselves through their elected representatives.

5

SENSIBILITY ON CANVAS

No doubt the dynasts at Vienna had imagined that it would be a comparatively simple matter to put back the hands of the clock to before the French Revolution. But they had judged without vision. The tricolours and eagles, the guillotines and trees of liberty, were no doubt under the veto of armed force; Central and Southern Europe might lie quiet for awhile under the most highly organized system of despotism that the wit of man could devise; but for all that, not only the peoples but the very rulers had changed, and though the black fog of the Metternich system might hide its face, the clock still went on remorselessly ticking out the minutes of mortal greatness.

But under the shadow of despotism, hope grew sick. German philosophy ceased to produce creative humanists like Kant and heroes like Fichte, but culminated in the awful figure of Schopenhauer, who could see in the world nothing but will gone wrong, and who counselled only resignation. The despair of murdered Poland sobbed and stormed on the piano of Chopin, and the gloom that enshrouded Italy is palpable in the writings of her Leopardi. Even in France, before the awakening of 1830, the Romantic spirit voiced the impulse of reaction.

It is only when we see her by comparison with these other nations of Europe that we realize in how true a sense England, even in the time of her darkest reaction, stood for freedom. The Anti-Jacobin spirit had certainly permeated the upper class during the first two decades of the century, but never to a sufficient extent to check the natural development of the Emotional Revival. The Lake poets may have shed the somewhat callow republicanism of their youth,

but they were very far from becoming mere reactionaries. The war with Napoleon witnessed Turner at his zenith and the sunrise of Byron. It was under the shadow of Eldon, Castlereagh, and Sidmouth that that other triumvirate of Shelley, Keats, and Byron were doing imperishable work—too untimely cut short!

By the time the smoke had drifted off the shambles of Waterloo, England had travelled an immeasurable distance from the world of Chesterfield and Gibbon. The polished and urbane culture that had emanated from Versailles was now but a memory, which the Romantic imagination was one day to invest with an almost medieval glamour, strangely incongruous with its somewhat unfeeling reality. The light touch of a Horace Walpole, the massive commonsense of a Dr. Johnson, were things not to be recovered. Sensibility, as Miss Austen would have put it, had conquered sense.

And yet there would probably be few, nowadays, found to deny that the conquest, imperfect as it was, was on the whole beneficent. Life may have lost something in spaciousness, but it had certainly gained in depth, in sensitiveness, and in sympathy. For one thing, England had entered, as never before, upon the heritage of her own past. Sir Walter Scott had crowned the work of Chatterton, of Gray, and of Percy, by lifting the Middle Ages out of the contempt into which they had fallen and refashioning them in the glowing likeness of his own mind. If the chivalrous lords and ladies on the canvas were little more like the real thing than the mere barbarians visualized by Gibbon, the error was one on the right side, for a sympathetic interest is the parent of accurate inquiry. The Elizabethans and writers of the sixteenth century had, at the same time, come to their own, and the light of Charles Lamb's critical genius, the most illuminating, in spite of its fitfulness, that modern times have produced, played deliciously over them. The very language became, in consequence, richer, more flexible, more expressive of the nuances of feeling.

Then, again, nature, which the taste of Versailles would have banished from the court and disguised with an iron mask of classical convention, began to be seen and loved. This was, both in literature and painting, England's peculiar province. How lovingly such amateurs of science as Gilbert White had observed her workings, with what powerful intuition poets like Blake had entered into her soul, we have already seen. It was, however, for the painters to afford the most memorable and distinctively British revelation of her truth in beauty.

The early eighteenth century had seen English landscape painting, such as it was, following with heavy steps those masters of an artificial convention, Claude, Poussin, and Salvator Rosa. The grotesque landscape by Lambert in the National Gallery is typical of the sort of thing that men of undoubted talent could produce by painting not what they saw, but what they imagined they ought to have seen. It is, in fact, a long time before English painters can get out of the habit of looking at their own country through foreign glasses. And yet a discerning foreign critic, Rouquet, can write as early as 1755 to the effect that few masters in this art can vie with the leading English landscape painters.

Even the tragic genius of the nearly starved Robert Wilson did not succeed in shaking itself free from the Franco-Italian classical obsession, and the first of our supreme masters of English landscape, John Crome the elder, caught some of his downright truth to nature from the influence of the Dutch painters of the seventeenth century, and particularly of Hobbema. It is, indeed, not surprising that the East Anglian counties of England, with their grave, Netherlandish vistas and their generous sprinkling of Dutch blood, should have inherited this tradition. The sombre gravity that inspires such a picture as Crome's of Mousehold Heath is typical of the best Dutch landscape interpretation. But the more lively and coloured imagination of the English Romantics was destined to go far beyond anything that Holland had achieved in this branch of painting, and, besides, British scenery was perhaps the most varied and opulent in the whole of Europe.

This was the discovery of another East Anglian, John Constable, who had such a passionate love for every detail of what he called his dear old England, that it sufficed him to paint her just as she was, with a robust honesty that scorned any embellishment of classic stage property or conventional arrangement. And then London gave birth to the supreme genius of Turner, another passionate lover of England, who not only visioned all nature with faultless accuracy, but who transfigured everything that he saw, and whose genius at last flamed to heaven in a superb attempt to express the inexpressible, to render the pure glory of light and colour.

It was not only upon wild nature that the Romantic imagination loved to dwell. The glamour of the past affected painting as much as literature. The pathetic ruins of the monasteries, the still inviolate Gothic cathedrals, castles whose grim and tyrannous associations were now happily forgotten, antique streets and bridges,

were found to possess more charm and dignity than the merely conventional temples and columns that Claude and Poussin loved to scatter all over their pictures. And yet when Turner did turn his brush to these glories of old Rome, as he saw them in Italy, how immeasurably did his reality surpass the mere graceful artifice of these his predecessors!

One branch of art England might claim almost for her own. This was painting in water-colours, a medium that afforded hitherto unsuspected opportunities for the rendering of the most fleeting moods and impressions. It is a fact worth remarking that English water-colour painting may claim a royal though illegitimate ancestry, for Peter, the great Tsar, begat Alexander Cozens, whose talent has only lately come into recognition, and Alexander begat John Cozens, whose delicate and dreamy interpretations of nature are among the first undoubted masterpieces in this medium, and show strong traces of Chinese influence. The earliest English water-colours are generally of a peaceful and remarkably sober tone, but here, as ever, the flaming mastery of Turner broke all bounds and anticipated the most daring flights of the ensuing century. Scarcely less remarkable is the way in which a Norfolk painter, John Cotman, found the way of impressionism long before the term was heard of—witness his almost Whistlerian “Greta Bridge”—and Richard Bonington, cut off in the flower of his youth, was yet able to light the spark which fired, in France, the outburst of the French Romantic genius in nature painting which is associated with the names of Fountainsbleau and Barbizon.

It is perhaps natural that in art as well as in war England should decisively have asserted her mastery over the sea. This was, like the development of water-colour painting, her peculiar achievement. The Venetian Republic had indeed solemnized yearly her marriage with her protecting sea, but she shrank from depicting the moods and visage of that awful bridegroom. Those mighty seafarers, the Dutch, had painted the sea with the honesty with which they painted everything else they saw, but her majesty and her terror alike proved beyond the scope of their vision; their calms are too pondlike, and their storms somehow fail to gather strength.

The earliest English marine artists were men who had trained themselves, like Mr. Masfield's Dauber, on board ship or as dockyard hands, and acknowledged no other tutor than the sea. The naval wars of the eighteenth century created a lively demand for the painting of ships, and the artist often had a hard task in satisfying

hard-bitten old naval skippers who understood nothing whatever about art, but displayed a minute and aggressively exacting knowledge of nautical detail. With the ground thus prepared, the great nature painters at the end of the century took to the sea as a matter of course, and here again Turner displayed a mastery never equalled by any of his contemporaries or successors. Such was the man's passion to wrest the very heart of her secret from the sea, that he would have himself lashed to the mast of some small boat in darkness and tempest, taking it all to his soul with a lover's eagerness, remembering, reproducing, transfiguring it all. It was but fitting that Turner should have depicted the last victory and death of Nelson, for he too had taught Britannia to rule the waves.

6

THE QUINTESSENCE OF ROMANCE

With the close of the war, the Romantic movement enters upon a new phase. The three great Lake Poets had all of them been carried along the surge of national enthusiasm for the liberation of Europe from Napoleonic tyranny; even Blake had seen visions of Pitt riding Behemoth and Nelson bridling Leviathan, heroic and awful figures; Sir Walter Scott had been an out and out Tory, a British as well as a Scottish patriot, while his compatriot Campbell, though a Liberal, had evinced a martial enthusiasm not less ardent. The cause of democratic liberty had naturally suffered an eclipse from its association with the national enemy, and the spectacle of Jacobinism degenerating into tyranny had revolted even those who had started with the keenest revolutionary sympathies.

A nation is seldom capable of being strongly moved by two enthusiasms at once, and when we were fighting—sometimes alone—against half a continent, it was apt to be forgotten that, whether we won or lost, multitudes of Englishmen were in a state of misery that no defeat could worsen, and that the reaction born of martial necessity was putting in peril those very liberties for which we professed to be fighting.

There were never wanting, even during that darkest hour, men with some inkling of the truth that it profits a nation little enough to conquer a Napoleon if she thereby loses her own soul. The Whig rump, after the secession of 1794, contained many politicians who, whether from statesmanlike or factious motives, gave liberty and reform at home the precedence of conquest abroad; and beyond

the Whigs, though but exiguously represented in the House, stood those somewhat heterogeneous representatives of democracy who took the name of Radicals, which is but the Latinized revival of "Root and Branch Men", as the more intransigent Ironsides had been called.

So far as these new Root and Branch men had a philosophy it was that formulated by Bentham and subsequently expounded in *The Westminster Review*, but Radicalism in England was more of a tendency than a consistent doctrine and, in fact, so far a product of the Emotional Revival as to be weakest on the intellectual side. Even among the most extreme democrats, it is rather the exception than the rule to find the least inkling of the scope or complexity of the problem created by the Industrial Revolution. A deliberate adaptation of society to its man-created environment, a constructive effort of unprecedented magnitude, and based on the exact study of human nature, was the last thing that most of them visualized.

What they could see was that the political system of their own country had got hopelessly out of date, that Parliament was no longer representative of the people but of a small class of rich and interested men. They wanted to get back to the Leveller's principle that no man born in England ought to be exempted from the choice of those who are to make the laws for him. So greatly had the corruption of our electoral system begun to stink in the nostrils of thinking men—at a time when seats in Parliament were openly advertised for sale in the newspapers—that the Reform of Parliament began to be regarded as something not far short of a panacea for all social evils. Dear, old, simple-minded Major Cartwright had already dotted the face of England with Hampden Clubs for the purpose of achieving universal suffrage.

We may not linger long over the personalities and views of this not uninteresting body of men. There was the slim and rather dandified Sir Francis Burdett, an immensely rich man with those ineffably gracious manners with which aristocrats who dabble in democracy are wont to overwhelm their proletarian comrades. Reform was his aim, a genteel self-advertisement his method, and at the end of his days he was safely gathered into the Tory fold. This rather euphemistically nicknamed "England's Glory" achieved the triumph of his life in 1810, by taking such a rise out of Parliament by an article on the liberty of the press that they committed him to the Tower. Burdett, who shut himself up with much ostentation in his house, attracted a delighted mob by announcing his intention

to resist, and when the soldiers broke in he hurriedly got hold of his little boy and commenced an impromptu lesson in the Latin original of the Magna Charta. When, at the end of the Session, he ceased to enjoy His Majesty's hospitality, that honest breeches maker (though assuredly not for such as Burdett) Francis Place, organized an immense procession to celebrate the hero's release. This was altogether too much for the sorely tried nerves of Francis, Bart., who got it into his head that Francis, breeches maker, was a government spy and fairly bolted from his admirers, with the result that the procession had to parade London heroless. No wonder that Place cut him afterwards for a coward and a poltroon !

The most fascinating of all these Romantic democrats was Admiral Cochrane, afterwards Earl of Dundonald. His very career was one continuous romance, a series of feats as incredible as those of Jack the Giant Killer. Where he was given the opportunity, which was never on a scale commensurate with his abilities, his brilliance puts even that of Nelson into the shade. But his character was tinged with that fatal instability from which so few of the Romantics seemed able to escape. The constant opponent of corruption in the navy, he was not by any means above profiting by the very abuses he denounced, and he was sentenced in 1814 to a fine, the pillory, and a year's imprisonment on a not wholly unpalatable charge of sharp practice in the stock market. Thus lost—most unfortunately—to the British Navy, this singular champion of political purity became the knight errant for any people that might be struggling to be free. He did this as a matter of democratic principle, for he refused to be made an admiral in the service of Spain, and joined insurgent Chili on the ground, as he proudly stated to the Spanish Viceroy at Lima, that “a British nobleman has the right to assist any country that is endeavouring to re-establish the rights of aggrieved humanity”. It is probably owing to his efforts—rewarded though they were with base ingratitude—that Chili achieved her independence.

This particular phase of the Romantic movement is especially *en evidence* in connection with the Greek struggle for independence against the Turks, a cause that united the sympathies of Liberals all over Europe. In England the most prominent of the political Radicals were members of a pro-Greek committee, and the indefatigable Cochrane, after an interlude in the Brazilian service, went to command the Greek fleet and soon found that even genius is incapable of snatching victory for pirates and cowards. The

glamour of Greece exercised an extraordinary fascination over the minds of Englishmen reared in the classics. Gallant gentlemen were proud to fight beneath her standards, and English officers were found side by side with old and honoured enemies of the Peninsula War. One ultra Romantic nobleman, Lord Frederick North, brought himself into some notoriety by going about Greece in the costume and under the name of Plato! Lord Byron, had he lived, might not improbably have become the Agamemnon of an independent Greece.

Of all the Romantic democrats—and their name is legion—none is a more authentic product of the movement, nor exercised a greater influence, than William Cobbett, perhaps the most English Englishman that ever lived, sprung from peasant stock, a self-made man, with all a self-made man's aggressive self-confidence and egotism. To work one's way to fame and affluence from a smock frock and a private's uniform argues an uncommon force of will, and in Cobbett the will dominated every other faculty; if he once determined on championing a cause he would do so with an energy that blinded him to everything except what he wanted to see, and even warped his naturally upright character—for he was capable of a thumping lie when in a corner, of gross libel when up against a personal enemy, and of bilking an inconvenient debt to a rich friend like Sir Francis Burdett. He was like a bull charging at first one and then another of a pack of dogs, and his style is a series of explosions.

These defects of temper and delicacy were compensated for by another product of Cobbett's upbringing, a direct vision of life itself, undimmed by the coloured glass of a merely conventional orthodoxy. He did not, like the political economists, move about in a world of abstract egotists, nor, like the more reactionary Tories, in a land of roast beef and plum pudding, of a free constitution and a jolly peasantry, but he, almost alone of his contemporaries, had the innocence to see his beloved old England exactly as she was—and what he saw appalled him, roused him to Berserk fury against anyone who could possibly be held responsible for creating the Hell she was as compared with the Paradise she had been.

For Cobbett, with all his singleness of eye, could not escape the spirit of his time—he was a thorough-paced Romantic with a historical outlook to match. That staunch Tory, Sir Walter Scott, had indeed cast the glamour of romance over the Middle Ages, and had conjured up a world of chivalrous gentlemen and enchanting

ladies. Cobbett cared little enough for the amenities—such as they were—of hall and bower, but he discovered something of more interest to the class from which he was drawn : an England in which poor men ate meat regularly and wore gloves, in which a day's toil produced two or three times as much food and clothing as in his own time, in which the country was dotted thickly with monasteries providing in a spirit of Christian hospitality, so different from the cruel mercies of a modern poor law, for the wants of the indigent. Cobbett—remarkably enough for such an obstinate John Bull—drew a rose-coloured picture of the medieval Church, which a more accurate knowledge of the ecclesiastics and monks of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries would have prevented, but he had the historical insight to perceive the essential democracy that pervaded the medieval social organism, and the decisive importance of the Reformation period in starting the new order of things which had culminated in such dire misery as that of his own England.

Cobbett was too much of a fighter to be a constructive statesman, despite the surprising flashes of intuition that he constantly displayed. He was almost incapable of thinking calmly, men were to him either angels or devils. The existing social system was corrupt and damnable, the Industrial Revolution an unmitigated calamity, the great towns were “wens”, of which London was the most bloated and poisonous, modern finance a swindle, national debts and a paper currency being its worst features. The whole governing class, being in corrupt conspiracy against the people, was lumped together under the comprehensive title of the “Thing”. Cobbett, who realized as well as any man living where the shoe pinched, who had marked, during his own lifetime, the poor slipping from depth to depth of misery, who had seen British soldiers robbed by their officers, who had suffered glorious imprisonment for denouncing their torture by hired Germans, who had probed more jobs than any man living, who had ridden from end to end of the country recording everywhere the signs of tyranny and desolation, this Ajax, in perpetual heroic defiance of

“ the old gods, the austere,
Oppressors in their strength,”

laid about him without mercy or discrimination on the principle of “do I not hate them, O Lord, that hate thee?” Thwack! would fall the cudgel on the saintly head of a Wilberforce, the hard head of a Malthus, the respected top hat of a Peel, and now the friend of the people would be dancing with ghoulish glee over the freshly

closed grave of a Castlereagh. But this remorseless hater was even more of a lover; he loved every acre of English soil with true Romantic ardour, and he loved with all his great heart, with all his terrific strength, that English people whose sorrows he understood so well, being bone of their bone and soul of their soul.

If he could not lead them into the promised land, he could at least arouse them, as nobody else could, to defy the lords of their bondage. Fashioning to himself a prose style of matchless simplicity and directness, he became the greatest of all popular journalists. Week by week in his *Political Register*, he turned out straight, hard-hitting stuff that went to the hearts of peasant and artisan, inspired them with a hope and an indignation equally divine, and made them feel that things had once been merry for the English poor, and that, by God, they should be merry yet, despite the whole army of ministers, judges, pensioners, squires, financiers, clergy, spies, and magistrates who were the authors and maintainers of England's shame.

It may seem a far cry from the burliest to the most ethereal of Englishmen, one who was, after all, a fellow Romantic and of good Home County stock—Percy Bysshe Shelley. Shelley had certainly arrived at his point of view by a very different road from that of the rough man of action and essentially conservative patriot. He was the linear heir of the French eighteenth century Enlightenment in its most advanced phase; he had sat at the feet of his father-in-law Godwin, who had derived his philosophy largely from Condorcet, that ill-fated Girondin apostle of human perfectability. Curiously enough, for so emotional a being, Shelley had imbibed from this teaching a limitless faith in reason—once allow that full scope, and original virtue, or rightness of thought, would lead inevitably to the golden age. Unfortunately, it seemed that an age-long conspiracy of tyrants and priests, who had somehow escaped original virtue altogether, had kept the human mind, and consequently the human race, in fetters.

What was, to the French thinkers and to exact-minded Godwin the quintessence of pure reason, came to Shelley as an intense emotional liberation. He was a shy, solitary boy; a stricken deer fleeing from the herd of schoolboy companions and feeding his mind partly on the tales of mystery and romance that were so much in vogue just then, and partly upon the wonders of experimental science. "Sudden," he cries, to the Spirit of Intellectual Beauty,

"thy shadow fell on me ;
 I shrieked, and clasped my hands in ecstasy !
 I vowed that I would dedicate my powers
 To thee and thine ; have I not kept the vow !"

Henceforth there were for Shelley two worlds, that which he saw and found almost wholly evil, and that which he visioned as the Kingdom to come after the overthrow of tyranny and the liberation of the human mind. This latter world his spirit invested with such perfection as had seldom, if ever before been clothed with words. There all would be love, joy, freedom, there woman would attain to her rightful equality in godhead with man, there the very animals would be drawn into the brotherhood of universal benevolence.

But between the world of bitter reality and that of inspired imagination, between what was and what might be, was an unbridgeable gulf fixed. A Hell ruled by devils is by no means to be conjured into Heaven, and Shelley was almost incapable of seeing anything or anybody not wholly good or wholly bad. The very witchery of his verse resides in the fact that he flees from reality into a dream world of his own creation, he cannot dwell, like Wordsworth, in communion with Nature. He must needs transfigure her, he is more at home in the clouds and luminous mists than on earth, and to his eyes the glory of the skylark is in the feeling that

"Bird thou never wert."

Shelley's ethereal sensitiveness brought him to a view of society not substantially different from that to which Cobbett's thick-skinned pugnacity had brought him. To both of them the condition of the people was one of unspeakable misery, nor could Cobbett have asked for a better summary of his message than :

"Nay, in countries that are free,
 Such starvation cannot be
 As in England now we see."

The spectacle of oppression, of cruelty, and of brutal stupidity that made Cobbett roar, made Shelley shriek with indignation, and his scarification of everyone in authority, the Royal Family, the King's ministers, the Tory reviewers, is not surpassed by anything in the *Political Register*. What Cobbett calls the Thing, Shelley symbolizes as the Zeus who binds the friend of man, Prometheus, to his rock amid the frozen Caucasus.

Here the resemblance ends. Cobbett, if he had no very practical constructive programme, was at least an invincible fighter ; the best counsel that Shelley could give to a Peterloo mob, assailed by the myrmidons of the three arch-fiends, Castlereagh, Sidmouth, and

Eldon, was to allow themselves "with folded arms and steadfast eyes" to be hacked to pieces, after which the soldiers would be overcome with shame and the people—such of them as survived—would, in unvanquishable number, shake off their chains like dew. To ascend to the realm of imaginative symbolism, the good Prometheus has no power of himself to help himself, the most he can do is to endure until a shadowy and unimaginable Power, called Demogorgon, is introduced for the sole purpose of overthrowing Zeus at the height of his malign omnipotence and disappearing with him, after which Prometheus is unbound and the perfectly evil world becomes in the twinkling of an eye perfectly good. In this and still more in the final drama, *Hellas*, it is evident that Shelley is beginning to doubt the possibility of his ideal kingdom ever coming, save as a figment of the mind.

Less delicate and spiritual, but a force of immeasurably greater potency, was Shelley's friend and fellow poet, Lord Byron. Through him, for the first time, the influence of the English Emotional Revival becomes European. His view of society, though tinged by a certain aristocratic scorn that made him, in a squib to his friend Hobhouse, refer to the "peoples' men" as—

" Yourself and Burdett, gentlemen,
And blackguard Hunt and Cobby¹ O ! "

was substantially the same as that of the last-named "blackguard", than whom his lordship, alone among Britons, wielded a more formidable fighting pen. Never were the woes of the industrial labourer expressed with a more persuasive indignation than in his maiden speech in the House of Lords, pleading for mercy on the stocking frame breakers. But the scope of Byron's vision was wider than that of Cobbett; Byron early found cause to shake the dust of England off his feet, and become the champion of a Continent groaning under the slavery of the Holy Three and the Metternich system. The young British nobleman, whose romantic personality made him the cynosure of all eyes and the darling of all women, dared and could thunder forth,* in tones that reverberated through Europe, what nobody else, on peril of life and liberty, dared to hint or whisper. And when the oppressed peoples heard, their hearts glowed with a hope that tyranny had almost quenched, and their blood warmed to the music of

" Still, freedom, still, thy banner, torn and flying,
Streams like a thunder cloud *against* the wind ! "

¹ Cobbett.

And yet Byron, champion of Europe, like Cobbett, champion of England, remained a force and a force alone, though of earthquake strength, after whose shaking the edifice of tyranny never quite recovered its former cohesion. He had no constructive philosophy nor any more definite programme than that of warring against tyrants and sycophants wherever he might find them. He had no illusions even about the Hellas for which he gave his life. At the age of thirty-six he had come to desire nothing better than to choose his ground and take his rest. Indeed, we may attribute its despairing melancholy, its wish to cease upon the midnight, its sense that

"The world is weary of the past,
Oh might it die and rest at last!"

to this besetting weakness of the Romantic mind, that it was seldom capable of working out its philosophy to a conclusion, that its richness in emotion was not reinforced by a corresponding strength of thought, and that though it could feel how grievously the time was out of joint, it was yet despairingly conscious of its impotence to see steadily or comprehensively enough to point a remedy.

Of the great trio whose names will always be associated together, not Shelley nor Byron, but the young man of the people, John Keats, came nearest to finding a solution. He was closer to the earth than Shelley, and, despite his disadvantages of education, possessed a mind naturally more balanced and philosophic than that of Byron. He was, like the other two, an ardent Liberal, though he allowed fewer evidences of it to be seen in his works. But towards the end of his all too brief career he showed that he was capable of rising to a standpoint to which neither of the others showed signs of attaining. It was in his unfinished drama *Hyperion*, where the overthrown Titans are debating—after the precedent of Milton's devils—how to restore their former state, that the aged Oceanus counsels them to take comfort in the contemplation of a progress through strife towards a perfection in which the vanquished participate as truly as the victors, and of which the primal law is that

"First in beauty should be first in might."

Keats, if he had lived, might have developed this germ into a philosophy of life more comprehensive than any which that dawning century was to produce, not a hopeless strife between an Ormuz of dream and an Ahriman of actuality, but a creative evolution in which even a Castlereagh might be working, in his own way, to the same end as a Shelley.

THE NEW TORYISM

The democratic Radicals, then, whether scientific or Romantic, cannot be said to have offered any acceptable solution of the problem created by the Industrial Revolution. They were able to lay their fingers on much that was wrong and they did at least keep alive a divine discontent with things as they were. But their historical sense was unformed and their psychology superficial; they were more powerful to destroy than to create. None of them, from Bentham in his study to Shelley among his clouds, was capable of visualizing a complete readjustment of the social organism to its new, self-created environment.

The elder generation of Romantics, with their more serene outlook though waning inspiration, were in some ways more fitted to the task of practical reconstruction. It is a mistake to imagine that the Lake Poets cast away their popular sympathies with their red caps of Jacobinism. They were Tories, it is true, but all Tories were not blind reactionaries, and very shortly after the war it became evident that the heirs of the old Royalist and High Church tradition numbered a progressive wing among their own ranks, before which the mere obstruction of men like Eldon was bound to give way. Speaking very roughly, and in full consciousness of the many qualifications to which the statement is liable, we may say that after the first quarter of the nineteenth century the Tory Conservatives tended to become the party of a cautious social reform, and the Whig Liberals of an equally cautious political reform. Universal suffrage was the first plank in the Radical programme, but where social reform was concerned they were often positive reactionaries. On the other hand, the new type of Tory, as represented particularly by Peel, was inclined to distrust any alteration of the franchise, but had more liberal notions about bettering the condition of the people.

It was to Toryism, thus conceived, that the Lake Poets devoted the enthusiasm that had once burned for the overthrow of kings and the defeat of British arms. Even Southey, with his incurably second-rate mind and that peculiar smugness that made him the easy target of such critics as Byron and Macaulay, had ideas that placed him in the van of social reformers. He was a keen sympathizer with Robert Owen's schemes for co-operative social betterment; he looked to a continuous improvement in working class conditions by means of universal education, humanization of the law, diffusion

of cheap literature, Savings Banks, sanitation, an efficient police and machinery of local government, as well as the development of our colonies for purposes of emigration. Wordsworth was a no less ardent reformer upon similar lines, and was a believer in universal education. Nor was the championship of such benevolent ideas in the Tory ranks the monopoly of the poets. Two of the doughtiest champions of humane principles against middle-class economics were Richard Oastler, the "factory king", as he was called on account of his efforts to bring the law to the protection of the workmen, and Michael Sadler, who ruined his health in unmasking the grim reality of factory conditions, and waged doughty war against the economists, whom he characterized in his haste as the pests of society and persecutors of the poor. All these reformers were deeply religious, not to say prejudiced Churchmen, and must needs treat of man not only as an economic but as a moral being.

Such threads of thought were gathered into a profound and original political philosophy by Coleridge, in the most complete of his usually rambling and diffuse treatises, an essay *On the Constitution of Church and State*. The significance of Coleridge as a philosopher consists largely in the fact that he, more than any other man before Carlyle, was responsible for bringing the German spirit and influence to bear on the English mind. His acquaintance with German thought does not seem to have been extensive according to our modern standards, but he had made some study of Kant and come under the spell of Goethe. What he, like others who drank from the same spring, seems to have acquired, was less any definite system of philosophy than—what was more valuable—a habit of mind at once profound and critical, a determination to rest satisfied with nothing short of ultimate reality.

Thus Coleridge was by no means satisfied with the comparatively plain-sailing piety and benevolence that satisfied other Tories of an advanced school. He was resolved, in the spirit of Saint Thomas Aquinas, whose *magnum opus* he had performed the Herculean task of reading through, to get down to the ultimate purpose of institutions, their idea, to use the Platonic expression. In this sense, the idea of the Nation¹ is its Constitution. Coleridge is a constitutionalist, but in a sense that might have made Lord Eldon's hair stand on end. For he sees in the Constitution no petrified perfection, but something living, dynamic, whose very permanence is progressive.

¹ The word Coleridge here uses is "State", in that larger sense in which it includes the Church, but as he afterwards uses it in the narrower and ordinary sense, I have substituted "Nation".

The English Constitution, according to Coleridge, results from the harmonious opposition of the State, whose object is to secure wealth and personal freedom, and the Church, which looks to the moral cultivation of the people. About the State his views are too cautious and conservative to possess much interest. It is only when he comes to the Church that he begins to break fruitful ground.

What he means by the Church is something that existed long before Christianity and might still exist independently of it. It is the nation organized and acting as a moral personality, just as the State is an association of individuals for the safeguarding of their individual interests. Accordingly Coleridge would have the whole property of the nation divided—presumably in fairly equal proportions—into the Propriety, as he calls it, or individual property, and the Nationalty, or property of the whole community. The Nationalty, which was formerly mainly in the hands of the Church, cannot be alienated without foul wrong to the nation, and in the fact that it was so alienated at the Reformation as to upset the rightful proportion of Nationalty to Propriety, Coleridge sees the prime cause of our social maladies.

Coleridge himself would have his Nationalty still administered by the Church of Christ, presided over by the Sovereign, though he admits that this is a matter, not of constitutional necessity, but of the highest expediency. His conception of the Church's function, however, is capable of the most elastic interpretation. Theology forms only part of its objects, though theology to Coleridge, as subsequently to Newman, constitutes the crown and highest synthesis of human knowledge. The objects of his Church would be almost exactly defined in Burke's ideal of a partnership in all art, in all science, in every virtue, and in all perfection. Its personnel, the Clerks or Clergy of the nation, formerly comprised "the learned of all denominations, the professors of all those arts and sciences, the possession and application of which constitute the civilization of a country". They were responsible for national education, for the humanities and for the provision of every parish with "a resident guide, guardian and teacher, diffusing through the whole community the knowledge indispensable for the understanding of its rights, and for the performance of the correspondent duties."¹

No doubt this is an idealized version of the past, for Coleridge, the philosopher, had not ceased to be the Romantic of the poems, and, like Cobbett, regarded the Middle Age as the Golden Age of

¹ From a summary by his nephew, H. N. Coleridge.

England. What the imaginary social contract had been to the eighteenth century, a more or less imaginary Middle Age was to the nineteenth. But this does not affect the value of his teaching, not as history, but as a practical social philosophy. For he, almost alone, indicates an acceptable *via media* between two extremes of thought, of which one, dominant in Coleridge's own day, concentrated on the State alone in the narrowest sense, restricting its functions to the safeguarding of individual rights and property, and the other would have made of the State a secular Church, overriding all individual rights whatever—the quintessence of socialism. Coleridge looks for salvation not in the triumph of either, but in the harmony—implicit in the British Constitution—of both ideals.

8

THE BIRTH OF SOCIALISM

Whatever the economists might claim to have demonstrated about the need for giving capital a free hand, there was no escaping from the fact that whereas, under the existing social order, wealth was being multiplied beyond the wildest dreams of a century back, the whole benefits of this revolution were absorbed by a minority of the population, while the majority were sinking from depth to depth of misery. And this majority comprised those very labourers who—on the authority of Adam Smith himself—produced the whole of the wealth. Nor was the contrast a matter of mere guesswork or tuition. In 1814, the year of Napoleon's overthrow, a certain Patrick Colquhoun, a metropolitan police magistrate, published a statistical estimate of the resources of the British Empire, in which the inequality of the distribution of wealth was revealed, with at least an honest attempt at accuracy, in the dry light of statistics. Here it was stated that whereas some 400,000 of the well-connected and well-to-do were drawing family incomes of from two to four hundred pounds per annum, the labourers in the fields and factories had to keep body and soul together on a beggarly eleven.

Here, then, was the plain meaning of the state of things analysed and favoured by the economists; the landlord growing fat on his rents, the capitalist pocketing everything else above the eleven pounds or so per annum necessary to keep each human machine grinding him wealth for anything over twelve hours in the twenty-four, and the man who turned the soil or tended the loom kept down by an iron law to a natural or unnatural rate of wages which might,

according to a very liberal interpretation of Ricardo, rise, in course of time—perhaps even to an average twelve pounds per annum!

To kick against these pricks might be—and, the whole school of middle class economists would assure you in one voice of ponderous indignation, *was*—quite fallacious and unscientific, but one might at first be inclined to wonder how the poor, once confronted with such arguments as Colquhoun's statistics and their own bitter experience could provide, did not rise, as Shelley—who was after all of squire stock and might be presumed to feel the pinch of the shoe less keenly—counselled them to rise.

“ Like Lions after slumber
In unvanquishable number—
Shake your chains to earth like dew
Which in sleep had fallen on you—
Ye are many—they are few.”

To expect this would, however, be to argue a lamentable ignorance of human, and particularly of English nature. The chain of habit is harder to break than that of economic slavery, and when men are so crushed to the earth and kept in such a state of degrading ignorance as the labouring class of the early nineteenth century, they are seldom able to combine or think for themselves as a class. It was enough for each individual or family to keep alive from day to day even if it were—as so often it was in the industrial districts—by passing their own children through the hands of the capitalist Moloch. Some crude and immediate sensual enjoyment, the oblivion of drunkenness, the excitement bought by some fellow-creature's agony, offered a more alluring prospect than the triumph of liberty or social justice. Besides, many of the men, particularly in the country districts, were genuinely religious; they believed in a vague sort of way that God was responsible for all this and would even up the odds hereafter, and they were often ready to fly at the throat of any would-be deliverer if, like Robert Owen, his orthodoxy was open to suspicion, just as they had burnt Priestley's library because he was not sufficiently patriotic. Holyoake, the veteran agitator, told the story of some Johnny Raw whom he had himself, in his youth, seen condemned to the savage sentence of transportation for life to Norfolk Island. The poor fellow had merely touched his forehead to the old gentleman in the wig, and answered with pathetic respectfulness, “Thank you, sir.”

Thus we are able to account for what may at first blush seem an amazing phenomenon. In the time of the greatest misery the English poor have ever gone through, in an age fermenting with new ideas

of all sorts, those often able and eloquent men, who arraigned the whole order of society and tried to point to something better, had seldom any effective influence, and were hard put to it to obtain a hearing. Many of them have been dragged from oblivion by the labours of a foreign scholar, Mr. Beer, whose *History of British Socialism* is one of the classics of modern research. But on turning his pages one cannot help asking, "who, nowadays, has ever heard of John Gray and John Francis Bray, of Ravenstone and Thompson and Edmonds and Minter Morgan? How many are there to whom even the great Robert Owen is much more than a name?"

It is therefore only necessary to indicate the general lines upon which most of these forgotten or neglected pioneers were working for the regeneration of society. One vital principle was common to all of them, to a greater or less degree. Wealth, they held, was the creation of labour and therefore the workers were justly entitled to the whole of what they produced. Capital itself was the product of labour, and the capitalist, as such, a parasite who diverted to his own benefit what he had not toiled to produce. Once ensure the equitable apportionment of wealth among its producers and there would be enough—and more than enough—for everybody.

Thomas Hodgskin, a retired naval officer, who on taking up the profession of journalism had by no means shed his pugnacity, counselled workers of all grades, from managers to scavengers, to fight, and go on fighting, till they had eliminated the enemy who sat still and drew dividends. This done, Hodgskin would have trusted to free competition—free for the first time after the elimination of the capitalist—among the workers themselves for the distribution of whatever wealth they might produce.

Hodgskin's candle did not burn very conspicuously, and flickered out altogether in the early thirties. Quite opposite to the spirit of this breezy apostle of class warfare is that of a few typically Romantic idealists, who dreamed of an order of things based on the last and greatest commandment, "love one another." Shelley was too much the kinsman of the dawn-mist and skylark ever to condescend to anything like a practicable policy. More definite had been the scheme of Spence, a shoemaker from Newcastle, a simple and amiable soul who had flourished, or rather languished in jail, under Mr. Pitt's Anti-Jacobin regime, and had dedicated to Citizen Stanhope a broadside modestly entitled *Something to the purpose, a receipt to make a Millennium*, the receipt in question being that every parish should pool its land among its members, raise all taxes on it, and live in

bliss and brotherly love ever afterwards. After Spence's death, which occurred in 1841, a handful of devoted followers continued to propagate his views under the name of Spencean philanthropists, but the idea died a natural death.

"A receipt to make a Millennium!" Never, some tender hearted souls must have deemed, was such a receipt more urgently needed than now, when an egotist and competitive civilization had succeeded in creating the exact reverse! Was it necessary always to fight greed and violence with violence? Might there not after all be sense and righteousness in the slogan of the old Puritan "Diggers":—

"To conquer them by love, stand in now, stand in now!"

Such at least was the spirit of another unconventional economist, William Thompson, of Cork, who looked for the coming of a free co-operative commonwealth, with all wealth equally distributed and every man a capitalist labourer. But he would not hear of force being employed, not if nine-tenths of the community were for his scheme and only one-tenth against it, partly because if force were once used by a majority it would be used again, and partly because "The unconvinced possessors of the real wealth would suffer more than the majority would gain, the sense of injustice neutralizing the pleasures of the majority, and increasing the pain of the privations of the oppressed".

But the gentle Thompson slipped into oblivion as easily as the combative Hodgskin. Men were more easily excited by the idea of reforming the franchise than by that of improving their own condition. But the genius of Robert Owen did at least succeed in making some impression on the imagination of his countrymen; partly because he was one of those men whose sheer energy and concentration of purpose can by no means be ignored, and partly, no doubt, because he not only theorized but most conspicuously put his theories into practice. At a time when tough-gutted employers were whining and protesting against the least attempt to restrain their licence in tyranny, Owen, in his mills at New Lanark, was demonstrating how humane and Christian principles could inspire the management, how a population that had been the terror of the district could be made happy and prosperous, and how, without the employees being sweated in any way, the mills could be made to pay handsomely.

Never was a life more wholly and unselfishly devoted to the good of mankind than this of Robert Owen, who might have been called the Saint Francis of the nineteenth century, but for one besetting weakness, his lack of humility and consequent lack of humour, which

made him the slave of any fixed idea to which he had once taken a fancy, and must often have made it difficult for his hearers to decide whether to acclaim him as a saviour of society or to flee from him as a bore. He was as completely innocent of guile as Fra Angelico ; he loved all mankind and all men, and he could never find it in his heart to believe that anybody he came across was not as good as himself. What manner of man, or big, lovable child he was, is apparent from his haste, on seeing an amorous couple committing what was then the awful offence of trespassing on their employer's private domain, to hide himself in order not to disturb their courtship. A belief in the original goodness of human nature was at the root of his philosophy.

In this he was a true child of the French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. He had the intuition to see that social philosophy must be based on psychology, and his own psychology follows that of Helvetius in making character almost entirely the result of environment. This, at any rate, is what it amounted to in practice, though in theory he did not altogether ignore the influence of heredity. He denied the existence of any form of free will, and he would never hear of his children being either rewarded or blamed, for fear of creating an impression that they were in some way responsible for their actions. Of course this was not what Owen, in his heart of hearts, really believed, nor what any determinist has at any time believed—what it amounted to was a subconscious conviction that the general mass of human beings were as clay for the free and benevolent potter, Robert Owen, to mould to his will.

As men are, so are communities, Owen's fundamental belief being expressed in his own emphatic words, "any general character, from the best to the worst, from the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any community, even to the world at large, by the application of the proper means."

In consequence Owen, in the true spirit of eighteenth century rationalism, was inclined to put his whole faith in the will of the legislator, of the benevolent despot: Lover of the people though he was, there was never a man who was at heart less of a democrat. This, as well as his lovable disposition, was no doubt the reason that Royalties and statesmen of the most conservative tendencies were inclined to look with so sympathetic an eye upon his schemes ; the Duke of Kent, Queen Victoria's father, was his friend ¹ and almost

¹ Not to speak of his debtor in this world, and his ghostly counsellor, *post mortem*.

his disciple ; the Grand Duke, who was to be distinguished, even among the Romanoffs, as the Iron Tsar, paid an interested visit to his factory ; and such was the innocence of Owen's heart that he aspired to make a proselyte of Metternich himself, who received him civilly enough. The Owen and the Metternich systems had this in common, that the people were to have their salvation thrust upon them from above.

But when we make all allowances for Owen's many limitations, we must confess that he, nearer than any man of this time, approached to a comprehensive solution of the problem created by the Industrial Revolution. Realizing, as he did, that civilization had got out of joint owing to the man-made change of man's environment, he prescribed as the remedy a corresponding change in man himself, individually and in the mass. Nothing would suffice but a regenerated man, and a new order of society. It followed that the most sacred beliefs, the most time-honoured institutions, must be brought to the reconstruction factory and, if necessary, scrapped.

Despite his touching faith in the goodness and reasonableness of his fellow men, Owen was aware that in stirring the deep and stagnant waters of accepted convention, he was inviting the fate of all saviours. But he was one of those men who do not know the meaning of compromise. Deliberately, in 1817, at the height of his fame and popularity, he proclaimed that no improvement of society was possible so long as men were divided from each other by competing dogmas ; that any religion that denied the fullest freedom of thought and fell short of loving one's neighbour as oneself, of whatever creed he might be, was a curse to mankind. Some clergymen in his audience, who evidently thought that the cap fitted, hissed so damnable a proclamation of heresy, and henceforth Owen found himself, even among the poor men he sought to help, an object of suspicion. Madame Tussaud, instructed by her Jesuit confessor, refused to degrade her company of waxworks, which included foulest murderers, by association with a philanthropist so tainted with infidelity. And in 1834 that elderly cynic Lord Melbourne, who probably believed in neither God nor Devil, objected to Owen's very presence as one of a deputation to the Home Office.

Scarcely less bold, in its way, was Owen's attempt to purge our financial system by abolishing all existing monetary standards, and frankly recognizing labour as the basis of values. In his model communities, and in the world as he wished to see it, the only medium of exchange would be a currency of paper notes representing so many

hours' labour, which could be exchanged at the stores for so many goods. To adopt this system would be to strike more effectively at the roots of capitalism than even the Bolsheviks have dared or thought of, for it would be the formal recognition of labour as the sole basis of value, and of the equal dignity of all forms of labour. "So long have you worked," says each note, "so much are you entitled to enjoy the fruits of labour." Owen himself, however, was to find that even in model communities a door was opened to swindling by the drawing of notes for labour that had either been scamped or never done at all. But then, even to his dying day, Owen could never realize that anybody was not as guileless and single-hearted as himself.

The benevolent despotism that he exercised over his mills at New Lanark was the one completely successful experiment that Owen undertook. His connection with this, which had achieved a European celebrity, he finally resigned in 1828. But long before this his restless genius had conceived of projects more daring. He proposed to get rid of unemployment and pauperism by the erection of model communities, each organized as a self-governing and co-operative unit, working in common, sharing the results of its labour on communistic principles, and sending its own representative to a central assembly—a community that harked back to the monastery as much as it looked forward to the soviet.

In these communities men and women were to live together in harmony and mutual affection. They were to be lozenge-shaped quadrangles of buildings, with the Church and school occupying the centre, very like monasteries in appearance. Like in spirit, too, for Owen added to his heresies by eliminating as far as possible that stumbling block in the way of all communistic schemes, the family. The idea of tying men and women together when their temperaments—which were formed for and not by them—made the bond a misery, was abhorrent to Owen. Besides, the building up of character was an operation of too much importance and delicacy to be left to parental caprice; from the earliest possible age, children were to be taken in charge by the community and brought up as its members.

When society is ordered on these principles and every member pulling his weight in the boat, the resources that mechanical power has placed at the disposal of mankind will, for the first time, become available for the purpose of making life sane and beautiful. Owen does not think that men will be required to do actual productive work

after the age of twenty-five, though to produce wealth will be as enjoyable as to consume it. Owen, in fact, visualizes a progression for his citizens of a new age not dissimilar from that prescribed for the Brahman by the ancient code of Manu. From 25 to 30 they will devote all but two hours of the day to study and social intercourse, from 30 to 40 they will govern the community, from 40 to 60 they will busy themselves with its foreign relations, and in travelling about in a beautiful and well-ordered world, in assurance of welcome and hospitality wherever they go.

Owen had never the least idea of forcing this scheme on the world by anything but persuasion and example. He believed, with that faith in reason so characteristic of his time, that men must love the highest when it has proved its claim so to be. Never did he lend himself to the promotion of class hatred. He devoted his own resources, with a recklessness that brought him to the verge of ruin, to setting up model communities which should prove an example and inspiration to a world gone wrong. One of these he founded in America, another, the first Communist experiment in England, in that same Motherwell, Lanark, which, almost a century later, sent the first communist member to a British Parliament. Both communities, and others which were subsequently started, proved failures.

Owen's ideas were too revolutionary and his temperament too guileless and uncritical to give him much chance of tangible success during the remainder of his long life. He was constantly busied with schemes for the betterment of mankind, now with a universal Trades Union, now with an Equitable Labour Exchange, and at last, in the evening of his days, with an endeavour to open up communication with ghosts. At least he can claim, though none of his own schemes lasted, to be the father of modern co-operation. But his influence is not to be measured by the success or failure of any definite scheme. As from Pisgah, he had seen the vision of a Promised Land, where the resources of civilization should be no longer wasted and turned to mutual destruction, but where life should have adapted itself sanely and beautifully to its self-created environment. He was destined to die in the wilderness, but of him most truly can it be said to-day, in the words of a fellow-visionary and philanthropist :—

“He is a presence to be felt and known.”

THE NEMESIS OF UNION

Once the military and economic stress of the French war was relaxed, it must have been evident that the sole excuse for the Anti-Jacobin reaction, with its martial law conditions, had disappeared, and that the Constitution must be allowed to develop freely. Even within the ranks of the still dominant Tory party a new, progressive spirit was beginning to be manifest not only in thought but in statesmanship. The middle class, which had increased so greatly in numbers and wealth during the Industrial Revolution, was not only dominant in the Whig and Radical parties, but had begun to leaven the Tories themselves. After the seven years of reaction from the battle of Waterloo to the death of Castlereagh, the most powerful influence in the Cabinet became that of Canning.

Theoretically the old Anti-Jacobin had not receded from the position he had occupied in the nineties ; he was a staunch lover of the Constitution, but he had come to take more and more the dynamic or Liberal view of it, except when it was a question of reforming the franchise. Canning, like the other reforming Tories, argued that the existing system, though logically indefensible, did in practice secure the maximum of ordered liberty. To reform it would be to open the floodgates of democracy, and Canning, with the advanced section of the Tories who supported him, was by no means a democrat, though to some extent, and particularly in foreign policy, a Liberal.

After 1822 the spirit of reform was fairly in the ascendant, and the pace was set by broad-minded middle class men like Huskisson, President of the Board of Trade, and Peel, an opportunist in the best sense of the word, who combined the profession of ultra-Tory principles with a readiness to move with the times at almost any expense of theoretical consistency. The whole fiscal system, which was the legacy of an age of comparatively petty commercial transactions, was overhauled and simplified ; numberless vexatious duties were scrapped, more were drastically reduced, and the Navigation Laws, once the bulwark of our commercial system, were so relaxed as to be of little hindrance to our now rapidly expanding shipping. The criminal code was humanized in a manner that would have rejoiced the heart of Romilly, could he have lived to see it, and the war-laws that had prohibited the combination of workmen were swept out of existence. Even the tax on imported corn, which was almost sacred to the landowners who were the traditional support

of Toryism, was about to be modified by the imposition of a sliding scale, when Lord Liverpool, who for seventeen years had been Premier, died, and the progressive and reactionary sections of the Tory party split apart. A brief coalition between the progressives and the Whigs was ended by the death of Canning and the incompetence of his successor, Lord Goderich, and the reactionary section of the Tories found themselves again entrenched in power under the Duke of Wellington.

However, the tide was now running irresistibly in favour of Reform, and Sidney Smith's comparison of the Iron Duke to an old woman trying to keep back the sea with a mop was a singularly happy one. Even at the dawn of Pitt's career, nearly fifty years ago, it had been recognized that the franchise was hopelessly out of date, and its obsolescence now was so obvious as to be a crying scandal. Not only were the mass of the people against a system which shut them out from any sort of voice in their own destinies, but the middle class was up in arms against the almost unlimited power it conferred on the landowning aristocracy, and the exclusion of the new industrial towns from any sort of representation whatever.

A definite cleavage was now beginning to be manifest in the ranks of the reformers. The extreme left or Radical wing, which included the Benthamites, were for Colonel Rainborow's old expedient of a universal suffrage. But the Whigs, who were becoming more and more definitely the party of the middle class, were at least as much afraid of the mob as they were of the reactionaries, and they were perhaps conscious of a certain inconsistency between the advocacy of a bourgeois economics and the power of a proletariat who would certainly not for long pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the capitalist. Their principal, but not altogether unwavering advocate of Reform, was Lord Grey, one of the old Foxite seceders, who during the nineties had risked his liberty by an advocacy of Pitt's reforming principles which Pitt considered inopportune, and who was a conspicuously respectable member of a powerful Northern family—the worthy progenitor of nineteen children. The younger generation of Whig reformers was led by a scion of the House of Russell, whose name was sufficient safeguard against any measure unduly calculated to inconvenience the possessors of this world's riches. Under such auspices Reform became a much less alarming proposition than when it was associated with mob-orators and inheritors of the Jacobin tradition.

Nevertheless, the old Tory government was back, seemingly more

impregnable than ever in the support of rotten and nomination borough members, whose opinions were those of their patrons and altered not. But the English House of Commons was never quite so unrepresentative in practice as it ought to have been by all human calculations. The spirit of the Constitution, undefinable yet potent, was felt within its walls, and when the heart of the nation was deeply moved no artificial barriers could prevent its will from finding expression. The tide was coming in, and neither the mop of Mrs. Partington nor the sword of the Iron Duke could hold it back. But it might be possible by a little judicious Whig engineering to prevent it from rising to those neat and flourishing middle-class villas that had sprung up so dangerously near the high-water mark.

It was evident from the very start of the Wellington ministry that a policy of reaction could no longer be maintained. The Dissenting interest was very powerful among the middle class, and when Lord John Russell proposed to do away with the last remnants of Restoration bigotry in the shape of the Test and Corporation Acts—which though practically a dead letter were none the less a source of irritation—the Government had to pocket their Church principles with such grace as they could. But the decisive blows were to come from beyond British shores—the first from Ireland, the second from France.

English statesmanship with regard to Ireland has not only been characterized by a most un-English tyranny, but by a singular clumsiness. The authors of the Act of Union may perhaps plead at the bar of history that they knew not what they did, and that their blindness to that Act's fatal consequences extended to their own interests as much as to their victim's. In allowing Ireland to be represented so generously in the British Parliament, they were placing a weapon in her hand that was bound, sooner or later, to prove irresistible, provided only that Ireland could keep her own patriotism alive. For in a Parliament in which parties were so fluctuating and so keenly opposed, it was certain that a solid block of Irish members would be able sooner or later to dictate their own terms.

This consummation, however, might well have seemed indefinitely remote. Not only—owing to the repudiation of the understanding on which Ireland had been induced to give such consent as she did to the Union—was a Catholic electorate represented by Protestants only, but under the corrupt system that obtained, the great landlords were able to drive their unfortunate tenants to the poll under

threat of eviction. But when even the logical and consistent tyranny of Prussia and Russia was powerless to quell the free spirit of Poland, it was not likely that Irish patriotism was going to be quenched by such very half-hearted tyrants as modern Englishmen were at their worst.

If we have been tempted to describe the condition of England after the Napoleonic war as Hell for the greater part of her population, we should have to find some word of more infernal implication to apply to that of the native Irish. Population was multiplying with the fatal rapidity that comes of utter recklessness, and the resources of the country, minimized as they were by inefficient and obsolete methods of cultivation, were less and less sufficient to maintain them. The land system was about as bad as it could be ; the landlord was separated from the peasant by a hierarchy of middlemen, each of whom screwed and evicted with pitiless frequency. Rents were high not only on account of fierce competition, but from the necessity of providing a profit for an ascending scale of extortions. The landlords, largely owing to the fact of Parliament and society having migrated to England, became more and more absentees, and steadily drained what little wealth Ireland could produce. At one time they multiplied small holdings in order to get voters and then, when the franchise was restricted, set to work clearing and consolidating their estates by wholesale evictions.

As for the people, they had touched the lowest conceivable depth of human misery. They lived for the most part in improvised mud shanties unfit for the very pigs that shared them. They went about in indescribable rags—it was a grim joke in those days that an Irishman's coat, which was not infrequently exchanged for that of a scarecrow, was a lot of holes sewn together. They were lucky if they could get a bite of meat at Christmas—the pig was sold to pay the rent—the potato, which was their staple food, was sometimes accompanied with a little milk, sometimes eaten dry. And the potato is of all vegetable food the most uncertain and liable to disease. There were constant partial failures of the crop—rehearsals on a small scale of awful impending tragedy of the Black Famine—and then a varying proportion of the people would die. In certain months of the year the peasants would leave their holdings and take to the trade of begging. Many emigrated to England, flooding the labour market and depressing wages. Naturally, where everybody was in reach of starvation, a pitiless brutality was displayed in the struggle for existence. Family feuds and vendettas were everywhere

THE TRIUMPH OF THE BOURGEOISIE

That blow was soon to be delivered from the outside, for now the curtain was to ring up on the second act of the European tragedy that had begun at Vienna and was to close—not without the prospect of a sequel—at Versailles. The key of the European situation was at Paris, for between Anglo-Saxondom, on the one hand, and the Holy Three despotisms on the other, lay the doubtful factor of Latin Europe, whose attitude might ultimately turn the scale between Liberal and despotic principles. With Spain moribund and Italy beneath the yoke, the only Latin power that counted, for the nonce, was France, and France, though endowed with a constitution, had showed every disposition, under her restored Bourbon Kings, of ranging herself on the absolutist side. Unfortunately for the reactionaries, the new French King, Charles X, tried to force back the hands of the clock too violently. The French middle class took alarm when their monarch, who like many superannuated rakes was exceedingly pious, delivered over France and her constitution to the mercy of Jesuits and Ultramontanes. There were, for three July days of 1830, fighting and fraternizing in the Paris streets, and then His Majesty, in unmolested dignity, lumbered away in his coach *en route* for England.

Another French Revolution was now an accomplished fact, but this time one exactly suited to the tastes of respectable Englishmen. For it was the middle class that had triumphed; a dreadfully uninspiring elderly gentleman was put upon the throne, and a constitution framed on the best Whig model. France had definitely ranged herself on the side of Liberalism, and it was of so respectable a brand as to cool the ardour of the three despots for a new crusade against this dangerous defaulter. But it was soon evident that a fire had been kindled that all the engines of Divine Right might be wanted to put out. The middle class of industrial and Catholic Belgium had waxed fat enough since the war to kick against the Dutch masters with whom the Congress of Vienna had thoughtfully provided them.

This new revolution, which was supported by the militant sympathy of French public opinion, at last roused the despots to the urgency of the peril. The Tsar Nicholas, the most consistent and single-hearted of them all, was preparing to vindicate the settlement of Vienna. Prussia was mobilizing, France was prepared to support

Belgium. European war threatened ; but now the Holy Three found their energies paralysed by the nemesis of their Polish crime. The Poles had proved even harder than the Irish for a suzerain power to come to any stable compromise with, and the generous Alexander had given up his Liberal treatment of them in despair. On the news of the Paris revolution they dreamed of their old ally France coming to their support, and they flamed into rebellion. The Tsar's forces, attacked at once by the enemy in front and the cholera from behind, had all they could do to stamp Polish liberty into the dust, while their two crowned accomplices in crime stood anxiously by, fearful of the conflagration invading their own borders. Germany and Italy tugged at their chains, but lacking as yet a prosperous middle class, failed to break them. East of the Rhine and south of the Alps the bourgeois revolution—for such in effect it was—was crushed, but in crushing it the despots had allowed France and her natural ally, little Belgium, to slip out of their orbit.

On England these momentous events had the effect of an electric shock. In the counties nearest to France, the wretched and starving peasants—it was no out-of-the-way occurrence for them to be found actually dead under the hedgerows—broke out into pathetic rebellion for a living wage of half-a-crown a day, and the abolition of the hated parish cart, to which men and women were harnessed like animals. On one occasion the tricolour actually made its appearance in Kent, along with the black flag. In the North, the newly legalized Trades Unions were closing their ranks for action. Cobbett was employing all his journalistic genius to arouse the proletariat and concentrate its energies on the burning question of Reform ; Place was devoting his matchless faculty of organization to the same object. The more respectable classes, with the exception of a small minority of confirmed reactionaries, were delighted at the spectacle of a revolution that followed so closely the precedent of our own more or less glorious performance of 1689. The news, as it happened, came just in the middle of an election, and the county constituencies fell like ninepins before the now jubilant opposition.

If any man could have saved the Tory situation, that man was certainly not the victor of Waterloo, who was as unversed as nearly all men of his profession are in the methods of constitutional government. Even for his good deeds he got no credit. He exasperated the Holy Three by his determinedly pacific attitude towards both the French and Belgian revolutions—exasperated them the more because they had regarded him as one of the main props of their system and

had cherished visions of the redcoats taking up their position again on the allied right, on the well-remembered ground of Flanders. But Wellington, through sheer clumsiness, managed to insert in the new King William IV's speech on the opening of Parliament, a passage into which hostile critics could read a threat of English intervention. In the nervous state of the country this was bound to raise a storm against the government that no explanation could lay, and the indefatigable Place was actually organizing direct middle-class action against a war policy by the refusal of taxes. And to crown it all, the Duke must needs select this very moment for blurting out an uncompromising panegyric of the existing system of government, and for banging the door on even the most moderate proposal of reform. When he sat down, he whispered to a colleague, with soldierly naiveté, "I have not said too much, have I?" He had, very decidedly, and the temper of the nation was now sufficiently near revolution point to find expression even within the walls of Parliament. The Tory government crashed, and Lord Grey and his Whigs came in, pledged to reform.

Curiously enough, the best apology for the old system is supplied by the manner of its fall. For as in the days of Sacheverell and of Fox's Martyrs, it was proved that when once the nation was deeply stirred, no party in the Commons could withstand its will. The Whigs brought in a Reform Bill framed on unexpectedly bold lines, for which the nation had probably to thank that great constitutional statesman, "Radical Jack," the Earl of Durham. The whole system of rotten boroughs was swept away, and a uniform franchise adopted which included the shopkeepers in the towns. But nothing was further from the minds of men like Grey and Russell than to adopt the proposal of a really democratic franchise, which should make citizens out of artisans and agricultural labourers; where such folk had already a vote, as at Preston and Westminster, it was taken away from them, and indeed the principle of the great Reform Bill could hardly have been better summarized than in the words "no capital, no vote".

However the non-capitalist class was far from realizing these things. The unexpectedly bold nature of the Bill had so surprised the country that workers and employers alike acted as if the one thing necessary for political salvation was to force through the Bill, the whole Bill, and nothing but the Bill, in the teeth of the now desperate minority of squires and borough-holders. Throughout the length and breadth of the country passion rose to heights unprecedented since

the days of the Long Parliament. Grave lords and commoners forgot all decorum, and stormed at each other like madmen. The Bill was brought in, the second reading carried by one vote, an amendment carried against it in committee, and amid a wild uproar in both Houses, the guns were heard announcing the King's approach to dissolve Parliament. This time even the electorate of the unreformed Parliament was fairly stampeded, and despite all the anomalies and corruption of the franchise, the Whigs romped home by a majority of over a hundred.

The game was now up, but it was a question whether the Tories would recognize this in time to prevent a national disaster. They were now driven to their last ditch in the House of Lords, where, under the leadership of the Iron Duke, they determined to fight it out to the last. The Commons passed a second Reform Bill, the Lords threw it back in their faces. Then what might have been the first symptoms of revolution began to manifest themselves. Riots broke out all over the country, Nottingham Castle was burnt and the Bristol mob, who had assuredly little enough to gain by enfranchising the middle class, expressed their fury by demolishing the jail and inflicting a fatal injury on their native city by destroying one side of that masterpiece of late seventeenth century architecture, Queen's Square.

There was nothing for it but to recommend the King, in the event of further aristocratic obstruction, to swamp the Upper Chamber by a creation of Whig peers. Even Grey hesitated to take such a step, and when Grey's stern Northern will was at last fixed, the King, himself a friend to Reform, drew back and summoned Wellington to form a ministry. It was hopeless, and the situation was now dangerous in the extreme. Even the memory of Waterloo was no protection for the Duke's person and windows against the now infuriated mob; Place was organizing a run on the banks; at any moment bloody rebellion might have broken out. The Duke, with the sense of fact that never deserted him and the strength of a true patriot, recognized, as Walpole had recognized in a less urgent crisis, that this dance would no further go. He gave up his active opposition to the Bill and a majority of the Lords sullenly acquiesced in the inevitable. The Reform Bill became law, the threat of revolution passed away, and the mob was left to discover at leisure for whom it had pulled the chestnuts out of the fire.

THE TRIUMPH OF STEAM

More momentous changes were taking place than those that could be accomplished by Acts of Parliament. In the memorable year, 1880, an incident took place more significant of the dawn of a new age than English reforms and Paris revolutions. A new railway between Liverpool and Manchester was being opened, and no less a personage than the Iron Duke had come down to ride in a procession of trains. Another great man, who had just resigned from the cabinet, William Huskisson, with the formal courtesy of his age, had taken advantage of a wayside halt for water to stroll across to his sometime colleague's carriage, and stood leisurely chatting on the permanent way. Just then one of the new engines came tearing through the station, and there lay Huskisson, one of his legs half severed from his body, his blood dimming the shine of the new-laid rails. Did the old Duke, who had at Waterloo replied to Lord Uxbridge's "By God, my leg's shot off" with "By God, so it is", realize that a force had come into existence more ruthless than that of gunpowder and more incalculable in its effects?

For the coming of the railway ushered in the final and most drastic stage of the Industrial Revolution. It not only linked up the whole country, and speeded the operations of commerce in a way never dreamed of before, but it represented, in the most decisive fashion imaginable, the triumph of the new mechanical power, steam. Henceforth it was only a question, with our middle-class captains of industry, of how quickly and by what improved processes the new power might be applied. As early as 1831, the question of steam carriages careering along high roads at 10 miles an hour, had been gone into by a Parliamentary committee, and though the report was favourable, nothing seems to have come of it. But the pace of industry was set not by members of Parliament, but by the like of the Mr. G. O. A. Head of Stalybridge, drawn in Disraeli's *Coningsby*, a millowner of uncouth manners, who could say, even of Manchester, "She is behind the times, sir, and that won't do in this age." As the old Puritan had desired to be right with God, even so panted the new industrialist to be in the van of material progress.

The self-made capitalist had come into his own, and his triumph was merely registered by the Reform Bill. The great millowners and ironmasters of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were a hard-headed and usually hard-hearted breed of men, who had

fought their way to fortunes by sheer cut-throat competition, and with the prospect of bankruptcy never very remote. Of education they had little, of culture none at all. In the Greek quality of magnificence, that had so conspicuously shone in the merchant princes, the Canynges and Jacques Coeurs of the early Renaissance, they had no part. On the other hand they were just as free from the splendid vices of that time as they were from the snobbishness which was destined to transform the Victorian middle class. They were eminently respectable, conspicuously independent. Such vices as they had were rather of the negative order, lack of sympathy, lack of imagination, all that is implied in Ricardo's conception of an economic man. Their ethics were those of the Black Hole, "every man for himself and the weakest to the wall."

How far the old Puritan discipline, which had held peculiar sway over the middle class, was responsible for this state of mind can never be precisely determined. We must not forget that the English squires who enclosed the commons and the Scottish chieftains who evicted their clansmen displayed just as keen an eye to the main chance as that of the first factory owners. But what we miss about the squires is the peculiar austerity that marks these industrial pioneers. The squire was at least as much of a sportsman as a producer, he loved his bottle and the fellowship of his neighbours, but for the typical industrialist the quantity of things produced and not the quality of life was the supreme end, to which he was ready to sacrifice himself and everybody connected with him. In the eyes of his economists, productive capital was that which went to produce more capital, unproductive capital that which went to beautify or sweeten life. As the old Puritans had knocked glass out of church windows and statues from their niches, so these new iconoclasts of progress treated all that did not directly conduce to the maximum of production at minimum of cost. They had no time to philosophize or look ahead, they had faith, a faith as blind and trusting as that of the sternest saint, in the providence that orders all things together for good for economic men. Let Mammon arise and let his enemies be scattered !

The spirit of every age tends to realize itself in matter. Just as Athens and Rome, just as Avebury and the Pyramids, gave form to the thoughts and dreams of those who raised them, so did the new towns, that were springing up in the North and Midlands with mushroom rapidity, body forth the spirit of the Industrial Revolution. With the coming of steam, it was no longer necessary to string out the factories along the rivers, it was more economical to concentrate

production in towns conveniently near to the coalfields and the sources or ports from which came the raw material.

Nobody had any object in building these towns but to get some sort of shelter run up, as quickly as possible, beneath which the men who served the machines might get a little brief sleep to recruit their energies. As all was done by competition and on a basis of quick returns, not only beauty but health and ordinary convenience were allowed to go by the board. Such a thing as intelligent town-planning was undreamed of. The unhappy "hands" were crowded together, deprived of sunlight, breathing smoke into their lungs, in the stench of open drains, and without their eyes being able to rest on any but the meanest and most restricted prospect—for even the sky was darkened. The resources of the churches were for a time inadequate to cope with the new situation; education seemed likely to wait indefinitely upon sectarian agreement, and the lot of the average worker seemed destined to be one both godless and illiterate.

No doubt this state of things was partly transitional, and throughout the century a progressive improvement was destined to take place. But the essential soullessness of the towns in which the majority of the population were eventually to be housed, was not to be altered even by the tardy provision of parks and public works and adequate drains. Not by the wildest stretch of imagination can we visualize some future Cook organizing tours to the art cities of Lancashire, nor the Five Towns as being hallowed by any more romantic association than that with Mr. Arnold Bennett's novels.

And this phenomenon of the city without a soul is of the gravest import for the future of civilization, for if men form their cities, men are also formed by them.

12

AN EMPIRE REBORN

During the fifty years that followed the loss of our American colonies, enthusiasm for empire was in abeyance. A not unnatural revulsion of feeling had swept over the Mother Country; the miserable fragments of our overseas possessions seemed hardly worth the trouble of keeping, and Whig statesmanship at the end of the war had been within an ace of throwing away Canada after the United States. Not only had the pride of empire received a deadly blow, but the whole theory on which it had been based had fallen

into discredit. The idea of a cunningly devised system of commercial exclusiveness and co-operation, regulated from London, had not only broken down in practice, but had been branded with the stigma of economic unsoundness by Adam Smith. In the only sense in which men had hitherto thought of using the word empire, Blake expressed the literal truth for England, when he cried,

“ Empire is no more, and now the lion and the wolf shall cease.”

The lion of despotic dominion had been wounded to the death at Saratoga, and the wolf of commercial greed had been coaxed to more profitable hunting grounds by Adam Smith.

Without any Panglossery of patriotic optimism it is allowable for us to say that the American catastrophe proved a blessing in the long run. Only by dint of such a shock was it possible so to purge our minds of the old conception of empire as to enable us to embrace another so unique and daring as that of a free Commonwealth of Nations. It was the fact that we had lost our old Empire and were resigned to the loss that enabled us to find the new.

All this, of course, needs qualification. It is at no time true to say that this country or its statesmen lost all pride in or care for our overseas possessions. In India we had added to our laurels during the war that lost us America, and with Pitt's Government of India Act we were entering upon a new epoch of imperial development and consolidation. There was also much patriotic pride in our retention of Canada, the scene of such glorious achievements and the home of multitudes of loyalists whom, with as much unwisdom as brutality, the Americans had harried out of the land into whose useful citizens they and their descendants might easily have been converted. And it is characteristic of John Bull that he may instinctively keep a tight grip upon the very possessions he professes to despise.

To some extent the idea of a free Empire had always been the natural heritage of Englishmen, and where they had crossed the seas the spirit of the Constitution migrated with them, giving birth to more or less representative institutions. There was this also that had distinguished them even in the strictest days of the Mercantile system, that they went abroad not only to trade but also to live, they gravitated naturally towards the temperate climates where there was a less immediate prospect of opulence than in tropic islands, but where white men could plant homes and ultimately nations.

Nothing is more remarkable than the way in which, without in the least realizing what she was about, England fulfilled her destiny of building up a second Empire greater than the first. This stupendous

achievement was to all appearances thrust upon her against her will and policy. No statesman or thinker who flourished at the opening of the nineteenth century pinned his faith to such an ideal. Few people at home were particularly interested in colonies when the nation was struggling for her life against France, except at the beginning of the war when Pitt and Dundas were confirming the aversion of ordinary Englishmen from colonial ambitions, by sending armies to their death amid the swamps of San Domingo. Conquered possessions were returned to the enemy, both at the Peace of Amiens and the final settlement, with a light-hearted generosity that might have made Chatham turn in his grave. And yet the end of the war found us established on the Australian continent and in the gateway of South Africa, with New Zealand in our grasp whenever we might think it worth the taking, with the complete conquest of India now a certainty, and with a chain of naval stations and calling ports that might well have been selected with the foreknowledge of steam and the Suez Canal. We are reminded of the old fairy stories where the clever and ambitious elder sons are sent away empty, where the fool of the family blunders into a royal marriage and half the kingdom.

Two decisive advantages we possessed, however little consciousness we might have had of them. One was in the very nature of our people, in the spirit of adventure that drove them forth, often for ends material enough, across the seas, and, most important of all, in the constitutional tradition inherited from the English Common Law, that impelled them to form communities of free men, and directed them instinctively to those temperate parts of the globe where the white races could strike root. The second was in our command of the seas, which gave us a perpetual highway to the remotest shores, and enabled us to close that highway to our enemies. At a time when our rivals in colonial expansion were actually at war with us, this had the effect of putting the unoccupied regions of the world, and such hostile possessions as we were capable of holding, at our mercy. Thus, however blind and ill-directed our statesmanship, we could hardly help, with such a decisive advantage as we possessed, winning most of the tricks in the game.

Napoleon was certainly more alive to the advantages of imperial expansion than any of our statesmen. Towards Egypt, India, the hinterland of the United States, the Mississippi Valley, even towards distant Australia, he cast longing eyes. But he was as powerless to transport his armies across the seven seas as he was to cross the

Channel, though a French expedition, bent ostensibly on scientific exploration, was allowed, by the chivalrous sufferance of our naval authorities, to proceed unmolested to the Australian coast, and even obtained generous help from the Englishmen on the spot. Thus while Napoleon was bleeding himself to death for a Continental empire that he could not hold, England was quietly and even reluctantly possessing herself and her people of one vaster and more durable. But of this, the most important result of all, histories of the war, even from a British standpoint, took little account. The guns of Waterloo made more inspiring reading than the convict ships of Sydney.

To attempt even to summarize the story of that strange expansion would be hopeless within the limits of our space. The most we can do is to bear in mind the spiritual tendencies that, along with the fact of our sea power, made it inevitable. And yet, in the important instance of South Africa, we must attribute the foundation of our supremacy to the sheer good luck of Cape Town being, for the nonce, the most important half-way house on the route to India. Even so we had no hesitation in handing it back to its Dutch owners on the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens, and at the final settlement, with that wise but almost quixotic generosity that we displayed throughout, paid in cash down for what we had already won.

As for Australia, that continent, as everybody knows, struck us at first in no better light than as a convenient dumping ground for convicts. Transportation was then a humanely meant way, not altogether new, of removing these poor devils, who were often more sinned against than sinning, from the murderous squalor of English prison life to where they would presumably have a chance to expiate their crimes by useful labour, and ultimately to make a fresh start in a new land. It was a strange and melancholy beginning for a mighty Commonwealth, and the project of turning convicts into useful citizens proved an unrelieved failure, though it did produce a harvest of ruffinism far into the nineteenth century and sensibly retarded the coming of free institutions. But perhaps it was the most practicable way of marking out the claim of the Anglo-Saxon race, and the convict element of the population, despite overlong recruiting from the Mother Country, left no enduring trace. The convicts did at least supply labour, of a sort, in the process of expanding the few coast settlements into a new land of promise for the white man, and the presence of the governor, with his staff and garrison, helped to make the land safe for free emigrants.

The apathy of Britain with regard to the new Australian lands must not be exaggerated. John Bull, if he was slow to take possession himself, was quick enough when it was a question of forestalling somebody else. When Napoleon's designs on Australia were suspected, the English government was quite alive to the necessity of forestalling him by a formal annexation, and when, as late as 1836, the French were preparing to use Tahiti as a jumping off station for New Zealand, they found that the inevitable Union-Jack-hoisting expedition had got there just before them. In South Africa this apparent attitude of dog-in-the-manger was particularly *en evidence* at the end of the thirties, when we discovered for the first time an insistent proprietary interest in Natal, for the sole and sufficient reason that the Boers, trekking to escape from our rule in the South, had found their way there.

But during the half century between the American War and the Reform Bill nothing like a colonial policy was adopted by those in authority. There was not even any very marked disposition to profit by the lessons of the great revolt, and be content with those bonds which though as thin as gossamer are as strong as links of iron. During the long Tory ascendancy, any truckling to democratic principles would have savoured overmuch of Jacobinism. The lesson of the American War was, for the average Tory, not that the colonies ought to be granted their freedom within the Empire—for an Empire based on such apparently anarchical principles would have seemed to them worse than no empire at all—but rather that sooner or later the colonies, like children, would get past the necessity of being governed and set up house for themselves. As for the Radicals, most of them regarded colonies as an unmitigated nuisance, and grudged every penny spent on them. Bentham, the hard-headed, had gone so far as not only to want to get rid of the colonies, but of the navy too, except one or two ships kept for the purpose of hunting down pirates! And yet we must remember that the first Earl of Durham was not only Radical Jack, but also one of the first to conceive of a British Commonwealth of Nations.

One fortunate exception to this Bourbonism of our colonial authorities is supplied by Pitt's treatment of Canada. Perhaps we had some subconscious instinct which impelled us to display an unwonted wisdom in the retention of this most important relic of our American Dominions. At any rate, we here showed a faculty of conciliation, even before the American revolt, strikingly in contrast with our policy towards the older colonies. As early as 1774 we had

made a wise concession to our new French subjects in their string of settlements along the St. Lawrence river, by giving them not a representative assembly, but what they appreciated a great deal more, their own code of civil law. And then Pitt, in 1791, before his alarm at the French Revolution had had time to choke his early Liberalism, divided French Lower Canada from the English province of Ontario—devotedly loyal because so largely recruited from loyalists—and had given to each a constitution based on the same principle of separation of powers as had inspired that of the United States, with a government dependent on the Crown and not on the elected Lower House of the legislature. This settlement was no doubt a makeshift piece of work, and with the children of two nations living side by side under a constitutional theory already outworn, problems were left outstanding that would require some blood letting before they could be solved. But when next blood flowed in Canada, Frenchmen and Englishmen were standing loyally shoulder to shoulder against American invasion, an invasion triumphantly repelled, but stained by the wanton brutality of sacking Toronto. This had no small effect in creating a sense of Canadian patriotism, and a solidarity with the country whose troops would signally avenge the outrage against a colonial city by executing the like upon Washington itself. It may be added that one important factor of Canadian loyalty was undoubtedly the chance that made our commercial system, that had weighed so heavily on other colonies, work to her almost unrelieved advantage, and that England appeared to her less as the author of restrictions than of bounties.

With the coming of the Emotional Revival and the renaissance of Evangelical sentiment a new factor entered into our colonial policy. A great wave of philanthropy was sweeping over the country, though it was a philanthropy that fear and greed stopped strangely short when it was a question of applying it to the poor of Britain. But as far as it went, it was perfectly genuine and represented an advance in civilized feeling that might have seemed miraculous to those who were old enough to remember the unfeeling spirit of the Prose Age. Rousseau had done more than any other man to encourage admiration for primitive and emotional peoples, and the Wesleys had taught that the important thing about a man is not the colour of his skin but the state of his soul, for which Christ died, and which in His eyes is infinitely precious. How powerfully the new Evangelical impulse had contributed, along with rationalist philanthropy, to the ending of the slave trade, and how it affected the policy even of worldlings like Castlereagh, has already been told.

The end of the eighteenth century saw a remarkable quickening of missionary activity, in which all Christian sects had a part, and in which the Church of England, or her Evangelical wing, showed an unwonted willingness to co-operate with Dissenters. To every part of the world, but most particularly to those that acknowledged the sovereignty of King George, set forth single-hearted though often narrow-minded enthusiasts, burning to fulfil their Master's command to preach the gospel to all nations. The extent of their influence can hardly be exaggerated. With a capacity for pioneer adventure as much English as Christian, they pushed out into the unknown and unexplored, they insinuated themselves into the confidence of barbarous and primitive peoples, and often, by sheer force of character, succeeded in ruling them like petty spiritual princes.

These good men—for good most of them were according to their lights—were no doubt responsible for an immense amount of harm, and they were at least partially instrumental in bringing about those two chief Imperial setbacks of the nineteenth century, the great Boer Trek and the Indian Mutiny. Their brains were often as small as their hearts were big; they were guilty of such absurdities as the forcing of European clothes on natives of the tropics, and with childish intolerance they would misrepresent,¹ often in scurrilous terms, such venerable faiths as that of the Hindus. They were often reckless and unjust in taking the part of their new or prospective converts against the white settlers, and would represent the most bloodthirsty of aggressive savages in the light of injured innocents. But when all is said that the devil's advocate can bring forward against these men of God, civilization has to thank them for inculcating a view of the more backward races that would have amazed those patriotic subjects of Queen Anne, who went into transports of joy because we had conquered the right of supplying South America with slaves. Even the lowest of natives was no longer to be looked on as a chattel, or as the natural prey of Caucasian violence and greed. He was a man and a brother, and, inasmuch as the white settler or trader wronged one of these, he wronged Christ Himself. Such a faith was never more called for than in a time when capitalist enterprise was beginning a ruthless and heartless exploitation of natives everywhere, destroying them body and soul with spirits and opium, filching their land, sticking at no chicanery and no aggression so long as these could be made to pay.

It was the strength of the Christian impulse that was responsible

¹ And still do, to judge by certain of their publications.

for pushing to a conclusion the movement against slavery under the British flag. In 1833, under the auspices of the Whig majority that swept the country after the Reform Bill, slavery itself went the way of the slave trade, though it is perhaps characteristic of the worthy gentlemen who carried this reform that they showed much less enthusiasm in dealing with the veiled slavery of industry at home, and that they were careful to pay the owners as compensation not much more than half the value of their human property. Beneficent as this reform was in itself, there was no doubt that it dealt a heavy blow at our West Indian possessions, and the gradual adoption of free-trade principles exposed these and other tropical colonies to the full competition of foreign slave labour. Accordingly, these colonies, which the eighteenth century had valued so highly, became of little profit, and the main interest of the Empire shifts to the white communities in more congenial climates. West Indian and West African prosperity had depended largely upon an elaborate system of commercial exclusion, and with the passing of the old order the control of the tropics became, for a while, a problem of minor interest, a fact that the cynical may hold to have contributed to our generosity at the end of the Napoleonic War.

It was in our new possession of the Cape Colony that the missionary influence is seen at its best and worst. We had taken over the Dutch settlement, with neither more nor less regard for the wishes of the inhabitants than other members of the Vienna Conference were wont to display in such transferences, with the sole object of commanding the ocean highway to India. With the same end in view we had fastened on Mauritius. But having once got a foothold on the coastland of South Africa, it was impossible that we could turn back or limit our responsibilities. To the North spread the vast plateau grasslands, inviting settlement, and from the North were pressing down the warlike and aggressive black peoples lumped together under the general designation of Bantu, which means, literally, "men."

Moreover, it was one thing to establish a legal sovereignty over the Dutch farmers who were already on the spot, but quite another thing to govern them. They were a pastoral and intensely independent folk, living in farms, separated often by a long journey's distance from the next white habitation, capable on very slight provocation of taking to their waggons and faring yet further into the limitless veldt, and only asking to be let alone in patriarchal simplicity. They had been troublesome and intractable subjects even for Holland,

and were not likely to be any more tolerant of British interference, though so long as the government left them to their own devices, they were not likely to bother much about a nominal allegiance. But even if the government would have been willing to let the Boers, as they were called, alone, there were the missionaries to be reckoned with, and South Africa soon came to be looked upon as a field especially white—or perhaps we should say black—for the Christian harvest.

Now the Boer was a sturdy Protestant, but that did not prevent him from protesting with peculiar vigour against even the most godly interference between him and the natives. He was, in his own eyes, one of the chosen people, an Israelite whose mission it was to drive out or enslave the inhabitants of a new Promised Land. He was a rough master and inclined to be free with his sjambok, but his nature was not unkindly, and he was by all accounts more humane to his blacks than the average West Indian or Virginian planter. But as for admitting the native to the rights of a man and the affection of a brother, he would sooner embark on another exodus into the unknown than countenance any such doctrine.

The missionaries, with the best intentions, followed the flag and began to work with great apparent success among the natives. Now the Boers had already had experience of missionaries before the coming of the English, when one of the leaders of the devoted Moravian community had descended upon them, and despite his unimpeachable Protestantism and the sufferings he had already undergone for that faith, made the Cape too hot to hold him. But the English missionaries, many of them plain working men, came in great force and with ample financial backing, and the missionary societies at home were now a power in the land which no government could ignore. The evangelists went to work with devoted energy, they not only acted as the pioneers of civilization but also as explorers. Going about generally unarmed, they performed miracles in the way of conciliating the most formidable savages, one of them being received with honour by the King of the dreaded Matabele. And they went to work manfully at the task of obtaining equal justice for the black man at the hands of the rough and often predatory white; they set their faces in particular against the curse of slavery.

It was all very human and noble in intention, but unfortunately the missionaries were mostly ill-informed and narrow-minded enthusiasts, who went about their task with a minimum of tact and commonsense. They infuriated the Boers by treating the blacks as

injured innocents, which they were very far from being, and backing them blindly and on all occasions against the whites. Some of them even carried their principles so far as to take wives to themselves from among the Hottentots. And the missionaries had the ear of the government both at home and on the spot. The first English judicial circuit, made in 1811 and known as the Black Circuit, gave the missionaries an opportunity of levelling wholesale charges against the Boers of oppression and murder, and four years afterwards some turbulent burghers not only broke out into rebellion, but, with singular inconsistency, tried to get Kaffir aid in sweeping the British into the sea. When these men were hanged, as by every standard, Dutch or British, they deserved to be, they became martyrs.

Another score of years sufficed to fill the Boer cup to overflowing. English emigrants were now establishing themselves at various points along the coast, and such company was not welcome. The friction between farmer and missionary continued, neither party being capable of seeing the right on the other's side. The liberation of the slaves came about in 1834, on terms ruinous to the masters, and timed, with incredible ineptitude, to come off in the middle of the harvesting. Meanwhile, the advance guard of the Bantus, in the shape of the warlike Kaffir tribes, were pressing hard upon the outlying farms, looting and murdering. But the missionaries would hear nothing against the Kaffirs, and the Boers could often get no redress even for the most flagrant outrages. Finally a Kaffir invasion in great force was repulsed, after widespread desolation and months of fighting, by British troops, and the governor, Sir Benjamin Durban, advanced the frontier to a more defensible line. But the Colonial office was then occupied by Lord Glenelg, a devout Evangelical, and completely under the influence of the missionaries, who represented the Kaffirs as a harmless folk, goaded into war. Accordingly the new territory was evacuated under orders from home, and the governor, who received neither respect nor courtesy, driven to resign.

This was the last straw. Large numbers of the Boers decided that the perils of the unknown were preferable to the constant harrying and interference of an alien government; they left their farms, inspanned their great ox waggons, and with their families and belongings fared forth into the unknown. It was a tremendous and heroic adventure. The authorities imagined that their survivors would presently return in a chastened mood. But they did not return. They passed Northwards over the Orange River, they found their

reverse of ideal—the whole early literature of Australia is redolent of failure and hope always deferred.

Wakefield and the Colonization Society aimed at organizing emigration on a sound and scientific basis. The principle they advocated was that land should be sold at a price sufficient to pay the expenses of providing a steady stream of emigrants from home, of the right sort, to work it. By this means a colony would pay for its own development, and the evil of cheap ownership and no labour would be avoided. It was a pity that this ingenious plan could not have been supplemented from the first by a provision preventing the accumulation of divers estates in the hands of a few individuals, and the consequent evils of speculation in land. But the reactions of capitalist enterprise upon the colonial social organism were hardly to be anticipated thus early.

The efforts of the Colonization Society were not always crowned with complete success ; its activities were not looked upon with any too favourable eye by the Colonial Office or by the still powerful missionaries, who suspected that the rights and souls of their native converts might receive scant consideration in a scientific scheme. But its eldest child, the Colony of South Australia, did make good in the long run, and it was the New Zealand Colonization Company, founded by the same men on the same principles, that forced the hand of the government just in time for us to anticipate the French in taking possession of that most delightful corner of the earth. And it was the influence of men like Wakefield, Buller and Durham that first taught Englishmen not only to think but also to organize imperially ; they built a bridge by which we could advance from the Island Kingdom that withstood Napoleon, to the Commonwealth of Nations that was to emerge victorious from a conflict even more terrible.

Perhaps inevitably, history tends to focus attention on matters of war and statescraft, but from such an angle of vision we shall gain a very imperfect appreciation of that tremendous adventure which we call the Expansion of England. The greater part of the average colonial's existence was little enough troubled about things like these. We must picture him as a rough, uncultured and generally unreflecting individual in a perpetual struggle to wrest the means of existence from untamed nature and scarcely tamed barbarism. These early colonials were, by the account even of their best friend, Wakefield, the very roughest of diamonds. Crime, from lack of temptation, was comparatively rare, except where

the Mother Country had deliberately imported it, but what in America was known as "smartness" and by the Boers as "slimness" was all too characteristic of men who were necessarily perpetually on the make. "For the growth of honour," as Wakefield drily remarks, "the colonies are not a very congenial soil." Morals were lax and manners coarse and slovenly—even members of the cultured classes quickly picked them up on adopting a colonial life. Education was almost impossible to get, nor was religion the restraint on primitive impulses it was at home, except in French Canada, where the Roman Catholic Church exercised almost as much influence as in Ireland.

For all that, great and heroic work was being accomplished by these rough and obscure men. Foot by foot they were conquering the world for civilization, bringing the light of knowledge where all had been darkness, causing the earth to yield fruits after her kind, preparing for the time when wheat would pour into Europe from Canada and meat from the Antipodes. But they were doing something more, for they were ensuring that the civilization that should take root and grow should be that inspired by the tradition of English liberties and the Common Law, in opposition to that of centralized and homogeneous Rome. This new Empire tended to be less an Empire in the old sense than a Commonwealth of free peoples. It was only a tendency, and it yet remained to be seen how far the blessings of freedom and equal justice could or would be extended to peoples outside the pale of Anglo-Saxondom. The missionaries—and it is to their everlasting honour—had faith that they could.

13

PROGRESS IN INDIA

A very different task to that of peopling virgin or barbarous lands had been essayed by the English when they saddled themselves—without realizing it and much against their will—with dominion over the ancient civilization of India. They had gone there for the sole purpose of turning a more or less honest penny; they had found the factory expanding into the province, and between the province and the Empire there was no practicable halting place. In the same way the speculative association of a few merchants now found thrust into its unwilling hands a responsibility and power to which even the Great Moguls would hardly have dared to aspire. Practical business men that they were, they shrank from such a

grandiose conclusion. They tried in every way to limit their responsibilities, to tie the hands of their Governors-General. But the logic of facts or, as the Indians might have put it, the Karma of their past actions, was too strong for them, and they must play the game to the end. Never, it may confidently be asserted, was a more unwilling or unambitious conqueror than England in India.

Pitt's India Act, in 1784, opened a new era in the history of our dealings with India. While avoiding the clean-cut simplicity of Fox's rejected measure, it proceeded from the same recognition that the government of our greatest and richest dependency by a private trading company for business purposes was now definitely out of date. But instead of making a clean sweep of John Company's political functions, Pitt adopted a compromise typically English. To transfer the whole of the Company's patronage into the hands of the politicians would have perhaps been to fly from one corruption to a worse. The dignity, the experience, and the traditions of the Company were not assets to be lightly thrown away, and accordingly a wholly illogical system was adopted which, while asserting the paramount authority of the Crown, kept the Company in being with a power by no means to be despised, though one that in course of time tended gradually to become superfluous. But the mere fact of the Company sharing in such awful responsibilities made its original status as a money-making corporation more and more obviously improper. Accordingly, at successive renewals of its charter, which occurred at twenty years' intervals, John Company was stripped of its commercial functions, until in 1833 it became purely a governing body, "the fifth wheel in the coach."

Partly owing to the humanizing influence of the Emotional Revival—displayed so unfortunately in the persecution of Warren Hastings—and partly, no doubt, owing to her chastening by the American Rebellion, Britain had come to take a higher view of her responsibilities than in the days when Bengal had been the happy hunting ground of sharks and plunderers. One of Pitt's reforms had been to put the all-important post of Governor-General in the appointment of the Crown, and to make that dignitary master of his Council in a way that Hastings never was, though still hedged about with anxious restrictions intended to debar him from anything like an adventurous or forward policy. It was none too soon, for Hastings's place, on his retirement, had been automatically filled by the senior member of the Council, a thoroughly crooked character

who gave India her last taste of a systematic jobber in supreme authority.

The governors sent out from England were henceforth, with surprisingly few exceptions, the best men she had to give, upright and able members of her aristocracy, with an invariably high sense of duty and a desire to do the best that in them lay, not only for the Motherland they loved with a passion too deep for outward show, but for that alien race with whose safety and welfare they were entrusted. In the first fifty years of Crown appointments, the only two which can by any means be stigmatized as failures were those of worthy but unadventurous permanent officials who exemplified the almost invariable rule of Indian government, that a long course of bureaucratic service constitutes a positive disqualification for supreme power.

The first of Pitt's governors, Lord Cornwallis, was typical of the burly, John Bullish gentlemen, with whom we are so familiar on the canvasses of Sir Joshua Reynolds. He had distinguished himself by achieving the most disastrous capitulation in the annals of British arms without forfeiting any person's respect—the very sight of his broad countenance, so transparently manly and benevolent, must have been sufficient to inspire trust in the teeth of any record. And Cornwallis's face was the mirror of his soul. From the moment he came out he set himself stoutly to purge the service of every form of corruption and jobbery, and it is needless to add that no one ever suspected his own hands of being anything but clean. But, like the honest, unimaginative squire that he really was, he succeeded in perpetrating one ghastly blunder with which his name will always be associated. In the Province of Bengal the collection of the land revenue was tainted by every sort of abuse. Cornwallis wisely decided to put this on the basis of a permanent assessment. Unfortunately, and with the best of motives, he invested the zemindars, a class of hereditary tax-farmers, with the status of English squires, in the hope that once their position was regularized in this way, they would become improving landlords of the type with which Cornwallis was familiar at home. This incursion into Indian economics had the effect of giving the zemindars unlimited opportunities of oppressing the peasants, and the government of putting the screw on the zemindars, who—precisely as happened in Ireland—were often ruined and forced to sell their rights to speculators, who, in their turn, exploited their wretched dependents with single-hearted thoroughness. We may add that

Cornwallis made it a principle to distrust all Indians, and to employ them as little as possible in any responsible post.

But sterner work was at hand for the British Raj. The position of England, as one among several powers competing for the mastery of India, must plainly develop into one of complete supremacy if it was not to be lost altogether. The whole Peninsula was in a state of unstable equilibrium; the powers with whom we had to deal were neither capable of keeping the peace nor their pledged faith, nor were any of them capable of setting up a government worthy of the name, and containing the elements of permanency. The urgency of our task was doubled when we became involved in war with France, whose rulers were fully appreciative of the advantages of stirring up trouble in India, and whose officer adventurers penetrated to Indian courts and imparted the secrets of European discipline.

Fortunately the hour brought forth the man. In 1798, after a promoted official, Sir John Shore, had for five years endeavoured to keep the peace at almost any price, Pitt sent out Lord Mornington, afterwards Marquis of Wellesley. The new Governor's imperious spirit rapidly divined that we had no choice but to impose our peace on India once and for all. Accordingly he dealt one after another with the three powers that challenged our supremacy. First, by a swift combination of diplomacy with the show of force, he disarmed the Nizam of Hyderabad, and made his province of the Deccan into an obedient vassal state. Next he turned on our inveterate and bloodthirsty enemy, Tippoo Sahib of Mysore, significantly called in France "Citizen Tippoo", and in two months had his power annihilated and himself slain. The Governor-General was now free to deal with our most formidable rival of all, the great Mahratta confederacy, whose chance of becoming the Hindu saviours of India had vanished once for all at Panipat, but whose chiefs ruled over a vast extent of territory and levied blackmail far and wide beyond its borders—even having the impertinence to demand it, on one occasion, from England. Wellesley, if left to himself, would have settled the business of this confederacy for good and all; his armies had smitten hip and thigh two of its most formidable members, and were proceeding to deal in like manner with a third, when the Marquis was recalled and his policy reversed. The Home Government, and still more the Court of Directors, had taken fright at a policy that had added forty million subjects to their dominions—there was even talk of impeaching the Governor-General—and the

old Lord Cornwallis was again sent out, as a safe man, to reverse as much as he could of his predecessor's policy.

What happened was that the Mahrattas were given leisure to recuperate, and what amounted to British leave to harry and desolate their Rajput neighbours. Terrible misery was caused in India by this refusal of England to accept the responsibilities that her position entailed. India was slipping back into anarchy, and worse even than the Mahrattas were the bands of robbers or unemployed mercenaries called Pindaris, whose fiendish cruelty in harrying Rajputana and Central India surpasses anything that even the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle can allege against Stephen's barons. At last, in 1817, the Governor-General, Lord Hastings, one of the hard-living set that had gone the pace with the Regent, but a fine old soldier and a strong man, determined to put an end to the business. He first destroyed the Pindaris, a proceeding that involved him in trouble with their fellow-robbers, the Mahrattas, upon whom he turned with irresistible force and reduced finally to impotence. There was left no Indian power, with the exception of the Punjab in the remote North-West, that had any chance of standing up against us. A now inevitable process of expansion and consolidation extended our rule to the Himalayan barrier. More against her will than with it, England had become ruler of India, and it remained to be seen whether she could use that position to her own advantage and that of her vast dependency.

This at least must be allowed in favour of the ruling race, that nothing which, by the allegation of its bitterest critics, it has brought upon India, can be worse than that from which it delivered her. The break up of the Mogul empire had given over India to a chaos that no Indian power was powerful enough to end. The strong hand of a European ruler was necessary to save her civilization from ruin and to give it a chance of reviving. And it is on the gradual resurrection of India, and England's part in helping or retarding it, that the interest of the historian is rightly centred.

It therefore behoves us to realize, as far as we may, where Indian civilization stood in those days of the English conquest. Certainly there was enough cause for despondency. There was something in the elaborate system of caste and tradition reminiscent of the state of Judaism at the time of Christ. What had originally been the dictates of a lofty morality, inspired by a subtle philosophy, had now petrified into an uninspired system of commands and prohibitions, maintained by an hereditary priesthood. The Brahmins, like the

scribes and Pharisees, had ceased, for the most part, to study more than the dead letter of their law and scriptures, nor had they any idea of penetrating beyond the gross literalness of their religious symbolism. Since they had ceased to be the counsellors of princes, they had taken more and more to catering for the tastes and superstitions of the common people on whom they depended for a livelihood. The last great spiritual revival of Hinduism, the Vaisnavite movement, which had given birth to those master poets Kabir and Tulsi Das, had long since spent its force. The very learning, that the Brahmans had monopolized and handed down from generation to generation, had suffered the decay of all lifeless things ; their ancient astronomy and medicine had become abracadabra ; for the recovery of much of their sacred lore they had to wait for English scholarship.

But as among the post-exilic Jews, the iron rigidity of form had, through times of stress and servitude, imparted an inextinguishable vitality to the civilization whose finer flowers it killed. Wave after wave of conquest might sweep over Hindustan, kingdom might rise against kingdom within her borders, but the essential framework of her society held together, and her underlying unity of sentiment and tradition survived all differences of race, language, and even religion. And if the learning of India was in a state of abeyance, her art was by no means dead. The Mogul school of painting had decayed with the Mogul dynasty, but it lived on, and the kindred Rajput school, though past its prime, had not ceased to produce works of exquisite merit. It was in Rajputana, most of all, that the traditions of the Indian master builders continued to inspire work of undiminished excellence, certainly not inferior to anything that the Europe of that time could produce. In music, too, India had a tradition of her own that was kept alive by successive generations of musicians, though the Puritan Aurungzebe had fatuously ordered the spirit of music to be buried out of sight.

Even in the eighteenth century, certain Englishmen had begun to accomplish for India a work of deeper significance than mere strength of government and development of material resources. They had seen, however dimly, the beauty and wisdom that centuries of formalism had dimmed, and they devoted themselves to separating the pure gold of Hindu civilization from the dross. It is not the least of the merits of Warren Hastings that, while he had no hesitation in letting the law take its course with such twice-born wretches as the forger Nuncomar, he was an admirer of the Hindu sacred books, and particularly of the Bhagavad Gita. But Hastings had scanty

leisure to spare from the pressing tasks of administration, and it was left to a young English judge, Sir William Jones, to appreciate the full value of Sanscrit literature.

Jones was a typical product of the Emotional Revival, and in his search for colour and romance he had gone not, like so many of his contemporaries, to the Middle Ages of Europe, but to the East—at first to Arabia and Persia and afterwards, from his arrival in India in 1783 to his death in 1794, to the almost unsuspected treasure house of Sanscrit literature. With an acquaintance, more or less intimate, with no less than twenty-eight languages, with a range of interests that embraced most subjects from music to the mathematics, and with the intuition of a born poet, he was admirably fitted to reveal the glories of Hindu civilization not only to Europeans but to Indians themselves. Besides translating much and planning to translate more of the Hindu classics, he had the noble ambition to become the Justinian of India, and left unfinished at his death what was meant to be a complete digest of Hindu and Moslem law. He was, like many pioneers, more a man of intuition than exhaustive research, and he is not to be compared for erudition with the next great English Sanscrit scholar, Henry Colebrooke. But he had a Pisgah vision of the mental paradise that his successors in scholarship were to make their own, along with the priceless gift of humility that sent him reverently to solicit the aid of the most learned Brahmin pundits, who, in turn, were overwhelmed with grief at his premature death. It is significant of the spirit in which he worked that he should have kept an image of one of the gods before him on the table as he studied their scriptures.

These Orientalists, as they were called, performed a work of inestimable value both for England and for India. They were doing for Indian civilization exactly what their fellow-Romantics were doing at home for the Middle Ages, and it is not surprising that, like them, they should sometimes have allowed their enthusiasm to run away with their critical faculty. One of them, Horace Hayman Wilson, actually went so far as to oppose the abolition of *sati*, or the burning alive of widows. But men who are fighting prejudice can hardly be expected to hold, always, the exact *via media*, and how deep the prejudice was against the idea of anything good coming out of India is shown by the fact that Dugald Stewart, who even North of the Tweed was renowned for the prosiness of his metaphysics, scintillated for once in his life with the discovery, to his own satisfaction, that the whole of the Sanscrit literature and language was

work his own has many points of similarity, he traversed the dogma of transmigration. And with a boldness that it needs a knowledge of India to appreciate, he even tried to undermine the sacrosanct institution of caste, by proclaiming that all folk were the children of the same God, and therefore brothers and sisters. And yet he was no mere Deist or unbeliever, but a loyal Hindu, a Brahman of the Brahmins, steeped in the lore of the Upanishads and making his life's work the restoration of the Hindu faith to its pristine simplicity.

It was in 1830 that Ram Mohun Rai founded the Brahma Somaj (literally the God Society) with the object of giving effect to these principles. Though never large in numbers, it has exercised a powerful influence in giving direction to the revival of Hindu civilization, and it was Ram Mohun's especial object to steer an even course between the Scylla of encroaching westernization and the Charybdis of Hindu reaction. He was great enough to see in Hinduism the basis of a universal faith in which Christian and Buddhist and Moslem could join without the sacrifice of any of their essential principles, and in India's destiny no triumph of exclusive nationality, but the lifting of the whole world to a new—and also very old—ideal of love and service. It is a strange and touching evidence of nobility in two naturally opposed natures, that the crabbed old utilitarian, Jeremy Bentham, should have hailed in the mystic Brahman an “intensely admired and dearly beloved collaborator in the service of mankind”.

We must not, however, lose sight of influences that were working in a very different sense from that of the Somaj and the Orientalists. The missionary movement, which had exercised so great an influence in the colonies, was making itself felt also in India. The men whom the various Christian sects sent out to evangelize India were fully as devoted as their brethren in Africa and Australasia, and some of them vied with the lay Orientalists in the knowledge they acquired of the various Indian languages into which they were indefatigable in translating their Good News. But they were, from the outset, setting themselves to a hopeless task in coping with the established faiths of Hindustan. Christianity has never inclined to the tolerance that can see in its own and other faiths different paths winding to the summit of the selfsame mountain. To the missionaries, as to the martyrs, the only hope of salvation lay in the acceptance of their own doctrine and Saviour, and they could see in Hinduism only what Ram Mohun Rai himself saw, its overlay of superstition,

without, like him, divining beneath it the quickening spirit of all true religion. Accordingly they set themselves to the truly forlorn hope of proselytizing the Hindus, who for their part regarded the missionaries as the exponents of a barbarous infidelity, and were unable to believe that men could be really holy who were so much less able or willing than their own sadhus to forego the good things of this life.

It was only in 1813 that the missionaries could get an officially recognized footing on Indian soil, and they had had, perforce, to conduct their ministrations from settlements like the Danish Serampur. The Company, which was out for money, had no use for missionaries, nor can the English government, in pre-mutiny days, be accused of undue partiality for its own religion. Nevertheless, despite all handicaps and their own limitations, the missionaries went to work manfully with the task of imparting not only Christian principles, but Western education, which they believed would be the best means of preparing the soil for the good seed. They founded numerous schools, in which instruction was given in the vernacular dialects, and they may justly claim to be the founders of Indian popular education. They displayed a truly Franciscan charity in ministering to the outcast and the sick, and they opposed with all their might the cruelty to human beings and animals that was practised under the guise of religion. Nevertheless their methods were often singularly ill-chosen. They attacked cherished beliefs with an intolerance that was not infrequently scurrilous and needlessly offensive. Instead of joining hands with Hindu reformers, they sought to depreciate their work; Ram Mohun Rai was opposed by two of the greatest missionaries, by Marshman on the score of heresy, by Duff on that of deism. In the long run the missionary work failed to reap more than a negligible harvest of conversions, and proved to be a source of dangerous irritation.

It was in the early thirties, under the governorship of Lord William Bentinck, that the controversy between Indian and Western methods of education came to a head. This excellent man, who was bold enough to follow Ram Mohun's counsel by abolishing *sati*, who put down the Thugs, a sect of professional murderers, and who displayed a tireless activity in giving India the benefit of Western reforming principles, was nevertheless so Philistine in his attitude to the civilization it was his duty to cherish, that he would have been quite content—had it been found a paying proposition—to have had the Taj Mahal broken up and sold for what

CHAPTER II

THE AGE OF MIDDLE CLASS LIBERALISM

1

THE DISILLUSIONMENT OF THE WORKERS

THE July Revolution in Paris ushers in the second act of the great European tragedy, *From Vienna to Versailles*, whose programme might read somewhat as follows :—

- Act I* (commencing 1815). The Time of Reaction.
Act II (commencing 1830). The Age of Western, bourgeois Liberalism.
Act III (commencing 1848). The partial triumph of the national principle.
Act IV (commencing 1871). The breakdown of bourgeois Liberalism and the rise of proletarian democracy. National and racial egotism precipitate universal war.
Act V (commencing 1914). The incomplete suicide of civilization.

This, like all historical generalizations, needs due qualification in the light of facts, for the stream of history is continuous and its cross currents of almost infinite complexity, but granting such a concession to human frailty as the division of time into epochs, the modern period lends itself thereto with singular facility. And our scheme of a five act tragedy, if it does not tell us all the truth, at least presents vividly to our consciousness the most important part of it.

In England, however, this distinction of epochs is naturally less marked than on the Continent, partly on account of her isolation, and partly because both politically and industrially she starts with an immense lead on her Continental rivals. Thanks to the traditions of her Common Law, the principle of constitutional government was firmly established within her shores. Thanks to her belt of waters and her wooden walls, she might reasonably hope to work out her salvation in peace, or at least without the exhaustion of life and death land warfare.

Accordingly we find that in England the second and third acts of the tragedy are practically continuous. The Bourgeois Revolution was as sharply marked by the passage of our Reform Bill as by the accession of Louis Phillippe, and indeed the two are vitally connected,

but the great year of revolutions, 1848, which sent that bourgeois King packing to England in the tracks of his divine predecessor, saw nothing more formidable here than the anti-climax of the Chartist meeting on Kennington Common—the good-natured pricking of a gigantic bubble. England was little concerned except verbally and sentimentally with the attempt of the Continental peoples to throw off the yoke of the Metternich System, and in the series of wars that culminated in the union of Germany and Italy. Her period of middle class rule was begun by a Reform Bill and ended with a Reform Bill, and the thirty-five intervening years forms a period of great outward simplicity and assurance. What destructive forces there were, were gathering beneath the surface.

There was a general belief, on the passing of the Reform Bill, that a new era of liberty and ordered progress had been ushered in. Some old fashioned Tories were credulous enough to imagine that the Jacobin Terror had at last come to England, that within a few years the House of Lords, the Church, the Throne, and the rights of property would all be swept away, but the majority of the party showed a surprising alacrity in adapting themselves to the new order of things, and the general sentiment not only among the Whigs but the mass of the people was at first that expressed by the Unitarian preacher Fox in the lines,

“ The people firm, from Court and Peers,
By union won Reform, sirs,
And, union safe, the nation steers
Through sunshine and through storm, sirs ! ”

And this in despite of the fact that the Reform Bill left the working class as much out in the cold—indeed more than as much, in a few constituencies—as they had been before.

It certainly did appear that the Whigs, whom a huge majority of the new electorate returned to power, meant to pursue an actively liberal policy both at home and abroad. Though almost from the outset the pace was too slow for Radicals like Lord Durham, the new ministers began a thorough overhauling not only of our political but of our social institutions. Royal Commissions became the order of the day, and on the Commission's report followed legislation. In the first year of the Whig ministry negro slavery was finally abolished, and the first Factory Act to be really effective, because enforced by Government Inspectors, showed that a doctrinaire individualism was capable, for this once at any rate, of giving place to humanity. In 1835—slightly to anticipate matters—came the

great Municipal Corporations' Act, opening up possibilities of transforming the hideous collections of houses that usurped the title of towns in the manufacturing districts into something more worthy of human habitation.

These were great and beneficent reforms, and there was much legislative activity of a similar kind in other directions, but after 1835 the pace began to slacken more and more. Durham had gone, and Grey and Brougham; Lord John Russell, once so active in reform, was beginning to earn his nickname of Finality Jack. Within two years of its election, the new Parliament had lost much of its driving power and support in the country, though William IV, with a clumsiness that would have horrified his astute old father, gave them another lease of power by a premature dissolution that brought in a Conservative ministry for a few months, and gave Peel, their leader, an opportunity of showing that between Conservative and Whig principles there was now not much to choose. The Whig premier who succeeded Grey was Lord Melbourne, whose policy in respect of any inconveniently controversial question was, as he would say, "why can't they leave it alone?" Under his auspices Whiggism became more and more commonplace and stagnant, none of the drastic changes in Church and State materialized, the torrent of reform shrank to a trickle. Administrative inefficiency reigned supreme and the budgets floundered through a series of deficits. Long before the party was driven from office—after its existence had been galvanized on through two extra years owing to a quarrel between the young Queen and the Conservatives over the appointments to the Royal Household—Whiggism was a spent force.

We have purposely hitherto refrained from mentioning the most important Whig measure of all, the Poor Law of 1834. This it was that emphasized beyond any possibility of mistake the antagonism between the middle class that held the power of the franchise and the working class that had helped to give it. The situation created by the wartime expedient of supplementing wages out of rates was demoralizing enough in all conscience, carried out as it was by parish authorities without system and often without humanity. But its intention had been kindly and, with all its faults, it had succeeded in tiding over a period of great distress. The unprecedented misery caused by war, mass production, and the pressure of population on the means of subsistence, left the authorities no choice but to leave multitudes to starve outright, or else to put themselves and the

country to some considerable expense and inconvenience in maintaining them. Nevertheless they were on the horns of a real dilemma, because if relief became acceptable as a substitute for work, the industrious would be burdened with the maintenance of the idle and dragged down to their level. But when work meant acceptance of the hours, conditions and wages of the average factory or agricultural worker, it was difficult to conceive of any lot to which these would be preferable. It ought, in fact, to have been obvious that Poor Law Reform would not stop at the Poor Law, but involved such a refashioning of our social system as to make decent wages and conditions the right of every willing worker.

Such an attempt would have seemed beyond the bounds of possibility to the middle-class economists who had practically a free hand in the framing of the new Poor Law. The utmost they were prepared to concede was already embodied in the Factory Law of 1833. They therefore approached their task in what they imagined to be a scientific spirit, one from which the disturbing factor of compassion was as far as possible eliminated. They acted in the spirit of a certain Christian preacher who, despairing of the commonplace amenities of Hell, was moved to proclaim a special and super-heated Gehenna for those who rejected his claims to divine inspiration. The life of a workman might very often be Hell—well and good!—but the authorities would undertake to make that of a pauper Gehenna. All the resources of scientific ingenuity were devoted to securing that the lot of those who were dependent on the tender mercies of the State should be worse in every way than that of the poorest starveling outside—no light undertaking when we remember that the spectacle of one of the latter starved to death under a hedge was not unknown.

The middle-class legislators were going to take no chances. The aged and infirm who were no longer capable of providing for themselves were doubtless assumed to be suffering from their lack of providence, it was better at any rate that their lives should be allowed to waste away under conditions that combined the minimum of expense with the maximum of affliction. Little children whose parents were imprudent enough to bring them within the clutches of the State would have the sins of those parents visited—with a vengeance—on their heads. The workhouse test was applied with the utmost strictness. With comparatively few exceptions he or she who wanted relief must go for it to the workhouse, a place which the poor, paying it an altogether unmerited compliment, called a

Bastille, and which was really a house of slow torture, torture by underfeeding, torture by every indignity that arbitrary tyranny could devise for the helpless and friendless, torture by the tearing of parents from children, and of husband from wife in their declining days. Lest any element of humanity should mar the exquisite perfection of this system, the parish authorities, to whose feelings some appeal was at least possible, were scrapped, artificial unions of parishes were made the unit of administration, and their Boards of Guardians were merely the mouthpieces of three permanent Commissioners sitting at Whitehall, in comfortable aloofness from all sympathetic bias, and only concerned to enforce the utmost letter of the law. Finally, no step was taken to redress the admitted grievance of the law regarding Settlement.

This Poor Law of 1834 was regarded as a triumph of reforming legislation by the class which the Reform Bill had elevated to power. It had many advantages; it certainly had the effect of enormously reducing the number of paupers, when it was no worse to die outright than to be kept alive by charity. It was likely to provide a cheaper supply of labour, when the alternative to accepting the employer's conditions might be to endure those of the Bastilles. What went on inside those ugly walls might not be nice to think about, but after all it was impossible to make scientific omelettes without breaking a few human eggs, and an old age in the workhouse was not after all a possibility that need greatly disturb the complacency of a ten pound householder voter.

But the working class were more prejudiced on the subject. They were blind to the ultimate advantages of a policy that presented them with the choice of death by starvation, or life just sufficiently maintained to be conscious of its own misery. The violent transition from the old to the new system accentuated their troubles, and the lot of those, in particular, who had been trained to crafts like handloom weaving—now killed by machinery—was pitiable. A succession of bad harvests and, in 1836-7, one of those periodical commercial smashes which had become a feature of the new industrialism, threw multitudes of willing workers out of employment—between the devil of the workhouse and the deep sea of starvation. The workers took these things in far from good part, and, especially in the industrial districts of the North and Midlands, were infuriated at the shabby return they considered the middle class to have made them for their help in securing the new franchise. But it was now too late, the new rulers were in the saddle and short of armed rebellion there appeared to be no legal redress.

But the workers' point of view found voice more eloquent than that of the politicians and dismal scientists. A young, Cockney journalist, called Charles Dickens, was just rising into fame as the greatest interpreter of the English character since Shakespeare. With even less book-learning than the little Latin and less Greek that Shakespeare had brought up to town with him, Dickens had, like him, a heart to which cruelty in any form was intolerable, and a directness of vision that enabled him to describe the thing that was and not the abstraction that was supposed to be. In 1838 appeared his *Oliver Twist*, in which the working of the scientific Poor Law was exposed in all its naked squalor and inhumanity, a description by which that piece of legislation will be branded for ever, though the very names of Chadwick the Benthamite and Senior the economist, its chief devisers, are known only to a handful of specialists. And yet these very doctrinaires were working, according to their lights, for the good of their fellows.

The sufferings of the workers found a more uncompromising champion even than Dickens in the person of a methodist preacher called Joseph Stephens, no Jacobin or Radical, but a High Tory who regarded the middle class as the real enemy and the Reform Bill as a national disaster. Stephens may not have had Dickens's power of seeing and describing the world around him, but he achieved something almost equally remarkable, in the fact that he could open his Bible and read therein not the comfortable things that provided sermons for the well to do, nor the meek counsels of resignation that kept the poor out of mischief, but the divine wrath with which the prophets had blasted those who oppressed the poor of their own days, the flaming passion with which Christ had denounced the devourers of widows' houses and driven the money-changers out of the Temple. Nonconformity spoke, through his lips, with the voice of the old Puritan Levellers, a voice terrible to men who dared call it science to exploit the misery of God's poor.

"The new Poor Law," he thundered, "is the law of devils, it ought to be resisted to the death, even if the first man who may be slaughtered in opposing it should be Lord John Russell himself." He went further than this, if further it were possible to go than uttering personal threats against a scion of so respectable a House. "If it is to come," he told an audience of Manchester workers, "let it come; it shall be an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, wife for wife, child for child, blood for blood"—and here his voice was drowned by loud and continuous cheers. He was even capable

of proclaiming from the pulpit some of those unfortunate texts that the good taste of other preachers consents to ignore: "Those who are to go to Hell hereafter are, not the Antinomians, not the Unitarians, not the Mahometans, the Pagans, the Catholics, or the Protestant Churchmen . . . there is not a word about creeds or articles of belief; there is not a word about any particular professions; there is not a word about any rites, or ceremonies, or institutions . . . but those who go away into everlasting death, they are men of all lands, tongues, trades and politics, that have refused to clothe the naked, and that have not visited and sympathized with the sick. Christ says so."¹ It was hardly necessary for the reporter of so strange a sermon to add, in parenthesis at this point—"great astonishment." For it was not the first time that men had been "astonished at His doctrine".

The opposition to the new Poor Law was swelled by the last invectives of the redoubtable old warrior, Cobbett, who argued, cogently enough, that since the rich had, at the Reformation and afterwards, deprived the poor of the Common Lands and ancient sources of maintenance, the poor were entitled to as human and Christian a treatment as they had received in the days of the old religion, and who demanded that Reform should be converted from a fraud into a reality by extending the right to make the laws to every citizen who was expected to obey them.

It was on this issue of the Poor Law more than any other that battle was joined between the voting middle and the non-voting working classes. But the Whig government had shown their lack of sympathy with the workers plainly enough in other ways. One of their first acts had been to repress, with brutal savagery, the feeble revolt of agricultural labourers known as the Swing Riots. The amiable Lord Melbourne, then Home Secretary, had casually thrown out the suggestion of reviving the use of spring guns. It was during his Home Secretaryship that the middle-class fright at Trades Unions nearly led to the reenaction, under a slightly modified form, of the Combination Laws, a step confidently recommended by Nassau Senior, whom we have already mentioned as one of the economic promoters of the new Poor Law. Lord Melbourne's instinct for letting things alone restrained him from such an open attack on the workers, but he characteristically turned the flank of the position by putting the forces of legal chicanery to work. In March 1884

¹ For these and similar extracts see *The Life of Joseph Rayner Stephens* by G. J. Holyoake.

a forgotten statute was revived, almost certainly illegally, in order to strike terror into the movement. Half a dozen labourers in the little Dorsetshire parish of Tolpudde, who had not even gone on strike, had bound themselves by oath in a Trades Union to resist a reduction of their wages to the lordly sum of 6s. a week. For this they were sentenced to seven years' transportation. It was only after a formidable popular agitation and a great deal of shuffling and procrastination that the Whig government, which had hurried the poor men off to Australia, consented to allow their return.

The Trades Union movement was, from the workers' point of view, a great disappointment during these early years. A grandiose scheme, under the auspices of the indefatigable Owen, of forming a union of all trades, broke down hopelessly, and in the lean years after 1836 the Trades Unions failed altogether to hold their own against the employers, or to include in their membership more than a comparatively insignificant minority of the workers. The popular indignation against the rule of the middle class found its chief expression in that formidable agitation which is known as Chartism, and which more than once seemed to threaten actual revolution.

The story of this agitation has been admirably told, in recent years, by two young writers, Julius West¹ and Mark Hovell,² both of whose lives have been tragically cut short. We do not propose to repeat the story here of how the populace which had, with the full approval of the Whigs, struck terror into the Tory opposition to the Reform Bill, now found themselves not only disfranchised, but under a government bitterly prejudiced against their class and its interests; how in London, in Birmingham, in Yorkshire and Lancashire, the fury which had unnerved the Tories now burned with double ardour against the Whigs; how a People's Charter was drafted, and so ominous a body as a National Convention came into being; how the crisis came to a head in 1839, with the presentation of a monster petition; how the government, backed by the entire strength of the voting classes, without distinction of party, refused to budge an inch; how the threatened insurrection fizzled out before the display of irresistible force; and how an attempt to present another monster petition in the year of revolutions, 1848, led to every gentleman in London, as Greville puts it, becoming a special constable, and the final collapse of the movement.

Chartism was, from the start, a forlorn hope, because at this

¹ *A History of the Chartist Movement.*

² *History of Chartism.*

time the workers, miserably educated for the most part and with little time for reflection, had never thought out their own position. They knew that their lot had been rendered desperately miserable since the advent of machinery and scientific agriculture, the time and the social system were palpably out of joint, but in spite of Robert Owen and such democratic economists as Hodgskin and Thompson, it had never occurred to most of them that this could be set right by a programme of social reform. The six points of the People's Charter were all purely political, and aimed at securing that Parliament should represent, at all times and accurately, the will of a majority of the people, and not, as under the Reform Bill franchise, that of a not unbiassed nor unbribed majority of those more or less comfortably off.

This may have been well enough for a start, but the Chartists and their leaders had only the vaguest and most conflicting ideas of what they meant to do with the franchise when they got it. The political economists, with all their faults, had a perfectly definite notion of what the sovereign power in the community ought or ought not to do. But there were almost as many Chartist Utopias as there were leaders. Some of them followed Cobbett and Stephens in a romantic desire so common at that time, to put back the clock before the advent of machinery or before the Reformation. Others were for a boldly socialistic programme, for taking away the property as well as the privileges of Dives, whereas others were for giving individualism its first full and free chance. As for the rank and file, they had, as Mr. Hovell puts it, "no policy at all . . . A moving sense of wrong, a fierce desire to remedy the conditions of their daily life, were the only spurs which drove them into agitation and rioting." No sense of wrong, however keen, can compensate for confusion of ideas and conflict of purpose.

Not only were the Chartists at hopeless variance as to what they wanted to get, but as to how they were to set about getting it. Some of them, like William Lovett, would hear of nothing but peaceful persuasion, others, like George Harney, who aspired to be the English Marat, talked cheerfully of tying Members of Parliament neck to knees and throwing them into the Thames. The man who came eventually to head the movement, Feargus O'Connor, was a big, blustering Irishman with more than the ordinary Irishman's flow of words, and no very definite ideas on any subject whatever except that of securing the maximum of advertisement combined with the minimum of personal risk. It was in the North that the party of

physical force was strongest, and the practical turn of mind of these revolutionaries was shown by their fondness for "the puissant pike", which was turned out in considerable quantities and often sold by its recipients for a profit of a shilling or so, which was about all the service it was capable of performing for anyone.

Luckily, in the critical year 1839, the commander of the troops in the Northern District was Sir Charles Napier, a thoroughly capable officer but—what in an officer is somewhat rare—a liberal-minded citizen, one who thoroughly sympathized with most of the demands of the Chartists, and had a horror of using physical force, save in the last extremity. He knew enough about war to realize how completely his trained regulars would have the largest mob at their mercy, and he had made his dispositions for crushing them swiftly and scientifically if it should come to that. But with infinite tact and patience he contrived to avoid the least occasion for strife and, lest his forbearance should be taken for weakness, he took one or two of the Chartist leaders in the friendliest way to see his guns and to realize, from his soldierly explanation, what the resort to pike and tocsin would really mean. It is thanks mainly to Napier that the crisis passed away without a massacre of Englishmen by Englishmen that might have kindled an inextinguishable fire of class-hatred.

With its divided counsels and divided leaders—they were perpetually squabbling among themselves—Chartism was doomed to failure, but what set the seal on its discomfiture was the discovery, by the middle-class, of a party cry capable of diverting the energies of the workers from the pursuit of political reform. The agitation against the Corn Laws, that led to the foundation of the Anti-Corn-Law League in 1839, was a thoroughly middle-class movement, and its leaders were drawn from the ranks of the employers. But these leaders differed from those of the Chartists by knowing what they wanted and how they meant to get it, and the cry of cheap bread was one that echoed in the heart of every working man in the "hungry forties". It was in vain that the Chartist leaders protested that the desire for cheap bread was not unconnected with that for cheap wages, that once the franchise was secured the repeal of the Corn Laws—together with other things less agreeable to the capitalist—would follow as a matter of course. The people can seldom think about two things at once, and their interest was shifted from the Charter to Corn Law Repeal. The better times that followed the attainment of this latter object seemed to justify the existing regime, and the social discontent that had risen to a height in the thirties was driven below the surface in the fifties.

THE OPTIMISM OF RESPECTABILITY

Thus was the triumph of the middle class confirmed by the defeat of their former allies, the proletariat, who wished to share with them the fruits of victory. The failure of the Chartists was certainly no unmixed evil, for a mass of uneducated men, reared up, often amid the most brutalizing conditions, and conspicuously lacking alike in leadership and in ideas, was hardly as yet fitted for the responsibility of guiding England through a period of such critical transition. And despite the inevitable bias that every class possesses in favour of its own interests, the electorate of the first Reform Bill showed itself in many ways surprisingly broad-minded and even altruistic. How far they were from getting to the root of the problems created by the Industrial Revolution time would show, but at least they made a brave attempt, and one which seemed at the time to have been successful, to adjust the social organism to the conditions of its new, self-created environment.

Whatever defects may have lurked beneath the surface were not yet obvious, save to a comparatively small minority, especially after the Chartist agitation had died down. The fifties of the century marked a time of fairly general complacency even among the workers, a complacency hardly ruffled by the distant horrors of the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny. It went almost without saying to the man in the street that the world was every day and in every way getting better and better, and that of this beneficent progress England was in the van.

It is easy enough for us, in the light of subsequent events, to laugh at the optimism of our great-grandfathers, an optimism that did not deceive the wisest even of their own generation, and perhaps the easiest way of acquiring a quick reputation in modern letters is to be pleasantly cynical about the foibles of Victorians—for the Victorian age, if we are to attach any useful sense to the word, commences not with the Queen's accession but with the Reform Bill. But we are the last people who have any right to laugh at an epoch of such solid and substantial achievement, unless the waterfly is the best critic of the crow for his failure to fly like the eagle. But our business is neither to vindicate nor to condemn the early Victorians (placing the dividing line of the epoch at the year 1867), but to understand both their achievement and their failure, their achievement in producing an amount of permanent and enduring work equalled in

hardly any equally short period of our history, except perhaps that intervening between Drake's voyage round the world and the death of Bacon, their failure in ordering and settling all things, or anything, on the best and surest foundations. For it was just the weakness of the Victorians that they strengthened and improved every part of the building except the foundations—their peculiar sense of decency perhaps withheld them from probing for dry rot in the cellarage.

Let us first briefly summarize the course of events, in England, between the two Reform Bills. The triumph of the middle class had brought the Whigs, who had all along been the party of the moneyed and Nonconformist interests, into power. But the Tory party, though snowed under at the election of 1832, had found in Peel a leader who conceived the idea of outbidding the Whigs with the middle class itself. This was no doubt a masterpiece of political tactics, but it involved the abandonment of almost every principle for which the Tories had hitherto stood, in favour of an enlightened opportunism. "Tory men, Whig measures," was the cry that Disraeli put into the mouth of one of his typical wirepullers, and it is no unfair description of Peel's new Conservatism. Peel, however, was sincerely honest and patriotic in his attitude; he was, in fact, a true product of that age in his eagerness to cut the theory and get ahead with the business of governing.

Up to a certain point he succeeded admirably. The reforming government of Lord Grey had become the played-out and muddling administration of Lord Melbourne, and in 1841 Peel swept the country with a programme that is seldom unacceptable to an English electorate, that of a sound and peaceful government, committed to no sensational experiments at home or abroad. The promise was well kept. Peel was not far short of an administrative genius; as Premier he was master, to the minutest detail, of the business of every department, but far from crushing the individuality of his subordinates, he succeeded in forming and training a team of ministers of probably unprecedented ability in the annals of Cabinet government. But Peel's temperamental opportunism brought its inevitable Nemesis on his party. If there was one thing to which his government was more pledged than any other, it was to the maintenance of the duty on corn, which was the bulwark of the old Tory landed interest, and with which even the Whigs had not dared to dispense.

It was against these very Corn Laws that a popular agitation was gathering in the industrial districts comparable with that which had brought about the Reform Bill. It was in 1838 that the Anti-

Corn Law League was formed, and its leaders, Richard Cobden and John Bright, though sturdy representatives of the middle class, were yet, where the business interests of their fellow employers did not bias their judgment, men of sincerely democratic sympathies. In the demand for cheap bread they managed to unite the workers once again with the middle class, and to create a popular agitation which no government could afford to ignore. This agitation was all the more powerful from the fact that the advent of railways was shifting the centre of political gravity from London to the industrial North, and giving point to the epigram that what Lancashire thinks to-day England will think to-morrow. Cobden, Bright and their associates were significantly grouped under the name of the "Manchester School".

Peel himself was the last man to wield the mop of Mrs. Partington against this new, rising tide of popular agitation. No sooner was he in the saddle than he embarked on a course of Budgets, two of which he introduced himself, which made such havoc with the protective system that the Corn Laws became more and more of an anomaly. At the same time he converted the Whig deficits into surpluses by a rigorous pursuit of peace and economy, and the imposition of a sevenpenny income tax.

The final crisis came when Ireland was swept by the terrible Black Famine, and something very like a famine was threatened in England. Wellington, in his unfeeling way, said that rotten potatoes had put Peel into his damned fright, but it would be fairer to say that the humane¹ and painfully conscientious Premier was unwilling to allow any theory or party interest to separate one crust of bread from any starving man or woman. He was more than half convinced already by his ministerial experience that the Corn Laws must go. He came out, to the amazed indignation of the old and consistent Tories, and despite the magnificent invective of the more philosophic leader of the young Tories, Benjamin Disraeli, as the opponent of the very system he had taken office to maintain. He saved his personal honour by an offer of resignation, but there was none to take his place, and the Corn Laws, under his auspices and those of the unconvinced but patriotic Wellington, disappeared from the Statute Book.

The enraged die-hards of Peel's own party, subordinating every other consideration to that of revenge, formed an unnatural alliance with the Radicals to get rid of the leader who, they thought, had

¹ As regards men. His humanity stopped short when it was a question of befriending animals.

betrayed them. They succeeded so completely as to split their party from top to bottom and, despite their triumph of five years ago and the brilliant record of their administration, to condemn Toryism to be in a permanent Parliamentary minority so long as a middle class franchise should last. Henceforth a Tory ministry could only exist on sufferance or through the differences of the Whigs.

For twenty-one years, then, from 1846 to 1867, the country continued to be ruled on Whig-Liberal principles, supported by a middle-class electorate, and it is to this period most of all that our thoughts instinctively recur when we speak of Victorianism. Up to 1846, the new electorate had not so completely succeeded in realizing their power as in the subsequent two decades. Henceforth we see the gradual transformation of an aristocratic Whig government by the new leaven of the Manchester school. So long as Russell, the representative man of the great Whig houses, and the old Canningite, Palmerston, remained at the head of affairs, this process was masked, and indeed may be said to have culminated in Gladstone's ministry of 1868, which was formed when the franchise had already departed from the class whose ideals that ministry translated into law.

Looking back at this period of solid respectability, frock-coated and bewhiskered, it must be admitted that if our middle class failed, in the long run, to get at the root of the social evil born of the Industrial Revolution, they at least failed very honourably or, as they themselves would perhaps have preferred to put it, respectably. Very few of them had the least doubt that they had succeeded; and then, and for a long time afterwards, it was the fashion to luxuriate in ecstasies of statistics over the wonderful century, the wonderful reign into which they had been happy enough to be born.

Macaulay had led the fashion. Moving, as he did, in the cultured and brilliant Whig coterie that graced the amenities of Holland House, it was not difficult for him to read into the whole course of our history the triumph of those very principles and that very party which came to their own in 1832. Nor was he altogether wrong for, though he was no lawyer, the Whig principles to which he gave his allegiance were those born of the English Common Law, and despite of gross partiality in his application of them, it may fairly be claimed for him that he had grasped the root of the matter so far as our constitutional progress was concerned. But Macaulay's robust optimism was not limited to the Constitution. Like other men who have very little scientific knowledge, he had an almost boundless faith in the possibilities of science. The celebrated third chapter of

his History, in which he contrasts the England of Charles II with that of Victoria, is an implied panegyric of the almighty god Progress, who has mapped out the landscape into neatly enclosed fields, and dotted it with towns where the wheels of industry never stop. Terribly did he trounce sentimentalists like Southey, who pined after the pretty, rose-covered cottages, the graciousness and sleepy amenities of the old, unprogressive days. But Macaulay had no regrets nor the shadow of a doubt about flinging the reins on the neck of science and letting her gallop off with us to . . . but the Macaulays of this world cannot pause to speculate unpractically about the end of progress. Science heals the sick ; science multiplies the fruits of the earth ; science gives knowledge where philosophy gives a headache ; science—more power to its elbow !—is fated to dispel the mists of poetry with its dry light and quench any frenzy, however fine ; science can deliver us from the cobwebs spun by priestcraft of all denominations ; therefore, pile up the fires of the good ship Progress, down with the helmsman into the stokehold, shovel on the chart with the coal, dismiss the pilot, and let all hands congratulate each other on the unprecedented number of knots an hour at which we are admittedly travelling somewhither !

Macaulay, however, was somewhat in advance of his time, for the full flood tide of optimism does not set in till nearly the middle of the century. The reason for this is not far to seek. Until the middle of the forties the country, still staggering under the burden of her struggle against France, had little enough cause for self-congratulation. The enormous debt involved crushing taxation, and little had been done to diminish it. Even so capitalist an economist as Ricardo had proposed to pay it off by a property tax, or what we should now call a capital levy.¹ Before the forties the dreadful prospect envisaged by Malthus, of population outrunning the means of subsistence, was to some extent realized. Our trade, hampered by the rising tariffs of our European rivals not to speak of our own import duties, showed a painful slowness in expanding. It was not until 1826 that the declared value of our exports topped that of the Waterloo year, 1815, only to drop below it again in '37, '38, '40, and '42. Wages, calculated in real values, had been rising—if we may trust Professor Bowley—during the period 1810–1852, but the rise had been exceedingly slow, and the adjective “ hungry ” that has clung, ever since, to the forties, shows how miserable the condition of the people must have been in the last days of the Corn Laws. The

¹ See *The Capital Levy Explained*, by H. Dalton, p. 24.

evil of insufficient wages was further aggravated by that of chronic unemployment, which to some extent it helped to cause. Goods would be manufactured for foreign markets with which those markets would be periodically glutted, and when this happened the poverty of the masses at home made it impossible for them to create an effective demand for goods of which they were in urgent need.

We should be entering on a region of bitter controversy if we were to speculate how far the improvement in material conditions that undoubtedly took place after the adoption of Free Trade was due to that policy, and how much to other causes that were operating at the same time. But if ever there was a time when England could afford to throw open her ports to foreign goods it was during the fifties and sixties. A boxer, pitted against an exhausted or inferior opponent, may sometimes abandon his guard and go in with both fists, tactics that might prove disastrous in other circumstances.

After 1848 our Continental rivals, who had been gradually creeping up on us, became involved in a cycle of wars, and in the early sixties the progress of the United States was arrested by the fratricidal struggle of North and South. England, during this period, was comparatively little affected by the folly of her Crimean adventure, the tragedy of the Indian Mutiny (for which India had to pay), and a crop of little wars. In the forties she had developed her railway system, despite the prodigal speculation and the complete lack of unified plan with which that development was accompanied. She was in the best position to use her giant strength to maintain the lead—out of all proportion to her natural resources—that she had already obtained in the race for wealth. Accordingly Free Trade became almost a gospel, and what Peel had begun, Gladstone, his profound admirer, pushed to as logical a conclusion as the English nature is capable of pushing anything.

Not only were the ports thrown open to foreign goods, but—what was of almost equal importance—the opportunity for profitable investment was thrown open to any member of the new governing class who had a few savings to embark in productive activity. In 1837 the first act was passed permitting the formation of Limited Liability Companies, and this system was consolidated by the Companies Act of 1862. In the previous year Gladstone, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, had made provision for the investment of the smallest sums saved by the workers, in his establishment of Post Office Savings Banks. Thus was the process completed, which had been begun when first those who had wealth above their

immediate needs had realized that it was better to invest than to hoard, and it now culminated in the practically complete mobilization of the whole surplus capital in the country. Even the children had the opportunity of putting their spare pocket money into the village penny bank.

The machinery for the handling and disposal of capital had all this time been growing in complexity and magnitude. The curious monopoly by which the Bank of England had been protected from the competition of any but private firms within a sixty-five miles' radius was finally abolished in 1883, and a number of great joint stock banks sprang up, centring in the Bank of England, and depositing their reserves therein. Thus the Bank became the support of a highly centralized system, the keystone of the arch of British finance, and its own position was secured on a permanent basis by Peel's Bank Charter Act of 1844, which separated the Issue from the Banking department, and provided that no notes should be issued, above a certain fixed amount, without a cash equivalent. It was characteristically English that the whole success of this law depended on the fact that at an urgent crisis ministers, who were no more above the law than bankers, might authorize the directors to break it in the faith that Parliament would indemnify them. It was a graver defect of our banking system that it actually helped to precipitate crises by the fact that the Bank of England naturally tended to lower its rate of interest during periods of speculative optimism, thereby promoting the very evil a wise policy should have sought to check, and then to raise the rate steeply on the first signs of a panic, thereby precipitating a smash. For in spite of its vast responsibilities the Bank continued to be, not a department of the State, but a money-making concern. The price of this individualism was paid in a woeful accentuation of unemployment and the miseries attendant on recurring shocks to our financial system, even though these tended to become somewhat less catastrophic during the second half of the century.

But, for good or evil, individualism was having its innings, though not nearly so completely as the more rigid economists would have desired. For it is seldom that any theory whatever is pushed to its logical conclusion in England. In the middle of the century the conditions for the free play of individual energy and competition, postulated in the textbooks, prevailed to a much larger extent than in our own days of trusts and huge limited liability companies. Many of the employers were still self-made men, and the hard conditions

that had obtained for the thirty years or so after the war had not provided them with the temptation to rest on their oars and take their prosperity for granted. They were possessed, for the most part, with the straightforward desire to dispose of their goods in any fair and open market, and to excel their competitors either by quality or cheapness. Such monopolistic forms of enterprise as the working of concessions, the exploiting of industrially backward peoples by usury, and the formation of vast business amalgamations, were as yet in their infancy.

The conditions were all in our favour. There was, during these years, a marked tendency on the Continent to adopt free trade principles, and the mid-century epidemic of wars in itself created a demand for British clothes to cover and arms to destroy the men thus drawn from productive labour. The colonies, which were just beginning to find their feet as self-governing communities, created another group of eager markets for the goods of the old country. By means not the most scrupulous, the peoples of India and the Far East were brought or retained in the orbit of our business activities. England was now sending out her manufactured goods to every quarter of the globe, and receiving in exchange the food and raw products necessary to her activities. She was not altogether unjustified in her boast of being the workshop of the world, and could, in fact, force the world to employ her, for the time, on terms highly advantageous to herself. In no respect had she profited more by free trade and the final repeal of the Navigation Laws than in respect of her shipbuilding industry, and now that iron ships were replacing wooden ones, her available mineral resources and the skill of her engineers placed her in a position of uncontested supremacy, especially when her chief rival, the United States, chose to commit temporary hari-kari.

This was not the end of England's advantages, for the enormous amount of surplus wealth she accumulated in these halcyon days of her industry made it natural for other peoples, trying to catch up with her development, to come to her for the necessary capital, machinery, and technical ability to start it. The result was that England became what is known as a creditor nation, and London a sort of universal clearing house. England was therefore attracting to herself a steadily increasing stream of wealth for services rendered, and much of this wealth was available for providing employment at home. All the statistics of this time tell the same tale of almost fabulous increase. Exports of British goods, which

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were less in 1840 than they were in 1815, had considerably more than doubled by 1855, quadrupled by 1864, and increased nearly fivefold by 1870 ! Other figures are to match.

It was no wonder that the ordinary Englishman of this time should have felt much in the mood of Nebuchadnezzar when he surveyed great Babylon which he had built to his glory. He had, by every measurable standard, made a stupendous success of things generally. In a distracted world he had held up a standard of peaceful and ordered progress. Freedom, in the words of his favourite poet, had broadened down from precedent to precedent, until the work of 1867 crowned that of 1832. He could point to a long series of reforming legislation ; to the early Factory Acts gradually expanded into a great code humanizing the conditions of labour ; to the work of Romilly, consummated by the reform of the Penal Law ; to that of Martin, crowned by the general protection afforded to domestic animals and the abolition of certain brutal sports, though not yet those of tormenting hares and carted stags ; to the more merciful treatment of debtors ; to the Public Health Act of 1848, which set up central and local organizations for combating insanitary conditions ; to the reform of the Civil Service from 1850-1870, which went a certain way to purge the executive from the blight of " influence ", and to prevent the development of anything like the American Spoils System ; to the rapid and beneficent advance in municipal self-government that had followed on the Act of 1835.

What must have seemed one of the most pleasing features of all was the general abeyance of class hatred and conflict. Chartism was no longer a force to be reckoned with after the fiasco of 1848, and the more militant and revolutionary forms of working class activity died down in the general increase of prosperity. Prices were certainly rising as a result of the new discoveries of gold, but wages more than kept pace with them, and there is no doubt, despite the propagandist assertion of Karl Marx to the contrary, that the workman had his share—though whether an adequate or just one is another question—in the general increase in prosperity. As for the unemployment that continued to dog the progress of industry, it was certainly less acute than during the first half of the century, and the generally booming trade tended to keep it within manageable limits. There was certainly no such sense of acute grievance among the workers as there had been at the time of Peterloo or in the late thirties.

The workers had also made the discovery that by limiting their

aims they might obtain more beneficent results to themselves. The glowing, idealistic schemes of Robert Owen had gone out of fashion ; the self-subsisting communities of co-operating workers had failed to pay their way, and the ideas of a universal Trades Union, and of the workers taking over the control of production, had proved, for the nonce, impracticable. The Trades Unions of the fifties and sixties were generally content to confine themselves to getting the best conditions possible in their own trades, and organizing themselves on business lines, with a permanent staff of officials. For all practical purposes, they dropped the idea of altering the framework of society, and accepted the capitalist system as a condition of the game. Meanwhile, the development of workmen's co-operative societies, which was thoroughly in accordance with the most orthodox political economy, was an impressive example of the power of the ordinary man to help himself without invoking the State. A few workers of Rochdale, undeterred by a previous failure in their native town, clubbed together to start a co-operative stores in Toad Lane. Either guided by their own Lancastrian shrewdness or warned by the fate of their predecessors, they decided to run the enterprise on severely business lines, making profits depend on purchases and not on ideals. The success of this venture made it the model for co-operative societies that sprang up all over England and Scotland, gradually widening and linking together their activities, until their membership came to be numbered by millions, to the great material benefit of the workers, and an increase, not to be reckoned by statistics, in their power of combination and self-help, when the time should come to revive the discarded ambitions of previous years.

It must be admitted that an advocate of the middle class, which the first Reform Bill had raised to power, could put up an exceedingly plausible defence. So distinguished an observer as Lecky pronounces that " the world has never seen a better Constitution than England enjoyed between the Reform Bill of 1832 and the Reform Bill of 1867. Very few parliamentary governments have included more talent, or represented more faithfully the various interests and opinions of a great nation, or maintained under many trying circumstances a higher level of political purity and patriotism ".¹ This is high praise, yet he would be a bold man who should pronounce it extravagant. For the middle class was by no means uncompromisingly disposed to use its power in the only way in which, according to some of their own philosophers, any class could use it, that is to say in a spirit of more or less enlightened egotism.

¹ *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i, p. 21.

There was indeed enough of this spirit about, both in statesmen and private citizens. It is a distinct shock when we find a man like John Bright opposing the intervention of the State to humanize conditions in factories, and when we remember that John Bright himself was an employer as well as a reformer, we are momentarily, at any rate, reminded of those earlier nonconformists who

"Compound for sins they are inclined to
By damning those they have no mind to,"

but then we must remember that Bright was doing his best, indirectly, to remedy the conditions of labour by constantly agitating for a transfer of electoral predominance from his own class to that of the workers. We cannot condone so readily the constant efforts of employers to prevent their workmen from combining, nor the prejudice which trades unionists had too good reason to complain of in the administration of the law in cases of trade disputes. And the hideous brick walls of the Poor Law Bastilles still marred the landscape with their insolent denial of Christ's Golden Rule in the relations of man to man.

There was enough and to spare of selfishness and tyranny, and the improvement was only relative—even in the good years there was a percentage, somewhere about four per cent, of unemployment, and there was an amount of squalor and misery beneath the surface from which the imagination shrinks. But the governing class of those days was, as ordinary human nature goes, surprisingly humane and broadminded. They believed in individualism, and on the whole subscribed to the doctrine of every man for himself and devil take the hindmost. But they were no doctrinaires—Englishmen seldom are. Their reign was marked by some measures of reform which, like the Factory Acts, were diametrically opposed to the extreme tenets of the classical economists. Nor were they selfish monopolists of power. They freely conceded the right of the aristocracy to bear a leading part in the work of government, and nearly all the most advanced of their intellectual leaders were keenly in sympathy with the claims of the workers to a share in the franchise. One of the most indignant denunciations of working-class patience came from the lips of Cobden, and when Gladstone talked of social forces moving onward, irresistibly, in their might and majesty, he was prophesying, in his grand manner, an extension of the franchise. And this middle class Liberalism kept on gathering force, until some further measure of Reform than that of 1832 became inevitable.

Even if, in the light of subsequent events, we have to decide that

the apparent prosperity of the mid-Victorian epoch was deceptive, that the day of reckoning for a civilization that valued the meat above the life and the raiment above the body had only been postponed, we can at least apply to our frock-coated predecessors the epitaph chosen for himself by one of their greatest : " Here lies a generation that tried to do its duty."

3

ROMANCE TRIUMPHANT

The year 1830, which we fixed as opening the second act of the tragedy " From Vienna to Versailles ", signalizes the oncoming of what we may call the second wave of the great Emotional Revival, a movement that might have seemed, to an observer of that time, as if it had already spent its force.

Both in England and on the Continent the great Romantics of the late eighteenth and dawning nineteenth centuries had ceased to create. Goethe, the greatest of them all, was, in his Olympian old age, in conscious reaction against the Romanticism of his youth. Heine and Victor Hugo and Delacroix had begun to display their genius, and Chopin, though only twenty, had made his mark as a composer, but these were stars hardly yet risen above the horizon mists. In Britain Scott and the Lake Poets survived, but they had little more to say ; the spirit of the time had already ceased to blow where they listed. In religion, always a touchstone of the English mind, the Low Church and Methodist movements had lost the glow of their primitive enthusiasm. The Evangelicals had learnt tactics, they had become less anxious about saving souls than cornering benefices for their party, and, as Dean Church puts it, they were on very easy terms with the world. Respectability of a rather formal kind had come to be their watchword, a narrow and colourless virtue from which charity was too often eliminated. None the less they continued to exercise a great and in many ways a beneficent influence in the inculcation of such virtue and purity as they were capable of understanding.

What distinguishes much of the early Romanticism is the facility with which it lends itself to purposes of reaction. Scott, like De Quincey and " Christopher North ", was so much of a Tory as to come, at times, perilously near to being a toady ; the Lakers, as Byron reminded them, turned out Tory at last ; the Evangelicals were more inclined to inculcate patience than revolution. In France-

the connection between Romance and reaction had been one of peculiar intimacy. Not even the Revolution could curb the posthumous tyranny of Racine and Boileau in the realm of letters; the regicide painter, David, carried the classic tradition to the extreme limits of pedantry, and his mantle fell upon that most gifted of draughtsmen, his pupil Ingres; in philosophy the most fashionable school of Napoleonic times favoured a dry and unimaginative rationalism; only among the still faithful supporters of Divine Right and the Bourbon lilies was the Romantic impulse stirring.

But now, in 1820, the Gallic cock, in Heine's expressive phrase, crows twice, and Paris becomes "the New Jerusalem of Liberalism". The dykes and dams of the classical tradition are swept away, not without trouble, for so high does feeling run that Victor Hugo is in actual danger of his life from the adherents of the old tradition—the performance of his *Hernani* converts the theatre into a nightly battle-ground of Classic and Romantic. The triumph of the latter is, for the next few years, at any rate, overwhelming, a swaggering and flamboyant Romanticism, harking back to the Renaissance and rife with the clash of swords and the passions of splendid *amoureuuses*. Characteristically French in its mode of expression, the Romanticism of 1830 is nevertheless greatly indebted to English influence. Byron was nowhere more potent than in France; it was the name of Shakespeare that became the rallying cry for those opposed to the dominance of Racine; the master painters who were to dominate the salons of the thirties had gone to school with Turner, with Constable, and with Bonington.

"In France," said Heine, "the sun of liberty flames ever more powerfully and illumines the whole world with its rays!" France was now, like Heine himself, predominantly bourgeois, and indeed the Romantic spirit seems to have had a peculiar affinity with the middle class. This is equally true of England, despite exceptions like Byron and Shelley, on the one hand, and Cobbett on the other, but then Byron at least was always straining back after the classic tradition, and Shelley's susceptible mind was early moulded by the influence of the thoroughly middle-class Godwins. But it was among the aristocracy that the old eighteenth century tradition lingered longest, and their favourite organs of opinion, the *Quarterly* and *Blackwood*, were perpetually emptying buckets of cold and often dirty water on any rising flames of emotional genius. On the other hand the working class, as soon as it came to have ideas of its own, lost little time in breaking away from a spirit essentially bourgeois,

until in Karl Marx it found a prophet and a doctrine of unrelenting and deliberately justified materialism. This struck deeper roots than the Romantic idealism of the middle-class Owen.

It is therefore during the period of bourgeois Liberalism in Western Europe that the Romantic movement enters upon its second and most influential phase. Before the thirties it had been Romance militant, now, for a season, it is Romance triumphant. In France, as Mr. Haldane Macfall puts it, "men thought awhile as though castles were on every hill, and rapiers on every hip, and women became love-lorn damsels, sighing for dangerous adventure," while in England, to adopt a happy extravagance of Mr. Chesterton's, it was a time of "inspired office boys". It was a time when young ladies used to go into ecstasies over the memory of Lord Byron; when they used to fill their albums with the chaste but soulful compliments of adorers in side-whiskers; when every occasion had its decently stereotyped emotion that it was almost improper not to display in public; the time when virgins, below a certain age, were almost indecently virginal, and fathers inhumanly portentous. We can see in those faded daguerreotypes that were the firstfruits of photographic science how exactly everybody had to pose in conformity with the appropriate sentiment, how tenderly the shrew would look up into the face of her henpecked lord, and how lovingly some grandfather, the terror of his family, would—and we are thinking of an actual instance—exhibit a plundered bird's nest to the terrified little boy who had been captured and forced, under menace of dire punishment, into the Presence.

It was by his perfect harmony with this spirit that Alfred Tennyson—his first independent book of poems was published in the momentous year 1830—commanded such an extravagant admiration among his own contemporaries, and has been so strangely depreciated in our own day. It is, significantly enough, by some of his pieces that sound most impossible in our own unromantic ears that his work was once chiefly prized. One hesitates between nausea and a guffaw on reading the Lord of Burleigh's programme for an ideal honeymoon:

"Let us see these handsome houses
Where the wealthy nobles dwell."

The dream world of these English Romantics was at once less exciting and less disreputable than that conjured up on the other side of the Channel. It was a world of stately homes, standing beautiful, as Mrs. Hemans has it,

" Amidst their tall ancestral trees
Through all the pleasant land,"

a world of great and bountiful gentlefolk, of white, Lawrence-faced ladies, "cruelly meek," in costumes appropriate to the selected period, of simple yeomen, of apple-cheeked millers, of light-hearted shepherdesses, and of a well-fed and behaved peasantry who divided their time between dancing round maypoles and serving their betters with manly devotion. It was an England easy for a prosperous bourgeois, particularly if he lived in towns and came little into contact with peasants, to wax exceedingly patriotic about. And a robustuous patriotism accordingly flourishes at this time, especially among those whom the real or fancied omnipotence of a British navy commanded by jolly sea-dogs and manned by equally jolly Jack Tars preserved from any peril of death by battle,

" Is it peace or war ? better, war ! loud war by land and by sea,
War with a thousand battles and shaking a hundred thrones ! "

This, at any rate, was one English aspect of what we have ventured to call Romance Triumphant, and it is this sentimentality that most irritates us, of a very different age, about the early Victorians. But it would be as unwise as it would be ungenerous to judge them as if they were nothing but sentimentalists, to talk of Tennyson, for instance, as if he were a mere minstrel of country-house drawing-rooms, or an unconscious court-jester who could see between the whiskers of the Prince Consort the majestic lineaments of King Arthur. *The Idiot Boy* and Wilkinson's spade could no more prevent Wordsworth becoming one of the supreme poets of the English language, than his most luscious lyrical *bonnes-bouches* could prevent Tennyson ; and our middle class was enabled, in spite of its eccentricities, to make the period of its dominance almost as fruitful in the realm of mind as in that of matter.

There is one respect in which English Romance is especially distinguished from that which centred in Paris. This might have been described by a friendly critic as its moral earnestness, though one less favourably disposed might have called it sententious respectability. The truth probably lies somewhere between the two, but how characteristic is this quality of England, at this time, is shown by the impossibility of imagining Tennyson, or any other English poet before Swinburne, being allowed to turn his sentimentality into such channels as the *Rolla* of that typical French Romantic, de Musset, who devotes the long poem of that name to describing how a young rake, having decided to commit suicide on

the expiration of his funds, devotes his last night and last coin to purchasing the seduction of an innocent girl, who comes to love him in the morning with a reciprocated but foredoomed tenderness.

This interesting young couple would have never done for an English audience. Over the whole of our literature at this time broods the invisible but latent domination of the young female, for whose eyes everything had got to be fit. Even the fires of passion must be lowered to the temperature of Christmas snapdragons; even Charlotte Brontë is not found pure in the sight of the critical inquisition. A startling reaction sets in against the gay way of life patronized by George, the Prince Regent. Pierce Egan, who wrote such a fascinating account, in his *Life in London*, of the three typical Regency bucks, Tom, Jerry and Logic, finds himself compelled, on writing a sequel, no later than 1828, to conciliate his public by bringing all the principal characters—save Jerry, who embraces the joys of virtuous matrimony and a reformed life—to the bad ends apportioned to the wicked of improving fiction.

It is therefore not wholly warrantable to ascribe the militant respectability of the early Victorians to the accession of a girl queen, though there is no doubt that Victoria, like her son after her, confirmed the dominance of what was already coming to be the spirit of the age. Despite her tuition by that genial cynic, Lord Melbourne, the determined little lady had the good fortune to represent, with extraordinary fidelity, the contemporary ideal of middle-class womanhood. So thoroughly did she set about purifying the Augean stable of her predecessors, that she allowed an innocent lady of her court to be driven into the grave by dint of insult and groundless scandal. Her stern sense of duty and the complete irreproachability of her private life were unenlivened by one sparkle of humour, and despite her proficiency in drawing-room accomplishments, she was at heart and in sensibility a true Queen of the Philistines. And she married a husband who, though a worthy and soulful man not lacking in wisdom of a sort, possessed that heaviness of touch which is almost inseparable from German culture.

Victoria and Albert, between them, no doubt exercised a powerful influence in enforcing external conformity to a young-ladylike standard of art and conduct. But the true cause of this change of spirit, or at any rate of form, is not to be sought in the personality of any sovereign, however masterful. The great Evangelical movement, which had played so prominent a part in the British phase of the Emotional Revival, was now beginning to reap its

harvest. Not only had it permeated the middle class but, in its Anglican form, had captured a large portion of the aristocracy. The head of the House of Nevill—to take one typical instance—was at this time a Low Church country parson, a god-fearing man whose outlook and way of life would have been unimaginable to a *grand seigneur* of the preceding century. We know of another instance of an important Tory squire who was in the habit of reading one of the Church homilies, every Sunday, to his long-suffering family. Over the middle class, Nonconformity, reinforced by Methodism, disputed with the Church for predominance, and the austere ugliness of family life under such auspices has been described in innumerable treatises.

The Evangelical Revival, at this time when it had attained the maximum of its power, had outlived its first enthusiasm. It could produce no leaders to compare with those of the newly-started Oxford Movement. Its lack of ideas, its complacent provincialism, were more pronounced than ever. The lost tribes were discovered in England; the poor Holy Father became more lurid and sulphurous than ever; the End of the World knocked at the door with deafening insistence. And it may be doubted whether the external conformity to the demands of the “unco’ guid” was reflected by an equally extensive change of heart or even of habit, once the forbidden thing could be decently veiled from sight. Such queer sidelights on the Victorians as we get in Lady Cardigan’s frank memoirs suggest that ringlets and a crinoline no more made the virtuous lady than the habit makes the monk. In the noonday of Victorianism, ladies of easy virtue, like the celebrated Anonyma, flaunted in the park attended by bevies of what Sir William Hardman described as “lewd guardsmen of the baser sort”. And there are not many families, nowadays, but can point to a black sheep in the shade of some disreputable great-uncle or the like who flourished in the very heyday of propriety. Peers and statesmen were not above resorting to the Coal Hole to attend the court of “Chief Baron Nicholson”, an entertainment whose chief attraction consisted in its indecency. Rabelaisian toasts and humour were rife in masculine intercourse. The illicit indulgence of carnal affection was, like smoking, a practice to be carried on out of sight and cognizance of the ladies under a genteel conspiracy of silence. For a Prince of Wales to flaunt his amours at Brighton, like the Regent George, would seriously have endangered the throne—there was a decency to be preserved in these matters if nothing else.

None the less it would be unjust to speak as if all this moral discipline were merely the whitewashing of a sepulchre of corruption. The strength of Puritanism has always lain in the strengthening and concentration of will, and though the nineteenth century phase of it was not to be compared for intensity with the Calvinism of the seventeenth, it certainly played no small part in making the early Victorian age what it was—pre-eminently one of copious and solid achievement. For the Victorians, whatever their defects of taste and form, were veritable gluttons for work. They poured forth volume after volume with inexhaustible fecundity; in Parliament they delivered and endured set speeches lasting for hours—Palmerston defended his policy from the dusk of one day to the dawn of another, and held the House in breathless attention; in tropic climes they performed prodigies of endurance in stuffy clothes and without sunproof headgear, dancing on merrily through the height of an Indian summer in stations where modern ladies, if they ever dared come down from the hills, would be too helplessly prostrated to walk. Those little, round-faced Floras and Carolines may have turned out worsted work, embroidery, poker-work, fancy wood-carving, nature sketches and suchlike pretty geegaws in the time that their great-grandchildren would have devoted to cutting divots and drinking dust on the carriers of motor cycles, but they would, from the Queen downwards, have blushed to shrink from the annual task of contributing to those enormous broods, the mere thought of which would horrify any but a working class mother of to-day. And of such came the Brontës, and Elizabeth Barrett Browning, and Florence Nightingale, and Victoria herself.

The importance of being earnest may have been harped on by the Victorians in a way peculiarly annoying to an age so suspicious of any sort of solemnity as our own. But earnest they were, with a capacity for sustained effort that is the quality most needful of all for work that is fitted to endure. Many a modern exquisite will indicate, with a dry tolerance, the foibles of these Victorians; he will rally them for their pretentiousness, their frequent lack of humour, their often execrable taste, their unrestrained prolixity, their blatant insularity, their superficial habits of thought, their trapless drains, their horsehair, their oleos, their Sundays, and then, having thanked God that he is not like great-grandpapa, he sits down in the light of knowledge to produce . . . but we shall have forgotten what it was this time next year, and Dickens and Tennyson and Trollope and the rest of them will continue to line our shelves with

their smug-looking, substantial volumes—and the shelves of our children to the last literate generation.

It may be a form of spiritual long-sightedness that makes men more appreciative of the past than the present, but is there one of us who seriously believes that what Emerson called “character” and the Roman “*gravitas*” is so conspicuous among ourselves as it was in the days of Peel, of Gladstone, of Florence Nightingale, of Darwin, of Thomas Arnold, of Outram, of the Lawrences, of Shaftesbury, of John Bright, of Newman; as it was when the Prince Consort opened that Great Exhibition of 1851 which was fondly believed to usher in a Millennium of peaceful industry, and when “the Duke”—he needed no other appellation—was still a familiar figure, stiffly acknowledging the homage of passers-by in Hyde Park?

4

ROMANCE IN STONE

To get out of the realities of a prosaic and industrialized present into a dream of ancient colour and emotion was an almost universal instinct of the Romantics. But at first they showed little discrimination in their choice of a past. Despite the traditional opposition between Romantic and Classic, many undoubted Romantics went back to Greece and Rome for their inspiration. Walter Savage Landor wrote with equal facility of Gebir and the Orient, and of Greek gods and Sicilian shepherdesses. The more earnestly he strove after the Classic form the more truly did he display the spirit of a Romantic, so unlike the heavy Classicism of the eighteenth century, and so exactly expressive of Landor's own proud and fastidious personality.

It is in architecture that this Romantic straining after an exact Classicism was most pronounced, especially after the British imagination had been fired by the spectacle of the newly acquired Elgin marbles from the Parthenon. We have only to take our stand at Hyde Park Corner to have the evidences of it all round us, including Westmacott's bronze Achilles, which is not Achilles at all, but a crib from one of the Horse Tamers on the Roman Quirinal. A Roman triumphal arch, straight out of the Forum and tidied up a little on the way, was dumped down by Nash at the entrance of Buckingham Palace, and subsequently shifted to the Oxford Street entrance of Hyde Park. In the same spirit Inwood contrived to erect a passably accurate Erechtheum, not to Erectheus but to Christ,

at St. Pancras, and then to complete the monstrosity by shoving a Tower of the Winds on top of it, and a smaller replica, presumably of the breezes, on top of that.

This taste attained its height during the Regency, as indeed we have standing witness in Carlton House Terrace, and the houses lining the South side of Regent's Park, with their statuary and Corinthian columns and tympana—the very word Corinthian is associated with the genteel modes of this time. But the Romantic spirit could not move freely in this inappropriate garb, the Classical architects of the time could only copy, and were totally unable to evolve, like those of the eighteenth century, a style of their own. A better way was shown by Sir Charles Barry, the designer of the new Houses of Parliament, who stands above the other English architects of his century as easily as Wren, Gibbs and Lutyens. Barry was too great a genius to copy anything to style, though his natural tendency was to favour the Renaissance. The highest tribute to his genius is that contained in *Social England*, though it is meant for something more like a sneer. "The whole thing," remarks its architectural expert, "is modern to the core," and this is all the more creditable to Barry from the fact that he would not have been allowed to design it at all unless he had done so in outward conformity with the style of Henry VII's chapel on the other side of the street. Like St. Paul's, the Houses of Parliament form a living record of their age and its spirit. It is a proud building, this temple of constitutional liberty, even to the point of being purseproud; it has neither the frank materialism of St. Paul's nor the virile aspiration of Westminster Hall; aspire it does, after a fashion, but not too passionately nor too high; it is imposing without calm, magnificent, but lacking in that strong simplicity which only comes from a philosophy of life thought out to the end. And the Victorians, for all their assurance, were like their laureate's King Arthur, in that they saw not to the close, nor, in their heart of hearts, did they desire so uncomfortable a vision.

Associated with Barry in this his master work—though to how great an extent is a matter of bitter dispute—was the younger Pugin, the son of a French designer-architect by an English mother. This man had divined, with an almost passionate conviction, in what form the Romantic spirit must find its appropriate expression. It had nothing in common with the calm intellectuality of the Greek, and not much with the Renaissance greed of life; it preferred feeling intensely to thinking keenly. This, to Pugin's mind, pointed straight

to Gothic, which appealed to him as being the natural style of Christianity—he himself became a convert to the Church of Rome. But the Christianity of the Middle Ages was at once coarser and stronger than the revived product of the nineteenth century. The new Gothic was itself an imitation, too often scamped and tawdry, of a magic whose secret was not to be recovered. As Mr. Statham, in his fine article on modern architecture in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, remarks of Pugin, “he seems to have entirely lost sight of the solidity and genuineness of material in the medieval architecture which he was trying to emulate or to outvie. So long as he could get his effect of height, his poetic interior, he was content to have thin walls and plaster vaults and ornaments; or, in other words, he spent upon height what should first have been spent on solid and monumental building.” None the less was he right in preferring the style of an age to which his own was at least sentimentally akin, to that of one to which it was directly antipathetic.

A Christian architecture was, in fact, a need of the time, for the bleak and austere religion of the Evangelicals no longer sufficed for the Romantic longing after colour and emotional stimulus. The same impulse which had produced the more extreme forms of Evangelicalism, like the cult of Johanna Southcott, found more genteel expression in the Swedenborgian Church which was established in England about 1810, and was to some extent the forerunner of modern theosophy. In 1829 we have the foundation of the so-called Catholic and Apostolic Church, a community of wealthy people who met together, with great fervour, at Hatton Gardens, and evolved an ornate and emotional ritual, deeply tinged with mysticism, under a picturesque hierarchy of apostles, angels, elders and so forth. It was appropriate that when they came to build a metropolitan temple for themselves at Gordon Square, it should, thanks to the operation of the tithe system on a community of prosperous enthusiasts, and the architectural genius of Brandon and Ritchie, have proved the one of all modern Gothic buildings that comes ‘nearest to inspiration. Its heaven-aspiring lines, the dim, religious light that suffuses its gorge-like interior, its old-world cloisters, make it a place for dreaming endless dreams, though not perhaps for seeing visions and certainly not for calm or consecutive thought. It is the very quintessence of the Romantic spirit.

It is not to the churches and public monuments that we should look for the most characteristic, or the most successful specimens

of Victorian architecture. Man creates in the image of his own soul, and the Victorian was most in earnest when it was a question of increasing man's command over matter. The great Gothic manifesto of the New Law Courts leaves us cold, and the Albert Memorial is a journalist's cockshy,¹ but few unprejudiced people will dispute that the Clifton Suspension Bridge is a noble and satisfying piece of work, while even that far from beautiful structure, the Albert Bridge at Battersea, is as full of character as the suburban Gothic churches are insipid. The enormous glass house, that the Duke of Devonshire's head gardener designed to cover the Great Exhibition, and which he reconstructed as the Crystal Palace, represents, whether we like it or not, a new departure in construction that the Bolsheviks, when they hit upon something similar, seventy years later, acclaimed as the emancipation of building from rigidity, and the coming of an architecture free to expand in the dimension Time.

The Victorian was pre-eminently the railway age, and it is natural that the railway construction, which transformed the face of the landscape, should figure among its most characteristic products. Where the railway companies tried consciously to achieve beauty, they could only perpetrate horrors like the portico that casts its gloom over travellers arriving at Euston. But where they were frankly utilitarian, as in their viaducts and bridges, in the long sweeping parallel of the rails, with its attendant telegraph poles and signals, now cleaving its way through the shade of cuttings and into the dark of tunnels, now raised above the landscape on embankments and arcades, they achieved results as grand, in their kind, as the roads and aqueducts of the Caesars.

5

THE NEW HIGH CHURCHMANSHIP

It was in Oxford that Romanticism, not in alliance with but in passionate opposition to the prevailing Liberalism, was to attain its most complete expression. Both the ancient universities were beginning to awaken from their long sleep of the eighteenth century. In Cambridge had arisen a group of brilliant young Liberals, nicknamed apostles, of whom Tennyson and his friend Hallam were distinguished members. But to the Common Rooms of Oxford

¹ The most ponderous missile being that of Mr. Lytton Strachey, who must needs drag in the bronze Albert's irrelevant tonnage.

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the spirit of progress could not penetrate ; she turned her eyes, as in quest of a truth that alters not with centuries, back to the past, to the years of faith and authority. She heard the surge and tumult of triumphant Liberalism as the courtiers in the Tuileries, on that August night of 1792, had heard the tocsin ringing from all the steeples in Paris. And it was in no craven fear that her defenders looked to the priming of their antique weapons.

They had an instinct, certain of these academic gentlemen in orders, that all was not well with the new age. But shut off, as they were, from the business of the world, their thoughts did not turn readily to Lancashire cotton mills, to enclosed commons, and Poor Law Bastilles. These thoughts ran more naturally in the old-established grooves, and while instinct warned them that something was rotten in the state of England, habit impelled them to look for it through ecclesiastical glasses. Talented as most of them were, they were a singularly narrow-minded group, bitterly intolerant on principle. The excellent Keble, author of *The Christian Year*, rather than cross the threshold of a suspected Liberal, preferred to spend a few Christian minutes on the doorstep.

Yet Keble was, in his way, a scholar of profound erudition, and set up for the new movement a standard unknown to the Evangelicals. It was scholarship of a kind strange enough in a progressive age. These Oxford dons might be blissfully ignorant of the universe around and the earth beneath them ; history meant little more to them than the vilifying of deceased opponents, particularly of the Protestant Reformers ; but they knew everything, except perhaps what was most worth knowing, about the Fathers of the Church, and ancient controversies and hair-splittings on points of dogma. They were capable of celebrating with pious lamentations the martyrdom of Charles I, and of rapturous thanksgiving for the Restoration of that martyr's far from edifying son. Their pious tears bedewed the memory of a feudalism that they innocently imagined to have reposed

“on the cheerful homage of a land
Unskilled in treason,”

and they might have taken for their motto, “Ring in the old, ring out the new.”

This craving of the moth for old clothes and of the night for the day before, though it may adorn itself with scholarship, has its roots in the heart. These Oxonians hated the ugliness, the blatancy, and the unkindness of the age into which they had been born. They

had neither the knowledge nor the creative ability to get to the roots of the evil and make the required adjustment of civilization to its new conditions. The very atmosphere in which they lived and the training they had received made them fly to a past that seemed as restful and gracious, by comparison with the present, as the spires and quadrangles of their own university. The movement had all the fervour and some of the ineffectiveness characteristic of Romance.

But there was an aspect of it that was practical enough. The Oxford revivalists were, for the most part, in orders, and a clergyman's career was beginning, in the heyday of Liberalism, to offer fewer and fewer attractions to a man of culture and honourable ambition. The Whigs, whom the Reform Bill had placed in power, had little sympathy with anything savouring of priestcraft, and it appeared quite probable to men who had not yet come to know the arch-reformer as Finality Jack, and who saw the new age typified by the gargoyle-like physiognomy of Brougham, that the Church itself might go the way of the rotten boroughs. Never was a more cogent appeal made at once to temporal apprehensions and spiritual pride than that formulated by Newman in the first of the *Tracts for the Times*, published in 1833 :—

“Should the Government and Country so far forget their God as to cast off the Church, to deprive it of its temporal honours and substance, *on what*,” he asks his fellow clergymen, “will you rest the claim of respect and attention which you make on your flocks? Hitherto you have been upheld by your birth, your education, your wealth, your connections; should these secular advantages cease, on what must Christ's ministers depend? Is not this a serious practical question? We know how miserable is the state of religious bodies not supported by the State. Look at the Dissenters on all sides of you, and you will see at once that their ministers, depending simply on the people, become the *creatures* of the people.”

The spirit of the age was thus at variance with the Church, and the alarm had now gone out to Churchmen against that new, conquering Liberalism. Newman, years afterwards, formulated in a series of lucid propositions exactly what it was that he and his friends held anathema. They denied, for instance, the right of Private Judgment; they denied that Christianity can ever be modified by the growth of civilization; they denied the validity of scientific conclusions as against revealed doctrines; they affirmed the duty of the State to persecute blasphemers and sabbath-breakers, but they denied its competence to dictate to the Church or to

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sequester its property; they denied the right of resistance to established authority and of the people to choose their own rulers; they abominated the idea that education, decent conditions, and the arts of life, can make people moral or happy.

Thus equipped, they might have ended by creating no more than a storm in a few parsonage teacups, had it not been that they included, in John Henry Newman, one who happened to be equipped with an intellect second to none of his age in power and subtle discrimination. Newman is almost unique among Englishmen in his capacity for remorseless logic; nothing short of a complete and consistent philosophy would serve his purpose.¹ He flung himself into the Oxford movement and provided it with its intellectual spearpoint. While Keble was fussing, like an agitated hen over the disappearance of an egg, about the Whigs cutting down the episcopal staff of the Protestant Church with which we had burdened Catholic Ireland, Newman was providing the Church of England with a doctrine and discipline the like of which had not been dreamed of since Laud's splendid failure to make her what Rome had been in the past. For the crude Evangelical psychology of elect and damned he substituted one more scientific and of subtler gradations; he eschewed constant purgatives of religious excitement, and looked to what amounted to a discipline of mind-training under the supervision of a skilled and authoritative priesthood.

This was, indeed, the most important contribution that the High Church revivalists had to offer towards the solution of the grand problem of readjustment for which, as they instinctively felt, Victorian Liberalism was worse than inadequate. They at least realized that what was most needed was not to increase wealth but to improve men. But the conditions of the nineteenth century were not those of the Middle Ages, and Oxford had only an old, though a dignified and picturesque answer, to give to a new question.

It was impossible that Newman, with whom it was ever all or nothing, should cling for long to what he himself called the *via media* of the Anglican Church. If such a man is not to give way to complete scepticism he must find refuge in a complete and impregnable system of authority, a denial of reason that must first satisfy reason of its validity. And the road of No Compromise

¹ Of all Mr. Lytton Strachey's strangely conventional judgments on the Victorians, none succeeds in more exactly reversing the truth than that on Newman as "a creature of emotion and sentiment", one who, under happier circumstances, might have risen to following in the footsteps of—Gray!

certainly does not end at Canterbury. It was, then, a blow that might have been expected by Churchmen, when first W. G. Ward, an even more uncompromising logician than Newman, and finally Newman himself, were received into what to the Evangelicals was the bosom of the Scarlet Woman.

Newman no doubt owed his affection for the ancient beauty of holiness to the Romantic influence to which he, as a poet, was peculiarly sensitive, but it was the logician and not the Romanticist in him that drove him to sever his connection with all that he held dear, and take refuge—if it could be found—at the feet of Peter. It was a starved and bereaved Romantic who was found, at the gate of his old Church at Littlemore, weeping his heart out over days never to return, but this was not the side of Newman that determined his onwards course, and made the Pope and his politic satellites regard their great convert as less of an acquisition than a danger.

“He thinks too much, such men are dangerous.”

For Rome herself was hardly strong or comprehensive enough to contain an intellect so vast and honest as Newman's. Intensely deductive as that intellect was, you felt that its whole beautifully interconnected system of faith and philosophy hung by a thread, and—if that thread were to break! It sagged ominously; did not Huxley discover a complete agnostic catechism buried in Newman's writings, and did not Newman, carried away on the wings of his own splendid eloquence, once permit himself to use language of passionate protest to the Deity on the subject of Hell? Nay, was it not a too significant fairness that allowed devils to assail the passing soul of Gerontius, in Newman's drama of death and eternity, with questions—unanswered—that seem the concentrated essence of Nietzsche's Antichrist?

It was not the thread that broke, but only Newman's heart. In tracing the Romantic movement of religious reaction we must leave the Cardinal of Saint George, as his superiors in the Catholic Church instinctively felt such a man ought to be left, in isolation. It is to his great rival, the Cardinal Archbishop Manning, that we must look for the true culmination of the Romantic spirit within the fold of Peter. Manning seceded from the Anglican Church some years after Newman, but not, like him, as the result of a gradual intellectual compulsion, but of an insignificant squabble in which the law intervened to prevent a certain High Church Bishop from arming himself with the powers of an inquisitor to purge his

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see of his opponents on points of dogma. Manning was no doubt a cultured and scholarly ecclesiastic, but it was not by intellectual standards that his actions were determined. He never dreamed of justifying his Church or life by reasoned apology; his way, and the way he designed for a revived English Catholicism, was not to persuade the reason but to overwhelm the emotions with the majesty, the ritual, and the intimate appeal of which Rome was mistress. It is said that when the indignant father of a convert rushed into the Archbishop's vestry with a torrent of menace, Manning confronted him in full canonicals and, fixing him with an awful eye, predicted—correctly as it turned out—his own conversion within three months. Newman would rather have died than stooped to such theatricality. But Manning's way, which was that of Romanticism, was no doubt the best practical policy, since it is not only in *Vanity Fair* that the truth is a drug on the market. And if Rome did not, as some anxious Protestants feared, sweep the country, she at least made notable headway during Victoria's reign.

Meanwhile the genuine Romantics of the Oxford movement had, for the most part, stood firm by their *via media*. Like Manning, they had a practical task to perform, which was to instil a new life into the Church by giving her an independence and, if we may use the phrase, a personality such as she had lost since the days of Laud. The crude theology of the Low Church they sought to replace by a study of the Fathers, whose works they caused to be published in voluminous translations, to which their opponents replied by issuing a vast and dingy library of the English Protestant Reformers. They sought to introduce an elaborate and coloured ceremonial modelled, as nearly as accorded with decency, on that of Rome. At the same time they exalted the supernatural authority of the priesthood, and sought to tighten the bonds of discipline, alike among the priesthood and the laity. They were furiously opposed; the vast bulk of the middle class, as represented by *Punch*, were inclined to see in them a mere set of buffoons and Jesuits, in the worst sense. But their appeal to the Romantic instinct, then at its strongest, was not to be denied. That appeal was particularly strong to women and among the poor of the great towns, and little by little they gained ground, until the austere, clean-shaven High Churchman began to replace the solid, whiskered Evangelist, as the type of God's good man in the popular imagination.

LIGHT ON THE INNER MAN

Materialistic as the first half of Victoria's reign may have been in its strenuous pursuit of this world's goods, it was yet suffused and softened by the luminous haze of Romance. Not only was the middle class itself thoroughly romantic, but even the various movements of reaction against its ideals partook of the same spirit. And no doubt Romance stimulated the imagination and created an aspiration after beauty, though usually beauty of a rather obvious kind.

It had also the effect of deepening the observation of character in a way that became very marked in Victorian times. John Wesley had visualized man as a creature with a soul to be snatched from the burning, but the great novelists and poets of the nineteenth century found that he had a soul to be studied. This was entirely contrary to the spirit of the eighteenth century. Even so consummate a delineator of character as Jane Austen had, by deliberate choice, refrained from exposing the raw passions of her subjects. Had she lived long enough to read *Wuthering Heights* or *Jane Eyre*, we can imagine how irresistibly funny she would have been at the expense of either. Catherine Morland would certainly have provided herself with one or other of them on her visit to Northanger Abbey, and no doubt have discovered all the characteristics of Heathcliff, or perhaps of Rochester, in General Tilney.

Richardson and Sterne had broken from the tradition of the eighteenth century in treating man as a being of emotions rather than of action or even intellect, and the theme of spiritual development or malady had inspired those masterpieces of Romantic fiction, Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Heloise* and Goethe's *Sorrows of Young Werther*. It was, however, only in the later stages of the Romantic movement that the close and intimate study of character came to be at all constantly pursued. Scott's characters, especially his women, are interesting more by their external than their spiritual adventures; Shelley could never draw the line between an angel and a devil—his lady acquaintances had a way of being cast successively for both parts—Byron could satirize anyone and could draw various melodramatic portraits of the kind of superman he liked to see in the looking glass, but his failure as a dramatist is due to the fact that he was constantly mistaking the looking glass, and a distorted one at that, for a window. None of our Romantic poets, before the

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thirties, achieved any marked success in the close delineation of character, except Wordsworth, in that memorable blank-verse autobiography which he called *The Prelude*, and which stands unrivalled in the world's literature as revealing the development of a poet's soul. But even Wordsworth's power of delineating character did not extend very far beyond the limits of his own.

It is in the Victorian phase of the Romantic movement that character came to be treated with a depth of observation such as even the Elizabethans had scarcely aspired to. It was in the year of the first Reform Bill that a young author-politician, called Benjamin Disraeli, produced *Contarini Fleming*, a novel to which he gave the significant sub-title, *A Psychological Romance*. It was of this book, now unaccountably neglected, that Heine ventured to assert: "Modern English letters have given us no offspring equal to *Contarini Fleming*. Cast in our Teutonic mould, it is nevertheless one of the most original works ever written: profound, poignant, pathetic; its subject the most interesting, if not the noblest imaginable—the development of a poet."¹ With all its unevenness and occasional crudities, the book marks an epoch in the history of the English novel, and the two elements of psychology and romance are blended in cunning harmony. Its theme is love, its chief character is like Disraeli himself—the "cynic Disraeli" of vulgar criticism—a passionate and sensitive being whose two master cravings are for love and ceaseless action of unlimited scope.

The tradition set by Scott, no less than by Fielding and Smollett, had been that of the novel where exciting things are constantly happening to the hero or a number of people. The first effect of Romance on this kind of story was to make the incidents more coloured and passionate without getting any further beneath the surface of character. But when Dickens came into the field, the novel of external happenings began to pass, by the urgency of overflowing genius, into the novel of character, though it may be said that Dickens seldom got very far, in character drawing, beyond the creation of splendid types, that he painted with too large a brush for subtlety. It is hard to say of him whether he partakes most of the old or the new spirit, but he does, undoubtedly, bridge the transition with an architecture as quaint and opulent as that of London Bridge before the fire.

It is with the poet, Robert Browning, who made his life's work an interpretation, at once comprehensive and profound, of human

¹ Quoted by W. F. Monypenny in his *Life of Benjamin Disraeli*.

nature, that the Romantic movement attains its quintessence in the domain of character study. For a Romantic Browning was, in the truest and best sense; in his early poems, his Cavalier songs, his ride from Ghent to Aix, and that delightful extravaganza of desolation entitled *Childe Roland to the Dark Tower came*, it is as if he had picked up all the stage properties of the thirties and combined them into scenes of a fascination undreamed of before. And he had, unlike Wordsworth, a mind capable of sympathizing with every sort of character. As Mr. Arthur Symonds finely says, "every man is for him an epitome of the universe, a centre of creation." He too, like Wordsworth and Disraeli, assayed the task of following the growth of a poet, of Sordello, and the result is one of those few really obscure pieces of literature which repay the task of prolonged elucidation.

We have merely touched upon the most notable features in this new development of Romance as leading to the study of the soul, and we have laid particular emphasis thereon, since it is of the highest importance to realize that creative art was making some attempt to supply the crying need of the time, that of raising our knowledge of the inner man to the level of that of external things. "Glory to man in the highest," declaimed Swinburne, "for man is the master of things!" But nobody ought to have known better than a poet that such glory is barren and even deadly unless man is, to an equal degree, the master of man.

The Romantics were undoubtedly feeling towards such a consummation, but unfortunately their efforts were marred by the lack of depth and thoroughness that seemed inseparable from the movement. Such inspired seers as the sisters Brontë darted flashes as of lightning into the depths of the soul, but there was no sustained radiance. Psychology was fast in the old ruts, the one branch of human knowledge that in the general advance remained obstinately unprogressive, until Herbert Spencer conceived, but only partially realized, the idea of reconstructing it on a basis of evolution. And even this did not produce any very marked effect during the remainder of the century.

In an age of such abounding talent and energy, it could not but be that certain exceptional visionaries would set themselves deliberately against the tide, and try to get back from things to man. Such a one was Thomas Carlyle, especially in his earlier phase. His "clothes-philosophy", if pursued to its utmost implications, is an allegory of a civilization which, in adorning itself with every sort of

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material accessory, has neglected that which alone matters. In Carlyle's eyes, Britain had been pretty steadily going down hill ever since Cromwell's magnificent failure to make of her a godfearing and heroic nation. From the pretentious littleness of modern life, Carlyle cast back regretful eyes to the monastic life of the Middle Ages, and it is greatly to his credit that he visualized the rough, workaday life under Abbot Samson stripped of the conventional sentimentality with which the Victorians were wont to invest anything medieval. The hero-worship for which Carlyle is famous was part of an attempt, in itself heroic, to exalt mind above matter, to concentrate human aspiration on the godlike man and the things that cannot be measured by statistics.

But Carlyle, though he may have been the Moses to glimpse the Promised Land, was not the Joshua to conquer it. Like so many selfmade men, he lacked that serenity and comprehensiveness of vision necessary for one who would be not only a prophet but a saviour. He regarded his own age, his own contemporaries, without patience or charity. He cut himself off from the possibility of leading his generation to a nobler deal, by obstinately refusing to realize and build upon such elements of nobility as lay to his hand. A bitter and scolding philosophy insinuated itself into his teaching. He would have liked to end the Whig Utopia of which Macaulay was so proud, by having the Duke of Wellington—of all people—clear the House of Commons at the point of the bayonet! He defended slavery; he would have made the lot of prisoners, cruelly hard as it was, more cruel still; the hero-worship became something more like Devil-worship, with Frederick the Great as its presiding demon. One of Carlyle's latest utterances was a song of thanksgiving over the triumph of Bismarckian Germany.

There was perhaps one man of whom, had he been born fifty years later and in a slightly different environment, it might have been written with a more unquestionable truth than it actually was,

“ He took the suffering human race,
He showed each wound, each weakness clear,
He struck his finger on the place,
And said, Thou ailst here—and here ! ”

But two years after the young Heine had heard the Gallic cock crow twice, he was passing through Weimar, where “ They were weeping and wailing, ‘ Goethe is dead and Eckermann still alive.’ ” But Goethe, from his Olympus in sleepy Weimar, had never fairly set himself to face the situation created by the Industrial Revolution.

And perhaps, for a saviour of society, he was too majestically self-centred, too coldly aloof from the hearts and needs of everyday mankind.

7

LIBERALISM LIMITED

The second phase of the European tragedy, that between the two revolutionary years 1830 and 1848, was a time of bright and, in every sense, of Romantic hope. France and her little sister, Belgium, had decisively freed themselves from the orbit of the Metternich system, and Spain was, in a few years' time, to follow their example. A solid *bloc* of middle-class Liberalism had now been established in Western Europe. The three great despotisms had been tied by the necessity of crushing their victim, Poland, or at least, as far as Prussia and Austria were concerned, of standing by while Russia did so. Germany and Italy failed to shake off their chains, but they had felt the breath of liberty.

The spirit of the new age obviously demanded the closest possible friendship between two countries so similar to each other in ideals as England and France. For now the French had, for once, paid us the high compliment of imitation. The government of the bourgeois King, Louis Philippe, was an obvious attempt to set up a constitutional monarchy on English principles, on the principles already taken as the basis of the American constitution. The Grand Alliance that swept to victory in 1918 was already beginning to be foreshadowed, for there was no doubt that a Liberal France could not forever tolerate the spectacle of Teutonic despotism in Italy. It might even be that Catholic Germany would unite under her benevolent auspices in preference to those of a jack-booted and half-Slavonic Prussia.

There was, as Europe had had only too good reason to know, another side of the French character. France might be the champion of liberty, but it would never be quite the same sort of liberty as had grown along with the tradition of the English Common Law. For she was, in a sense, heir to that Rome whose province she had been. No paper constitution could rob her of her preference for uniformity, for centralization. And it was perhaps the Celtic strain in her, combining with the Roman pride, that had implanted in her soul a desire for military glory for its own sake, a delight in the pomp and trappings of war, a restless energy that impelled her to gain laurels beyond her frontiers, and that made her chafe acutely

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under the blessings of humdrum prosperity. The French Revolution had shown how easily the love of liberty was capable of being transmuted into the love of glory, and it is this dual aspect of the French character that has made any dealings with France a matter of such peculiar difficulty for statesmen.

Even before Charles X had been turned off the throne, French diplomacy had been plotting for an extension of frontier to the North East, and in the mood of excited confidence that was born of the July Revolution, it was natural that France, being what she was, and having got rid of one incubus in the shape of a legitimate Bourbon, should have aspired to get rid of another in the shape of the settlement—moderate though it was—that had been imposed on her after the fall of Napoleon. The outbreak of a revolution in Belgium was calculated to strain the situation almost to breaking point. Here again France was divided between two impulses, the one of generous sympathy with a sister nation that had just entered upon the same path of freedom as herself, the other of ambition at least to get back the fortresses that had been taken away from her after Waterloo, and generally to fish in these troubled waters for such glory and territory as might be obtainable.

Here was a task of the acutest difficulty for the new Whig government. The Low Countries, and particularly Belgium, had for centuries been the vital point of our foreign policy. At all costs they must be kept out of the clutches of any great Continental power. Our diplomatists of the Vienna Congress had esteemed it a notable success to have formed a united and presumably strong Netherlands under one monarch. Now that scheme had come to nought, the Netherlands had fallen apart, and something even worse was threatened, for the Dutch King was minded to win back his lost province by force of arms, and when the Belgians had run away from his advancing troops, a French army marched into Belgium for liberty's sake, and seemed likely to remain there for their own. The three despotisms would have gladly supported the cause of a legitimate monarch of their own creation against the upstart parvenu whose usurpation, as they deemed it, of the French throne, they had only tolerated because their hands were too full elsewhere to prevent it. Europe was on the verge of a war in which England, threatened at her most vulnerable point, would have been forced on to the side of a Holy Alliance marching to crush Liberalism.

The new Whig government had now at the Foreign Office the remarkable Irishman whose personality was to dominate our external

policy throughout the whole period of middle-class rule. Lord Palmerston was one of those followers of Canning who had changed sides when Wellington attempted to close up the Tory ranks under his premiership. He was a brisk, rakish, exuberant person, with a lucid intelligence and great capacity for the business of office. His cult of beautiful handwriting is symptomatic of his personality. Whatever else may be said for or against Palmerston, it is certain that England has never had a Foreign Minister so versed in what may be called the technique of diplomacy. Whatever his objects were, he knew them, and pursued them with masterly finesse.

Unfortunately diplomacy is not, or at least ought not to be, a matter of mere technique, but of great principles steadfastly pursued. And it was Palmerston's weakness to regard it as a game in which success is to be measured by the number of points scored. Perhaps one of the secrets of his immense popularity with a sport-loving people was the way in which his mind and language were constantly recurring to this motive. He was always talking about his innings and so forth. Even his fall from office, in 1851, he merely regarded as an occasion for having his "tit for tat" with the Premier. It was this weakness of his that prevented him from maintaining the high standard set by his exemplar, Canning. Perhaps his Irish blood had something to do with it, but he was lacking in *gravitas*. His statesmanship was conspicuously lacking in the grand manner. He would call on the whole force of the nation to support the impudent claim of a Shylock against a helpless Greece, but when he found his bluff called by a Bismarck, to whom diplomacy was a matter of deadly earnest, he abandoned his own strong line with the most humiliating complaisance.

Not that Palmerston was a mere diplomatic technician, devoid of any principles whatever. On the contrary, though the most obstinate of reactionaries in home politics, he had a real and active sympathy for constitutional freedom abroad, and it was his greatest merit that under his auspices England was constantly ranged under the Liberal standard, and that her voice and influence were employed in defence of oppressed peoples and against despotism. This was at any rate a memorable advance upon eighteenth century diplomatic methods, and showed that Britain was to be regarded as a nation not only with an interest, but with a soul. It may not have been prudent of the Foreign Secretary to have testified, unmistakably, to his satisfaction when Marshal Haynau, who had flogged delicate ladies for the crime of patriotism, sustained a hearty

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drubbing, with some diminution of whiskers, at the hands of the London brewers—not prudent, but delightful to the heart of every chivalrous John Bull. Old “Pam”, with all his faults, was the darling of middle-class England, and even his opponent Peel, when attacking his policy, could not refrain from the admission, “we are all proud of him.”

“With all his faults,” we say, but perhaps there would be some reason for saying “because of his faults”. The difference between Palmerston and Canning is that between the electorates that supported them. The middle class loved a bouncing and advertising policy, but they were not prepared to run risks for the sake of a dignified consistency. If they were to fight, they were prepared to pay, in moderation, for other men to fight at a distance against a not too formidable enemy. If their bluff seemed likely to be called by too big an opponent to be tackled with safety, they preferred to cut their loss of dignity and back down. And Palmerston, who sunned himself in popularity, played up to them only too well. Instead of following Canning and Castlereagh in their wise policy of never committing themselves to a line of action that they had not the will and the means to follow to the end, he had his finger in every pie, he interfered all over Europe, and often had to be content with a galling snub for his pains. Moreover, his perpetual restlessness had the effect of irritating every Foreign Office in Europe, and particularly that of France, whose friendship it should have been the object of every Liberal statesman to secure. But Palmerston could never realize that the points he scored with such cheery good-humour in the diplomatic game, were remembered afterwards against him and his country.

It must at least be admitted that he began his career as Foreign Minister by a veritable masterpiece of diplomacy. He succeeded in the almost impossible task of preventing the forces of European reaction from extinguishing the spark of Belgian liberty, and in that of seeing the French armies safely off Belgian soil without one inch of territory annexed or one Barrier Fortress demolished. The way was now clear for an Entente between the two Liberal powers which, for the remainder of the thirties, continued to be the dominating factor of European politics. This was even expanded into a formal, though not very hearty Quadruple Alliance of the four constitutional powers, England, France, Spain and Portugal. Meanwhile the three great reactionary despotisms had drawn closer together, under the influence of the Tsar, Nicholas I, a brutal illiterate, but a man of

iron determination, and capable of subordinating all minor considerations to that of maintaining the principle of the Holy Alliance intact over as wide an area as possible. If France and England, he wrote to his Brother of Prussia, "have the courage to profess loudly rebellion and the overturn of all stability, we ought to have the right and the courage to support Divine Right."¹

It was unfortunate that there was no statesman in either England or France capable of following such steady and clear-sighted policy on behalf of Liberalism. The history of these years is one melancholy record of lost opportunity, of mutual suspicion, of petty ends pursued in preference to great ones. The entente was what old Wellington sarcastically characterized as a cardboard alliance. Palmerston continued to play his diplomatic game with undiminished acuteness, but he thoroughly distrusted the French and their constitutional monarch, and a cloud soon rose in the East which completely darkened the new friendship, such as it was. The French had already started a colonial expansion into Northern Africa, without much opposition from ourselves, but when it became a question of their securing a virtual protectorate over Egypt and Syria by supporting the rebellious Pasha, Mehemet Ali, against his Sultan, England once more found herself threatened at a vital point, this time on her communications with India. By another masterpiece of diplomatic finesse Palmerston managed, throwing himself on the side of the three despots, not only to checkmate France, but also to end in a friendly way a dangerous hegemony, amounting almost to a protectorate, that Russia had secured at the Porte. This was no doubt a double point in the game, but it had hopelessly divided the Liberal forces and was calculated to cause a more solid satisfaction to the Iron Tsar than the Whig ministry.

This ministry was now tottering to its fall, and the relations between England and France were greatly improved by the retirement of the man whom the French had come to regard as a dangerous firebrand. The Tory ministry of 1841 was little concerned with promoting Liberalism at home or abroad, but Peel and his foreign secretary, Aberdeen, were determined, by all honourable means, to seek peace and ensue it, and had no itch for the excitement of a dashing foreign policy. Aberdeen, who though he had no spark of imagination, was a kindly and devout gentleman, managed to establish so intimate a friendship with the French minister, Guizot, that the two worked together almost on the footing of colleagues.

¹ Quoted in the article "Europe" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

The entente was knit together more closely than ever, when Louis Philippe and Guizot stooped to one of those dirty dynastic intrigues that reduce statesmanship to the level of pimping. They revived the old policy of Louis XIV by endeavouring to secure the succession of the Spanish Throne for France, and in pursuit of this chimaera they were ready to sacrifice any reputation they might have possessed for good faith or ordinary decency.

Nevertheless Queen Victoria may have been right in her opinion that if dear Lord Aberdeen had only remained at the Foreign Office, the intrigue would never have materialized. But the Tory government fell, and Palmerston came back, bustling and officious as ever. He was not long in applying the little irritation that was needed for making Louis Philippe rush through his fatal Spanish Marriage scheme. Palmerston was not the man to leave the French to reap the consequences of their own folly ; he was, by his own account, determined to humiliate them. As a result, the Liberal Entente was changed to mutual hostility, and the wretched Louis Philippe now threw off the veneer of Liberalism and swung round to the attitude of Charles X as a champion of Divine Right and a supporter of Russian and Teutonic autocracy. The first result of this was seen when the three despots combined, in cynical defiance of their own settlement of Vienna, to enslave the last patch of free Polish soil in the shape of the Republic of Cracow.

The situation was now dangerous to the last degree. Palmerston, by a stroke of extraordinary astuteness, did indeed succeed in preventing France and her new allies from making an end of a united Swiss Republic, but there is good reason to believe that our former friend Guizot, mad with hatred of *ce terrible Lord Palmerston*, was hatching a diabolical plot of uniting with the three despots to crush England. But the cup of Louis Philippe was full, and the curtain went up on a new act of the European drama, when the Paris mob, which had a way of its own with reactionaries, sent him and Guizot to seek the hospitality of the very people they had marked down for destruction. Central Europe and Italy now broke into revolution ; thrones were toppling everywhere ; only Liberal England in the West and despotic Russia under her Iron Tsar in the East stood unsubmerged amid the flood. But the time of deliverance was not yet ; the Hapsburgs, whose army of Northern Italy hung on grimly to its famous Quadrilateral of fortresses, recovered marvellously ; the old trick was tried of playing off one race of the Empire against another ; and at last the Tsar, with his usual far-sighted championship of

despotism, marched with overwhelming force to the help of his afflicted Brother in stamping out the last fires of Hungarian liberty. Austria, now flushed with victory, next devoted herself to putting an end to the prating of a German Parliament that had assembled at Frankfurt, and restoring the framework of the Metternich system from Sicily to the Baltic.

So the bid for national liberty against Divine Right had signally failed, for a time that we now know was not to be very long. What had, however, failed for good and all, on the Continent, was the Romantic and essentially middle-class Liberalism that had triumphed in the July days of 1830, the high and hopeful idealism that was the inspiration of Victor Hugo, of Heine—despite his bitterness—and of Mazzini. The dream of a brotherhood of nations, beating their swords into ploughshares and exchanging freely one another's goods, was beginning to dissolve in the dry light of a new realism. By blood and iron, in the phrase of the most clear-sighted realist of them all, were nations to work out, if not their salvation, at least the right of a majority to rule the roost within its own frontiers.

8

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL AND THE CRIMEA

It must not be thought that the crushing of the Revolutions in 1849 marked any violent or even apparent break with the Romantic and bourgeois Liberalism of the thirties and forties. For a long time this Liberalism was to play an important part in the making of a new Europe of intensely militant and self-conscious nationalities, that was coming into being as the result of a series of violent conflicts. If it was the Machiavellian brain of Cavour that planned the union of Italy under monarchial auspices, it was Garibaldi, perhaps the most romantic figure of the century, who put a sword into the hands of his countrymen. And the man who filled the centre of the European stage, the Emperor-adventurer with the pointed beard and melancholy eyes—he too had more of the sentimentalist and dreamer in him than any quality appertaining to the first Napoleon.

The fifties and sixties are, in fact, a time of transition in Europe, and it is not until the white flag was hoisted over a bombarded and starving Paris that it was possible to say with any certainty that Romantic Liberalism had shot its bolt, and even then it would have been necessary to make an exception of England. During these

two decades, France was ostensibly the leading power of the West. After the Revolution that turned out Louis Philippe, the ship of state had rocked so violently between the sentimental republicanism of Lamartine, and the premature social democracy of Louis Blanc, that she seemed in danger of capsizing, and then the thing happened that the whole existing European system had been designed to prevent—a military empire came into being under a Napoleon. The lust for glory, which was rooted in the French nature, was now about to find satisfaction, and Europe was thrown into a state of nervous tension such as she had forgotten since Waterloo. But the terror of Europe was merely the rather seedy adventurer who had knocked about in Soho, and with no more formidable powers than an adventurer's low cunning. If he was an Emperor, he was also a Liberal, and he oscillated and wobbled between the Napoleonic and the bourgeois conceptions of statesmanship, until in a deeper sense than that intended by Tennyson, only the devil could tell what he meant.

The second Empire, founded in ruffianism and maintained by corruption, was in fact an ulcer whose poison was affecting all Europe. Everywhere there was an atmosphere of unrest, a readiness to scheme deeper and employ a more effective violence than one's neighbour. The old generous ideals were gradually being discarded and discredited; men with hard faces and no illusions were taking the lead, and there emerged grim figures in spiked helmets to inaugurate a new order of things, very different from that envisaged in the glad, confident heyday of Liberalism.

In England, however, shut out as she was to an unusual degree from Continental influences and entering upon a new period of prosperity, there was no sign of Liberalism being a spent force. The second and third acts of the European tragedy are, for her, merged into one; there is no new departure whatever in 1848. Romance and Liberalism were at their height in the fifties and sixties; Tennyson reigned supreme in poetry, Mill in thought; a Whig party, becoming every year more and more Liberal, was firmly entrenched in power. It was the age of drawing-room ballads of an incredible sentimentality, of an almost childish pride in material achievement, of a complacency which sent Englishmen swaggering over the Continent with the assured patronage of racial superiority. It was the heyday of modern Gothic; everywhere in the new suburbs of great towns sprang up the needle-like spires of churches correctly copied to style and bearing much the same relation to their medieval

prototypes as the waxworks of Madame Tussaud's to their originals. If it was an age of extraordinary achievement, it was also one of an equally extraordinary banality. In perhaps no other period of history could Martin Tupper have been taken seriously as a philosopher—rumour even cited his works as the Queen's favourite reading! The Crystal Palace arose, and black statues of men in massive frock coats, and ugly brick cottages all over the countryside, and mean though substantial streets where the towns kept on expanding. Never had there been such a complacent lack of taste, never such easy acceptance of the shallow and the commonplace. And yet scarcely ever had there been such copious and solid achievement.

It was in 1851 that English Liberalism made its greatest bid for the suffrages of the world with the great Exhibition in Hyde Park. It did really seem as if all peoples, nations and languages were about to realize the millennium of free and peaceful industry, an endless flood of oratory was poured forth to that effect, and while crowds from all over the world filled the vast, expanded greenhouse in which the triumphs of the Industrial Revolution were displayed, a peace conference was sitting at Exeter Hall. And yet, by a strange irony, these trumpets of peace did but usher in an era of war.

Though the old-fashioned and conservative Whigs still remained at the head of affairs, by far the most powerful intellectual force was supplied by what was known as the Manchester School, and to most people this rather vague term practically comprised the doctrine preached, with extraordinary eloquence, by the two triumphant leaders of the Free Trade agitation, Richard Cobden and John Bright, the representative men of the English middle class at its zenith of power and ability. They had not the smallest desire to pose as anything else but bourgeois; they neither desired to gain the graces nor to ape the manners of the aristocracy. The future of England, as they visualized it, lay with her industrial leaders, to whom they confidently looked to rival the glory of those bygone commercial princes, the Fuggers and the Welsers. Sturdy individualists themselves, they held to the gospel of free competition—every man for himself and God for us all. They were distrustful of any form of state interference. When Lord Shaftesbury was fighting to obtain more tolerable conditions for the factory hands, he encountered no more formidable opponent than John Bright, who was an employer—to do him justice, a conspicuously good one—and raised the somewhat Jesuitical plea that His Lordship was a landowner, and that

agricultural labourers were worse off than those in the towns, as if that were any reason for Bright and his class not setting their own house in order.

It would however be as misleading as ungenerous to talk of Bright and Cobden as if they were mere unctuous egotists busily engaged in pulling motes out of their brother's eye and neglecting the beam in their own. It would be more to the point to say that they were Romantics, and shared in that lack of intellectual consistency and thoroughness that is common to all Romantics. But whatever their subconscious bias in favour of their own interests may have amounted to, they were the very opposite of those thoroughgoing class egotists of whom, according to the early utilitarians, the whole human race may for all practical purposes be said to consist.

Their class bias was, indeed, strong enough to attach them to the system of capitalist economics that was fashionable at this time, though their sincere Christianity and their Romantic leanings induced them to modify its harsher precepts very considerably. But such as the system was, they held to it as strongly when it worked against as when it worked for them. The working man had just as much right to the free expression of his personality as the employer, and it was with an almost quixotic disinterestedness that these champions of the middle class devoted their immense influence to breaking that class's power by a drastic extension of the franchise. No British working class leader of these middle years of the century did half as much for his fellows as the comfortably off and sometimes prejudiced John Bright.

Neither Cobden nor Bright was a man of extensive or liberal culture, and this was no doubt a source of weakness, even though both possessed something more essential in an uncompromising sincerity, which made of Bright the most splendid orator of his century, and endowed Cobden with a personal fascination against which not even sovereigns and statesmen were immune. Nevertheless the fact that Bright could sneer at culture and Cobden make Philistine jokes about the Ilissus, testifies to a certain narrowness of outlook that handicapped them in trying to arrive at a large and unbiased appreciation of contemporary problems.

They had a gospel not lacking in nobility. They believed that the time had come for nations to lay aside their hatreds and armaments, and to unite in the common task of making the best of the world, not under any scheme of universal government or state

socialism, but as free men in free nations exchanging their goods with one another, having previously got rid of the barriers of protective tariffs. They were, in fact, equally ardent as merchants and as Christians, and they saw nothing inconsistent in a close and mutually beneficent alliance between God and Mammon. War they detested, because they were at once sincere Christians and practical business men. Quite consistently with their creed, they were against every form of imperialism. They believed that England would do better to trade freely with an independent Canada and Australia than incur dangerous and unprofitable responsibilities by keeping up the connection. The experiment of governing India they regarded with grave disapproval, and Bright, who held that so unnatural an attempt was bound to end in disaster, argued that despotic principles of government abroad might prove infectious at home.

It was this gospel of the Manchester School, emanating from middle-class England, that throughout these two decades was making a strong bid for universal acceptance. It happened to be a message whose acceptance would have been extremely profitable to England, whose industrial start on the rest of the world had enabled her to fling open her ports, and who had nothing better to desire than that other nations should do the same, and expose their rising industries to the full force of her competition. But, not unnaturally, other nations, less favourably situated, had other ideas. A German economist, List, whose influence was powerful on the Continent, had directly traversed the practical conclusions of the Free Traders. As an ultimate ideal, he admitted, it would be a good thing if all barriers ceased to exist, but as things were at present, nations who refused to protect themselves scientifically would be committing suicide for the sake of England. He was therefore in favour of an intense and uncompromising nationalism. It was List's hard doctrine that the world was too bad to make the quest of international peace and brotherhood practical politics, and nations must do what they could to feather their own nests at the expense of their neighbours. What other end than eventual suicide there could be to such an anarchy of national egotisms was a question that List and his school did not envisage. But, leaving such long views out of account, they had a strong case, and one that was eventually to be accepted by every nation but England.

For a time, however, the issue was in doubt, and our two most important Continental rivals, France and the German Zollverein, or Customs Union, inclined towards a Liberal policy in the matter

of tariffs. It was the greatest triumph of the Manchester School when in 1860 Cobden crossed to France, and employed his wonderful persuasiveness in inducing Napoleon III, who, for all his faults, desired nothing more sincerely than to be friends with England, to conclude a commercial treaty with us on Free Trade principles. Never had the Manchester Utopia of universal Free Trade appeared so well on the way to realization, and for the next decade nothing occurred in the way of a serious set-back. But the high-water-mark had been reached, though it was some time before the turn of the tide became perceptible.

Even in England, however, Cobden and Bright were very far from ruling the roost. They represented the most advanced form of contemporary Liberalism, but they were too uncompromising to fall in easily with the ways of practical politicians. Cobden never got into a cabinet, and Bright did not remain in one very long. So long as Palmerston and Lord John Russell remained in political life, the old aristocratic Whiggism counted for more in national policy than Manchester Liberalism. During the time of European revolutions and their suppression, the activity of Palmerston waxed greater than ever. In his part of manly Englishman he was lavishly generous in forcing his advice on foreigners everywhere, and he drove the Queen and Prince Albert, who disliked his Liberalism even more than his arbitrariness, to the verge of distraction. At length, however, he made the curious slip of too openly expressing his satisfaction with Napoleon III's *coup d'état*, and he had to leave the Foreign Office, dragging the government down shortly afterwards.

He was, however, soon back in office, this time as Home Secretary to a coalition of Whigs and Peelites, but his spirit dominated our foreign policy to such an extent as to allow us to be forced into the Crimean War against Russia, about the most stupid and unnecessary contest in the whole course of our history. It is a facile task to tabulate, after the manner of an examination paper, the various ostensible causes that precipitated what John Bright, in a bitterly serious anagram, characterized as "A Crime". Russia was pushing forward her Eastern expansion into Asia in a way that had for some time caused considerable nervousness to our statesmen; Lord John Russell had hazarded the opinion that if we did not fight Russia on the Danube we should have to fight her on the Indus, though in what conceivable way our fighting on the Danube would retard her progress Indiadwards he did not explain. The Russian bogey had,

in fact, been intermittently on English nerves since Pitt had nearly gone to war about the obscure fortress with the unpronounceable name, only Pitt, luckily for himself and England, was not troubled by a press-fed public opinion capable of backing him so vigorously as to render it impossible for him to draw back if he wanted to.

But the middle class had waxed fat and wanted to kick, provided that this could be done by proxy and without too ruinous expense. Russia was an ideal enemy. Her Iron Tsar, who on this occasion was heartily anxious to keep the peace, had come to be a sort of symbolic Ahriman to the Ormuz of Liberalism. It would be pleasant to give him just such a good British drubbing as the brewers had given to old Haynau. And Nicholas would have as little chance of hitting back at the respectable instigators of this drubbing as the "Wolf of Brescia" had had of avenging the loss of his whiskers. In fact the scheme of attacking him had a double advantage, since the new Emperor Napoleon, whose preposterously presumed desire to avenge Waterloo might have threatened the persons as well as the pockets of Mr. Podsnap and Mr. Bottles, was safely roped in as an ally. The butchering and suffering could be done at a safe distance by mercenaries, mostly of the lowest class, whose exploits would, in a suitably Bowdlerized form, make excellent reading and afford a fine theme for patriotic sentiment.

So it was willed, and so therefore it was done. A ridiculous quarrel between two sects who believed themselves to represent the Prince of Peace at Jerusalem, developed into a Russian attempt to bluff or bully the Porte, which was countered by our ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Stratford de Redclyffe, and set the four other chief European powers in more or less pronounced opposition to the Tsar. However, terms were presented at Vienna which Nicholas had actually accepted, when Lord Stratford, who had the Sultan in his pocket, encouraged him to raise them, which not unnaturally proved too large a pill for a proud autocrat to swallow. But England, instead of allowing Turkey to accept the offer or the consequences of her refusal, went on backing her, and Napoleon, who saw the chance of reaping in the most reputable company the glory he needed to justify his name and throne, was determined that we should not get out of it. The premier, the peaceful Aberdeen, did everything short of resigning to keep the peace, but the sons of Zeruaiah, in the shape of Palmerston and Stratford, were too hard for him. The middle class press howled and blustered for war; *Punch*, always ready to pander to their crudest instincts, represented

poor Aberdeen as a miserable wretch blacking the Tsar's boots or trying to hold back the British Lion. War broke out between Russia and Turkey and the war fever in England rose to the point of delirium. A Russian Admiral, who did his obvious duty in sinking some transports that were conveying Turkish troops to fight against the Russians, was represented as a monster of the most fiendish stamp. War was declared amid a tempest of enthusiasm, and the valiant Palmerston speeded a fleet, which was destined for the Baltic, with an after-dinner speech of such robustuous levity and bad-taste as to induce some—probably quite unjust—doubts in a present day reader's mind as to the good man's sobriety. But there is, as the Hebrew prophet knew, a more dangerous drunkenness than that which comes of wine.

Prussia and Austria stood aside, France came in. An expeditionary force, excellently drilled but villainously commanded and even worse organized, was sent to the Near East, and for some time remained dumped down at the port of Varna, with nothing particular to do except to catch cholera. Finally, for want of a better object, the allies agreed to strike at the Russian naval base of Sevastopool in the Crimea. This, after having driven a Russian covering army in best Peninsula style from the heights of the Alma, they could easily have accomplished, if they had not chosen to make a loitering and circuitous march which gave an exceptionally able Russian engineer commander time to make the place almost impregnable. As it turned out, the incompetence of the corrupt and dying wretch who commanded the French army produced the effect of the most far-seeing strategy. So long as the Russians were committed to defending Sevastopool, the allies were better outside than in. Through a terrible winter they hung on to their lines, trusting to their sea communications, which were interrupted by the Black Sea gales, so that the unfortunate men were reduced to the utmost depth of human misery. But the case of their enemy was even worse. There were no railways to bring the constant relays of new troops that were necessary to keep the Imperial standard flying over Sevastopool. They were marched over mud tracks from all parts of the vast empire, and every march was a reproduction in miniature of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. The poor Russian peasants and English labourers were committed to a competition of agony, and the matter was made worse on our side by the fact that the hospitals to which the wounded and diseased men were taken were at first such Hells of filth and mismanagement that it

would, in most instances, have been more merciful to have knocked the sufferers on the head where they fell. This state of things was revolutionized by perhaps the only person, except the defender of Sevastopool, who emerges from the war with any lasting glory, the heroic volunteer nurse, Florence Nightingale.¹

It is to the everlasting credit of the Manchester leaders (though neither Cobden nor Bright were Manchester men), that in face of the most bitter opprobrium they never ceased to denounce this criminal lunacy of the Crimean war. Bright, his whole Quaker soul revolted by such a crucifixion of his Master, depicted the horror of the situation in words of such impassioned solemnity that they seem as fresh now as when they were spoken. But this attitude met with almost universal execration; the good folks at home, who could not feel the cold of the trenches nor smell the stench of the hospitals, were staunch to put the thing through in spite of all such traitorous and sordid palterings of men whose ears were "stuffed with cotton". And so the war went on; the lines were held against every attack; one of the greatest blackguards unhung was lauded to the skies for charging in the wrong direction and thereby sacrificing a brigade of cavalry and one of our most vital lines of communication; the dreadful winter passed into spring and at last, after an infinity of butchery and blundering, the French surprised one of the key forts of Sevastopool and the siege ended.

By this time Napoleon was thoroughly anxious to be out of it, and as Austria had now almost made up her mind to come in against the power that had so recently saved her in Hungary, a feeble and inconclusive peace was patched up, the most important article of which, forbidding Russia to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea, was torn up at the first opportunity. Our late ally, France, was almost at once hand in glove with our late enemy, Russia, and threatening the invasion of our shores; the advance towards the Indus was not stopped, and our loss of prestige had no small part in causing the mutiny of the Bengal army in 1857. Nevertheless, everyone was tolerably satisfied; the horrors of war were buried with the war's victims; memories of the thin red line and the Light Brigade were kept sedulously alive; the middle class's booming prosperity enabled it to shoulder the burden of the war as easily as it could have shouldered that of such almost undreamed of social reforms as the

¹ The consuming zeal of her pity for the poor soldiers, which drove her even to keep a cabinet minister up to the mark, has caused her to be branded as a tigress. So strange a creature is the Georgian lion!

humanizing of the poor law or the provision of pensions for the old. So all ended amid the firing of guns and the lighting of bonfires, with Lord Palmerston as premier and the most popular man in the country.

9

THE NEW LIBERALISM

It was, in fact, the jovial personality of Palmerston that kept alive the old aristocratic Whiggism long after it had ceased to answer to the changing spirit of the time. The country, or rather the class that held the franchise, was certainly not prepared to go the whole way with Bright and Cobden, but nobody but "old Pam" could have slowed down its progress in Liberalism to the snail's gait that was actually adopted. So long as he lived, Palmerston was undoubtedly the man whom the electorate wanted at the head of affairs, though he had a strange and sensational fall from office in 1858, curiously enough owing to the fact that he, of all people in the world, had tamely yielded to the bluster of some French officers who threatened awful things unless we would restrict the hospitality we had hitherto granted to political exiles—a plot to assassinate Napoleon III having been hatched in England. But next year Palmerston was back in office, in company with "Finality Jack", and with Gladstone as his Chancellor of the Exchequer. There he remained till his death in 1865.

But he was now the brake on the coach, and the man who was transforming the spirit of the party was the austere financier who, like Palmerston before him, had come over from the ranks of the Tories. The character and career of Gladstone present such extraordinary complexities that they will probably form the subject of acute controversy as long as history continues to be written. Just now, like Tennyson and most of the other great Victorians, he is under a cloud of somewhat unjust depreciation—our age has so completely reacted against their ideals. And even now party bias is apt to affect our judgment, one way or the other, in appreciating so mighty a champion of Liberalism.

If any one generalization be sufficient to comprehend the whole of his character it is this: Gladstone was in the political sphere—what Tennyson was in poetry—the supreme representative Englishman of his time; supreme, because in energy, in capacity for work, and sheer force of personality, there was no one, except perhaps

his rival Disraeli, to touch him; representative because he was essentially middle class—"Oxford on the surface, Liverpool below", was an early estimate of him—endowed with a concentrated moral earnestness that eschewed humour, a typical Romantic in his sensibility to emotional impulses and a certain inconsistency and even shallowness of thought that becomes more apparent as his figure shrinks into perspective.

This last characteristic of Gladstone will be evident to anyone who considers the singular impermanency of his voluminous literary output, and, to a somewhat less degree, of his eloquence. He wielded a facile and skilful pen, but he has left nothing behind him that the most enterprising publisher is likely to reprint. Even in pre-war days, the first volumes of a projected collection of his speeches dropped still-born from the press. It would be better for his reputation if his futile scriptural apologetics had not been kept alive by Huxley, as Robert Montgomery's poems are kept alive by Macaulay. And their absurdity is eclipsed by the unrelieved prosiness of his eight volumes of miscellaneous *Gleanings*, of the correspondence that he conscientiously ground out on religious subjects, and of his excursions into Homeric criticism. And yet Disraeli lives still in his Young England novels and *Lothair*, and his phrases stick in the memory now that Gladstone's sonorous periods have died into oblivion.

There is no dividing men's lives into closed compartments, and it is certain that Gladstone's mediocrity of output must have been the result of some corresponding lack of mental profundity or philosophic grasp. A great deal of what at first seems complexity in his character must thus have its explanation in sheer inconsistency. Sincere as he was, there was never a man whose actions were less easily deducible from his principles. His name will live as that of a champion of freedom, of oppressed nationalities, and yet he went out of his way to back the slave-holding Confederacy that seceded from the United States, he had scant sympathy to spare for Hungary and Poland, and he used language implying that he had no objection, on point of principle, to Austrian rule in Italy. After his triumphant Midlothian campaign had landed him in office on a programme of peace and non-interference, he precipitated the Transvaal rebellion by refusing the Boers the self-government which they not unnaturally expected as the firstfruits of his triumph, and he launched us on a course of Imperialist adventure in Egypt by smashing the patriot Arabi in the cause of the bond-holders.

In Ireland he was at first for the stern coercion of men whom he described as marching through rapine to the dismemberment of the empire and then, suddenly, for leading them to their goal.

These incalculable variations become intelligible on the supposition that Gladstone was, to a pre-eminent degree, of the volitional temperament; it was the driving force of his will and not dispassionate judgment that dictated his actions. If ever countenance was an index to character it is surely Gladstone's; the intense, glowing eyes, with their beetling brows, the massive nose, the tight-set lips, the advancing chin, speak of one whom we should describe less as a thinker than an embodied force, sweeping everything before it, sometimes even—which is wonderful in a man whose life was religion—delicacy of scruple. For it was said of Gladstone, with some plausibility, that though he followed his conscience in all things, he did so as the driver follows the horse. His conduct in countenancing Parnell's liaison as long as it remained secret and then rising against him in righteous indignation when the thing became public has often been defended, on Jesuitical or Machiavellian principles, but will never be justified on those obtaining among gentlemen. Nor is his record in the matter of Gordon one very easy even for the most loyal partisan to explain away to his credit.

So much, we believe, must be conceded in any candid appreciation of Gladstone. In no way was he more representative of his age, that age of abounding activity and shallow-rooted thought, than in his unexpressed desire to get things done without delving too deeply into their principles. His will and not his philosophy was his guide; the latter was, in fact, mostly a matter of high-sounding generalizations about social forces moving onwards in their might and majesty, the freedom of nations and so forth, generalizations that he was invariably capable of qualifying to admit of any concrete application, or none, as the spirit moved him.

"What matter which way the head be so long as the heart be right," was, as nearly as it can be formulated in a sentence, the unexpressed creed of Romantic Victorianism. And the glory of Gladstone consists in the fact that his heart, at least, was emphatically in the right place, and again and again warmed him to take the generous part and to stand forth as the champion of freedom and righteousness at home and abroad. It is for this reason that despite his somewhat equivocal record as an advocate of national self-determination, his name is now cherished with an affection lavished on no other of his countrymen, in Italy, in Greece, in the Balkans,

that his memory has, in fact, been an asset of the greatest value in our dealings with these peoples. And among the English working class, despite the fact that he was, according to modern standards, an individualist reactionary, his name is still one to conjure with. His policy may be long out of date, but his spirit is always marching on.

Like all men of action rather than of intellect, Gladstone's opinions were usually borrowed from his contemporaries. His mind was a sensitive plate that took impressions very easily, and he was justly proud of the fact that he was always a learner. Though he first came into prominence as the young hope of extreme Toryism, it was at a time when Peel was imparting that middle-class complexion to the party which it retained until the revolt of its aristocratic element in 1846. He was, in fact, the true child of the Industrial North whose burr so pleasantly tinged his eloquence, and though like Peel, he had taken a double first at Oxford, the culture which he assimilated was only a secondary, though a most powerful determinant of his character. Lancastrian though he was, Oxford had given him a scope and versatility that were lacking in John Bright. Perhaps, too, the interaction of Oxford and Liverpool had taken from him some of that superb simplicity that was at once Bright's strength as a reforming influence and his weakness as a practical politician. For Gladstone was a man of the world and in every sense of the word a great Parliamentarian. He was capable of formulating the most impressive proposition, and always leaving himself a loophole for escape. And, with his overmastering desire to get things done, he knew the expediency of compromise; like a wise yachtsman he deemed it preferable to tack this way and that, rather than to steer a straight course, marked on the chart of abstract principle, into the teeth of the wind.

The great formative personal influence in Gladstone's life was undoubtedly Peel. Under him the rising statesman received an education in the craft of administration and in finance that he never forgot. Peel and Cobden had been coming very close together at the time of the Corn Law repeal, and it did not need the Premier's generous tribute in Parliament to one who had been his doughtiest adversary to signalize the fact that Peel's middle-class bias and practical experience had made him, to all intents and purposes, a convert to the Manchester School. Gladstone had only to follow the path marked out for him by his master. In a series of great budgets, first as a Peelite Chancellor of the Exchequer and afterwards

as an avowed Liberal, he pushed to a conclusion the Manchester policy of taxing only for revenue, and of keeping down expenditure by the sternest economy.

It was here that the driving force of Gladstone's personality showed itself to the greatest advantage. With a Titanic capacity for work and an aptitude for business natural in the son of a Liverpool merchant, he pursued his object of purging our financial system with an energy and mastery of detail that brooked no denial. It was not unnatural that this ruthless determination to cut down expenditure should have brought him into conflict with such old-fashioned colleagues as Palmerston and Lord John Russell.

For Gladstone, like every careful steward of the national treasure, had a natural aversion from pouring it out in unproductive military adventure, or even in that form of insurance that consists in the piling up of armaments. But by the time that Palmerston came to form his last ministry, the changed spirit that was abroad on the Continent, the reaction against the bourgeois and peaceful ideals that had found symbolic expression in the Great Exhibition was beginning to be felt even in England. The bubble Empire of Napoleon III had not yet been pricked, and the danger of a descent on our shores was heightened by the low margin of naval superiority that we possessed at a time when the transition from wooden ships to ironclads was compelling us to make an entirely fresh start. The danger was probably exaggerated, if only for the reason that friendship with England was a cornerstone of the Emperor's policy, but it was acutely felt at the time, and produced a reaction in the form of an active volunteer movement, in which such purists as Herbert Spencer scented the beginnings of militarism.

But Napoleon had other adventures in view than an enterprise that had baffled even his mighty namesake. His thirst for glory would find an easier and more time-honoured satisfaction in fighting the Austrian on the plains of Lombardy, and to do him justice, the Liberalism which was a real though fitful element in his strange nature prompted him, no less than the subtle persuasion of Cavour, to essay the enterprise of driving the Hapsburg out of Italy. In a hopelessly muddled campaign he and his ally, Victor Emmanuel of Savoy, managed to push back the Austrians as far as they seemed likely to go, and then Napoleon, whose nerves had been upset by the sight of a battlefield and who dreaded a counter-stroke by the Prussians on his Eastern frontier, backed out, to the furious indignation of Cavour. But a landslide had been set in motion, and with the

Austrians out of Lombardy nothing could stop the long pent up desire of Italy for freedom. Garibaldi, landing with his Thousand at Palermo, applied the spark to a powder magazine. The petty tyrants of North and South Italy collapsed without a struggle, and Cavour, playing the Machiavellian game for Victor Emmanuel, made no mistake. In an incredibly short time the only obstacles to the complete and now inevitable union of Italy under the House of Savoy were the Austrian troops holding down Venetia and a French force that propped up the tottering throne of His Holiness Pius IX.

If a man of genius or vision had occupied the place of Napoleon, he would have rejoiced, as at a crowning mercy, at the spectacle of a new Latin power shaking off the fetters of Teutonic despotism and coming, young and ardent, to join the ranks of Western Liberalism. But the man—Victor Hugo has branded it on his pale forehead for ever—was little, infinitely little in all his thoughts and deeds. He could only scheme for the pettiest gains, and he dreamed of keeping Italy weak and dependent on himself. No sooner, therefore, was his abandoned ally's face turned southwards towards the people who cried for a deliverer, than he seized the opportunity to annex the Departments of Savoy and Nice as a reward for his own honesty in not stabbing him in the back. He furthermore, by way of conciliating the French Catholics, deliberately held up the union of Italy, and played the part of volunteer bully for the Pope, an error that he had reason to repent of when left without an ally against a united Germany.

England, however, played a more creditable part, and one that is remembered with gratitude in Italy to this day. Palmerston may not have been a very consistent champion of liberty, but he showed at least the trend of English sympathies in a strange, roving commission that he issued to Lord Minto during the year of revolutions, to go about generally encouraging the spirit of Italian liberty. Gladstone, who was still, in 1851, ostensibly a Tory who had quarrelled with his party, visited in that year the prisons in which the Bourbon King of Naples confined the best of his subjects, and stricken to his great heart by the spectacle of inhuman tyranny, exposed the horror of it with an eloquence that stirred Europe. Heart speaks to heart, and the sympathy of Liberal England for an Italy still in chains was something more potent than the calculations of politic egotism.

It was lucky that when in 1859 the supreme crisis arrived, a

Whig ministry had just come into power. Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone were each, in his way, inclined to side with the patriots and against the despots, but none of them, it must be confessed, was capable of subordinating every smaller consideration to the grand imperative—

“ Italia, Italia, shall be free ! ”

They were politicians and trained to consult the immediate interests of the State they served, though it may be doubted whether it would not have been better for England herself, in the long run, to have identified herself greatly with the cause of liberty for which, sooner or later, she was bound to stand or perish. The complicated history of her diplomatic dealings in respect of Italy at this time is that of men who, consciously pursuing the lesser ends, find themselves drawn by what is best in them towards the greater. Fortunately Sir James Hudson, who represented us at the court of Turin, was not only a friend of Italy and of Cavour, but was capable of thoroughly understanding and playing up to the Machiavellian policy by which that statesman was steering to his goal between the Scylla of France and the Charybdis of Austria. It was a critical moment when Garibaldi and his patriots were preparing to cross from Sicily to deliver Southern Italy, in ostensible defiance of Victor Emmanuel himself. The French fleet was ready to co-operate with ours in stopping Garibaldi, but our Government, to their honour, refused the bait, and Britannia stood aside to let the hero pass. And when Victor Emmanuel was marching Southwards, at imminent peril of European intervention, to hold back the impetuous “ Lion ” from Rome and reap the harvest of his victory, Lord John, like the good Whig he was, addressed a famous dispatch to Hudson in which he justified the royal liberator on the precedent of William of Orange. Seldom, if ever, has a diplomatic document produced a more decisive effect. The despots of Central and Eastern Europe—the three chief of them were in conclave at Warsaw and boded mischief to Italy—were furious, but they did not move. The Crimean War had at least this advantage, it created an impression that when England had pronounced an opinion she might be prepared to back it by arms.

The spirit of Europe had already ominously changed since the forties. The system of Vienna, which had at least been a guarantee of peace, was now fairly shattered, and Europe was again in the melting pot. The sabre-rattling of our neighbours warned nervous patriots at home that we must look to our own defences. Lord

Palmerston, always bellicose, came forward not, as might have been expected, with a proposal to increase our first line of defence, but a scheme of putting up forts along the coast. Here the issue was fairly joined between him and Gladstone, who, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was pursuing his policy of rigid economy, and was averse to spoiling his budgets by providing large sums for works that could only do harm to an enemy who voluntarily chose to come within range. It was a ding-dong struggle between the two colleagues, Gladstone fighting point by point against both army and navy estimates, and the matter usually ending in a compromise. It was, curiously enough, the older man who voiced the spirit that was destined to prevail against the peaceful ideal that Peel and Aberdeen, from their point of view, and Cobden and Bright, from theirs, had represented.

But as far as men could see, it was evident that the new Liberalism of Gladstone was in the ascendant, and that its hour was only being delayed by the aged hand of Palmerston putting back the clock.

10

FROM EMPIRE TO COMMONWEALTH

In Europe, then, the forces of Western Liberalism were notably strengthened by the emergence of Italy as a European power, though it was not till the fall of Rome in 1870 that she was completely mistress in her own house. But this was not the only, nor perhaps, in the long run, the most important acquisition to the forces that sooner or later would come together to dispute the mastery of the world with the hosts of leagued despotism. Italy, though she had the tradition of the free cities, had yet, also, something of Imperial Rome in her soul, but far across the seas, in lands of which the Roman had never dreamed, were arising communities that might be composed of rough and uncultured men, but whose very spirit was liberty of that stubborn, intractable kind which it has needed centuries of English law and constitutional practice to engender.

The history of the colonies during this period is one of extreme simplicity. In Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa communities of white men are, with the assent of the Mother Country, taking upon themselves all the essential functions of domestic self-government. Four independent nations, members of a League of Nations centring in Britain, have, by the end of the sixties, taken firm root, and though only two of them are as yet united, their

subsequent development from the Colony to the Dominion stage is only a matter of time.

While grasping firmly this essential feature of colonial development, we must be on our guard against the error of visualizing these pioneers of a new order as wholly or even mainly absorbed in politics. It is probable that in the thoughts of men in constant battle with nature, or inflamed with the desire to get rich quick, politics played no more than an infinitesimal part, and in fact it was an almost universal trouble that suitable men, with the time and inclination for assuming representative functions, were almost impossible to get. We must picture the Canadian settler as hewing valiantly at the timber—or, as he would have put it, lumber—of his virgin forests; the Australian as battling with the drought, or following the forlorn hope of nuggets into the waterless inhospitality of the “never-never”; vast distances, a struggle for bare existence that left no time for thought, perils often and amenities few; towns springing up in a few years, perhaps from a row of huts with galvanized iron roofs. . . .

These overseas possessions, whose growth appears to us of such overshadowing interest, did not bulk so largely in contemporary imaginations. To such a statesman as Lord Palmerston, with the whole of European diplomacy at his finger tips, colonies were more or less of an irrelevancy. His patriotism was that of an islander, and if he gloried, it was in the little England that had, within his memory, stood alone against a Continent in arms. It was hard to be very enthusiastic on behalf of communities whose long continuance within the Empire was, even to those who desired it, by no means a certainty. The romantic sentiment of the time was strangely slow in taking fire from the conception of a Greater Britain, and to the utilitarian mind colonies were generally a source of unnecessary expense. The idea of trade following the flag was little accounted of in the early days of Free Trade, when Englishmen were confidently expecting that all the world would sooner or later follow them in the levelling of tariff walls and free exchange of goods. It was difficult for the early Victorians to realize that the ties of love may prove firmer than those of discipline, that each successive grant of freedom might tighten a bond as thin as gossamer yet strong as links of iron.

It was in Canada, the eldest and strongest of the greater Colonies, that the decisive battle was fought between the ideal of an old-fashioned empire and that of a free commonwealth. In the English

province of Upper Canada and in the French province of Lower Canada the machinery of government had attained the maximum of inefficiency. No money could be obtained even for the most essential services; the development of each Colony was held up for the lack of communications, education, posts, police and criminal justice. The emigrants, who suffered untold horrors from lack of any provision for their reception, filtered through, in large numbers, to the United States, which seemed, by comparison, a very paradise of prosperous progress. The separation of powers between the governing and money-providing bodies was proving, as it had proved in England, the curse of the country. In the first year of the Queen's reign the inevitable revolt broke out in both provinces.

At this darkest hour in Canada's fortunes Lord Melbourne had resource to the man who, there is good reason to believe, had already had the chief hand in framing the Reform Bill. Lord Durham was made Governor and practically dictator of Canada. He took out with him, as secretaries, the two most enlightened Radical imperialists, Buller and Wakefield, and the three of them set to work not only to tide over the immediate crisis, but to find a way of adjusting on a permanent basis the relations between mother and daughter nations. Durham had not been more than a few months in Canada before his work was cut short by the low malice of his enemy Brougham, who induced the House of Lords to pass a vote of censure on him, whereupon Melbourne, to his everlasting shame, took his customary line of least resistance by throwing over the man whom he had so recently induced, by the promise of ungrudging support, to take up a thankless task. The blow killed Durham, and came within measurable distance of losing us Canada. But before he closed his eyes for ever, the stricken statesman concluded—with the assistance of his secretaries—that famous report which may, with some pardonable hyperbole, be described as the Bible of the British Commonwealth.

Durham—if we may assume him to have been the author—was about the one prominent Englishman of his time with the vision of self-governing communities, whose loyalty would be in direct proportion to their freedom. He did not, it is true, go quite the whole way; he wanted the central government to retain the control of defence and foreign affairs, and of the Crown lands—for he believed in one imperial policy for the control of emigration. He also believed in something like an all-British Zollverein or Customs Union, likewise controlled from London. But with regard to the

Colony's own internal affairs, these, he held, must be managed by ministers responsible to the elected assembly, the Governor's functions being those of an umpire but not a participant in colonial politics. For the immediate crisis, he proposed to unite Upper and Lower Canada under one Parliament, with equal electoral representation for each province. And this was, in fact, what the government decided to do.

The history of the next few years is of absorbing interest. English statesmen, even of the Whig persuasion, could not make up their minds at first to so revolutionary a departure as that of allowing the Canadians a free hand to shape their own destinies. Lord John Russell, in drafting instructions for the first governor of a united Upper and Lower Canada, was strong against the theory that the Governor should allow his functions to be reduced to those of a *roi fainéant*, but at the same time he shrewdly counselled both parties to use a wise moderation, which, in fact, might be interpreted to mean, "Keep all authority you like provided you don't assert it." And this is more or less the policy that the first two governors pursued. But then came a Tory ministry, a strong man at the Colonial Office, in the shape of Lord Stanley, and a Governor, Sir Charles Metcalfe, one of the ablest and noblest of men his time, but unfortunately trained in the Anglo-Indian tradition. His attempt to exert a benevolent authority over the not too scrupulous politicians of Canada only succeeded in raising a hornet's nest about him, and again bringing the Colony to the verge of rebellion. This was the last serious attempt to assert the authority of the Crown against the wishes of Canadians.

The Tories went out, and the Colonial Secretary of Russell's new government was Earl Grey, who was an almost fanatical free-trader, and who, though far from being a tactful or sympathetic administrator, was generally content to let the colonials work out their own salvation, and to cut down the responsibilities and expenses of Empire to a minimum. It was this government which, at the beginning of 1847, sent out as Governor Lord Elgin, one of that brilliant group of statesmen trained by Peel. Elgin was wise enough to abandon finally any attempt to keep the executive in independence of the legislature; he frankly accepted the position of a Constitutional ruler and abandoned all attempts to take a side in the struggle of parties. Even when the Parliament House at Montreal was burnt down, and he himself pelted by a mob of enraged loyalists who regarded as treason his consent to French ex-rebels receiving com-

compensation for their losses, he deliberately refused to swerve a hair's breadth from his chosen policy. After his time the representative of the Crown recedes to a position of comparative unimportance. The principle of Canada for the Canadians is established once and for all.

Nevertheless, the system of government adopted from the Durham report was obviously no more than a temporary makeshift. The idea of giving the two provinces equal representation had been conceived of as a means of giving the English a preponderance over the French, but the population of the Upper Province, from being smaller than that of the Lower, became greater, and it was now the turn of the French to be over-represented. Any attempt to upset the arrangement would probably have resulted in a rebellion, and, ultimately, in annexation to the United States.

For this was an ever present possibility. There was, as yet, no railway to bind Canada on a thread, and trade routes naturally tended to run from North to South. The Americans had, indeed, made an attempt to block the natural expansion of Canada by annexing the whole of her Western seaboard, but this had been too much even for the peace-loving Peel, who had been ready to go to war rather than yield. So serious had affairs become that in the year between Metcalfe's resignation and Elgin's arrival, the post of Governor had to be filled by a military commander. The threat of American power all along a vast, indefensible frontier was, indeed, an ever present menace. There were, besides, many who thought that Canada's best interests would be consulted by amalgamation with a republic whose progress seemed so more rapid than her own, and this feeling gained a good deal in strength when the adoption of Free Trade by England seemed to cut off Canada from the chief commercial advantage she had hitherto derived from her allegiance.

However there was little serious disposition among any section of the Canadian people to exchange King Log at London for King Stork at Washington. Such a change would not have appealed to the steady-going and somewhat backward French, who wanted most of all to be left in peace, while the crime of the Americans in persecuting the loyalists of the War of Independence had created a feeling among the latter's descendants of undying loyalty to the British connection. Sentiment, in despite of utilitarian calculations, counted for more than economics. Elgin, in 1854, negotiated a treaty with Washington of reciprocity in the admission of raw materials,

and Canada took advantage of a freedom, greater than Durham would have conceded her, to frame her own tariff.

Nevertheless it was becoming plain enough that Canada could not hope successfully to compete with or stand against her mighty neighbour under her existing system of government. The dual union was growing more impossible every year, and it only comprised the territory drained by the waterway of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes. The Sea Provinces stood outside; the Hudson's Bay Territory in the North was owned by a company; the great Western Hinterland was ripe for development. Fortunately there were men of vision and patriotism on both sides of the party game, and they saw that the old Canada, linked by the Eastern waterway, must be merged in a mighty Dominion stretching from ocean to ocean, and linked together by a line of railway. The two original provinces could then, without any loss of dignity, separate from each other and come in as members of a wider Federation. The home government had by this time quite given up the idea of dictating to the Canadians, and were not likely to raise difficulties in sanctioning any scheme on which they would agree among themselves.

Federation, when it did come in 1867, was hastened on by the danger there had been for some time of an attack from the States. There had been intense irritation against England during the Civil War, on account of the pro-Southern bias of our upper class, and some of this was unjustly, though not unnaturally, directed against Canada. War had been a distinct possibility, and there were grave outstanding questions even after the collapse of the South. In many a homestead the prospect of the attentions of Sherman's bummers or Sheridan's devastators of the Shenandoah valley must have caused some searchings of heart. As it was, nothing more serious took place than annoying but ineffective raids by a few Irish Fenians. Nevertheless the United States displayed the rawness of their feelings by terminating, with scant courtesy, the existing arrangements of commercial reciprocity.

The form of the federal constitution, which was outlined in a series of resolutions in 1864 and became law in 1867, was therefore largely determined by the fact that Canada felt herself to be menaced by a powerful and not altogether friendly neighbour. As nearly as we can frame any generalization in politics, we may say that every pressure from the outside produces an increased centralization at home. For a federation, Canada is remarkably centralized, much more so than the United States, where each separate state retains

its independence in all functions not expressly assigned by the Constitution to the central government. Canada exactly reverses this procedure, her states are merely provinces, and the central government is presumed to have all powers not especially reserved to the provinces. It was not without difficulty that the various provinces were got to make such a large sacrifice of their rights. The island of Newfoundland, which was protected by British sea-power, never came in at all, and Nova Scotia tried, unsuccessfully, to get out again. It was only after the lapse of a few years that the process of union was finally completed, that the Hudson's Bay company was bought out and the West brought into the Union. It was a vital part of the understanding that the great railway, on which all Canada should hang, should be taken in hand, and accordingly the Canadian Pacific began to creep, year by year, Westward, every rail of it binding Canada closer together, and removing the threatened annexation by the United States from the realm of practical politics.

Having thus followed the development of Canadian unity, we need not do more than glance at the development in constitutional freedom of the other Colonies. By the middle of the century the principle of leaving the colonials to manage their own affairs, even to erect their own tariffs and frame their own constitutions, was pretty generally conceded, though not always without grudging and delay. Lord Grey, with a strange perversity, did indeed attempt to revive the practice of using the colonies as dumping grounds for convicts, but both the Cape and New South Wales gave him pretty decisively to understand that, whatever the Home Government might choose to do, convicts would not be received. The remote and backward colony of West Australia did indeed continue to receive convicts of free choice, until her neighbours gave her plainly to understand that she could not create this nuisance at their doors without provoking reprisals. And so transportation died an unlamented death.

The Australian colonies had no inducement to follow the example of Canada. Their tendency was rather to fall apart than unite together. New South Wales found the whole East and South East coast too long a line for her to hold, and the colonies of Victoria and Queensland split off from her to South and North. There was even some question of subdividing Queensland. The natural lines of communication did not run laterally between the Colonies, which were settlements along the coast, each of whose activities were focussed in the principal seaport, which was also the capital. Behind

them all stretched the vast and waterless desert. There was no apprehension whatever of danger from abroad, least of all from the quaint and remote Japanese. Therefore there was but the slightest incentive to unity, and the various colonies preferred to work out their constitutions on the principle of each for herself and the Mother Country for all. But the daughters had come of age and wanted no maternal interference in their own houses. And as often happens when that salutary principle is recognized in family life, the bonds of affection were strengthened. The discovery of gold in the forties brought a veritable rush of immigrants—not always of the most desirable kind—and the demands of the diggers stimulated every form of industrial and pastoral activity. In the flourishing and pushful communities whose population went on doubling and redoubling through the forties and fifties, the memory and taint of the bad old convict days were gradually erased.

New Zealand had a more placid development, except for the wars with the heroic and chivalrous Maoris that for a long time held up the development of the North Island. Isolated as she was in the remotest corner of the world, the only external danger that had ever threatened her was lest the French should have grabbed her while the English were making up their minds whether they wanted her or not. But the physical conformation of her two principal islands and their nearness to each other gave them a stronger tendency to unite than the settlements along the fringe of the Australian Continent. Accordingly we find New Zealand, for her first twenty years or so of responsible government, adopting a somewhat loose federation of six provinces, and it was only after twenty years of struggle between provincialists and centralists that the latter won the day and the provincial councils were abolished in 1876.

In South Africa, as in Canada, the situation was complicated by the presence of a large, non-British, white population. The great trek of Boer farmers to the North had by no means put an end to our difficulties—in some ways it rather increased them. Nobody, as yet, dreamed of a great South African Empire; Lord Grey would have liked us to have fulfilled our original purpose of keeping Cape Town as a naval base and cutting all our other responsibilities. But this was more easily said than done; already large quantities of Britons had emigrated to South Africa and the Great Trek had led to our annexing another colony in the shape of Natal. Hopeless vacillation marked our policy: we did not want to go on and yet we found it impossible to stop. The missionary, Dr. Philip, persuaded

the authorities to undertake the plausible experiment of throwing a barrier of native or half-caste states between us and the Boers, but these states were failures from the first, and another Kaffir invasion roused us into undertaking a forward policy in the course of which we not only reduced this formidable enemy to order, but annexed, after one sharp little fight, the Boer territory between the Orange and the Vaal rivers.

This might have proved a success, as the Boers of what was afterwards the Orange Free State were, for the most part, well pleased to accept the protection of the British, who were now less inclined than in the days of the great trek to be at the beck and call of the missionaries. But the reaction had already set in against a policy that might prove troublesome and expensive, and the British not only formally recognized the independence of the Transvaal or Northern Boers, but insisted, despite the protests of the Southern Boers, in clearing out of that very Orange Free State they had so recently fought to annex. This bare summary gives, however, but a faint idea of the indecision and inconsistency that characterized our policy throughout.

Cape Colony itself received, in 1854, a representative government, in which even Africans with a sufficient property qualification were not excluded from the electorate. In Natal, where the handful of white settlers were enormously outnumbered, Crown Colony rule was retained till the nineties. There was one statesman, however, who had imagination enough to conceive of a scheme that, if adopted, would probably have saved untold expense and bloodshed in future years. This was Sir George Grey, who came to the governorship of the Cape after having had a main hand in framing the New Zealand constitution. He at once saw that a federation of the British on the coast with the Boers in the Hinterland would serve the best interests of both, and he conceived of this federation as based on the same large measure of provincial autonomy as obtained in New Zealand. The Free State Boers, when sounded, expressed their willingness to come in, and there is little doubt that the Transvaalers would in a short time have followed their example. But the Colonial Office took fright at the idea of any sort of union with the Boers. Grey was branded by the Tory under-secretary, Lord Carnarvon, as "a dangerous man"; he was, in 1859, with appropriate compliments to his character and abilities, dismissed, and though a Liberal government promptly reinstated him, it was on the understanding that federation should be dropped. Thus the golden opportunity slipped away.

The period of bourgeois rule in England thus witnessed a development of the Commonwealth overseas that, though little regarded, was of supreme importance. At the beginning of the Queen's reign it was an open question whether Canada should be British, American, or independent; the Cape was hardly regarded as more than a calling station; it had not been decided whether New Zealand should be a British or a French possession; Australia was looked upon as little better than a social cesspit—Charles Lamb's jokes to an Australian friend about the thieving propensities of his fellow-colonists make odd reading nowadays. By 1867 matters had changed out of recognition; flourishing and self-governing daughter communities were firmly established, and, though there were still plenty of Little Englanders at home, there was no serious idea, in responsible quarters, of cutting the connection. The love of Britons beyond the seas for their motherland, though ignorant and unsympathetic politicians at home did their best to damp it, could not but grow under the fostering influence of liberty. England no longer appeared in the light of a partisan in colonial politics nor as an authoress of irritating restrictions. Distance now lent enchantment to the old country; imagination could play freely round her charms; loyalty could centre chivalrously round the person of the Queen.

"Instead of looking on us as a merely dependent colony," said Sir John Macdonald in his great speech on introducing the scheme of federation to the Canadian Parliament, "England will have in us a friendly nation—a subordinate but still a powerful people—to stand by her in North America in peace or in war. The people of Australia will be such another subordinate nation. And England will have this advantage, if her Colonies progress under the new colonial system, as I believe they will, though at war with all the rest of the world, she will be able to look to the subordinate nations in alliance with her and owing allegiance to the same Sovereign, who will assist in enabling her again to meet the whole world in arms, as she has done before."

11

BUREAUCRACY AND MUTINY IN INDIA

In India there was, as yet, no question of self-government. The last decades of John Company's rule were devoted to the extension and consolidation of the British Raj. A curious complication of fictions, becoming ever more and more transparent, masked the

realities of the situation. The Company, which had now ceased altogether to be a trading association and was really one aspect of the British Government, was still, for certain purposes, a mere feudatory of its own pensioner, the Great Mogul, and there was even some ancient question as to whether the Mogul himself might not own some shadowy allegiance to Persia. Such shadows might be not unfraught with danger in a land where dreams are little less accounted of than realities.

There was no question but that England, if she was to hold India at all, must go forward until her frontiers were secure. The expansion, to its South East, of the Russian Empire was already felt as a menace, and Palmerston, if he failed to appreciate the importance of the Colonies, was at least alive to that of India. The Tsar's agents were busy in Persia and Afghanistan; a Persian army actually besieged Herat, which was supposed to be the gate of Afghanistan, which again was the gate to India. Accordingly the Governor General, Lord Auckland, committed us to one of the most insane and crooked adventures in the whole of our history. He forced a worthless pretender upon the Afghan people and tried to prop him up by an army, mainly of sepoys, at Cabul. Of that army, only one man got away, and though we had the poor satisfaction of retaking Cabul and burning the bazaar, we had to make a virtue of necessity and give back to Afghanistan the ruler of whom we had deprived her.

Our next experiment in a forward policy was more successful if no less iniquitous. To round off our territory it was necessary for us to acquire that of Scinde on the Lower Indus. This Naboth's vineyard was ruled by three somewhat inept but—so far as we were concerned—quite inoffensive Amirs. However it was easy to fasten a quarrel on them, and almost as easy to fall upon them and seize the whole of their territory. Perhaps our General, Sir Charles Napier, had a twinge of conscience when announcing his conquest in the famous pun—"peccavi"—I have Scinde.

Our next struggle was against the Sikhs of the Punjab, that North Western province which had for long been known as the sword arm of India. This time at least, we had the quarrel forced upon us, for the Sikh army, whom dynastic anarchy had rendered entirely out of hand, suddenly took it into their heads to make a dash for Delhi. It took four desperate battles, in one of which our forces came measurably near disaster, before the Sikhs were turned back and driven into the Sutlej at Sabraon. Even this overthrow and the

severe peace which we imposed upon them did not tame their spirits ; it needed a second war, little less desperate than the first, before they were finally overthrown and their province annexed. Our frontier on the North West was now brought to the natural rampart of India, the Himalaya mountains. To the North East, two wars against the Buddhist Kingdom of Burma gave us, in Mr. Vincent Smith's words, " control, direct or indirect, of the entire eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal, from Chittagong to Singapore." The final absorption of the Kingdom itself, thus cut off from the sea, was only a question of time.

England had now acquired an empire of India, of which the proudest of that country's former rulers had not dared to dream. It extended from the Himalayas to Ceylon, from Singapore to the borders of Baluchistan. All this time, under a series of energetic Governors General, the work of internal organization was proceeding apace. Sati and Thuggee had gone ; slavery was abolished ; human sacrifice was put an end to. One of the greatest of the many great English rulers of India was Lord Dalhousie, another of that splendid team of administrators who had been coached by Peel. Under his auspices, from 1848 to 1856, the process of Westernization was pushed on with bewildering energy. The public services were thoroughly reorganized ; a halfpenny post was established throughout the length and breadth of India ; vast irrigation works were undertaken ; the most important centres were linked together by the electric telegraph ; railways, the beginnings of a network designed to cover the whole land, were begun ; a comprehensive system of education, starting at the village schools and culminating in three principal Universities, was thought out, and subsequently carried through in despite of the Mutiny.

No doubt India owed and still owes a debt of gratitude to this able and selfless man. But India did not recognize this ; in fact the pace of Dalhousie's reforms had caused her the gravest disquiet. No doubt this was partly due to the resentment and suspicion always excited in a naturally conservative people who find themselves hustled out of a groove. But there are Indian writers—we would instance particularly one so judicial as Mr. Pramatha N. Bose¹—who have drawn attention to another side of the case not so immediately obvious. For if India was opened up by the new means of communication, it was largely for exploitation by British capital. Much the same thing happened to her as had happened to Ireland

¹ In his *Hindu Civilization during British Rule*.

under the Union. If the railways allowed her raw products to get out, they also allowed our manufactured products to get in, and we had carefully deprived India of doing what every other country, not to speak of our own Colonies, had found it necessary to do in face of the overwhelming strength of our industrial resources—to protect her more backward industries by a tariff. Indian handicrafts were therefore knocked out as Irish industries had been, and the country sank into that state of economic subservience which is implied in the exchange of her own raw goods against her rival's manufactures, with the result of driving still more of her people to the already congested land, and thereby making poverty chronic.

Besides, it must be remembered that the railways, being financed by British capital and manned in all their skilled branches by Britons, constituted a permanent drain on the resources of the country. And these railways would, as Dalhousie's enthusiastic biographer, Sir W. W. Hunter, indicates, act as a bait to bring British capital to India on a hitherto unprecedented scale. All this, however, was not immediately apparent, and what did alarm India much more was the way in which Dalhousie, slipping for that purpose alone into the role of Mogul's vassal, applied the feudal doctrine of lapse to absorb Indian States, in which the direct line of succession failed, into the British Dominions. He was no doubt perfectly sincere and, what is more, probably right in saying, as he did when he annexed the important state of Oudh, that "the British Government would be guilty in the sight of God and man, if it were any longer to sanction by its countenance an administration fraught with suffering to millions". But it remains true, as the aforesaid biographer has pointed out, that he increased our dominions in India by between a third and a half, and it is no wonder if the supporters of the old order felt that now or never was the time to shake off this alien incubus.

There was still one chance, and it was a good one. English power was, after all, largely maintained by Indian bayonets. The sepoy army enormously outnumbered the British troops among them, and the bulk of it, the Bengal army, had for some time been in a state of chronic unrest, manifesting itself in more than one incipient and abortive mutiny. Things had been working up some time for a general explosion. The men's caste prejudices had been paid an exaggerated deference in some instances, and in others mortally insulted. There was talk of a general plot to force India to become Christian, talk rendered only too plausible by the officious

activities of missionaries and even of Low Church officers. At last the ghastliest of all possible outrages, both from a Hindu and Mahommedan point of view, was perpetrated, when it was rumoured that the cartridges of the new rifle, that the men were expected to bite, were greased with the fat of the sacred cow and the unclean pig. The government publicly denied this charge, and perhaps with honest ignorance, but the low caste employees in the munition works knew better, and the word went round that the sahibs were lying. The simple sepoy, with fury and despair in his heart, found himself confronted with the choice of mutiny or damnation. To unimaginative Englishmen such a state of mind was, and probably still is, inconceivable.

The ineptitude of the authorities passes belief. Though on the edge of a volcano, and even after a regiment had had to be disarmed and men were everywhere refusing the cartridges, they took no precautions. The vast arsenal of Delhi, hard by the palace-fort of the great Mogul, was at the mercy of a sepoy garrison. Forty miles away to the North East, lay the military centre of Meerut, which at least ought to have been safe, as it contained as many British as sepoys. Here the divisional commander, who was in his dotage, took a very strong line with 85 Indian cavalymen, who preferred the utmost punishment to defiling their souls with the accursed cartridges. After their sentence of ten years' hard labour had been promulgated and their irons struck on on parade, the poor fellows were actually put under the care of a sepoy guard. Next evening the British garrison went on church parade, without ammunition. The comrades of the imprisoned men rose and rescued them, and then, in panic as to the vengeance the sahibs would take, most of them crowded off down the line of least resistance, which happened to be the Delhi road. For two hours the British troops waited for orders, and then the retreat was sounded. Neither the Brigadier nor the Divisional Commander, though with ample resources, would take the responsibility of scattering the fugitives and saving Delhi. The Delhi sepoys were, in fact, for some time afraid to rise, and did so only when the lapse of an hour or two had driven them to the not unpalatable conclusion that the sahibs at Meerut were indeed, as some of the new arrivals assured them, wiped out. Then, while they were making an end of all the English they could catch, two devoted men somewhat mitigated the disaster, one, an Eurasian telegraphist, by wiring the news to the Commander-in-chief at Umballa and dying at his post, one, an English subaltern, by blowing up at least part of the magazine.

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The storm, thus conjured up by almost unbelievable incompetence, burst with awful suddenness on the handful of British scattered through Northern India. With Delhi as its centre and the Mogul for its figurehead, nothing could now stop the mutiny of the Bengal army. It was a revolt of the military caste, and the only province where there was anything like a popular rebellion was Oudh, where the reins of authority had been entrusted to the hands of a peculiarly overbearing official. In the country round Delhi the peasants vaguely believed that the Toorkh, the Mahommedan plunderer of dire tradition, had again come out of the North West. Many of them showed kindness to white fugitives. The rebels themselves, however, made it their deliberate policy to exterminate every British man, woman and child, and on our side there was no quarter for ex-sepoys. A remarkable feature of so ferocious a struggle was the almost entire absence of rape.

It seemed to many level-headed folk at home as if the handful of British could never hold their own against such disparity of numbers. It was, in truth, a nearer thing than we are apt to realize in the light of events. The Nizam of the Deccan had been turned into an enemy by our having deprived him of Berar, and if he had come in against us, Southern India would almost certainly have taken fire. Providentially this Nizam had just died, and a pro-British chief minister kept his son straight. An equally dangerous region was the newly-conquered Punjab, to which Dalhousie had sent all the ablest administrators he could collect, and which, under the sympathetic rule of John Lawrence, had, from a standing menace, become the sword arm of British India. The Sikhs had no desire to exchange their new rulers for their old tyrant, the Delhi Mogul. So from the Punjab in the North West and our Eastern base at Allahabad, British and loyal Indian troops closed in upon the chief seats of rebellion. The mutineers, though enormously superior in force, were, in fact, without unity among themselves, without leadership and without a plan. An Anglo-Sikh army performed the almost incredible feat of besieging and storming the fortified city of Delhi, the focus of the rebellion, against six times their numbers. Lucknow, the Capital of Oudh, where the British population held out with desperate valour in the Residency, was relieved twice, and the city finally stormed by the newly-appointed commander-in-chief, Sir Colin Campbell, now at the head of a sufficient army. The back of the rebellion was thus broken, though it needed many weary months to complete the process of reconquest.

One dreadful episode cannot be passed over, because its memory has exercised ever since a profound and tragic influence on our relations with Indians. The station of Cawnpore, on the Ganges, happened to be commanded by a certain Sir Hugh Wheeler, who, like the commander at Meerut, was aged and incompetent. When a mutiny of the sepoy garrison was practically certain, he could not make up his mind to seize the magazine, which he could almost certainly have defended until relief came. Instead, he chose to defend a miserable mud wall, behind which the white population contrived to hold out for nineteen days. Then he yielded to the overtures of the rebel leader or figurehead, the deposed Mahratta Peishwa's adopted son, entitled the Nana Sahib. This man had a grievance, in that Dalhousie had, quite rightly, refused to extend to him the life-pension granted to his father. A surrender was arranged on the Nana's undertaking to dispatch the whole white community by boat to Allahabad. With what, in a responsible commander, fell not far short of lunacy, Wheeler appears to have allowed troops and civilians to straggle down to the river without any sort of military precaution. Of course they walked into a trap and were helplessly massacred. The surviving women and children were confined in a small building and, on the approaching of a relief column, hacked to death by five ruffians who were procured for the purpose after the sepoys, at no small risk to themselves, had refused to disgrace their uniforms by so foul a deed.

The sight of the well into which the bodies—not all dead—had been thrown, not unnaturally maddened our troops. Dreadful reprisals were thought out, elaborately designed to compass not only the death but—in his own opinion at anyrate—the damnation of anyone thought to have had a hand in the crime. The accumulated horror of the tragedy made an indelible impression on the British imagination, long after similar massacres at Delhi and Jhansi had been forgotten. Nana Sahib, who seems to have been a mere tool in the hands of others, became as symbolic a figure as Guy Fawkes, and there was a subconscious tendency, especially after the lapse of years, to regard all Indians as somehow being more or less implicated. The little islands of Britishers in the cantonments could never quite get it out of the back of their minds that what had happened once might, in certain not inconceivable circumstances, happen again to their womenfolk, and in this sense it may be said that Amritsar was an answer, though after sixty-two years, to Cawnpore. A subtle poison had been introduced into our relations with Indians—

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after the mutiny there was never quite the same sympathy as before.

Nevertheless, after the last mutineers had been killed or driven to perish in the Northern wilds, India settled down to a period of peaceful development. The old fictions were swept away ; the Mogul dynasty was finally dethroned, John Company ended its long and splendid existence, and the British Raj was formally vested in the Crown. There was no human possibility, for a long time to come, of upsetting British rule from within. The authorities were not going to be caught napping twice, and the most elaborate precautions were taken to prevent any recurrence of a mutiny. The sepoy's were carefully mixed, deprived of artillery, and associated with an adequate proportion of British. The civilian population was kept rigorously disarmed. Meanwhile the machinery of bureaucracy was brought as near perfection as such machinery can be. Competitive examination had been introduced in 1853, and a type of civil servant was evolved of almost invariable competence, devotion to duty and—what East of Suez is the rarest of virtues—incorruptibility. Railways, education, justice, irrigation, the beginnings of famine relief, all these things were cared for with a practical efficiency that India had not known since Asoka had graved his royal edicts upon the rocks, more than two thousand years ago.

And yet there was another side to the picture not quite so pleasant to contemplate. The more elaborate any bureaucracy becomes, the more nearly does it approach to being a machine, a soulless thing working by a complication of rules, crushing out imagination and individuality. This tendency is immeasurably strengthened when the bureaucracy is alien in race and sympathy to the people among whom it functions. And though the theory was maintained of a free and open career for talent, whether British or Indian, how little a share the Indian was really conceded in the administration of his own country is shown by the figures for 1892, quoted by Mr. Pramatha N. Bose, which show that the Imperial Civil service included only 21 Indians out of 939 members. The British civilians, in fact, came to form a close and jealously race-conscious caste, isolated from the life of the country in station clubs from which Indians were often excluded,¹ and tending to resent anything implying an equal comradeship between themselves and the people whom, according to their

¹ I know of one instance in which an Indian member of the I.C.S., now occupying a distinguished position, received what was practically an order from his chief to stand for membership of a famous club. He was blackballed !

lights, they ruled with such inflexible conscientiousness. This was very different from what had obtained under the best Mohammedan rulers of India, and especially under Akbar, who had employed Hindus in the highest posts of state, and who had numbered among his most trusted counsellors such men as the wise and witty Rajah Birbal.

It was even different from what had obtained before the Mutiny, for then not only was there no shadow of Cawnpore to darken sympathy, but Englishmen had lived their lives in India and come to look upon it as a second home. Now, however, after the coming of the steamship and the cutting of the Suez Canal had so immensely shortened both the time and cost of a journey to England, leave became a matter of every few years, and affection had no time to strike roots in the country. With the development of the Hill Stations, India became an agreeable place of habitation for English womenfolk, and there was now little temptation to form irregular connections and even marriages with Indians. Not the least serious feature of the system, from an Indian point of view, was the fact that, according to a Parliamentary return in 1892, again quoted by Mr. Bose, nearly one fifth of the whole revenue of India went into the pockets of Europeans, all of whose savings and no small part of whose current expenses went to England and were a continual drain of the resources of a desperately poor community. An unfriendly critic might have said that if England had insisted on bringing her civilization to India, she had made an uncommonly good thing out of the transaction.

One notable effect of the new system of education in India was to create the beginnings of an Indian intelligentsia. The mere fact that the whole bias was towards Anglicization had at last the effect of turning young Indians from their own aristocratic and caste-dominated traditions to half-comprehended ideals of Western democracy. It was impossible to introduce the most quick-witted people in the world to such doctrines as "Taxation without consent is tyranny", "Redress of grievances must precede supply", and so forth, without the certainty of having them applied in a sense that the teacher might not have bargained for, and when such sentiments were broadcasted as,

"This England never did, nor never shall
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror."

it was difficult to explain that what was sauce for the English goose might be rank poison for the Indian gander. Another factor was

also making for the rise of an Indian patriotism. The opening up of the country by railways, telegraphs, post and newspapers had knit India together as never before in the course of her history. And not least important was the fact that England had supplied her with a common language for political purposes. The new knowledge, it is true, had only spread to a small minority, the new spirit to one still smaller, but the vast inert lump of the Indian population might ultimately be leavened by this new leaven of Westernization.

Meanwhile a struggle was going on none the less critical because few marked it. It was a question whether an emancipated India, if such a dream could ever come to pass, would not find that the civilization handed down to her from remote ages had been lost beyond recovery. Many of the new type of educated Indians desired nothing better than to model themselves on the pattern of the West. When the whole of the immense influence wielded by the government was exerted on behalf of Westernization, the danger was great indeed. In architecture, for example, the noble traditions of Hindustan, modified to a greater or less extent by Saracenic influence, were ignorantly set aside, the barbarous practice of copying to style became officially *de rigueur*, gifted young men had to learn how to put up sham Classic and tinsel Gothic, or go without the patronage of the sahibs. To obtain skilled government employment of any sort, it was in fact, necessary to have a prescribed smattering of English education which, being an imported product, was apt to be regarded as a mere means of passing examinations, and was "mugged up" by the mnemonic "stunts" of obscure coaches in the bazaars.

There was then, on the one hand, this unnatural and unsatisfied desire to make Indians into Englishmen, and on the other the vast, stagnant sea of Brahman conservatism. And yet the true Renaissance of India, of which Ram Mohun Rai had laid the foundations, was gathering strength in spite of difficulties that threatened to obscure its original aim. The career of his own Brahma Somaj was, as far as numbers and unity were concerned, somewhat disheartening. The ideal of advancing from Hinduism to a universal religion, in which Christian and Moslem, Buddhist and Confucian, would join without the sacrifice of anything essential, was too splendid a dream to meet the demands of Indians to whom their Vedic tradition was something superior in kind to all other faiths and scriptures. They could not quite sacrifice the faith of a people to find it reborn in the faith of mankind.

The man who represented the most advanced wing of the Somaj

was Keshab Chandra Sen, who had received a Westernized education and was thoroughly versed in English literature. With an extraordinary broad-mindedness he desired to assimilate all that was best in Western civilization and Christianity, while remaining, as he himself expressed it, a confirmed Indian and a confirmed theist. Not the least important result of this contact with the West was a passion for social reform on the most drastic lines, sweeping away caste, raising the status of women, and generally doing away with the letter of Brahmanic tradition in order to enter into the pure freedom of the sons of God. But so Radical a policy was too extreme for the more old-fashioned and patriotic Indians of the Somaj. These found a leader in the saintly mystic, Devendranath Tagore, who though an equally pure theist, grounded himself solidly on the rock of the Vedas and refused to admit to any equality the Hebrew Scriptures or the doctrine of Christ. On this fundamental difference the Somaj split in 1865, the Hindu Conservatives remaining on in the original Somaj, the Radical universalist party forming, under Chandra Sen, a new body which itself was destined to split in half on its leader's fall from his own principles by marrying his child daughter, with full Brahmanical rites, to the son of a Mahrajah.

It may seem waste of time thus to dwell on the fortunes of a society which never numbered more than a few thousands, all told, among the hundreds of millions of Indians. But the issue at stake was one that may conceivably be held, by future generations, to have been vital not only to India but to mankind at large. Might it not be possible that the new spiritual impulse of which Western civilization stood in so sore a need might proceed from the ancient cradle of religion in the East? And would the leaders of Indian thought be capable of the almost superhuman detachment and abnegation that will sacrifice even the pride of race and prejudice of tradition? Above all, would they be able to make this sacrifice when Indian civilization no less than Indian nationality was struggling for life in the clutches of an alien but no doubt benevolent despotism? In any other country but that of Asoka and the Buddha, a negative answer would have gone without saying, but there might be just a chance, though faint, that India would rise to the occasion.

12

THE WEST IN THE FAR EAST

One great Eastern civilization had now become, apparently in permanence, a field to be exploited by Western capital. But this was by no means enough to satisfy the insatiable hunger for markets. China and Japan had asked nothing better than to remain harmlessly within their own borders and live the life that seemed to them in every way more desirable than the fevered industrialism of which they knew only by vague rumour. They produced all they wanted for their own needs, and they feared, not altogether without reason, that the advantages of traffic with the West would be dearly bought. When George III had approached the Chinese Emperor with a view to the opening of diplomatic relations he had received a magnificent snub. Such trade as there was with China had to be carried on by Western merchants on the footing of barbarians, in humble contact with a superior civilization. Japan, which two centuries previously had found contact with Christianity on the make extremely distasteful, had purged herself of the nuisance and kept herself to herself ever since.

The natural remedy for the humiliating conditions insisted on by the Chinese would have been to withdraw our custom. But this would by no means suit our book, especially when we happened to be strong enough to blow open any gate that might be closed against us. The Chinese had the first taste of our methods at Canton, to which we were bringing the blessings of our civilization in the shape, principally, of opium. It is only fair to state that this trade was by no means frowned upon by the local mandarins, who contrived to make an exceedingly good thing out of it. The Chinese were no doubt arrogant and discourteous to the last degree, and when, on the lapse of John Company's monopoly in 1833, trade became open to all British subjects, they insisted on treating our representative, Lord Napier, with the most humiliating assumption of superiority. The unsentimental Duke of Wellington, who served a brief term at the Foreign Office under Peel's short ministry in 1834, and had, when commanding in the Peninsula, made no difficulties about going down on his knees to a Spanish grandee who had insisted on this mode of address, was stolidly unmoved at the idea of his lordship having been called a barbarian dog. Palmerston, however, had different ideas, and in 1839 the seizure of some opium by the Chinese followed by

outrages on British traders resulted in our attacking the Chinese, who were quite helpless against us, and ultimately in our appropriating the fine port and naval base of Hong Kong, besides forcing the Chinese to open five ports to our trade.

Our next war, which started in 1856, was almost wholly indefensible from any point of view except that of might being right and business the highest morality. The original excuse was that the Chinese governor of Canton had arrested some of his fellow countrymen on a charge of piracy, these men being at the time under the protection of the British flag. The Chinese governor seems to have acted with dignity and moderation, but Lord Palmerston was Prime Minister, and the Chinese were quite weak enough to warrant the full assertion of the "Civis Romanus" doctrine. Accordingly Governor Leh's arguments were simply ignored, or rather met with the counter argument of shot and shell. By this time other powers had come to feel that the business of exploiting China ought not to be a British monopoly, and that the wretched Celestials must now be forced to open their doors in good earnest. Accordingly the French joined in with us, and ultimately the Americans and the Russians, and after a good many Chinese had been made an end of, the path was cleared for civilization by the burning and looting of the Emperor's Summer Palace, "a building whose artistic value," as Mr. Bertrand Russell drily remarks ". . . must have been about equal to that of Saint Mark's in Venice and much greater than that of Rheims Cathedral".¹ It is only fair, however, to add that this palace had witnessed the torture of some prisoners who had been captured under circumstances of gross treachery. It was on this question of bullying China that Lord Palmerston's government was defeated in the Commons in 1857, after a memorable debate in which Lord John Russell ventured to say that we had heard too much of late of the prestige of England. "We used," he added, "to hear of the character, of the reputation, of the honour of England." But the old Premier knew enough of the middle class to be confident that, provided prestige could be attained at the expense of a thoroughly weak opponent, character, reputation and honour might go by the board. He therefore appealed, not in vain, to the constituencies.

It must be remarked that one of the results of this policy of forcing open the door to European trade was to take away from the Chinese the right enjoyed by every sovereign state of regulating its own tariff. The goods that came in at the treaty ports did so at a fixed and low

¹ *The Problem of China*, by Bertrand Russell, p. 52.

tariff, which the Chinese government had no power to raise. When internal taxes were imposed, European goods were allowed to pay a fixed rate that gave them an advantage over Chinese goods. No matter how desperately the government was pressed for revenue, they had to find some other resource—sometimes in the form of hampering export duties—or go without. Thus the system of compulsory exploitation which Britain applied to India was imposed by Europe upon China in a modified form called “The Open Door”. In this connection we may perhaps quote a remark of Mr. Bertrand Russell’s, “If you lived in a town where the burglars had obtained possession of the Town Council, they would very likely insist upon the policy of the Open Door, but you might not consider it wholly satisfactory. Such is China’s situation among the Great Powers.”¹

The business of forcing the door open in artistic and feudal Japan was first undertaken—ironically enough in the light of subsequent developments—by America, though the other white powers were quick to join in the forcing of their economic attentions on a victim who might be presumed to be more quaint and helpless even than her neighbour China. But there is a difference between the Chinese and Japanese spirit which is best expressed by the contrast of treatment of the same subject by two of their respective artists. The Chinese painting is of a sage crossing a river on a reed and impelling the reed—as you cannot but feel—by sheer, quiet intensity of contemplation. But in the Japanese picture, a sage is crossing not a river, but a storm-swept sea, crossing it not on a reed but on a sword, in a tempest of determination beside which the storm that whistles through his long hair and whiskers seems feeble indeed. Will-power and not contemplation is the basis of the Japanese character, and this was evoked as never before by the insolent intrusion of the foreigners.

But the Japanese, a race of fighters and patriots, had no mind to be the mere passive victims of barbarian violence. They had already adopted one civilization from China, and now another had come into the field against which the first seemed helpless. A philosophic standard of values was alien to the nature of a people who have produced many artists but few philosophers. The West might not have found ultimate truth or inward calm, but it had undoubtedly attained power, and that was enough justification. The Japanese did not hesitate. With an adaptibility almost miraculous they set themselves to scrap the grotesque and charming

¹ Op. cit., p. 56.

feudal order which Gilbert caricatured with such humorous tolerance in *The Mikado*. They determined to take from the West everything she had to teach, constitutional, industrial and—above all—military. Nay more, they would beat the foreigner at his own game. They positively welcomed intercourse. In a few brief years they had scrapped the old order and were feverishly setting themselves to acquire the power over material things that had already worked such strange transformation in the West. It was as if Poo Bah had disappeared from the stage, effected a lightning transformation, and suddenly re-appeared in European uniform, armed with a machine gun, which he pointed at the audience, who were at first unable to grasp that this was not another of the fellow's jokes. But we are anticipating a process that had barely begun in the sixties of the nineteenth century.

13

IRELAND—THE DARKEST HOUR.

While we were thus enlarging our power and responsibilities abroad, trouble was accumulating at the heart of the Empire. What Poland was to Europe, Ireland was to England, and when all was said that could be for the sternness of our necessity and the benevolence of our intentions, two facts emerged with more distinctness than ever during the course of the nineteenth century. The first was that, except in the North East corner of Ireland, we were holding down by force a people whose national self-consciousness was inflamed by an intense sense of wrong ; the second, that under our rule Ireland did in fact become the most miserable land in Europe, a misery plainly reflected in the appalling statistics of her population, which little short of halved in the years between the Black Famine of 1845 and the end of the century.

During the period of middle class ascendancy in England, the Irish question had been more or less in abeyance in so far as the predominant Power was concerned. And yet the cup of Ireland's miseries had been steadily filling, and it was only a question of time, when England could be invited to partake of it. For we must continue to bear in mind that Pitt's Act of Union had created a situation that must inevitably prove intolerable for England herself. With a Parliament in which power alternates between two jealously competing parties, it is obvious that a compact body of four-score or more members, that knows its own mind, can sooner or later

hold the balance of power, and dictate its own terms as the price of its support. And with the continuous democratizing of our institutions, the time would sooner or later come when the national sentiment of a practically unanimous people would succeed in returning an Irish patriot for every Irish constituency.

There is another aspect of England's relations with Ireland to be considered. The conquest was not only political but—what hit the average Irishman a great deal harder—economic. The compulsory opening, under the Union, of her ports to English competition, had almost wiped out Ireland's manufactures, except in the North East, and the Celtic Irish had become more than ever an agricultural population, living in a state of frightful destitution on a few pence a day, sometimes subsisting on milk and potatoes, sometimes on potatoes without milk, and reduced, in large part, to the trade of begging during the slack seasons. This miserable peasantry competed desperately among themselves for land, a fact of which the landlords, a class largely and increasingly alien to them in race and religion, took advantage to force up rents to the most extortionate rates. These landlords could not plead the justification of the English common enclosers of the preceding century, that they had sunk capital in the land and improved cultivation. They were mostly simple parasites, who rack-rented the people and took the proceeds across the Channel, steadily draining the country of its wealth. The lot of a poor man was hopeless beyond belief. Let him improve his holding, and on the expiry of his lease the rent would be put up more than in proportion, and he would probably be turned out to starve or, not improbably, to take the life of his successor. What was most fatal of all, the Irish, like nearly all people living on the verge of destitution, indulged without stint in the only pleasure life afforded them, and bred children in reckless profusion. When one considers that the population was increasing by millions, and that it was dependent for bare life on the potato, a root notoriously liable to epidemic disease, it ought to have been obvious towards what sort of a catastrophe Ireland was rushing.

One lesson England seemed determined on teaching. If there was to be any remedy for so terrible a state of things, Ireland must win it by her own strong arm. It was by the threat of rebellion that she had secured the Catholic Emancipation that no considerations of honour could wring from England at the time of the Union. It is true that by a piece of clever finesse the most awkward consequences of this measure had been at least postponed. With the ostensible

object of bringing Irish into line with English practice, the property qualification for a vote was increased tenfold, and in spite of the fact that government posts were now legally open to Catholics, sufficiently good care was taken that only a very few of them should be appointed. But at least the Liberator O'Connell was in Parliament with a fair "Tail" of followers, trying his best, in the years following the Reform Bill, to strike up a working alliance with the all-powerful Whigs.

Meanwhile England was trying to deal with the troubles of her sister island after her usual fashion of prescribing pills of somewhat dubious composition for the cure of an earthquake. Under Tory auspices a system of education, universal but not compulsory, was set up, but one carefully calculated to stamp out, if that were possible, any spark of national feeling in Irish bosoms. In some schools we even went so far as to adopt a method subsequently tried with less success by the Prussians on Poland, and flog the already fast disappearing native language from the lips of school children. We also set up a poor-law, but scrapped a constructive scheme for finding useful employment for the multitudes of destitute who drifted about the country, because some official person, who found time to spend a fortnight in the country, came to the conclusion that it would be better to dot it with workhouse Bastilles on the good old English model. The municipal corporations were, after much chopping and changing, given a form of self-government on a £10 franchise, and reduced in the process to ten.

Meanwhile the Irish people had shown that they had not forgotten the sort of argument to which England was most amenable. Of all Irish grievances the most humiliating, though not the most severe, was the tribute that was wrung from them, in the form of tithe, for the support of a church which was, in their eyes, not only foreign but heretical. In 1830 began what was known as the Tithe War; payment was refused all over the country, and dangerous riots took place. It soon became evident that the cost of collecting the tithes would greatly exceed the proceeds of the collection. After various attempts by force and half-measures to end what had become an impossible situation, the government gave in to the extent of having the tithes commuted. It must have been obvious, even thus early, that the methods that had proved successful against a tribute to Protestantism might some day be applied to defeat the tribute to the landlords, which was called rent.

O'Connell's next task, after having secured Catholic Emancipation, was to press on to the goal to which all Celtic Ireland was now looking,

the repeal of the hated Union. If he had had any hopes of obtaining support in the English Parliament, he was soon undeceived, for it transpired that the Whigs were as solid against Repeal as the Tories. For some time the "Liberator" pursued a Fabian policy of supporting the Whigs for the little he could get, but with the opening of the forties he fell back upon the methods of popular agitation that had proved so successful in 1829. A tremendous enthusiasm was aroused from end to end of the island, enormous mass meetings were swayed by O'Connell's eloquence, a "repeal rent" provided funds for the campaign, and it might not have seemed unduly sanguine to forecast that Peel and Wellington, who, in 1841, came into power, would yield, as they had yielded before, rather than face a rebellion in which the loyalty of the Crown Forces, of whom a large proportion were Irish, might be dangerously undermined. But on this issue the government, one of the strongest of the century, was determined to fight rather than yield, and the old Duke was quite prepared to buckle on his sword and have it out with the Irish, who had furnished the flower of his Peninsula armies. O'Connell had used the most violent language, and plainly threatened to meet force with force, but he was really bluffing, and this time it was evident that the bluff would be called. Ireland was in no state to withstand the wealth and manpower of Britain, and O'Connell was never more of a patriot than when he decided to draw back and save his countrymen from a repetition of '98.

But the leader, who works up his men to attacking pitch and then sounds the retreat, is not apt to be sympathetically judged, and the power of the big, lovable, devout, and yet coarse-grained O'Connell was fatally weakened. A new generation of Irishmen was growing up to whom the "Liberator's" shrinking from the use of force was nothing less than treason, and a party of high-souled, visionary, and brilliantly gifted men was now forming under the title of Young Ireland. It was the Romantic impulse, which, working up for the revolutions of 1848, was beginning to be felt in Ireland, as it was in France and Italy and Central Europe.

Romance was no new thing in Ireland of the forties. Ever since the '98 rebellion a patriotism had been astir of a wistful tenderness that had fastened on to thoughts of Ireland as of a poor old woman, the "Shan Van Vocht". The song bearing this name dates from Hoche's abortive effort to land a French army in Ireland in 1796, and the "Shan Van Vocht's" call to her sons to make themselves free from the centre to the sea. Even more poignant is that song

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of the '98, called the "Wearin' of the Green", of which the original version contains the lines :

"And if the colour we must wear is England's cruel Red,
Let it remind us of the blood that Ireland has shed ;
Then pull the shamrock from your hat, and throw it on the sod,
And never fear, t'will take root there, tho' under foot t'is trod !"

These songs, which, under a number of versions, were sung throughout the length and breadth of Ireland, voice the spirit of a people that cannot forget and will not forever submit to be governed against its will.

It was impossible that in the revival of medieval and primitive cultures that took place early in the century, the rich heritage of Celtic literature and tradition should be forgotten. Just when his language was dying out, the Irishman was reminded that he had a glorious past, that Ireland was a mother nation with a right to the loyalty of her sons. Thomas Moore may not have been a poet in the same class as his friend Byron, his view of Ireland may have been coloured by the crudest sentimentality, but his ideal was to awaken the harp that once had sounded through Tara's halls, and he spoke in a language that was all the more appealing because it was that best understood by his contemporaries.

The group of romantic Liberals who started the Young Ireland movement of the forties were one and all imbued with the strongest sense of Ireland's nationality. She was to them the land of saints and heroes, of Bridget and Columcille, of Cuchulain and the Fianna. They looked to the magic of freedom to restore to her the glories and beauty of the past. Their organ, *The Nation*, edited by Gavan Duffy, with the avowed object of directing "the popular mind . . . to the great end of nationality", was rich with patriotic poetry. The horrors of '98 were still in the memory of many an old man, who could tell how Irish men had been flogged and slaughtered, how chaste Irish girls had been raped by mercenaries, and of the pathetic heroism with which the sons of the "Shan Van Vocht" had given their lives in a hopeless cause.

"They rose in dark and evil days
To right their native land ;
They kindled here a living blaze
That nothing shall withstand.
Alas ! that Might can vanquish Right—
They fell and passed away ;
But true men, like you, men,
Are plenty here to-day."

To understand "Young Ireland", the passion and romance of its patriotic self-devotion, it is necessary to be carried along the tide

of its song. Ireland is now the poor old mother, now the beautiful young Queen :

“ I could scale the blue air,
 I could plough the high hills,
 O, I could kneel all night in prayer,
 To heal your many ills !
 And one beamy smile from you
 Would float like light between
 My toils and me, my own, my true,
 My dark Rosaleen ! ”

Men of this spirit were not likely to count the odds, nor to let any considerations of prudence curb their ardour. They soon broke away from the old “ Liberator ”, with his lawyer’s caution and his genuine horror of bloodshed. The Church, whose power had organized the national movement in favour of emancipation, shrank from anything that smacked of revolution. Young Ireland was in a minority even in Ireland, and not wholly at one in its own ranks. There were some, including Mitchel, a writer of beautiful prose, and Meagher “ of the sword ”, an intransigent rebel, for whom even *The Nation* was too mild and Laodicean. The Romantic spirit working on the Celtic temperament was not likely to produce solid political results. It was perhaps unwise for them to immolate themselves for their Dark Rosaleen, instead of setting to work to provide her with a comfortable home—but it is the unwisdom that sacrifices its mortal all for one immortal hour, and counts its all well lost.

A disaster was now approaching Ireland of such awful completeness as to put every other consideration, even patriotism, into the shade. Across Europe passed a plague that attracted comparatively little attention till it got to Ireland, where it proved a scourge comparable to the Black Death in the fourteenth century. This disease smote not man but the potato. For years these roots were blighted and blackened—the crop, which was all that stood between the teeming and destitute Irish peasantry and actual starvation, failed. And so they dropped down and died, many of them from starvation pure and simple, more from the diseases that famine brings in its train. Some of them were dropped uncoffined into common graves, some lay unburied in the fields and by the wayside, to be crunched by dogs, or the poor, famished pigs whose ravenous hunger could not distinguish between the dying and the dead. “ A calm, still horror,” wrote Mitchel, “ was over the land . . . You stood in the presence of a dread, silent, vast dissolution. An unseen ruin was creeping round you. . . . It seemed as if the *anima mundi*, the soul of the

land, was faint and dying, and that the faintness and the death had crept into all things of heaven and earth."

And yet all this time, Ireland, if denuded of potatoes, was bursting with corn. That harvest had been unusually good, and there was enough of a better food than the potato to keep alive and healthy the whole of her population. But the corn was carried past the dead and the dying in great waggons to the coast, there to be shipped for the benefit of English and other foreigners who could afford to pay for it. Even the unfree Irish Parliaments of the eighteenth century had stopped corn going out of the country in famine time, but the Parliament of Westminster would hear of no such thing. They had their own people to consider; it was the leanest time of the hungry forties, and to have stopped Irish corn coming into England might have relieved distress there at the price of intensifying it at home. It would have been almost too much to expect of any national assembly not to have put number one first.

There was no deliberate cruelty nor callousness among the English people, nor even among the politicians. O'Connell himself testified to the good feeling both in and out of Parliament. "I am afraid," he said, "of not finding words sufficient to express my strong and lively sense of English humanity." Englishmen, of all classes, were genuinely shocked and anxious to help. Purse-strings were freely loosened; Peel himself sacrificed his government and party to free imports because, as Wellington put it, rotten potatoes had put Peel in his damned fright. But stupidity can be more cruel than cruelty itself, and the Whig government of Lord John Russell, that succeeded Peel, was pedantically wedded to the dogma of the "classic" political economy. They refused to allow the ships of the navy to take corn to Ireland, because it was better to let men starve than interfere with "the legitimate interests of shipowners". They set up relief works, but instead of scientifically developing the resources of the country, they made them of carefully calculated uselessness—roads that led nowhere—because competition must not be interfered with. Worst of all, they refused to give relief to anyone who had so much as a quarter of an acre of land. This ingenious provision offered most of the peasantry the choice between eviction and starvation. No wonder a frequent verdict of coroners' juries was one of wilful murder against Lord John Russell.

The landlords, themselves desperately hard pressed by the almost complete failure of rents, had their own way of dealing with the situation. A few of them, it is true, lived with their people and saw

them through the trouble, but the more usual way was to deny them the luxury of starving in their own cabins. Evictions of families ran into tens of thousands; the wretched creatures were flung out to die in the open.

Words cannot paint and imagination cannot conceive the full tragedy of this time. O'Connell himself, in despair of helping his people, set forth on a last pilgrimage to Rome, but when he reached Genoa his great heart broke, and as the ship bearing home his body sailed into port, it was greeted by the wails of emigrants who were fleeing from the charnel house that had been their motherland. The great exodus from Ireland had begun that was to continue for the remainder of the century. Packed in fetid and fever-stricken spaces, amid horrors comparable to those of the middle passage, they were shipped across the Atlantic, dying all the way and continuing to die of want and disease before they could be absorbed into the populations of their new homes. Some Englishmen had the heart actually to exult over this process, which would, it was fondly predicted, render a Celt on the banks of the Shannon as rare a sight as a Red Indian on those of the Hudson. The *Times* quite frankly announced that at last England had Ireland at her mercy and could do with her as she pleased. But Irish nationality was not so easily to be disposed of. The majority of the emigrants had gone to the United States, to be away from the detested Union Jack, but they kept their love for Ireland, and a burning, never dormant hatred of England. The natural basis of our foreign policy was undermined by the estrangement between the two Anglo-Saxon powers; an element of active disloyalty was introduced into the colonies; in England itself there was added to the electorate an incalculable proportion that sought not the good but the harm of the community.

When a people is dying for lack of food, it has no strength for revolutionary activities. The Irish leaders were now, as always, at variance among themselves. The O'Connellites deprecated violence, the Church regarded the visitation as the act of God, even Young Ireland had no clear programme. An insurrection was attempted—it fizzled out bloodlessly, amid ridicule, in Smith O'Brien's potato patch. The militant chiefs were soon laid by the heels, and sent off, as common convicts, to serve long terms of imprisonment, which, after a period of years were, with contemptuous good-nature, remitted. Helpless and hopeless, Ireland sank down to the apathy of utter wretchedness.

The most important development of the Young Ireland

movement had been the doctrine propounded by the hunchback revolutionary, James Fintan Lalor, who, despairing of an open appeal to arms, counselled Irishmen to direct all their energies towards making the position of the landlords impossible. The Irish people, he maintained, had an indefeasible right to their land. "They or we," he said of the landlords, "must quit this island." These men had grown fat on the export of the corn which might have fed the people, "hating and hated . . . an outcast and ruffianly horde . . . tyrants and traitors have they ever been to us and ours." Such were the bitter feelings engendered by this bitter time. Lalor was arrested in 1849, and soon let out to die, but in 1848 a Tenants' League had been formed, the precursor of the Land League of thirty years later.

14

THE CRUMBLING OF ORTHODOXY

The year 1848 marks, on the Continent of Europe, the decline of the Romantic and essentially bourgeois Liberalism that had been dominant, at least as an ideal, ever since the July days of 1830. But in England, so firmly rooted was the middle-class ascendancy, and so prosperous became the country under its auspices, that the great wave of revolutions, followed by the trough of reaction, scarcely produced more than a slight ruffling of the surface in the safe harbour of the British Constitution. Never, to all outward appearance, had a more stable and self-confident civilization ever existed than that of Victorian England, one that so perfectly combined the elements of permanence and progress, one that more obviously justified the self-complacency that was among the most conspicuous qualities of the Englishman of the fifties.

Yet even now it was not unmarked that the intellectual and spiritual foundations of this imposing structure were insufficient to bear it. There was no time when the complacency of the age with itself could be said to have mastered its leading spirits. Carlyle was in frantic revolt against the "pig-philosophy" he saw everywhere triumphant; to Newman and the Tractarians the ascendancy of Liberal ideas signified the Abomination of Desolation; Disraeli saw the country fatally divided into two nations of haves and have-nots; even Tennyson's respectable optimism is marred by some strangely jarring notes—in *Locksley Hall*, for instance, his vision of progress fades for an uneasy moment into another of a slowly starving population outrunning its means of subsistence, and later,

the opening canto of *Maud* contains an attack on capitalist civilization, with its swindling, its overcrowding, its "Timour-Mammon grinning on a pile of children's bones", which might have passed muster with Karl Marx himself.

These, however, may fairly be classed as rebels, and Tennyson and Disraeli as fitful and not wholly convinced rebels, against the prevailing optimism of their time. And yet the almost boundless complacency that attained its zenith in the fifties was based upon a system of compromises, born of a distaste for driving any line of enquiry too far below the surface. An acceptance of appearances, even in the realms of thought, formed part of the strange decency of those days.

Nowhere was this characteristic avoidance of fundamentals more apparent than in the sphere of formal religion. To all outward appearance, England was a conspicuously Christian country. The scepticism that had honeycombed her intelligentsia of the eighteenth century was, to all seeming, completely superseded. Infidelity had ceased to be fashionable or even very respectable among the upper class. So firmly entrenched was orthodox dogma that it was difficult so much as to publish a book that in any way conflicted with it.

Samuel Butler, in his posthumous novel, *The Way of All Flesh*, says of this period, "It must be remembered that the year 1858 was the last of a term during which the peace of the Church of England was singularly unbroken. Between 1844 when *Vestiges of Creation* appeared, and 1859, when *Essays and Reviews* marked the commencement of that storm which raged until many years afterwards, there was not a single book published in England that caused serious commotion within the bosom of the Church. Perhaps Buckle's *History of Civilization* and Mill's *Liberty* were the most alarming, but neither of them reached the substratum of the reading public. . . . The Evangelical movement had become almost a matter of ancient history. Tractarianism had subsided into a tenth day's wonder; it was at work, but it was not noisy. The 'Vestiges' were forgotten . . . the Catholic aggression scare had lost its terrors . . . the Crimean war was the one engrossing subject, to be followed by the Indian Mutiny and the Franco-Austrian war. These great events turned men's minds from speculative subjects, and there was no enemy to the faith which could arouse even a languid interest. At no time probably since the beginning of the century could an ordinary observer have detected less sign of coming disturbance."

And yet this *soi-disant* Christianity of the Victorians bore about

the same relation to that which had given birth to the Franciscan movement or the Gothic cathedrals, as the romantic heroes of Sir Walter Scott bore to the real knights and barons of the Middle Ages. The Victorians were less rowdy, more dignified, more—we cannot help repeating the word—respectable, than the contemporaries of Hugh of Lincoln and Thomas a Becket. Archbishop Sumner or Longley would not have been in the least likely to settle a point of precedence by sitting down in the lap of his colleague of York. Anything like the scriptural horseplay of the old mysteries would have invited the attentions of the police. The Christianity of the Victorian bourgeois was, in fact, a cautious and Bowdlerized imitation of what had obtained in the age of real faith. As for its having any part or lot with the teaching of Christ, the idea is too blasphemously absurd for present-day discussion.

By their fruits ye shall know them, and the fruits of early Victorian Christianity are manifest. There was certainly a notable revival of religious art in all its branches from Church-building to the carving of lecterns and the embroidery of altar cloths. A perfect epidemic of Gothic swept over the land, especially after the writings of John Ruskin had inspired a passion for that style. Ruskin himself was a typical Victorian in his immense energy and his uncertain intellectual grasp, which caused him to see the quintessence of Gothic not in its native North, but in Italy, where it was always an alien and artificial product.

It was in the rapidly expanding suburbs of London and other great towns that Victorian Gothic found its most conspicuous expression. Everywhere arose tall tapering spires, surmounting Churches with lancet or decorated windows, and whatever of the medieval it was possible to reproduce. The attempt was about as hopeful as that of a chemist who should try to create a man by chemical synthesis. Of what use was it to copy the style when the life that had formed the style was no more? And yet this bastard and devitalized Gothic was as true an expression of Victorian Christianity as Bishop Jocelin's West Front of Wells had been of medieval.

The very manifoldness of religious activity is enough to show that some spirit was at work. The Victorian young lady, for all her ringlets and swoonings, put as much energy into her religion, and a good deal more concentration, than her great-granddaughters devote to the ritual of dancing club and golf-links. The daughters of country houses were not infrequently sedulous ecclesiastical craftswomen—

we know one instance of a Church window having been stained, not discreditably, by three such sisters. The Victorian Jehovah was sufficiently real to the Victorian paterfamilias to warrant His day being made into one of pain in order to appease Him. Religion, of a sort, was a very serious affair with the average Victorian.

But the uncompromising purpose, the ruthlessness of aspiration that informed the old Gothic were alien, if not shocking to the average Victorian. He wanted something safe and comfortably emotional, something with the romance but without the rawness of medievalism. Gothic, with its emphasis on the emotional and its avoidance of the intellectual factor, exactly suited his needs—up to a point. But the exuberance, the tamelessness, the downright and unromantic sincerity of the old builders and craftsmen were not to be recaptured. So far, in fact, were the Victorians from desiring any true return to the genuine Gothic spirit, that they fell upon the relics of the Middle Ages with an obscene fury of restoration that proved even more destructive than the sincere indifference of the eighteenth century. It was during the thirties that the beautiful Norman tower at the North Western end of Canterbury Cathedral was destroyed, in order to make way for one copied correctly from its companion. In the forties the mania was at its height. This was the time when Dean Jenkins, of Wells, did his considerable best to effect the ruin of the interior, wherein, by an act of poetic justice, he reposes beneath a tomb of unexampled hideousness.¹ Scarcely an ancient building of any note, but was subjected to the horrors of what the guidebooks know as “a judicious restoration” by the inevitable Sir Gilbert Scott.

If these things were wantonly done against the spirit of medieval Christianity in its existing relics, what could we expect when these frock-coated Vandals tried their hands at creating buildings in the likeness of those they delighted to mar? In a very different sense to that which they intended, their works bear witness to the thing Victorian religion really was. Those smug saints and young lady angels that advertise themselves in nightmare clamancy of yellow and vermilion (as in one unbelievable window in the South Aisle at Gloucester), those details repeated *ad infinitum* by the employees of enterprising contractors, the general combination of the cheap with the unexceptionable, testify—if indeed stones and glass are capable of crying out—to the plight of a civilization which, in striving after the material world, is so perilously neglecting its own soul.

Such a faith which, whatever name it chose to adopt, was really

¹ And, until very recently, a window to match.

directed to nothing nobler than a compromise between a sentimental God and a practical Mammon, could not stand for very long, despite of appearances. If Christianity was little more than a romantic veneer, science was at least desperately in earnest, science as the Victorians understood it, directed almost entirely to the knowledge and control of external nature. All along the line, not only in England, but throughout Western civilization, science was going on from strength to strength. The time was now passing when practical mechanics, like Watt and Stephenson, were capable of revolutionary invention. New energies were coming into play that could not be harnessed to the wheels of commerce without the abstruse calculations of trained mathematicians and physicists.

The utilization of water vapour by means of the steam engine, which had accomplished such miracles during the Industrial Revolution, was now coming to be recognized as a comparatively crude, primitive and wasteful method of commanding energy. New forces were coming into play, and in particular electricity, which demanded the utmost delicacy of calculation. When the Atlantic Cable was first laid, it required the mathematical genius of William Thomson, afterwards Lord Kelvin, to make it a working concern by solving the problem of retained electricity. In the forties, thanks largely to the researches of Joule, the whole science of energy and its transformations was revolutionized and established on a permanent basis.

Chemistry was meanwhile steadily building on the foundations laid by Dalton, though the simplicity of his atomic law was giving way to an ordered complexity of relations, that appeared as first one and then another generalization was established by experiment. The elucidation of organic chemistry, largely through the work of Liebig, brought chemistry to the aid of agriculture as well as of manufacture. The chemist and physicist played constantly into each others hands. All along the line earnest and self-sacrificing men were thus cooperating in the quest for truth; and with the improvement of means of communication, this cooperation became more and more international.

Science, in spite of its fatally material bias during the nineteenth century, partook more of religious earnestness than any of the Churches or sects of that time, and the informal brotherhood of its devotees—a true communion of the elect—gave promise of a world order fraught with more hope than the existing anarchy of nations and orthodoxies. It was inevitable that the new demand for truth

should, before long, break through the partial monopoly of it claimed on behalf of revealed religion by its devotees.

For whatever may be said about the ultimate tendencies or omissions of Victorian science, there is no doubt that Victorian Christianity was honeycombed with the crudest and most obvious materialism. Its God was no longer a spirit, but a magician, and a clumsy one at that—an author of Semitic legends on the tottering strength of which his godhead was supposed to stand or fall. The bulwark of Anglican orthodoxy at this time was supplied by the apologetics of a certain deceased Mr. Paley, who, having found a watch on a heath, and a certain complex harmony in both, deduced a sort of glorified watchmaker or heath maker *in excelsis* and thought it no blasphemy. One of this good man's works, a long, dry exposition of Christ's title to omnipotence on the ground of His having taken greater liberties with His own laws of nature than Simon Magus or Jannes and Jambres, was supposed to be of so fortifying a nature to youthful faith that it received a kind of canonization by the dons of Cambridge University, who prescribed it as a subject for the Little Go.

In no other country in Europe was such zeal displayed in defence of a literal interpretation of scripture, in no other country was there so steady a flow of apologetic literature as in England. This was no doubt mainly due to the Low Church revival, with its rigid insistence upon the sanctity of the Hebrew Scriptures. As that revival lost its first fervour of salvation, it tended to concentrate more and more on the form and to maintain its position not by spiritual enthusiasm, but the maintenance of taboos. Having staked their faith upon a series of doubtfully religious propositions, the apologists endeavoured, for some time with success, to prohibit discussion of them. Science was told to keep her hands off the Bible. She might pursue her quest for truth provided she could make truth square with the Authorized Version and Archbishop Ussher's chronology.

The purely physical and mathematical sciences might have gone on their way with comparatively little hindrance, though astronomy had always attracted a certain amount of covert suspicion, even in Protestant circles. But Moses had not felt himself inspired with any decided opinion concerning the conservation of energy or the nature of the atom, and the obvious business value of such researches was a strong argument for tolerance. Piety might frown on the quest for truth, but to interfere with profits would have tended as little to

edification as if the vicar of some country church had taken for his text not Jonah's whale nor the Tower of Babel, but "Woe unto you rich", or one of those uneconomic outbursts about whose literal inspiration, by a tacit decency, the less said the better.

Science, though she had concentrated on the physical out of all proportion to the vital, was now gradually making up the leeway. She was beginning to take more interest in life, to find out more about it, though she approached it from the physical side, and her tendency was to concentrate on its lower and physical aspect, to see in man rather the son of mud than the father of God. Looking back, we may visualize the eighteenth century as an age of mathematical thought, dominated by the genius of Newton, and the nineteenth century as one whose dominant note is biology, and whose supreme genius Darwin. Is it too bold a speculation that the twentieth century will see an equal development in the field of mental and spiritual knowledge?

So long as the sciences that were to coalesce into biology could be kept to a static and unhistorical standpoint, no harm was to be apprehended by the defenders of Holy Writ. Paley's glorified watchmaker was assumed to be incapable of creating a self-acting universe; it was felt that he could not justify, or at anyrate prove his existence, without constantly winding up the machinery or taking it to pieces. Zoology and botany were so conceived of, at the beginning of the century, as to fit in with this scheme. Species stood apart in absolute isolation. The Rationalists, who certainly did not believe in the intervention of a Semitic God, could find no very plausible bridge between species, though the old soldier, Lamarck, had a theory of his own which did not find such general acceptance as the system of zoological statics formulated by his countryman Cuvier. There was a comfortable feeling that the burden of proof of an evolutionary doctrine lay on the misguided men who propounded it, and that this burden even Lamarck had failed to shoulder.

It was on the side of geology that the first breach was made in the orthodox stronghold. The beginning of the century had seen a theory highly approved of in pious circles, that postulated a series of complete catastrophes in the history of the globe, God having made several clean sweeps of life in order to make a fresh start. Geologists were—with good reason, if they wanted either publication or a fair hearing—usually careful to preface their treatises by an assurance of their conformity with Semitic tradition.

This was too artificial a state of things to survive the insistency

of genius. Already, towards the end of the eighteenth century, an English geologist, Hutton, had found the facts, which he so diligently accumulated, to point to the hypothesis of a continuous development. His views, however, were expressed with too much obscurity to carry the weight they deserved. But the year of his death saw the birth of another geologist, Lyell, who added to scientific genius the graces of literary style, and in the early thirties fairly knocked the bottom out of the theory of catastrophism. It was easy to see that evolution, if once it could be established in regard to the earth itself, would in all probability equally apply to life upon the earth, and then the horrible conclusion would follow of a blood relationship between men and animals. Such a shock to the pillars of Victorian respectability might be attended with who knows what untoward consequences to that imposing structure !

For a whole generation after the publication of Lyell's book the catastrophe hung fire, but the idea was being mooted. Coleridge, immersed in rather cloudy metaphysics, took alarm at the idea of an ourang-outang theology, as he called it, the theory of a brute ancestry being to him, as it was to Carlyle, merely the assertion of a degraded philosophy of human nature, and not to be decided on grounds of fact. In 1844 appeared *Vestiges of Creation*, by a certain Robert Chambers, who, with a just fear of outraged bigotry, took elaborate precautions to conceal his name. This book, though the scientific qualifications of its author were hardly equal to the task he had undertaken, created a great fluttering in orthodox dovecotes, with its downright assertion of an evolutionary origin for plants and animals. Even in the drawing rooms of society the topic was being mooted.

" Ah ! " says a charming young lady in Disraeli's *Tancred*, " that's it : we were fishes and I believe we shall be crows."

Meanwhile the defenders of the faith, clinging obstinately to their long and indefensible position, found it not only attacked but undermined. Largely through the medium of Coleridge and Carlyle, German thought had come to exercise a considerable influence upon that of England, such of it, that is, as the English mind was capable of assimilating, for such abstruse cobwebs of thought as those spun by Hegel certainly never did, nor never shall, find appreciation South of the Tweed. What Germany had to impart was a depth of thought, an earnestness, almost ruthless, in the quest for the truth, the innermost truth, and the ultimate truth. It was in this spirit that a certain school of German critics had ventured to lay sacrilegious hands on

Holy Writ. To Baur, the profundity of whose critical erudition could hardly be denied, not even the gospels were sacred, or indeed authentic. Such blasphemy of foreigners might be met with a conspiracy of silence, but it would not forever be possible to conceal the fact that there was in the field an evolutionary theory to account, without any supernatural aid, not only for life but also for revelation.

Nevertheless, as we have seen from Butler's account, there was never so great an appearance of outward security for established belief as in the fifties. After all, it was possible to keep such heresies as those of the higher critics from tolerance in Church or universities, and on what orthodoxy had chosen to make the crucial question of the Mosaic account of creation, the evolutionary case had not yet been completely made out, and Lamarck's theory of minute adaptations transmitted by heredity was not felt, even by unprejudiced critics, adequate by itself to account for the facts. Moses was still in possession, and until somebody else could prove a better title, was likely to remain so. Philosophers like Herbert Spencer, who were already working out a complete revolutionary cosmogony, were letting their intuition outrun proof, and were in fact jumping the claim.

The decisive importance of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859 was that it showed how, by natural selection, it was possible to conceive of life evolving without the interference of Paley's super-watchmaker. Darwin had first had this idea suggested to him by reading Malthus. It struck him that the upward progress of life might be accounted for by the fact of the world's living population continually outrunning its means of subsistence, a process that would only permit of the best adapted types surviving and transmitting their qualities. The operation of this process over an indefinite number of million years—and Darwin's friend Lyell had already put the case for such an antiquity of the earth—was, Darwin plausibly maintained, sufficient to account for all the facts.

It is not of course pretended, at this distance of time, that Darwin's explanation was any more final than Lamarck's, and Bergson's taunt that Darwin had taught how to build houses by throwing stones is something more than a mere epigram. No doubt the idea of Natural Selection might have occurred, and in fact had occurred, to others, without making any particular stir. It was not Darwin's having read Malthus any more than the apple falling on Newton's head that effected a revolution in the world's thought. It was the fact that Darwin had read in the book of Nature, which, if anything,

is justly entitled to be called that of divine revelation, with greater devotion and patience and insight than any of his contemporaries. He was as indisputably the leading naturalist of his generation as Sir Launcelot had been the head of all Christian Knights. Whatever faults time may have disclosed in *The Origin of Species*, none of Darwin's contemporaries was capable of meeting him on his own ground. Quite apart from the philosophical and religious repercussions of his doctrine, Darwin had opened a new epoch in the science and classification of biology.

Victorian orthodoxy had received a fatal blow; materialist superstition, masking as religion, was now powerless to hold back the tide. Only the year after *The Origin of Species*, appeared a book, compiled by several more or less liberal-minded Churchmen and entitled *Essays and Reviews*. Herein the doctrine of literal inspiration was treated in the most cavalier fashion, and the floodgates were opened for the Higher Criticism. Great was the wrath and consternation of the pious—the offenders were violently assailed, and to pass a favourable review on the book was an act requiring considerable courage. Argument being found an inadequate mode of defence, resource was had to persecution; two of the offenders were suspended from their benefices by an ecclesiastical court and put back by a secular one. So great was the alarm that 11,000 of the clergy—High and Low suspending their bitter hatred of each other in presence of a common danger—were induced by Dr. Pusey to sign a manifesto in favour of Hell at its hottest and Holy Writ at its holiest. It was another case of Mrs. Partington's broom. A few years later no less a dignitary than a Bishop, though a colonial one, who had been shamed by a Zulu convert out of claiming divine authority for the story of Noah's Ark, published a searching criticism on the Pentateuch, was promptly excommunicated and deprived of his benefice by his Archbishop, and reinstated on appeal to the courts.

Middle Class orthodoxy was, in fact, breaking down all along the line in the sixties. Darwin had started an intellectual avalanche, of a kind that he had never anticipated nor desired. Humble seeker as he was, wholly absorbed in his own science of biology, his grief was that so much bitterness should have been aroused in the peaceful realms of science. But other men of science and liberal thought were more combative, and a long reign of triumphant bigotry had aroused an answering spirit of bitterness. Perhaps the foremost British biologist, next to Darwin, was Thomas Huxley, a thorough

John Bull, who took upon himself the role, as he expressed it, of Darwin's bulldog. At a meeting of the British Association at Oxford he administered an annihilating rebuke to the Bishop of Oxford, the famous "Soapy Sam" Wilberforce, who, with a complete ignorance of biology and a strange disregard of good manners, had presumed to make merry at the expense of Darwin, and had twitted Huxley with the latter's presumably Simian ancestry.

The offensive had now passed into the hands of the Rationalists, and in fact there was no small danger of evolution itself becoming a sort of intellectual panacea for solving all sorts of problems to which Darwin, who was from first to last a biologist, had never dreamed of applying it. Darwin himself was in danger of becoming the figure-head for an orthodoxy as unreasoning as that against which he had striven. That uncompromising iconoclast, Samuel Butler, found that new rationalism was old pietism writ large and in slightly different terms, and it was even more difficult for an anti-Darwinian than an anti-cleric to obtain a hearing. "The clerical and scientific people" he said, "rule the roost."

The philosophy of evolution was, however, indebted to Darwin for nothing but its biological credentials. Years before *The Origin of Species* saw the light, the plan of a complete system of the universe, on evolutionary lines, had been forming in the brain of a young Derbyshire ex-engineer called Herbert Spencer. This remarkable man was the scion of a long line of militant Nonconformists, men whose dissent had frequently driven them forth from the fold of their fellow Nonconformists. Herbert Spencer merely continued the family tradition with the aid of an abnormally developed intellect. He saw, what the Ranters of Cromwell's day had seen before him, that for the consistent Protestant there is no more halting at Biblical than Papal infallibility, and that Christianity itself must sooner or later cease to bind.

Spencer was thus in the direct line of spiritual succession from the great Protestant Reformers, and he was also endowed with the characteristics, exaggerated to the point of caricature, of the middle class Victorian of the forties and fifties. He was aggressively self-confident, an individualist wholly lacking in humour or humility, contemptuous of anything that he could not instantly square with his preconceived opinions, which were those of his time and class stripped ruthlessly of every qualification. Kant and Plato, Dante and Michelangelo, he could dismiss with a few contemptuous strictures. Early in the fifties he had pinned his faith to the individualism of the Manchester

School and the classical economists, carried to its logical extreme. He would have scrapped poor laws, state currency, the post office, sanitary regulation, and public works generally, though, like the true Radical he was, he would not have stuck at nationalizing land. From these principles he never substantially receded to the day of his death. It was not his way to change his mind, and Huxley once shrewdly remarked that if Spencer ever wrote a tragedy, its plot would have been the slaying of a beautiful deduction by an ugly fact.

It was such a man who undertook the task of making the principle of evolution that of a universal philosophy. In striking contrast with the diffident caution of Darwin was Spencer's way of fixing his generalizations and making the facts accommodate themselves. In 1858 he had traced the rough outlines of his *Synthetic Philosophy*, of which one volume, that on Psychology, was already published. The rest of his long life was devoted, with a perseverance truly heroic, to filling in the details. For a man of so little scholarship and such scanty reading, not to speak of his being a chronic invalid, the performance was an astounding one. Its very extent and solidity made it impressive; its display of scientific erudition qualified it to serve as the gospel of progress in an age of science triumphant. For once England appeared to have produced the leading philosopher of his time. Spencer's reputation became European, his influence was comparable with that of Hegel earlier in the century. And yet the *Synthetic Philosophy* was hardly completed before it was out of date. Even before his death professors at the Universities were talking of "the time when Herbert Spencer was taken seriously as a philosopher". In no branch of science had his achievement stood the test of time, and as a philosopher, his capacity may be judged by his having formulated propositions about the Unknowable, and even, in his preliminary scheme, having entitled one section "The Laws of the Unknowable", which reminds one of Sir Boyle Roche's intention to nip a rat in the bud.

It was ironical that so typical a Victorian as Spencer should have played so leading a part in the intellectual revolution that was ultimately to wreck the edifice of Victorian complacency. The ineffable confidence of middle class England in itself and its ideals, the habit of shirking ultimate issues, could not survive the repeated shocks of this intellectual Jacobinism. Spencer, like Henry VIII, thought he could preserve the fabric of an arch of which he had knocked out the keystone. He had substituted the Unknowable for the Incredible, but he preserved an invincible—it would hardly

be too much to say a mystical faith in the perfection of a capitalist, individualist and commercial order of Society. It was with horror and consternation that Spencer, in his declining days, forboded the triumph of everything that had been anathema to his inbred Manchester orthodoxy. For if the foundations be destroyed, what can the righteous do ?

And the foundations of Victorianism were crumbling, in spite of the fact that the destroyers were men sincerely desirous of preserving the structure substantially intact. There were, perhaps, never such worthy representatives of frock-coated respectability as those terrible scientists who set all the vicarages and rectories of England in a fluster. The same type of face is repeated in all their portraits with little variation ; the massive forehead, the determined chin, the tight-set lips and rather pinched features usually flanked by formidable side whiskers. Their private lives are unexceptionable to the point of dullness. With true middle class independence they reacted against what was, in their eyes, the tyranny of a superstitious priesthood. But so far from desiring to overthrow the accepted system of Christian morality, most of them aspired to make their righteousness exceed that of the Scribes and Pharisees. Few people can doubt that between Darwin and his revilers the balance of Christianity lay with the scientist, and Spencer came nearer to applying Christ's principles to foreign policy than any of his contemporaries, not even excepting the Quaker, John Bright. As for Huxley, his well-known *penchant* for lay sermonizing gave point to a sly transposition in which " Archbishop Huxley and Professor Manning " were described as having been present at some meeting.

It is one thing to start an avalanche, and another thing to set bounds thereto. The snows of orthodoxy had begun to move, slowly perhaps, but with ever-gathering weight, and with a menace as yet unrealized to many a trim dwelling in the vale. Other things were loosening besides what Gladstone had called the impregnable rock of Holy Scripture. Karl Marx was at work ; Nietzsche was growing to manhood ; Bismarck had already begun to develop his policy. A new epoch was foreshadowed in which it would no longer be possible to postpone settlement with realities that ever more insistently were knocking at the door.

15

REALPOLITIK

It is doubtful whether any human observer, during the fifties and sixties, could have appreciated what forces were at work during those troubled and explosive decades. Even to-day we are only beginning to understand why the artificial state system consecrated by the Vienna diplomatists was breaking down, not without bloodshed. The geographical expression that was Italy, the anarchy of petty states that was Germany, were now at last beginning to assert their nationhood and their freedom from outside dictation. But nationality had been the very thing that the Holy Alliance had been born to suppress. Surely the principles of Liberalism, spreading from the West, had spread their Empire over these two new-born Powers of Europe !

Unfortunately this was not quite so simple as it appeared. Had the Second Empire of France been based upon principle instead of the expediency of the moment, and had that principle been the Liberalism towards which the shallow mind of Napoleon really inclined, things might conceivably have worked out differently, but the corruption in Paris was calculated to bring out the worst elements in the French nature, selfishness and vanity and the lust of glory, and to make France forgetful of her natural championship of liberty based on reason. Never was there a time when her attitude was of such vital importance to the cause of European civilization, only nobody, not even the Emperor himself, knew from one moment to another what that attitude was going to be.

So far as Italy was concerned, partly thanks to France and partly in her despite, freedom and a constitution on the English model were attained, and though the democratic idealism of Mazzini and Garibaldi was far from being realized under the House of Savoy, the new Latin Power was not on the side of the despots. But the achievement of German unity, under the auspices of Prussia, so far from being a vindication of the democracy that had inspired men like Heine and the Young Germans, turned out to be not a loss but a gain to the forces of Divine Right which dominated Central and Eastern Europe. The Metternich system, which had proved so formidable up to 1848, was not to be compared with that which came into being after a helmeted and jack-booted Prussia strode to the front, thrusting rudely aside the antiquated, inefficient Hapsburg

dynasty, and, at the head of a united and scientific Germany, assumed the headship of the old Holy Alliance, reconstituted after 1870 as the League of the Three Emperors.

There had been a moment when a free and Liberal Germany had been a possibility. The 1848 Revolution had thrown up a united German Parliament, which, when the Hapsburgs were paralysed by rebellion in their own dominions, had offered the imperial crown of a free people to the King of Prussia. But that Hohenzollern did not swerve from the principles of his dynasty; he would not, he said, pick up a crown out of the gutter. That was the end of the Frankfurt Parliament and the chance of a Liberal Germany. By 1850 Austria was back in the saddle, Prussia impotent and humiliated, and the old anarchy of states restored. The lesson had not been thrown away upon a devout and royalist squire, Otto von Bismarck, who twelve years later was summoned to the head of the Prussian ministry and boldly announced, to a House of enraged Liberals, that Germany could not be saved by Parliaments and speeches, but by blood and iron. Few people at the time took him seriously, or imagined for a moment that so outrageous a reactionary could continue in power any longer than Polignac in Paris on the eve of the July Revolution or the Duke of Wellington when he tried to hold back the flood tide of Reform in 1832. But Prussia is a hard soil for the growth of liberty; middle-class Liberalism was an ebbing tide, and Bismarck was a supreme master of statecraft as Machiavelli had understood and Frederick the Great had practised it. In a position of unexampled difficulty he clearly realized the end of a Germany united, upon monarchical principles, under her ablest dynasty. In the pursuit of this end he swerved not for fear of God nor man, and he made no mistake.

Now, as always since her partition, Poland was the Achilles heel of the some time Holy Alliance, or triple concert of despotisms. And in 1863 Russian Poland made a wild, heroic and futile effort to throw off her chains. This, had they known the hour of their visitation, would have been the chance for the two great Liberal powers of the West to have joined hands, and kept Poland, a far more worthy protégé than Turkey, from utter slavery. But petty aims and shortsighted views determined the policy of both, and Napoleon III had committed the almost unbelievable blunder of wasting his best troops in a mad adventure in Mexico, where they only stopped until such time as the United States had freed her own hands of civil war, and could warn them off American soil with an authority

not to be denied. Napoleon not only was in no condition to back his European policy by arms, but he had hankerings after an alliance with the comparatively Liberal successor of the Iron Tsar.

The Protestant Whigs of Palmerston's Government had, for their part, no desire to see a Catholic and independent Poland in alliance with France. Their sentiments were unexceptionable, their demands upon Russia explicit and stern, but when it became a question of backing them by force, Russell appeared in the characteristic role of the boy who had chalked "no tyranny" on the Tsar's door, and then ran away. So, amid mistrust and verbiage, the two might-have-been champions of national rights passed by on the other side, while her gigantic opponent bludgeoned Poland into a quiescence that looked like death.

Bismarck, unlike either Napoleon or the Whigs, knew exactly what he wanted. More than anything else he dreaded an alliance between Russia and France, and he felt instinctively that the principles of the Holy Alliance were doomed if Poland should ever rise from her ashes. So, short of actually attacking the Poles, he rendered the Tsar all the aid he could in stamping out the rebellion. For a time, he could now feel, his Eastern flank was secure.

While Napoleon III was wantonly paralysing the sword arm of France, Bismarck was staking everything on raising Prussia to the condition of organized efficiency envisaged by her military philosopher, Clausewitz. This officer, inspired by the example of Napoleon, had aimed at forging the whole nation into one terrific engine of the will to power. War was an instrument of policy, to be used as expediency dictated. It was also an act of violence, whose application, and consequently ruthlessness, were unlimited. Life was war, the nation an armed camp, the only right that of the strongest. To put this doctrine into practice, Bismarck had to brush aside Parliament and defy public opinion, but the object was worth the risk. In a surprisingly short time, thanks to the efforts of Moltke, the Commander-in-Chief, and Roon, the War Minister, he was ready to carry into effect his foreseen plan of uniting Germany, a plan that demanded not only dauntless courage, but the most delicate finesse. His first move was to secure the future waterway from the Baltic to the North Sea, by getting Austria to co-operate with him in turning the Danes out of their half-German dependency of Schleswig and their wholly German one of Holstein.

The unscrupulous but unerring finesse with which he succeeded first in removing his neighbour's landmark, and then in ousting

both the puppet claimant to the disputed provinces and his own ally and dupe in their conquest, need not be told here. The cause of the Danes was as popular in England as that of the little fellow pitted against the big bully usually is, and pro-Danish sentiment had been intensified by the recent marriage of the Prince of Wales with a beautiful and winning Danish Princess. Public opinion was ludicrously misinformed both as to the strength of Prussia and the utter impotence of a few thousand redcoats to call a halt to the New Model of Moltke and Roon. *Punch*, which faithfully reflected the opinion of the all-powerful middle class, was not ashamed to depict the sovereigns of Prussia and Austria as a couple of disreputable roughs in the dock being "told off" by that sternly righteous magistrate, Mr. John Bull.

Palmerston and Russell reflected fairly accurately both this sentiment and this ignorance. They started on a firm line, and Palmerston, with his breezy downrightness, made it clear to the world that England was not prepared to stand by and see Denmark despoiled. Unfortunately he had not the force to make good his brave words, and France was still weakened by her Mexican adventure and, after our shilly-shallying about Poland, felt it her turn to beware of

"such a faithful ally
That only the devil can tell what he means."

Bismarck, with whom the calculation of political forces was the first essential of statesmanship, decided that it would be safe to call the English Premier's bluff. Denmark was attacked by the overwhelming forces of Prussia and Austria, and she fought alone while the two Western Powers stood by in hopeless indecision. A war policy had not even the backing of a united cabinet, and the widowed Queen was thoroughly out of sympathy with the provocative tactics of those two dreadful old men, as she called Palmerston and Russell. So old Pam, confronted with a phenomenon whose nature he did not understand, was fain to treat Bismarck on the precedent of Dogberry :

"Take no note of him, but let him go ; and presently call the rest of the watch together, and thank God you are rid of a knave."

For Pam's time, perhaps, and even Bismarck's, but assuredly not for ever !

The next move was to get Austria out of Germany with as little permanent offence as possible. Bismarck was careful to secure the alliance of Italy, which was straining after Venice, and having picked a quarrel with as much appearance of right as he could, let loose

Moltke's New Model, armed with breach loaders, on a force inferior in numbers, arms and leadership, that barred its path in Bohemia. Having crushed this main army at Sadowa, and mopped up the forces of the other German states in a few weeks, the Prussians would have marched on to Vienna, had not Bismarck, who had no desire to make a permanent enmity between two of the "Holy Three", been ready to commit suicide unless his master and the General Staff should hold their hands. This passionate moderation and not his occasional brutality confers upon Bismarck his title to rank among the world's supreme statesmen.

Austria, beaten but neither humiliated nor estranged, now stood aside, and the path was clear for Prussia to that leadership of Germany to which blood and iron had entitled her. But the task of consummating that unity demanded the delicacy and finesse that only a Bismarck could command. The Southern states must be shepherded into the fold with the skill of a champion sheep-dog. But now a diplomatist of a very different calibre was minded to take a part in the game. Napoleon III, still paralysed by his Mexican madness, had made another of his miscalculations in imagining that he could let the two German powers fight themselves to a standstill, and then, after the precedent of Richelieu, make capital for France out of Germany's agony. The whirlwind invasion of Bohemia had thrown out all his calculations, and when he did begin to hint at armed intervention, he found that Bismarck was prepared to fight rather than have French interference in a German quarrel. And the French army, as both were well aware, was in no condition to face the needle guns of Moltke.

Poor Napoleon was now rapidly approaching his fall. He was in the clutches of a fatal disease and the reins of government were slipping from his hands. The prestige of his Empire was buried with his puppet Emperor of Mexico, whom he had perforce abandoned to be shot in cold blood. France was visibly tiring of him, driving him, as his uncle had been driven, to compromise with encroaching Liberalism. His only chance now was to keep up the Napoleonic legend by some masterful stroke of foreign policy. French public opinion was determined to regard German unity as an offence to be prevented by force of arms, or at least to be condoned for by some substantial compensation to France in the shape of the German Rhineland or neutralized Belgium. And the weary and agonized adventurer had no choice but to submit to a strong line from which he was probably averse.

This was to play right into Bismarck's hand. An ostensibly righteous war was the very thing he needed to weld Germany together; a French foreign minister, himself spoiling for a fight, rushed into a quarrel from which Bismarck gave him no chance of withdrawing; the result was a foregone conclusion.

France had not a friend in the world. Italy, whom she had abandoned in 1859, only desired to see the French troops out of Rome. Austria, if she had any thought of intervening, was held back by the fear of Russia, and Russia had her own game to play by tearing up the treaty which had concluded the Crimean War, and building a Black Sea fleet. In a by no means brilliantly fought campaign the Germans, who outnumbered their opponents by nearly two to one, smashed up the French regular army, captured the Emperor, and marched to the investment of Paris. The untrained heroism of the newly constituted French Republic only availed to prolong the struggle. Had Germany now practised the restraint in victory that she had displayed after Sadowa, she might have established the Empire, which came into being during the war, upon impregnable foundations. It is possible that Bismarck was overruled by the generals. For whatever reason, Germany made the fatal mistake of mortally wounding her adversary's feelings without crushing his power. She imposed a trifling indemnity, but she seized two provinces and perpetrated the boorish insult of a parade march through Paris. Henceforth France's hope and Bismarck's nightmare was "*la revanche*".

England's attitude throughout the struggle was one of scrupulous neutrality, qualified only by a determination to maintain her time-honoured policy of preserving the neutrality of Belgium. Opinion was divided, though there was, thanks to Bismarck's diplomacy, a general disposition to regard France as the aggressor. The aged Carlyle waxed positively lyrical over the triumph of his beloved Germany, and *The Times* threw the ponderous weight of its influence continuously on the Teutonic side. As time went on, the natural English sympathy with the man who is down came into play. But at no time was there any disposition to take more than a spectator's interest in the struggle, still less to see in the newly-formed German Empire a menace to ourselves. And indeed the danger was not in Germany herself, but in the new spirit which had triumphed in her victory. An age of limited idealism was passing into one of realism unlimited. Machiavelli had put Christ out of date.

"Europe," said an English diplomat,¹ "has lost a mistress and gained a master." A complete change had come over her politics. Bourgeois Liberalism was not only dead but damned. Germany had achieved her nationality, but at the price of her freedom. The old sleepy and soulful German was a disappearing type; it was Prussia that set the tone to the new Empire, a pushful, efficient, self-confident and unimaginative culture was generated by intensive governmental discipline. Germany was triumphant; Europe was afraid of her—but she was not safe. France was on her flank, a France that would not forget, and on her unprotected Eastern frontier was a gigantic and semi-barbarian Russia. How if these two should someday combine and close in upon Germany? So long as she held Alsace and Lorraine—and her pride would never permit of her resigning them—there was no peace for her. What blood and iron had won, blood and iron must hold. Germany was an armed camp; she must go on arming, arming; not for a moment dared she relax her watch on the Rhine or on the Vistula.

Prussia had set the pace to Germany; now inevitably Germany must set the pace to Europe. A horrible circle was created—Germany must arm more and more for fear of her neighbours and her neighbours must arm more and more for fear of Germany. It was as if, in some rather leisurely business, the latest American methods of speeding up and standardization had been introduced. The Second Empire of France may have disturbed the peace of Europe, but it was, at worst, a slipshod and unscientific affair. The Hapsburgs and Romanoffs may have been tyrants, but they were anything but hustlers, nor, despite individual geniuses like Radetzky and Todleben, did their ideas of efficiency go much beyond those of the drill sergeant. But now Moltke in Generalship, Roon in organization, Clausewitz in the theory, and Bismarck in the practice of statesmanship had set a new standard to which these others must either conform or go under. Nations must be organized; commerce, education, diplomacy, armaments must be forged and hardened to one spearpoint of—the phrase was soon to be coined—will to power.

Romance, which had been the accompaniment of bourgeois Liberalism, had received its deathblow. Bismarck, the protagonist of the new era, was, in the face he turned to the world—albeit a certain Protestant mysticism lay near to his heart—an out and out realist. He had no use for sentiment except as a weakness to be taken advantage of. If he sought to have a just quarrel, it was because he

¹ Quoted in Morley's *Life of Gladstone*.

calculated on being thrice armed under such circumstances. If he blurted out the truth, as he very often did, it was because, like Machiavelli, he knew that a reputation for honesty was the most valuable asset of a statesman. From pure egotistic or rather patriotic calculation he sought to stand well in the opinion of Europe, to practise a studious moderation even in the hour of victory, and, having once attained his object of making a United Germany, to seek peace and ensue it, and to keep his country from ambitious schemes that might maké her a terror to her neighbours. Complete lack of sentiment and public morality, backed by supreme cunning, might almost have seemed to justify itself, had it not been for the fatal slip of the annexed provinces—a step for which a plausible case could have been made out on the highest grounds.

Bismarck's proceedings had imported a new and deadly atmosphere into European politics. For even he could not, and perhaps did not desire to disguise the absolute cynicism of his motives. The familiar libel of his having falsified the Ems telegram originates in his own reminiscences. In his old age he preferred to twist a perfectly honourable and straightforward act into a piece of bloody-minded sharp practice. The Tartufferie of the new age was not that of the crooked man protesting his respectability, but that of the occasionally respectable person trying to establish the complete immorality of his supermanliness. Under such auspices, the rulers of the various nations strove to key up their governmental machinery to a pitch of efficiency worthy of a machine-ridden age, and there was no time to answer so antiquated a question as whether, in the long run, the advantages of the new *Realpolitik* would be cheaply bought at the sacrifice of a man's or a nation's soul.

16

THE PASSING OF MIDDLE CLASS RULE

These swiftly moving events, that were ushering in the fourth act of the European tragedy, the long, feverish, thunder-charged peace preceding the final catastrophe, had scarcely ruffled the tranquil surface of English life. England felt herself even less vitally concerned in the wars of 1866 and 1870 than she had in the revolutions of 1848. Never was there any serious prospect of her taking a side in either, unless the neutrality of Belgium, which she was bound in honour to maintain, and which she regarded as vital to her security, should be violated.

But the middle class Liberalism which had been scarcely threatened in 1848 and was as yet unaffected by the menace of Germany, had, of its own free-will and in the silent process of constitutional development, yielded up its practical monopoly of the franchise. Even that staunch Whig, Lord John Russell, for all his nickname of Finality Jack, was a convinced though very cautious advocate of further reform, and those protagonists of the middle class, Gladstone and Bright, were both thoroughly in favour of a generous trust in the people. The Conservative party, who seemed doomed under the existing franchise to remain in a permanent minority, had an interest in broadening it which, though it might not have been obvious to the crusted landowners to whom any sort of change was anathema, was not likely to escape the shrewd eyes of the parvenu, Benjamin Disraeli, whose transcendent ability had marked him, in despite of racial and class prejudices, for their leadership in the Commons. It is notable that Bismarck, a much more pronounced Conservative, had preferred a manhood to a middle class suffrage for his North German Confederation, and, subsequently, for the Empire.

So long as the old Canningite, Palmerston, remained at the head of affairs, the electoral *status quo* was likely to be maintained, but he was a dam across a rapidly swelling stream, and in 1864 Gladstone, whom the aged premier regarded with an ever-increasing distrust, had electrified the country by what amounted to a declaration of faith in manhood suffrage. Palmerston's death, in 1865, released the now irresistible torrent of opinion in favour of reform. A fairly cautious Reform Bill was introduced, in the next year, by Gladstone himself, but this was too much for some crusted Whig champions of the bourgeoisie, who were horrified at the idea of power passing into the hands of the lower orders. They therefore joined hands with the Conservatives in defeating Gladstone's measure.

The Conservatives were now, for the third time, in office owing to the dissections of their opponents, and were therefore, as before, governing on sufferance and in a minority until such time as the Liberals could agree to sink their own differences and turn them out. The lesson of this was not lost on Disraeli, who had all along consistently pleaded for making the Tories (which was the word he preferred) a national as opposed to a class party. The first Reform Bill, as he had foreseen, had upset the balance of the Constitution by throwing power into the hands of one class. It is true that the notions of a great many Conservatives merely comprehended a

shifting back of power from the monied to the landed class, and Disraeli, though he had bitterly satirized such reactionaries in his novels, knew that to force the principles of the Tory democracy, in which he himself believed, upon the noblemen and squires of his following, would have been merely suicidal.

Disraeli now decided that the time had come to break up the long middle class dominance by a really generous measure of reform. To the Premier, Lord Derby, the scheme probably appealed merely as an astute move in the party game, it was he and not Disraeli—to whom the saying is usually attributed—who talked of dishing the Whigs. Disraeli talked not of dishing the Whigs but of educating the Tories, to principles which he had always held. He was not in any degree afraid of trusting the people, “this great and understanding people” as he called it. He believed that given inspiring and sympathetic leadership the people would follow, not demagogues nor revolutionaries, but the national party he aspired to create and to lead. Only, he maintained, when the Tory party degenerates into an oligarchy does it become unpopular.

Disraeli would probably never have been able to break up the middle class dominance with the help of the Tories alone. The genuine oligarchs of the party, like Lord Cranbourne, the future Lord Salisbury, were horrified at what they quite naturally regarded as a betrayal. But where his followers failed him his opponents helped or—as they believed—forced him forward. Gladstone and Bright were great enough to rise above a merely class policy. No doubt they did not realize, as Disraeli did, how surely they were undermining the foundations of the middle class Liberalism by which they lived, moved, and had their being. But they believed that what Gladstone called the great social forces were fighting for reform, and they followed a noble instinct in ranging themselves on their side. Disraeli was nothing loath to have his original Bill widened and democratized almost out of recognition, and to the horror of Whig and Tory reactionaries he replied with goodnatured chaff about the boots of the “Blue Boar” and the chambermaid of the “Red Lion” embracing each other, in perfect accord in denouncing the wickedness of railroads.

And so the middle class rule passed away after thirty-five years of not unfruitful progress. What sinister forces were at work beneath the surface, what unsolved problems clamoured for solution, time had not yet revealed. No pressure from without, no threat of revolution, had forced the wearers of top hats to resign their power

and put their own fortunes and those of their country at the mercy of poor and frequently uneducated men. It was a rare tribute to the genius of the British Constitution that a Parliament, so thoroughly representative of capitalists, great and small, should, of its own free choice and with the agreement of a majority of both parties, have invited the working man to share with them the privileges of citizenship. It would be a piece of unwarrantable cynicism to attribute to them the foreknowledge that what the vote had given the caucus might take away.

The momentous effects of the Reform Bill of 1867 were so slow to display themselves that it might have seemed as if the irruption of the working class into the franchise had made no such vital difference after all. There was no intense feeling in the country such as had caused the political landslide after the first Reform Bill. When Disraeli, who on the retirement of Lord Derby had become Premier, was forced, in the next year, to appeal to the new electorate, he found that the working men, as Mill put it, said "thank you" to Mr. Gladstone for the Reform Bill, and returned the latter and his Liberals to power by a substantial majority. But Disraeli must have known that middle class Liberalism was ultimately incompatible with democracy. How long the inevitable decline might be delayed, and how long Toryism could establish itself in power as the national party, were questions beyond his or any man's power to answer. It might be that the workers would develop, some day, a policy and party of their own.

Meanwhile, under Gladstone's great ministry of 1868-1874, middle class Liberalism attained to the zenith of its power and usefulness. Palmerston was dead and Russell had retired, so that Gladstone was free to embark on a policy of thoroughgoing reform on lines consonant with the doctrines of the Manchester School, interpreted in a liberal and human spirit. Peace and retrenchment were constantly pursued; an honourable neutrality was maintained during the Franco-German War, an equally honourable settlement was arrived at, by arbitration, of our outstanding differences with the United States; Russia was at least induced to pay a formal homage to the sanctity of treaties before rebuilding her Black Sea Fleet. The Income Tax dropped to threepence and would have disappeared altogether if Gladstone could have framed the Budget of 1874.

The Irish Protestant Church, whose establishment was a standing grievance, was thrown on its own resources, and the first attempt

made to protect the Irish tenant from the rapacity of his landlord ; the army was reformed by the introduction of the Short Service system, and purified by the abolition of purchasing commissions ; the Civil Service was protected against a Spoils' System by the final establishment, in all departments except the Foreign Office, of the Chinese test of competitive examination ; one of the six points of the Chartists was conceded in the shape of the ballot ; a much needed reform was made in the law by the inclusion in one Supreme Court of the hitherto independent Common Law and Equity jurisdictions ; but the most important of all the many achievements of this ministry was the establishment of a system of universal, State education—as yet neither free nor compulsory. Unhappily the attention of legislators was concentrated, as it had been ever since the beginning of the century, not on getting the children educated so much as on getting them indoctrinated with this, that, or the other version of Christianity. And it is hardly to be wondered at that real education, which had been dangerously postponed owing to these squabbles, was, when it did come, a far from creditable product as judged by Continental standards.

All these measures were in accordance with the average middle class orthodoxy—Mill himself had been an advocate of universal education, though Spencer's unmitigated individualism would have anathemized even this. And no doubt Gladstone's ministry had a record of achievement second to none of its predecessors. But other problems were coming up for solution with which his stern individualism was quite incompetent to grapple. Social reform, as we understand it to-day, was almost wholly beyond his purview, though the political reform, which is its inevitable prelude, found in him a generous champion. His ignorance of the working class point of view led him into one blunder that, more than anything else, proved fatal to his ministry. Not for the last time did the Trades Unions find themselves deprived, by a judicial decision, of a privilege, that of picketing, which they had claimed and exercised for years. And Gladstone, who could not read the signs of the times, allowed matters to take their course. At the next election the working man did not say, "Thank you, Mr. Gladstone !"

CHAPTER III

THE WILL TO POWER

1

SIGNS OF CHANGE

It is, as nearly as we can fix any date in a process so gradual, about the year 1874 that we see the first definite signs of the middle class Liberalism, which had dominated England for more than a generation, having passed its zenith. It was in this year that the long, political supremacy of the Whig-Liberals was decisively reversed by the new, working-class constituencies. It was a supremacy that had really become established with the passing of the First Reform Bill, for Peel's ministry of 1841, though Conservative in name, owed both its triumph and its downfall to the fact that, as Disraeli had said, it represented a policy of Tory men, Whig measures, a complete surrender, in fact, to middle class ideals. The mantle of Peel had fallen on Gladstone and needed very little tailoring to make it a perfect fit.

This obvious and sensational phenomenon of the return to power of a Tory party in fact as well as in name was, however, of less fundamental significance than a subtle and gradual process of change, partly material and partly spiritual, that was destined to transform Britain, as it had already gone far towards transforming her neighbours.

Hitherto she might have seemed hardly affected by such events as Napoleon III's experiment of a Liberal Empire, the rise and triumph of Prussian imperialism, even her own democratic Reform Bill. While Paris had been burning, the same Liberal party, that had come to be regarded almost as a permanent depository of supreme power, was busy legislating into practice the most approved principles of middle class individualism. Scarcely a whisper was heard of the newly-enfranchised workers taking power into their own hands and developing a class policy of their own; Karl Marx was nothing accounted of in the England of 1870. The statistics of prosperity, which had been mounting with such staggering rapidity since the repeal of the Corn Laws, took a fresh spurt after the Franco-German

war, largely owing to the great demand for English capital and exports, particularly of iron and steel, for the development of comparatively backward countries. This prosperity rose to its height in 1874, but after that a long period of depression set in, with its usual accompaniments of liquidations, contraction of exports, unemployment and falling wages. By the end of the decade, things had begun to improve again, but improvement was now at a more sober pace than had obtained during the fifties and sixties. The declared value of our exports—though the figures are certainly affected by the fall in the world's level of prices occasioned, in part, by discoveries of gold—instead of multiplying in geometrical progression, fluctuated, up to the end of the century, round about the level attained in the early seventies. And whatever may have been our progress in comparison with our own past, as compared with that of our principal rivals it was slow indeed.

That we could not forever establish ourselves as the workshop of the world was, of course, only to be expected. The momentum of the start we had gained at the Industrial Revolution and during the Napoleonic wars had kept us ahead throughout the first half of the century, and the fact that we kept comparatively peaceful while our rivals, from 1848 to 1870, were exhausting themselves in mortal combat, contributed to prolong this agreeable state of things. But the man-power and vast natural resources of Germany and the United States must inevitably begin to pull their weight so soon as they had put their affairs in order and settled down to a strenuous course of peaceful development.

Nor were these powers minded to play into our hands, as they considered it, by swallowing whole the principles of the Manchester School and exposing their rising industries to the full blast of British competition. Inevitably with the waning of middle class and partly cosmopolitan ideals, the stern nationalism propounded by List began to supersede what was known, in Germany, as Smithianism and Manchesterthum. It was in 1879 that Bismarck introduced a highly protective tariff, and France was not long behind him in finally breaking with the principles that had inspired the Commercial Treaty of 1860. The United States had, since the Civil War, been wedded to protectionist principles. Thus was the expectation of Cobden, that other nations would follow our example of throwing open their ports, falsified, though up to the end of the century, British opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of sticking to our chosen policy, and fighting tariffs with free imports.

The resources and ideals of our neighbours were things beyond our control, but one cause of our loss of ground in the race for wealth lay in ourselves and our failure to keep pace with the requirements of a scientific age. Too easy a success is good neither for men nor nations, and circumstances had been so overwhelmingly in our favour during the fifties and sixties as to create a subconscious impression that British industrial supremacy was part of the order of nature, and Free Trade a veritable panacea.

There was one disadvantage, in the very fact of our having stolen so long a march on our rivals. For the mental habits of our industrial leaders had been inherited from a less exactly scientific age. The abstruse calculations and exhaustive research which the latest developments of industry necessitated were hardly dreamed of in the days of Arkwright or even of George Stephenson. Nor were the advantages and economies of large scale production appreciated so early in England as either in America or Germany. The old generation of self-made and comparatively uneducated employers was passing away, and their sons were men of an easier gait, content to carry on the business on the old lines and not to be hustled out of their stride into the adoption of new-fangled or foreign methods. And the independent and individualist employer was already beginning to give place to that inhuman entity, the limited liability company.

It was not only with the employers that the fault lay. Our national elementary education was sadly behindhand, owing to the paralysing squabbles of sects about the infinitely insignificant aims of competing proselytism. With regard to the teaching of science, it is not altogether easy to generalize. The strength as well as the weakness of British science lies in its individualism. Organized effort does not suit our national genius, and it was long the aim of our ancient universities rather to train the mind in the humanities than to encourage specialism. Accordingly we find that in the production of individual, scientific genius, Britain, with her Darwin, her Lister, her Kelvin and her Clark Maxwell, is second to no nation in the world. But when it comes to organized effort, to the teamwork by which the discoveries of genius are exploited and developed, there is a different tale to tell. Thus we find again and again that the harvest of some originally British discovery has been reaped by the foreigner.

A typical instance is that of the aniline dye industry. One of our greatest chemists, Sir William Perkin, experimenting with the

products of coal tar, discovered, in 1856, quite accidentally, how to produce the colour mauve. This opened up an entirely new range of possibilities in the art of colouring, which at first redounded to the advantage of the British industry. "But after the Franco-German War," to quote Mr. Clerk Ranken's excellent little manual of Industrial Chemistry, "the German factories took the lead, and the period 1870-80 must be recognized as that in which British dye-making was definitely overtaken by the German industry." One of the reasons for this, as Mr. Ranken goes on to explain, lay in the excellent use the Germans made of part of the French indemnity, by which they subsidized their scientific colleges, and trained up an abundance of skilled chemists. Moreover, the docile nature of the German allows experiment to be organized with minute thoroughness by the employment of a great number of brains on the details of one task.

This capture by Germany of the artificial dyeing industry is merely one—perhaps the most conspicuous—manifestation of a tendency that was more or less at work all alone the line. Britain was ceasing to set the pace to her neighbours; she was beginning to show signs of flagging in the race. Her strength now lay in the soundness and honesty of her output, and in her reserves of individual genius which enabled her, when the supreme trial came, to catch up and ultimately to surpass even the German in the application of science to war.

The glory of middle class England had lain, if the spokesmen and organs of that class are to be trusted, first of all in her abounding prosperity. It was this attitude of pocket-slapping optimism against which the keenest satire of Matthew Arnold was directed, but satire was not nearly as effective to damp self-complacency as the fact that prosperity itself was ceasing to prosper quite so conspicuously, that Britain was entering a period in which she would have much ado to hold her own against the ever-increasing competition of nationalities who thought in terms not of peaceful co-operation, but of a never-ceasing war in which every weapon, short of direct violence, was legitimate.

The middle class itself, as Cobden and Dickens had known it, was entering upon a transformation that was to rob it of much of its mid-century grandeur. The most conspicuous quality of that class, the dominant note of its thought, had undoubtedly been an uncompromising individualism. Such a character as that of Herbert Spencer, with his aggressive contempt for any sort of authority, of Carlyle, who spurned any honour, however tactfully

pressed, of Bright, with his idealization of the old merchant princes, bespeak a class thoroughly conscious of its own importance and dignity, and certainly not disposed to imitate nor truckle to the landed aristocracy. Dickens, who knew his middle class through and through, never even dreamed of any special divinity hedging a lord or gentleman, nor was his interest in them even great enough for him to take any special trouble to understand them. Mr. Brownlow and Mr. Grimwig are as sufficient to themselves as any Duke alive, and Scrooge, though in his unregenerate days he may have had every other unpleasant quality, would never have dreamed of using those hard wrung sovereigns to purchase the acquaintance of Sir Leicester Dedlock.

But Dickens, towards the end of his career, had seen with evident disgust and apprehension the beginnings of a change in his beloved middle class. His sketch of the *nouveau riche* Veneering household, with their courtship of needy aristocrats, and their pretentious absence of any proper self-respect, was a danger signal, too lightly disregarded. About this time a *Punch* artist, Du Maurier, was beginning to find his feet as the satirist of a bourgeoisie that was fast exchanging the reality of independence for the veneer of gentility. This class was multiplying with great rapidity in the suburbs which were springing up round all the great towns, and especially London, for in the industrial North the old middle class grit made the process of change more gradual.

A contributory factor was the breaking down of the upper class exclusiveness that had made "society", in the more restricted sense of the word, almost a closed circle—even more so during the early years of the Queen's reign than in the eighteenth century, with its queer streak of democracy that accounted for the dominance of adventurers like Beau Nash and Casanova. In France, during the reign of Louis Philippe, we have the sure testimony of Balzac to the extent to which fashionable society was honeycombed with a singularly vulgar and heartless plutocracy. But in England, partly no doubt owing to the strict exclusiveness of Victoria's court, the doors were kept shut much longer. As Lady Dorothy Nevill points out, even Hudson, the railway king, was never in society. "The forties and fifties," she says, "were aristocratic days, when the future conquerors of society were still without the gate." It was a time when conversation was an art, and manners, at least within the pale—for there was a different tale to tell regarding governesses and inferiors generally—of a dignified urbanity quite out of date in modern

drawingrooms. And there was individuality bred in the upper almost as much as in the middle class. It was an age of "characters". Even blackguards like Lord Cardigan were at least far from commonplace.

But gradually the fortunes that were made during the booming fifties and sixties began to assert their owners' claims to recognition with an insistency not to be denied. The English aristocracy has ever had the Wellington prudence of effecting a timely withdrawal from a position that has become plainly untenable. But it was only very gradually that money began to take the place of breeding as a social passport. The Queen herself had no idea of compromising with the new spirit, and her court remained as exclusive as ever up to the end of her reign.

It was in 1874 that the fortunes of the landed interest began to undergo an eclipse, that rendered it wholly incapable of resisting the encroachments of plutocracy. The prolonged depression affected the agricultural with all other interests, and a series of bad harvests culminated in the wretched summer of 1879. But agriculture did not, like other industries, recover, for now the vast grain fields of Western North America were coming into competition, and as the century declined the unfortunate agriculturist found himself forced to compete with a flood of imports, both of meat and grain, from all the ends of the earth. The result was, not only that progress of every kind was thrown back, but that the rental of estates was often as much as halved, and that these estates had to be disposed of to *nouveaux riches* who were ambitious to assume the style and prestige of the country gentleman.

It had a further effect in that the members of old families were often desperately put to it to keep their heads above water. Many of them went into trade, some even condescending to the practice of lending their names to the directorates of companies, in order to provide a somewhat dubious guarantee of honesty. There was also the chance, not to be despised, of retrieving the family fortunes by a rich marriage, and even for a daughter a wealthy husband was worth a few dropped aitches. The leaven of wealthy Americans, from the seventies onwards, had a marked effect in accelerating the process of change. And finally the shameless and increasing corruption by which honours were sold to recruit party funds, enabled the new rich to flood the aristocracy itself.

This breaking down of barriers between the landed and monied classes had more than one notable effect. The old standard of upper-

class manners, dignified and yet simple, was gradually superseded. Social life was speeded up and a strenuous pursuit of pleasure and excitement replaced the old leisurely routine. Instead of living on his estate for at least ten months out of the twelve, and perhaps being dragged up to London under great protest and for the shortest possible time, the wealthy landowner became a more or less frequent week-end on his own estate, especially after the advent of the motor-car. His friends were no longer his neighbours, but smart and rowdy people hurried down in relays by train or car to make the most of the Sabbath.

Such birds of passage were not likely to retain the old, eighteenth-century flair for scientific agriculture. In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, with its generally good times for the farmer and its resident landowners, there had been considerable enthusiasm for up-to-date methods, and notably for the breeding of pedigree stock. But the great agricultural depression unfortunately coincided with the gradual break up of the old order and the weaning of the landowner from the land. The slumping of rents and the merciless incidence of foreign competition were enough in themselves to take the heart out of the most improving owner, but social and economic forces were working in the same direction, and a state of things could not fail to be produced too ominously reminiscent of that which had gone before the French Revolution.

To the *nouveau riche* landowner, whose fortune was derived from trade, an estate was not a means of livelihood, but a costly luxury, partly a pleasure-ground and partly a sort of alpenstock in the business of social climbing. His heart was anywhere but in the country. The old squire, whatever his faults, had been the centre of rural life, the cornerstone of the social edifice. But now that his direct influence, even his tyranny, was in so large a measure withdrawn, the tendency was for village life to languish. All sorts of small collective activities, village bands and the like, gradually lapsed; rustic life became not only an unprofitable, but a dull and soulless grind, from which any high-spirited or ambitious lad was only too glad to escape to a town or a colony. Thus social and economic causes combined to deplete that agricultural population which had been traditionally the backbone of England, and by a steady elimination of the fittest, to devitalize that which remained.

Swift waters seldom run deep, and the surrender of birth to wealth was not unnaturally accompanied by a decline not only of manners but also of intellect. The days when conversation was an art, when

dinner parties were carefully arranged to produce the most agreeable clash of wits, receded into a past that became almost incredible. The atmosphere of such gatherings as those that had frequented Holland House in the days of Fox and of Macaulay did not survive the century. The last attempt to resuscitate it was by that brilliant group of young people which was nicknamed "The Souls". But the social forces, as Mr. Gladstone might have put it, were moving onwards in their might and majesty, a veritable Juggernaut of dullness, so far as the upper ranks of society were concerned. The owners of country houses ceased to stock their libraries with the most learned and imaginative literature of their time, and those ancestral folios that remained unsold, the Livies and Horaces, the Humes and Voltaires, mouldered untouched as ornaments, often locked up in glass cases. But a sufficient sprinkling of magazines and sporting works remained accessible to show that their owners still retained the art of reading.

This flight from intellect may be partly accounted for by the gradual transformation of the public schools, which were now the sole medium of upper class education, and were catering for a rapidly increasing proportion of middle-class families. Educational reformers like Thomas Arnold of Rugby and Butler of Shrewsbury had been appalled at the state of anarchy, tempered by flogging, that had prevailed early in the century. Adopting principles that had been formulated in a humbler sphere by Bell and Lancaster, they succeeded in tightening up discipline by deputing a considerable amount of authority to the bigger boys as monitors or prefects, besides humanizing the school system in all kinds of ways.

The immediate effects of this reforming spirit were no doubt all to the good, and no one could regret the passing of such Hells of vice and cruelty as the old Long Chamber at Eton. But the tightening of discipline implies, by its very nature, some curtailment of freedom and individuality. Under the old system a Shelley may have been shamefully persecuted, but he was at least able to experiment in science and devil raising, not to speak of writing *Zastrozzi*. At the end of the fifties, in spite of the monitorial system, we gather from Dean Farrar's stories that out of school hours a boy's time was still his own, to wander at will climbing for seabirds' eggs or picnicing on the top of mountains.

But a time was at hand when a boy's play would be subjected to an even more rigorous discipline than his work, when the education of the body would acquire an importance not conceded, in practice, to that of the mind. The turning point was signalized by the dramatic

episode, in 1875, of Oscar Browning's dismissal from Eton. This egotistical but liberal-minded house master had endeavoured to realize the ideal of "educating a governing class in the delight of all intellectual pursuits, a governing class that would owe its position not only to wealth and privilege, but also to the Platonic virtues of wisdom and goodness".¹ But it was not to be. The headmaster, Hornby, and his eventual successor, Warre, both noted athletes, believed in allowing the boys to work out their own manly salvation on the river and in the playing fields, without any nonsense about Platonic virtues.

Their triumph was decisive, and it was the triumph of an ideal which, if it de-intellectualized upper class education, was by no means wholly contemptible. For it did, undoubtedly, succeed in creating a school of character unequalled anywhere in the world. It was not the kind of character that would have appealed to moralists like Thomas Arnold,² for the Victorian sentimentalism about public schools frequently masked a state of things which only twentieth century frankness has dared expose to the light of day, but it included the Kiplingese virtues of restraint, discipline, and power of command.³ It turned out a type of white man who was unrivalled in dealing with every kind of "native" but the educated native, platoon commanders of an excellence that almost compensated for the mediocrity of a public-school trained higher command. But the tremendous efficiency of a discipline that was about the boy's path and about his bed, regulating every moment of his existence at the most formative period, could not fail to nip any tender shoots of creative genius, and to merge the individual in a type, manly and well-groomed and urbane, but with an invincible distaste for mental effort, a mind hardened in racial and class prejudice, and a religion comprehended in the words "good form".

And the working class, all this time, the great unvocal majority into whose roughened hands a Parliament of well-to-do gentlemen has seen fit to confide the supreme power in the State—what of them? For the most part they had remained, through the years of mid-

¹ *Oscar Browning* by H. E. Wortham, p. 44.

² Mr. Strachey, having raked Arnold's career for a greater earnestness than would be quite good form in a modern headmaster, suddenly clinches his indictment by branding him as "the founder of the worship of athletics and the worship of good form". *Post Arnold ergo propter Arnold* would seem to be a good enough logical cudgel for the game of Victorian Aunt Sally.

³ Though Mr. Kipling's own "Stalky and Co." were fighting the last battle of the old individualism against monitors and compulsory games. They would have been caned or kicked out of it in the 'nineties.

Victorian prosperity, contentedly unobtrusive. There was no movement of revolt anything like as widespread or intense as Chartism. An attempt on the part of Karl Marx to form an international working men's association for carrying on class warfare *à outrance* gave birth to a so-called national congress at Nottingham in 1872, but it was a complete failure. Says Mr. Beer, the historian of British Socialism, "the British section of the I.M.W.A. lingered on for some time and expired from exhaustion. The working classes had definitely abandoned all socialist agitation and class warfare, and not even the genius of Marx could bring them back to Chartism."

Nevertheless quiet and steady progress had been accomplished during these years. The Trades Unions had been consolidating their position, and obtained full legal recognition of their claims from Disraeli's government in 1876, though the years of depression saw, as such years always do, a temporary decline in power and membership. The co-operative societies were beginning to cover the country and supply a training in self-help that might come in useful, some day, for more militant activities. The Education Act was destined to train up a generation more susceptible to mass suggestion than that which had preceded it, and more easily organized for combined action. And above all there was the vote, an irresistible weapon for a class-conscious Demos could he but pluck it out of its scabbard. That scabbard was not so much talked about as the sword it retained, and its name was called Caucus.

2

DISRAELI AND THE NEW TORYISM

The most sensational, though perhaps not the most important event of 1874, was the resounding fall of Gladstone's Liberal administration, and the triumph under a democratic franchise of Disraeli's Conservatives. The social forces, to which Gladstone had fatalistically appealed, were now beginning to work not for, but against, his policy of middle-class Liberalism, but the dramatic suddenness of the change was due to the far-sighted genius of the man who had guided the fortunes of Conservatism through long years of eclipse and discouragement, and provided it with a policy based, not on the expediency of the moment, but on a reasoned and consistent philosophy and interpretation of history.

The character of Benjamin Disraeli is one that will provide material for historical disagreement, until such time as human

nature is studied with the same scientific detachment as chemistry or biology. The long duel between him and Gladstone has been kept up by their partisans, long after the principals have been quiet in the grave. And, for more than one reason, Disraeli has received less than his due proportion of fair play. Largely, no doubt, this is due to the fact that so many of the historians of modern England have happened to inherit Whig or Liberal sympathies. A vague anti-Semitic bias has been imparted into the controversy from the fact of Disraeli's Jewish descent. Perhaps, however, he has suffered most of all from the fact that of all his contemporaries he was the one who most consistently refused to bow the knee or pull the long face before the smug little god of Victorian respectability. Whether his righteousness exceeded the righteousness of Mr. Gladstone is a question on which opinions may plausibly differ, but there is no doubt that in perpetually suggesting to his contemporaries that every day and in every way he was getting more and more righteous, Disraeli neither could nor, indeed, would hold a candle to the Grand Old Man of Victorianism. And yet he, too, cultivated a pose—an intellectual pose, less tolerable to Englishmen than the moral variety.

The cynical and self-seeking Jew of Liberal tradition is hardly more absurd than the flawless and nearly omniscient hero that some ardent Tories would make of Disraeli. His was a strangely complex character, by no means to be comprehended in the sweeping generalizations of up-to-date biography. To invoke his Jewish origin as a ready-made explanation of everything he was or did is surely the last resort of disingenuousness. His youthful flamboyance of dress and manner he borrowed from the set among which he moved, a set that included Count D'Orsay, the prince of dandies; his occasional lusciousness of imagery was that of a typical Romantic; his *penchant* for the East was thoroughly in keeping with the Byronic fashion of his adolescence. He had the far from Hebraic characteristic of being in perpetual monetary embarrassment, and of being weakest, as a statesman, on the side of finance.

In spite of the fact that he carefully cultivated the appearance of inscrutability, his was an exceptionally impulsive and affectionate nature. In one of his early novels, *Contarini Fleming*, he was admittedly depicting his own nature in that of the hyper-sensitive hero, who is perpetually craving for love—"love me, love me always!" This was the Disraeli who as husband and brother was able to give and inspire a love as constant and intense as any on human record, and who, at the end of his life, solaced his heart by a friendship, at

once pure and passionate, for those two gracious and venerable sisters, Lady Chesterfield and Lady Bradford, and who brought back a little sunshine to the widowed heart of his Queen. This was the essential Disraeli, but there was another side to his nature which was almost inevitable in a parvenu with nothing but sheer brain and will power to help him climb to the summit of his ambition. This side is depicted in his first novel, *Vivian Gray*, also an attempt to explain his own nature, this time under the guise of a brilliant but not too nice young superman of the Byronic order. This streak of the adventurer is also from time to time apparent in Disraeli's career. Sometimes it pleases him, in his correspondence and political manoeuvres, to sink the statesman in the cynic, the wire-puller, even the charlatan. On one celebrated occasion he lied, boldly and unblushingly, to the House of Commons, denying that he had ever sought office from Peel, and staking his whole career on the chance that Peel would have lost the damning letter. He once sought alliance with the Cobdenites, and on their refusal of so monstrous a coalition made a speech in which he himself denounced coalitions. He was capable of putting things in his letters, in moments of petulance or affectation, that made nonsense of his whole philosophy, but by which, most unfortunately and ungenerously, he has been judged and condemned. Gladstone was only obeying the dictates of an upright though not inconvenient conscience when he allowed himself to be converted to Home Rule so soon as this was the only apparent way of securing a majority, and in leaving the ship of Toryism as soon as it was obviously waterlogged; his abandonment of Gordon, his far from delicate treatment of Parnell, are tactfully explained away; but Disraeli, who was no less honourable and public-spirited, and far more consistent to his principles, is surely entitled to an equal measure of generosity. Hath not a Jew . . .

What brought Disraeli, in spite of every handicap, inevitably to the front of the Tory party was the fact that he was the only active politician of that party who had the least claim to rank as a political philosopher. Wellington was a reactionary at heart and a patriotic opportunist in practice; Peel had a genius for administration, but was, without realizing it, no Tory at all, but a middle class Liberal; Shaftesbury, in spite of his splendid practical work for social reform, was not to be taken seriously as a thinker; Lord Derby was a thorough-paced party tactician, more concerned with dishing the Whigs than providing a reasoned faith for the Tories. Disraeli, on the other hand, had been born in a library; his father

was not only a man of enormous if somewhat discursive erudition, but a student of the great constitutional struggle of the seventeenth century, who had put the case for our first two Stuart Kings against their politicians.

It was on this basis that the Young Disraeli built up his philosophy of Toryism. The Tories, in his view, were the party of the whole nation, and their opponents, Roundhead or Whig or Radical, were that of a class or faction. He showed how the "patriots" of the Long Parliament had opposed direct taxation that fell on rich men like Hampden, and had ended by substituting crushing indirect taxation that fell on the people. The Whigs of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries he characterized as a Venetian oligarchy, a clique of titled and monied men seeking, under the cant of liberty, to bind the fetters of their tyranny on sovereign and people alike, an unpatriotic faction that had done its best to weaken the hands of our leaders in the struggle with France.

But Disraeli had a more subtle distinction in mind when he characterized the Tories as the national party. His view of nationality was the evolutionary or dynamic one, as contrasted with the abstract principles to which his opponents were constantly appealing. In his *Vindication of the English Constitution* (1835), a classic of political philosophy which has received less attention than it deserves, he justifies our fundamental institutions, not because they are perfect in the abstract, but because they are perfectly English, with roots deep in the past. Indeed, he has nothing but contempt for recent attempts to transplant them to soils, such as that of France, to which they are not indigenous. And with a historical insight remarkable for a writer in the thirties, he clearly realizes how firmly rooted is the English Constitution in the English law.

This standpoint of course involved Disraeli in irreconcilable opposition to the utilitarian and Radical doctrines that had begun to capture the now dominant middle-class. The sole test of a constitution to him, was whether, in practice, it was suited to the nation. The proof of the pudding, in fact, is the eating, and not the cookery book. Mehemet Ali probably acted wisely, thinks Disraeli, in saving his Egyptian subjects the trouble of electing members to their brand-new Parliament by electing them himself. A King, a bench of Bishops, a House of Lords, may conceivably be more truly representative than a House of Commons elected by universal suffrage. The curious superstition that the tyranny of a majority is more sacrosanct than that of an autocrat is not for Disraeli. He

is constantly applying the test—how does your constitution work, not on paper nor in communities of economic men, but here and now, in that partnership which includes, as Burke once declared, the living and the dead and those yet to be born?

In one respect Disraeli goes beyond Burke as a political philosopher. He does not conceive of the past as a dead weight on progress. The nation is in a perpetual process of development and the national party ought to develop with it. Only progress ought to be organic, inspired by a tender reverence for the past, and based not upon abstract but upon national principles. It was always Disraeli's chief pre-occupation to get his party out of the ruts of blind reaction, whose protagonist, Eldon, he had satirized in one of his early novels as Lord Past Century. He was equally opposed to the uninspired Conservatism of men like Peel, whose policy it was to construct as many temporary dams as possible across the stream of progress. From the first, his proposals were bold to the point of scandalizing hidebound Whigs as much as crusted Tories. He started by advocating the ballot and Triennial Parliaments, and when taxed with vote-catching, appealed triumphantly to such Tory fathers as Bolingbroke and Windham for support. When the Chartist movement was at its most alarming phase, he boldly professed his sympathy with the workers as against a capitalist bourgeoisie, who, as he pointed out, were monopolizing power without performing any corresponding duties. He flung himself heart and soul into the question of social reform, which he always maintained was the especial concern of the Tory party, and his novel *Sybil*, published in 1845, is a burning plea, in which selfish landowners come in for as drastic censure as selfish capitalists, for the masses as against the tyranny of the rich.

Disraeli's early career was one long struggle to guide his party back from what he described as political infidelity to political faith. This was bound to bring him into conflict with his leader, Peel, who in his eyes was politically the arch-infidel, and whom he assailed, in a series of terrible Philippics, on the latter's *volte-face* on the question of the Corn Laws. It is about this time that Disraeli, a born Romantic, plays a leading part in what was known as the Young England movement, a sentimental attempt of some young aristocrats to reproduce under their own auspices such a medieval England as the imagination of that time loved to conjure up, with a happy people loyally devoted to benevolent lords of the soil, and a church solicitous alike for the material, intellectual, and spiritual requirements of the people. But "Young England" was never more than a

vague aspiration, and Disraeli was soon at work, as Conservative leader of the House of Commons, at the thankless task of guiding his party through their twenty-eight years of minority, never forgetting the political faith in which he had started, though it is probable that his leader, Lord Derby, regarded his not altogether welcome colleague in no other light than that of a fellow opportunist. It was Derby, we repeat, and not Disraeli, who talked of dishing the Whigs.

"The Whigs invoke the people," Disraeli had cried, "let us appeal to the nation," and that, so far as it can be compressed into so small a compass, expresses his political creed. Jew though he was, he was proudly and passionately devoted to the land that had given him birth, and only prejudice can deny him a leading place on the roll of English patriots. But in the very intensity of his nationalism there lurked a danger. It is possible to conceive of the national well-being as the end of all statesmanship, and its promotion the supreme dictate of morality. Nations, viewed from this standpoint, constitute an anarchy of giant egotists, with no other object in view than that of satisfying, by any means and at each others' expense, their lust for wealth and power. It is significant that at the height of his power, when defending his Eastern policy, which his critics, not without reason, had characterized as selfish, Disraeli, then Lord Beaconsfield, should have replied, "It is as selfish as patriotism." In those half dozen words is implicit the doctrine of Machiavelli, of Bismarck, of the men who made the world war and marred the Peace of Versailles.

Now it was just on this question—whether morality stops short at the individual, or whether it applies equally to communities—that Gladstone was most fundamentally opposed to Disraeli, and Gladstonian Liberalism to Disraelian Toryism. Gladstone said and believed that selfishness is the greatest curse of the human race, and to him a patriotism that was selfish would have seemed no patriotism at all, but a devilish mockery of it. He loved England not for her power or wealth or splendour, but because, as he said, wherever in the world a high aspiration was entertained or a noble blow was struck, it was to England that the eyes of the oppressed were turned. He loved her, in fact, most of all because he believed her to be lovable. He believed that the way to make her great was to let it be known that she would, before all things, be just, for national injustice was, he held, the surest road to national downfall. And in these principles he was at one with the greatest of the mid-century Liberals, and most of all with Bright, who in speaking in 1858 on

foreign policy, asked his audience to believe that the moral law was not written for men alone in their individual character, but that it was written as well for nations, and that only by the guidance of that law can we be permanently a great nation or our people a happy people. And Freeman, the historian of the Norman Conquest, a lover of his country if ever there was one, could go so far as to say, when it was a question of upholding Turkish oppression by British arms, "Perish the interests of England, perish our dominion in India, sooner than that we should strike one blow or speak one word in the cause of the wrong against the right!"

It was evident then that Disraeli was the exponent of an altogether different kind of patriotism from that of his Liberal opponents. The difference is more clearly marked by the fact that patriotism was with him less a question of ideals than of race. Race, he maintained, was the key of history, and the importance he attached to it is, perhaps, one of his few idiosyncrasies that we may plausibly attribute to the fact of his Semitic origin. But he was at least in harmony with a tendency that was growing on the Continent to think in terms of the Latin or Teutonic or Slav races, enormous super-national groups, whose interests soon came to bound the mental horizons of their champions, to the exclusion of those of humanity.

It was impossible that with these views Disraeli could remain satisfied within the bounds of a merely insular patriotism. Inevitably his vision of England widened to include those members of the British race who had left her shores to plant her flag and institutions in distant lands, those of them at least who retained their allegiance and loyalty to the Motherland. Disraeli came to maturity at a time singularly unpropitious for the growth of imperialist sentiment, particularly in his own party, which had by no means entirely shaken off its delusion that colonies, if not to be abandoned, must be governed. Accordingly we find in Disraeli's earlier productions few references to colonial questions, though a lively interest in the gorgeous and romantic Near East to which the Byronic as well as the Jewish tradition had, from the first, attracted him, and which was very much to the fore both in the literature and politics of the thirties.

There is a passage, however, in *Contarini Fleming*, written in the year of the Reform Bill, which shows how, even in these early days, Disraeli had grasped the root of the matter, which was that the bond between the mother country and her colonies ought to be, above all things, spiritual and not merely businesslike. "There is a great difference," he says, "between ancient and modern colonies. A

modern colony is a commercial enterprise, an ancient colony was a political settlement. In the emigration of our citizens, hitherto, we had merely sought the means of acquiring wealth; the ancients, when their brethren quitted their native shores, wept and sacrificed. . . . I believe that a great revolution is at hand in our system of colonization, and that Europe will recur to the principles of the ancient policy." Had the relations between England and our American colonies been ordered on the principles of this noble passage, there need have been no Declaration of Independence.

That thoughts of empire were simmering in Disraeli's mind is evident from a strange and flamboyant romance published in the year following *Contarini Fleming*, entitled *Alroy*. This describes the attempt of a scion of the House of David to revive the glories of his race. He so far succeeds as to found an Empire by the conquest of Bagdad. But he is ruined by the defection of his spiritual guide, the priest Jabaster, a devotee of the race doctrine in the narrowest sense, who holds that the school of Empire is the law of Moses. Alroy has broader views, he scorns to think that the Lord of Hosts must needs fix the boundaries of omnipotence between the Jordan and the Lebanon. "Universal empire must not be founded on sectarian principles and exclusive rights", in other words, there must be no "lesser breeds without the law". This early imperialism is, however, too tentative and nebulous, too much the product of a romantic imagination, to constitute more than the glimmering dawn of a reasoned philosophy.

After the separation from Peel, we find Disraeli, now the Tory second-in-command, revolving schemes for a closer union with those colonies whose eventual separation from us most of our leading statesmen anticipated without regret. In 1849 we first find him toying with the idea of admitting colonial representatives to the British Parliament, and in 1851, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, pressing his scheme upon the notice of Lord Derby, who seems to have turned it down with the polite depreciation of an unimaginative man confronted by an innovation. It is shortly after this that we find Disraeli, in a moment of discouragement or petulance, writing to Lord Malmesbury of the colonies being a millstone round our neck, and despairing of their retention. Such a reaction was not unnatural, and it is absurd to judge of Disraeli's serious and considered opinion by the salvage of Lord Malmesbury's wastepaper basket.

It was in 1859, when Disraeli was next in office, in the usual Tory minority, that, addressing his constituents at Aylesbury, he

made the significant pronouncement that England, though bound to Europe by many ties, was not merely a Power of the Old World. "If ever Europe by her short-sightedness falls into an inferior and exhausted state, for England there will remain an illustrious future. We are bound to the communities of the New World and those great states which our own planting and colonizing energies have created by ties and interests that will sustain our power and enable us to play a part in the times yet to come as we do in these days, and as we have done in the past." So that Disraeli had now the vision, that may yet prove prophetic, of England casting loose her moorings to an exhausted Europe, and taking her place as the head of an amphibious and world-wide league of "great states".

It was in 1872, when the victory for which Disraeli had planned and waited for so many years was now in sight, that his political philosophy attained its full maturity in the greatest of all his speeches, delivered at the Crystal Palace. Herein he laid down three great principles as the basis of a Tory or national policy. The first of these was to maintain the institutions of the country, and on this head Disraeli had little to add to the doctrine formulated nearly forty years before in his *Vindication of the Constitution*. There was nothing new, either, in his making social reform, the elevation of the condition of the people, a main plank in the Tory programme—the author of *Sybil* could hardly have done less. The most original and important part of the speech was his plea for the maintenance not only of our institutions and domestic prosperity, but also of our Empire, an ideal to which one of the great parties in the State, and that the one which was to be in the ascendant for more than a generation, was henceforward committed.

This declaration reveals both the grandeur and the imperfection of Disraeli's matured imperialism. Though he coined the phrase "*imperium et libertas*", he could never quite rise to the conception of a Commonwealth of Nations whose service was perfect freedom. He held that self-government ought to have been conceded to the colonies as part of a great policy of imperial consolidation. It ought to have been accompanied not only by a representative council in London, but by an imperial tariff, a military code, and the retention by the Crown—an euphemism for Downing Street—of unoccupied lands. But if anything could have been more certain than another—and a study of Canadian politics ought to have enlightened Disraeli on this point—it is that no colony would have dreamed of tolerating such interference. These regrets, though they avowedly refer to the

past, are too reminiscent of a petulant outburst of Disraeli's, in a letter to Lord Derby in 1867—"what is the use of these colonial deadweights which *we do not govern*?"

Disraeli had, in fact, approached the imperial question from the racial standpoint. He had the vision of the Anglo-Saxon race spreading its power and civilization to the remotest corners of the earth, and he saw, as plainly as he had seen in 1832, that to regard imperial affairs, as the Manchester School were inclined to do, merely in a financial aspect, was to pass by "those moral and political considerations which alone make nations great, and by the influence of which alone men are distinguished from animals".

That is finely said, but Disraeli, for all his historical insight and philosophic grasp, lacked one thing that some of his opponents possessed. He had, throughout his career, a strangely imperfect sympathy with liberty. This was no doubt partly due to his aversion from all abstract principles in politics, but it deprived him of that generous sympathy for oppressed and struggling peoples that was the strength of Gladstone. And it blinded him to those very aspects of the colonial problem which Gladstone, whose imagination was much less fired by the vision of Greater Britain, divined by a sure instinct. For Gladstone saw plainly that the less we attempted to govern or interfere with the colonies, the more surely we should bind them to us. And to Gladstone the pursuit of racial supremacy was of little importance compared with the maintenance of God's law of justice and liberty, and Christ's golden rule, which is binding in all ages on men and communities.

"I believe," he said, at the conclusion of one of his great Midlothian speeches, "we are all united in a fond attachment to the great country to which we belong, to the great Empire which has committed to it a trust and function from Providence, as special and remarkable as was ever entrusted to any portion of the family of man. When I speak of that trust and that function I feel that words fail. I cannot tell you what I think of the nobleness of the inheritance that has descended upon us, of the sacredness of the duty of maintaining it. I will not condescend to make it a part of controversial politics. It is a part of my being, of my flesh and blood, of my heart and soul. For those ends I have laboured through my youth and manhood, and, more than that, till my hairs are grey. In that faith and practice I shall die."

3

ROMANTIC IMPERIALISM

In 1874 Disraeli, now old in years but incurably young in spirit, found himself in power with an overwhelming majority for his threefold policy of constitutional stability, social reform and imperialism. His ministry started with the fairest prospects. He was particularly fortunate in his Home Secretary, Mr. Cross, under whose auspices a good beginning was made with housing and sanitary reform—" *sanitas sanitatum* " had been one of the happiest of Disraeli's verbal coinages. The privileges of the Trades Unions were restored and established upon what all parties imagined to be a permanent basis. Finally the efforts of Lord Shaftesbury and his fellow philanthropists were crowned by the grand consolidation of the Factory Laws in 1878.

Could Disraeli have confined himself to these paths of peaceful progress, there is little reason to doubt that he would have died in the premiership. The electorate had returned him as they had returned Peel before him and were to return Salisbury and Bonar Law after him, because they fancied that he would pursue a policy conservative in fact as well as in name—perhaps his most effective indictment against the very able ministry he superseded was that they had begun to attack every interest, every class and calling in the country. The Englishman seldom calls for a sensational policy; he prefers to be godly and quietly governed, and Gladstone, though abounding in godliness, had displayed a disquieting energy in speeding up the advance of his " great social forces ".

Disraeli was not the man to embark on any grandiose programme of legislation. The restlessness of his genius impelled him in another direction. For he was an inveterate Romantic, and the East had the same attraction for him that it had had for Napoleon. He was also—what was rare in a Romantic—a follower of the same kind of national and racial egotism as formed the basis of Bismarck's *Realpolitik*, and this had led him to the ideal of a world-wide British Empire, effectively united in the pursuit of wealth and power. But, unlike Bismarck, he was also a constitutionalist, and this made him a seeker not only of *imperium* but also of *libertas*, blended in not always calculable proportions. This threefold strain in his nature renders Disraeli's imperialism less simple and absolute than that of such whole-hearted enthusiasts as Chamberlain and Milner, and

certainly the prosaic colonies touched a less sympathetic chord in his heart than the gorgeous East. Sometimes we are at a loss to determine whether his policy embodies the seed of modern imperialism or the flower of Victorian romance.

That Disraeli had even yet failed to grasp the essentials of the colonial problem was proved, soon after his accession to office, by the policy he permitted his Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, to adopt with regard to South Africa, then just beginning to emerge from her purely pastoral and agricultural stage. His Lordship displayed true statesmanlike insight in divining that the supreme need of the four white communities, two of them independent Boer Republics, was to attain some sort of political union, but what he did not realize was the almost aggressive independence of the self-governing colonial, who would rather suffer the utmost inconvenience than have the wisest policy imposed upon him from Downing Street.

Lord Carnarvon, to whom the whole business appeared exceedingly simple, proposed a conference between representatives of the chief white communities, of Griqualand West, whose participation was intolerable to the Free State, and the Eastern Province of Cape Colony, whose separate recognition constituted an offence to the Cape government. To make matters worse, he coolly proposed himself to nominate all except the Boer representatives. The matter was further complicated by an extraordinary roving commission to James Anthony Froude, an eloquent speaker and distinguished historian, but a man wholly lacking in tact and relevant knowledge, to go about making speeches and trying to convert all and sundry to the Government's policy. Of course, the combined efforts of Froude and Carnarvon had no other effect than that of setting everybody concerned by the ears. The Cape Parliament flatly refused to have part or lot in the conference, and the Boer Republics had grievances which made them even less willing than they might have been at ordinary times to dance to the piping of the British minister. The Tory government's attempt to box the compass on the policy of its predecessors, who had positively insisted on driving the Boers out of the pale of British sovereignty and responsibility, thus ended in what amounted to a hint to Downing Street to mind its own business.

It was, however, to the East that Disraeli's thoughts most naturally turned. His romantic loyalty to the throne no less than his instinct for enhancing our prestige found expression in the title "Empress of India", which he caused the Queen to assume. He

brought off a notable financial *coup* when, acting through the great Jewish house of Rothschild, who cleared a hundred thousand over the deal, he snapped up, from under the very nose of our French rivals, the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal. But his great opportunity came when the Christian populations of the Balkans broke out into desperate rebellion against their Ottoman master, and it became evident that orthodox Russia was not going to see them crushed without herself taking a hand in the struggle against the Turk, and thus re-opening the whole question which we had thought to settle in the Crimean War.

It was not long before domestic problems had receded into comparative insignificance; the reforming progress of the ministry slowed down, and the eyes of Western Europe were turned to the Balkans, where the Cross, long trampled in the dust of conquest, was once again raised in defiance of the Crescent. But to most Englishmen, a more dramatic and absorbing contest was that between the two great men who occupied the centre of their own political stage, Disraeli, now Earl of Beaconsfield, and Gladstone, drawn irresistibly from what he had fondly imagined to be his final retirement from active politics. It was one of those noblest quarrels in which not personalities, but great and fundamental principles are at stake. For with Beaconsfield, the whole matter was frankly one of his adopted country's interests. If the Turkish hordes were let loose on the insurgent Bulgarians, to practice every form of devilry—that was no concern of his. With a cheerful conscience, he elected to discuss all reports of such massacres as “coffee-house babble”. *Realpolitik* was his game, the statecraft of Machiavelli's “Prince”, and he played every move with consummate skill and single-hearted devotion to Britain.

Gladstone, on the other hand, took the ground that the Turk was in the wrong, and he could not bear to think of our countenancing or abetting his tyranny under any pretence whatsoever. Like the Hebrew prophet, he felt that God's law should override the calculations of political expediency. The Turk ought to clear, bag and baggage, out of the province he had desolated. Beaconsfield was haunted by the fear lest the newly enfranchised peoples should become pawns in the hands of Russia. But Gladstone, with his faith in liberty, held that the best defence against tyranny, Ottoman or Muscovite, resided in the breasts of free men. Thus, while Beaconsfield justified himself on the grounds of national self-interest, Gladstone appealed to the national conscience.

It can at least be said of Beaconsfield that he displayed a mastery of his craft that moved the admiration of Bismarck himself. After a good deal of diplomatic manoeuvring, Russia, whose deepest feelings were roused by the defeat of orthodox Serbia, came to the rescue, and though her unwieldy armies encountered an unexpectedly strenuous resistance as they attempted to debouch from the Balkan passes, the Turks were at last beaten and the way cleared to Constantinople. This roused feeling in England to fever-pitch. The name of the Japanese goddess, Jingo, was somewhat incongruously imported into our language in a song which asserted that we had fought the bear a thousand times before—when and where were not specified—and that “they” should not have Constantinople. Another song, about this time, was to the effect that “they” should not wipe their nose on the flag. This sort of thing had been heard before the Crimean war, but the Premier was now a cooler if a less scrupulous hand than Aberdeen. One of Tenniel’s cartoons represented him as a guide, leading Britannia to the edge of an abyss, and balancing himself on his toes, with his heels over, imploring her to come a step nearer. But his balance was sure, and he knew to an inch how far he could go without losing his footing.

It was a thrilling and tense time, when war with Russia, a war conceived and planned on the grandest scale, seemed inevitable, when the fleet was brought up to cover Constantinople, when a force of Indian troops was landed in Malta—and all because the Russians had imposed upon the Turks a treaty which created a Bulgaria stretching from the Black Sea to the Ægean, a strong Christian state in which English opinion foresaw a vassal of Russia. A time was to come when England would have given much had this foreboding of Bulgaria’s subservience to Russia been justified.

Russia, secretly furious at England’s attitude, but unwilling to proceed to extremities, stayed her hand and agreed to a Conference. A bigger game was on hand, had anyone except Bismarck realized it, than the comparatively petty question of whether a few wretched Christians could or could not be forced back under the Turkish yoke. For the alliance of the three Emperors, which was nothing less than the old Holy Alliance brought up to date, had developed a fatal rift. Austria had her ambitions and still more her fears in the Balkans, and she dreaded above all things the rise of Russia’s special protégé, Serbia. Hapsburg and Romanoff were jostling one another in the South Eastern gate of Europe, where their ambitions fatally overlapped. The spectacle, to the far-seeing eyes of Bismarck, was

infinitely disquieting. If Europe believed in Germany's invincibility, he was under no such illusion. He had realized, too late, his mistake in neither conciliating nor annihilating France. The indemnity had proved a mere bagatelle and a severe blow to German commerce. His first thought had been to remobilize, with or without excuse, the armies of Moltke, and finish the business once and for all in the true spirit of Clausewitz. This desperate plot was frustrated by the joint influence of the Tsar and—to her everlasting honour—Queen Victoria.

Henceforth the Chancellor was, for all his terrible seeming, in a state of mortal fear for the Empire he had founded in blood and iron, and the dynasty whose fortunes he had raised to such a towering height. He knew—none better—that France would never forget, that France was recovering, and that when the day of reckoning came she would see to it that she did not stand alone. He had therefore, from his own point of view, done the best thing possible in uniting the three great reactionary powers of the Holy Alliance in what he hoped would be an abiding union. So long as that held, all was safe. But, like the original authors of the Holy Alliance, he had reckoned without the Balkans.

When, therefore, Beaconsfield, accompanied by his foreign secretary, Lord Salisbury, came to Berlin, his contention with Russia, upon which all the limelight was turned, must have seemed a matter of minor importance to Bismarck, as compared with the question whether, in the last resort, Germany was to sacrifice her Russian or her Austrian alliance. On the whole, Bismarck inclined towards Austria. A Franco-Austrian alliance was no new thing, but, judiciously handled, Austria might so be drawn into the German orbit as to become practically a vassal state. Of a choice of evils, the best was to hold fast to Austria and to lose as little of Russian friendship as possible. Now Austria was more vitally concerned than England to keep Russia at a distance from Constantinople, and to prevent the formation of a greater and presumably pro-Russian Bulgaria. Accordingly the weight of German influence was thrown, reluctantly but decisively, into the scales against Russia.

Bismarck, and neither Beaconsfield nor his Russian opponent, Gortschakoff, was thus the dominating figure at the Berlin Congress. The English premier, however, had the opportunity in figuring in the splendid role for which his temperament and ambitions had cast him. There was talk of his quitting the conference and letting the sword decide if he did not get his way. As his way happened to be

that chosen by Bismarck, get it he eventually did. For that master of *Realpolitik* had other ends in view than the advancement of his Hapsburg client. The supreme object of his policy was now to prevent a combination of European powers against Germany, and therefore to divert their interests into harmless channels, or to set them at each others' throats. With Austria the most obvious policy was to set her face towards the Aegean and her back to Germany. England and Russia might, with judicious management, be made to keep each other busy. It would, at any rate, be far better if Russia's resentment at her rebuff could be directed against England. Accordingly Bismarck was only too happy to let "that old Jew", as he called him, achieve a triumph not for English but for Austro-German interests, and happier still to have created a tension between England and Russia that for a whole generation maintained a pleasing state of Anglophobia on one side and Russophobia on the other, and might, with any luck, have involved France's two chief potential allies in a ruinous and suicidal war.

Disraeli returned home in a blaze of triumph. He had secured "peace with honour". Russia had given away so far as to break her Greater Bulgaria into three parts. Of these, the Macedonians were handed over to the tender mercies of the Turk, and the Southern portion of Bulgaria was—and it was on this question that Disraeli had nearly broken up the conference—formed into a separate vassal state of Turkey under the title of Eastern Rumelia. In a few years, this precious arrangement was terminated by the inhabitants themselves, who meant to belong to Christian Bulgaria, and did so. Meanwhile Russia compensated herself by filching from her allies, the Roumanians, the tract of Bessarabia that we had made her give up after the Crimean War, and thus creating a grievance which, when the Great War came, seriously compromised our situation in the Balkans and might easily have brought in Roumania on the side of the Central Powers. Self-compensation was a game that we also could play, to the extent of filching Cyprus from its sovereign, Turkey, and its natural guardian, Greece. It was a trumpery enough picking. Among other points scored by Beaconsfield was an undertaking by Russia not to fortify the port of Batoum. Needless to say, the power that had recently swallowed the camel of Sevastopool and the Black Sea Fleet, did not strain for very long at this gnat. Furthermore, the clumsy attempts of Russia to assert the Balkan hegemony that Beaconsfield had so much feared, merely served to show the truth of Gladstone's contention that the best safeguard against

tyranny lies in the breasts of free men. These intensely self-conscious and truculent nationalities soon showed themselves little more willing to be dictated to by the Tsar than by the Sultan.

What Beaconsfield did at Berlin will probably redound less to his credit in the long run than what he refrained from doing. For to embroil England, or any other power, with France, was even more important for Bismarck than to provide enemies for Russia. The value of the Suez Canal to England and the significance of her Premier's coup in buying up the Khedive's shares had not been lost on him, and he was well aware that France regarded Egypt as a special preserve of her own. It is not, then, very difficult to understand his motive in going out of his way to inform Beaconsfield with what benevolent interest Germany would watch any extension of British power or influence in that direction. It was the very bait that might have been considered most attractive to such a nature as Beaconsfield's—a Liberal historian writing more than twenty years afterwards thought him merely inept in refusing it—but here, at any rate, the wily old statesman was not to be caught napping. He would have nothing to do with any Egyptian adventure.

Had Beaconsfield chosen to go to the country on the strength of "peace with honour", there can be little doubt that his government would have been returned to power by an overwhelming majority. But there would have been no honest excuse for such a stroke of political *finesse*, and the country was soon to exchange the sweets for the bitterness of a forward policy. In these dismal years of depressed trade and bad harvests it would have been hard for any government to have stopped in office with unimpaired prestige, and the Tory policy was now beginning to produce a crop of petty and inglorious troubles. In South Africa, where they had already blundered sufficiently, they could do nothing quite right. They had been persuaded by that Afrikaner Machiavelli, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, into reversing the Liberal policy of the Sand River Convention¹ by annexing the Transvaal Republic, anarchic and debt-laden as it had become, to the Crown, a step which, though it was no doubt for their material advantage, was profoundly distasteful to the freedom-loving burghers, and which was made still more unpopular by tactless administration.

On the top of this came a Kaffir War, and afterwards a more serious struggle with the Zulus, in which of course we were victorious in the long run, but only after much blundering and one humiliating

¹ By which, in 1852, Britain had renounced sovereignty over the Transvaal.

reverse, the consequences of which might have proved disastrous for Natal. The government were fortunate at this time in having as High Commissioner Sir Bartle Frere, who had distinguished himself by conspicuous ability among the many able Indian civilians trained up in John Company's service. But they showed, in their treatment of him, a spirit more worthy of their leader's notorious creations, Taper and Tadpole, than of men fit to sway the rod of Empire. Though they were too much dependent on Frere's services to dispense with them outright, they were not above attempting to saddle him with the blame for a state of affairs that was fast beginning to involve them in unpopularity. They treated him with studied discourtesy, superseded him in his post of High Commissioner while leaving him his governorship of the Cape, and even refused his request to vindicate him, tongue-tied as he was by his official position, against an outrageous slander launched at him by Gladstone in the course of one of the Midlothian speeches. All this treatment Frere bore with the patient dignity of one conscious of his own integrity. But the spirit, neither liberal nor imperial, in which the politicians at home misjudged the problem of South African politics—which was fast becoming the supreme test of imperial statesmanship—must inevitably produce its harvest of misadventure.

It was on the Indian frontier that the nemesis of Beaconsfield's anti-Russian policy overtook him. Foiled and humiliated in what she regarded as a crusade, Russia began to push ahead, with malicious energy, her South Eastern expansion, which brought her ever closer to the Himalayan barrier. It was the dream of her greatest soldier, Skoboleff, to plant her standards on the fort at Delhi. Under these circumstances the buffer state of Afghanistan became of decisive importance, and there the situation was most disquieting, for not only was Kabul honeycombed with Russian intrigue and her bazaars overflowing with Russian goods, but the Amir himself was secretly a tool in Muscovite hands. Our viceroy at this time was Lord Lytton, an imperialist statesman of the new school, and an exponent of the forward policy in its most uncompromising form. Such a man was no more capable than Beaconsfield himself of appreciating that the best safeguard against Russian aggression lay in a free and jealously independent Afghanistan.

The situation was no doubt one of extreme difficulty, and it is hard to see how, in face of the Amir's intrigues and insults, we could have avoided striking, as we did, with the full force of our military power, to restore the situation. We were brilliantly

successful, chasing the Amir from his kingdom and occupying his capital. Now, however, the forward policy led us into disaster. We insisted on taking Afghan foreign policy into our own control, and on sending a British mission to Kabul. Old Lord Lawrence, who probably knew more about India than any other man, sought to approach the Premier with a view to protesting against what anyone, who remembered what had happened in 1841, must have known to be madness, but, with a strange discourtesy, he was not even received. "They will all be murdered," was his mournful comment—and so it came to pass.

This, of course, meant another Afghan War, longer and more bloody than the last, and in the course of which a small British and Indian army, based on Kandahar, was half destroyed at Maiwand. Visions floated through Lytton's mind of the permanent occupation of Kandahar, the ancient gate of India, and the disintegration of Afghanistan. But before the monotonous and expensive triumph of civilized over barbarian arms could be finally consummated, the Tory government, which had plunged deeper and deeper into unpopularity and discredit, had fallen from power. The country was not yet ripe for a full-blooded imperialism. Gladstone, now at the height of his oratorical powers, was swaying vast audiences with an impassioned appeal to turn from the unrighteous and uneconomic courses of the last few years to the principles of middle-class Liberalism. These principles he summarized as—

1. Economy and just legislation at home.
2. Peace abroad.
3. To maintain the concert of Europe.
4. To avoid needless and entangling engagements.
5. To acknowledge the equal rights of all nations.
6. Sympathy with freedom everywhere.

His triumph was as astonishing and complete as that of his opponent five years before. His majority at the polls was overwhelming, and though *Realpolitik* was triumphing everywhere abroad over the old Liberal idealism, the latter was, to all outward appearance, stronger than ever in England.

4

THE MORROW OF MIDLOTHIAN

When Gladstone committed himself to that flight of rhetoric about social forces moving onwards in their might and majesty, he little knew in how ironical a sense the fates had destined him to

give proof of his own doctrine. For a new social force was gathering strength against which the thunders of Midlothian might peal in vain. Even Beaconsfield's cynicism might have shrunk from predicting that within three years of taking office the government of idealism and international morality would have goaded one freedom-loving people into rebellion, would have crushed into the dust an army of patriots, fighting against tyranny, would fain have employed, if that had been possible, the unspeakable Turk on this congenial task, and would have embittered our relations with Europe and launched us on a policy of armament and expansion by planting our foot firmly on that very Nile Valley with whose lure Bismarck had striven, and striven in vain, to tempt Beaconsfield! There are times when even the least imaginative historian finds it hard to resist the belief that there are ideas abroad, which exercise a hypnotic effect over men and lead even the wisest whither they would not.

The failure of Gladstone to guide England into the ways of peace and righteousness is no condemnation of the Midlothian speeches, unbalanced and unjust as parts of those speeches no doubt were. Had he dared to live up to them, had he handed over, promptly and generously, Cyprus to the Greeks and the Transvaal to the Boers, had he insisted upon allowing Egypt to work out her own salvation without the assistance of British shells and bayonets, how much better would it have proved for England and the world at large!

The atmosphere of Downing Street is one in which ideals have little chance to thrive. Things may be said which, as every permanent official knows, are not done, and ministers are more dependent on their permanent staff than the world realizes. Gladstone's principal colleagues in the cabinet were anything but idealists. The two chief of them, the men who had led the party during Gladstone's temporary retirement, were the ponderous-witted and utterly unimaginative Lord Hartington, and Lord Granville, the foreign minister, a polite and indolent Whig magnate, with no particular faith in anything except the capacity of most affairs to right themselves if they were only left alone sufficiently.

If there was one thing to which Gladstone was more plainly committed than another it was to reverse what he himself had denounced as the insane and dishonourable annexation of the Transvaal, in defiance of the wishes of practically the whole of its Boer population. Certainly the Boers themselves, to whom Gladstone's

prenouncements were perfectly well known, imagined that he would honour words of such unmeasured emphasis upon coming into office. But, to their amazed indignation, nothing whatever was done, and the government made it plain that what England held, England would hold, by force of arms if necessary. Of course, all sorts of official reasons were found for this apparently brazen repudiation. There was doubtless some vague idea of a South African confederation, though Gladstone himself recognized that the total failure of the Cape Parliament to move had put this wholly out of view "for a time quite indefinite and almost certainly considerable". And not only did the Liberal Government refuse to give the Boers their independence, but they neglected even to provide them with a free constitution within the Empire, and left them at the mercy of a stupid and tactless military governor.

This was too much for the Boers. They proclaimed a republic, surrounded the few British garrisons, and shot to pieces a handful of British troops who tried to drive them from the Natal border. The government, who saw themselves threatened with a Dutch rising throughout the whole of South Africa, were convinced, by this leaden argument, that the time had come to honour their own principles, but before the Boers had had time to reply to their overtures, the general on the spot made a desperate effort to retrieve his reputation by occupying a certain Majuba Hill which commanded the Boer position. Unfortunately he neglected to command the slope over which the Boers might advance to attack him, and, in fact, allowed them to accomplish one of the most remarkable military feats in history, for they stormed the crest, killed the general, and drove what remained of his force in panic-stricken rout from the hill with a loss to themselves of only one man.

Gladstone had at least the sense and magnanimity not to listen to the cries for vengeance upon this perfectly legitimate act of self-defence. He decided to cut our losses, and dictated a peace to the Boers which granted them independence under British suzerainty, whatever that might mean. Three years later his government consented still further to modify these terms. It was not to be wondered at that the Boers, flushed with the splendid success of their little war of independence, should have imagined themselves more than a match for any force that the British Empire could bring to bear against them, either now or in the future. Could they, however, have remained the simple, pastoral community they were in 1881, no harm might have been done, and time might have wiped

Majuba gradually from the slate. But beneath the soil of the Transvaal lay hidden a wealth of precious stones and metals which must inevitably, sooner or later, attract a huge British population. Sir Garnet Wolseley, the hero of so many little wars, had plainly foreseen this and warned Beaconsfield's government, but an exact knowledge of economic geography was no part of the old diplomatic training. Amply sufficient for Gladstone's ministry was the evil of 1881.

This affair of the Transvaal was, for the nonce at any rate, far removed from the main stream of international politics. The grey eyes of Bismarck were not, as yet, fixed with any intensity upon South Africa, and it was Bismarck who called the tune to which the rest of Europe danced. To compensate, in some measure, for his failure to maintain the triple league of Emperors, he had thrust Austria into the Serb provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus diverting all her attention to her expansion South Eastwards *away* from Germany. He had set England and Russia by the ears for a generation. Finally, he had lured on France herself to an adventure as rash as it was wicked. He dangled before her, with a benevolence worthy of the snake in Eden, the bait of Tunis.

France had, as early as 1830, begun to carve out for herself a dominion in North Africa, and she had at least the excuse that she was finally stamping out the cruel piracy that had terrorized the Mediterranean for centuries. For the seizure of Tunis she had no shadow of an excuse, it was a sheer act of brigandage only to be justified by the immoral principles of *Realpolitik* which had now definitely put out of date the old Liberal idealism. Even from the new standpoint the crime was a blunder. France was playing against a supreme master of the game, and playing, not for the first time, straight into his hands. For Italy had also had her eyes upon this Naboth's vineyard so close to her door, and such was her estrangement from her Latin sister that Bismarck was able to draw her into alliance not only with Germany but also Austria, lately her hated oppressor and still the mistress of "Unredeemed Italy".

Bismarck had accomplished a masterstroke of finesse in his game of isolating France, but even he did not understand with what smouldering fire he was playing. No practical statesman, at this time, attached much importance to the great Islamic brotherhood which had been the terror of Europe until John Sobieski had called halt to the Turkish advance beneath the walls of Vienna. Since that crowning mercy, not European arms but European machinery had

put the East more and more at the mercy of the West. There had been no Industrial Revolution East of Suez. India and Algeria had already furnished examples of the conquest and exploitation of industrially backward peoples; China had shown how a peaceful community could be exploited without even the formality of conquest. What was to hinder similar methods being applied to Syria, to Mesopotamia, to Central Asia, to the remains of the Turkish Empire in North Africa, to the vast uncharted lands in the centre of that Continent? What, indeed, except such obsolete precepts as those forbidding men to murder, to steal and to covet? Such bogeys had little enough chance of sustaining the dry light of *Realpolitik*.

And yet a very farsighted observer might have found another reason. What if the slumber of the East were to be broken? What if she were some day to recover the terrible strength of old days, and snapping her chains, to drive these dogs from her doors? In the hey-day of European Liberalism even Turkey had showed signs of responsiveness to Western ideas, and in 1876 the strange and ephemeral spectacle was witnessed of a Liberal constitution for her whole Empire. In Tunis there had been faint stirrings of Liberalism, and in India there had been Ram Mohun Rai and Keshab Chandra Sen. But theirs was essentially a doctrine of free co-operation, as befitted the time, and not of conquest.

None the less the East was beginning to awaken to the danger that threatened it. Islam was anything but a spent force, and had, in fact, been actively and successfully proselytizing throughout the nineteenth century. A fiery prophet, one Djemal-ed-Din, an Afghan, who had travelled widely and acquired enormous influence with his co-religionists, gave voice to a creed that had little in common with Liberalism. He proclaimed, not without some plausibility, that Christians, however much they might differ among themselves, were at least united in the determination to destroy all Moslem states and to suppress every attempted reform or revival on the part of Mussulmans. There was nothing for it but to unite against this common enemy, to acquire his science and fight him with his own weapons.¹ A like spirit was already beginning to breathe new life into another warrior community in the islands of the furthest East.

Simple prophets, like Djemal, might divine the spirit but were hardly capable of understanding the latest and deadliest method of Western exploitation, nor the urge which was driving the white man to grow rich at the expense of his coloured relation. The

¹ See *The New World of Islam* by Lothrop Stoddard, pp. 53 and 54.

Industrial Revolution had resulted in the creation of ever-increasing quantities of surplus wealth, or capital, and it had become a fundamental article of Western belief, that wealth was not meant to be hoarded but put out to usury. He that hath, to him shall be given, and the faster capital accumulated the more persistently it clamoured for employment. But the market value of capital, like that of everything else, is fixed by demand and supply, and industrial progress sooner or later tends to accumulate wealth even faster than it can profitably reabsorb it. Capital becomes a drug on the market, and the rate of interest goes down. The small investor, with a hundred pounds to spare, finds that a cotton mill or a railway company is only prepared to offer him a beggarly 3 or 4 per cent for the use of his wealth. And the investor feels himself aggrieved, because, quite a short time ago, money was fetching considerably more than this—the difference may conceivably be to him that between comfort and penury. It is irrelevant to point out that perhaps a majority of his own countrymen are pinched for lack of food and brutalized for lack of the houses and comforts that capital could supply. There may be demand for these things, but it is not what the economist calls an effective demand, a demand backed by money. The poor man will die before he can offer 5 per cent, and until the State can either borrow or steal on his behalf, the poor man, the less-than-5-per-cent man, is out of the reckoning.

The investor seems hard put to it, so long as he has to go about banking his little all among his fellow Christians. But the resources of civilization are not exhausted. It seems almost too good to be true that a coloured potentate has been discovered who will offer ten, fifteen, twenty, even thirty per cent to the officer's widow or retired tradesman for the use of their money, and pledge thereto the resources of his subjects. But then, these timid people may reflect, extravagant interest means desperate risk, and it is more than probable that so extravagant a borrower may render neither principal nor interest, and so leave them to the workhouse. "Not so," replies civilization, "no matter how heavy the interest, pay he shall, and his heirs and subjects after him, to the uttermost farthing, even if we have to possess ourselves of his land and administer his finances and bleed his peasantry and blow any opposition to pieces with our constantly improving weapons. Can you doubt our strength to do it?" And the countenance of the timid investor lightens, and joyfully he or she shoulders the white man's burden. Only, in real life, the matter is stated with not quite so much directness. Just as

we employ the butcher to kill our mutton and pork out of sight, so we use the international financier to oil the wheels of our investing machinery. And yet *Punch*, still the mouthpiece of a Philistine but not illiberal middle-class opinion, could depict respectable British shareholders as being ready to enslave other countries, or even to sell their own for the sake of dividends.¹

5

THE WINNING OF EGYPT

Ismail Pasha, who in 1863 became Khedive of Egypt under the nominal suzerainty of the Porte, was a potentate of the kind just described. He was, in fact, one of that pernicious class of Orientals who discard all that is best in their own civilization in order to adopt what is worst in that of the West. He had ideas, of a sort, for the development of his country and its resources, but his main object was to enjoy all the sweets of a magnificent despotism and to be on terms of familiarity with the sovereigns of Europe. What rapture for him to have entertained, at prodigious cost, Napoleon III and his beautiful consort for the opening of the Suez Canal!

Unfortunately the sweets of despotism are not to be purchased for nothing, and Ismail's subjects were miserably poor. Certainly he was ready to employ all the resources of tyranny to extract the utmost piastre, but one cannot get blood out of a stone, and the proceeds of the utmost taxation were insufficient to pay such a way as Ismail Pasha's. To his other expenses were added those of an expansionist military policy to the Southward, and lavish bribes at Constantinople to regularize his status as an independent sovereign. But Ismail had found a way in which wealth could be acquired in practically unlimited quantities, by the mere signature of his name on a piece of paper. Obliging contractors were at hand to finance and work his schemes; the House of Rothschild was very much at his service. There was nothing of the skinflint about Ismail: he allowed Europeans and Semites to charge him rates of usury that out-shylocked Shylock and attained ever more staggering figures as he plunged deeper and deeper into the mire. Under these circumstances, Egyptian bonds became a most attractive investment, and feathered the nest of many a kindly soul who had never heard of Ismail nor dreamed of the blood and tears which their payment forced out of the wretched peasantry of the Nile Delta.

The inevitable crash came. The peasants were taxed till they

¹ See especially two articles on the same page, dated February 18, 1882.

could be taxed no more ; the revenue of the Crown lands was poured into a bottomless gulf of bankruptcy ; the utmost resources of Ismail were insufficient to meet the interest on his debts. To an unsophisticated observer it might have seemed as if the obvious thing to do would have been to leave the usurers and bondholders to the consequences of their extremely questionable adventure, and Egypt to the shattering of credit which is the sequel of national bankruptcy. Had Egypt been capable of defending herself, reasons would perhaps have been advanced for this line of procedure ; as it was, there was nothing to check the outraged honesty of the two powers concerned in the financing of Ismail, and upon whose policy such great financial interests as that of the Rothschilds exercised an incalculable but palpable magnetism. France and England accordingly agreed to set up a joint control of Egyptian finance, importing for the purpose an army of European officials for whom Egypt had to provide. It was decided that the bondholders should have the uttermost farthing of their bond, and that even a scaling down of the rate of interest would be quite unthinkable. The wretched Ismail, having served his purpose, was quietly got rid of, and allowed to retire with a princely fortune that nobody dreamed of impounding. But the peasants of the Nile Delta remained, to be squeezed for the debts of their departed tyrant, no longer with haphazard brutality, but with the scientific efficiency of Western administration.

This—from the bondholder's standpoint—eminently desirable state of things, was destined to receive a rude shock. Among the economies pressed upon the new, puppet Khedive, was that of cutting down the army, and incidentally of dismissing without their pay a number of officers, for whose interests the Control evinced somewhat less moral sensitiveness than for those of the bondholders. This had the effect of precipitating a military revolt, under the leadership of a colonel of fellahin origin, called Arabi. This remarkable man succeeded in placing himself at the head of a genuine national movement, directed not at the Control, but at the Turkish clique that surrounded the Khedive, men who despised and misgoverned the Egyptians and were answerable for most of the evils that had fallen upon them. The watchword of the new movement, which by the admission of no less an authority than Lord Cromer was a genuine revolt against misgovernment, and not necessarily anti-European, was " Egypt for the Egyptians ", and its object was to create a free, self-governing state in the valley of the Nile. An assembly of Notables accordingly began to draft a constitution.

It might have been thought that Gladstone, who had seen even in Cetewayo's murderous impis an oppressed people rightly struggling to be free, would have hailed this new-born Liberalism in Egypt with feelings of unqualified sympathy. But Gladstone's mind was a mass of prejudices, one of the strongest of these being directed against Mahommedans. In consequence he was inclined to accept for gospel the opinions of the two chief Englishmen on the spot, the consul-general, Sir Edward Malet, whose sympathies, if they existed, were well bound up in diplomatic red-tape, and Sir Auckland Colvin, a thoroughly able administrator, trained up in the strictest traditions of Anglo-Indian bureaucracy, and anxious to apply the same British panacea to the sick man of the Nile. Both of these men saw in Arabi's revolt merely the conspiracy of a fanatical clique to establish a military tyranny and make chaos worse confounded. There is little doubt that they were both honestly convinced that the only thing to be done was to smash up Arabi and procure British armed intervention, if not annexation.

Gladstone was only too willing to be convinced that the patriot leader was nothing but a vulgar conspirator. The harshest possible view was taken of the efforts that were being made to draft a free constitution. The nationalist leaders were quite ready to concede to the European Control the administration of that part of the budget which was allotted to the payment of the debt, but what was left over they asked to have in their own hands. Even this was regarded as an intolerable presumption on their part. And early in 1882 Lord Granville, either wittingly or through sheer incompetence to realize to what he was committing himself, put his signature to a joint dispatch, drafted by the French premier Gambetta, in which England and France plainly expressed their determination to uphold the existing order of things, the very Khedival and Turkish administration of which Arabi and his nationalists aspired to disburden their country. This note was not unnaturally taken as a declaration of war on Egyptian freedom.

But the British government were not yet disposed to back the policy of the joint note by force of British arms. Gladstone was actually coquetting with the idea of introducing the very Turkish soldiers at whose recent atrocities he had made all England shudder, to stamp out the first tender flames of Egyptian liberty. This, however, was a conspiracy in which his prospective confederate, Sultan Abdul Hamid, was too wily or too timid to join him. By way of striking terror into the nationalists, a British and French squadron

anchored off Alexandria. Anti-foreign feeling rose to such a pitch that the mob of Alexandria, not without the connivance of the Khedive's police, massacred a number of foreigners, mostly Greeks and Maltese, and were only put down by Arabi's troops. Not long afterwards the British admiral on the spot, who found that Arabi was putting up batteries for the defence of the town, summoned him to not only to desist but to surrender some of the fortifications, and on his merely offering to withdraw the guns, promptly opened a bombardment by which the Egyptians, who stood up pluckily but hopelessly to their guns, were driven off with the loss of about 1,000 men. As might have been foreseen, in the confusion and anger of the evacuation, the town was set on fire and looted. The French fleet, which refused to have part or lot in these proceedings, steamed away to Port Said, and John Bright resigned his office in the government in horror at what appeared to him as a breach of moral and international law.

But the government had not done with Arabi. He had retired from Alexandria, but his army was still in being, and might threaten the Suez Canal.¹ It is true that Arabi offered his alliance to Gladstone, but this was not taken seriously. So it was decided to smash him once and for all. In this venture the French were invited to co-operate. But Gambetta had fallen from power, and his successor, De Freycinet, had grasped just that fraction of the essential truth that may be worse than ignorance. He realized that behind all these events, and controlling them in his own interests, was the sinister personality of Bismarck. He realized that the supreme object of the Chancellor's Machiavellian benevolence was in some way to weaken France, but he thought that the trap consisted in the locking up of French troops in Egypt. And so, without in the least realizing what he was about, he did the very thing that Bismarck intended, and rendered inevitable a quarrel between France and England which was to keep these two natural allies angrily glaring at each other for the next twenty years, and might at any moment have flamed into actual war. France refused to join in the attack on Arabi and left England to go on alone with the occupation of Egypt. But if she could not join she could still less forgive her. Egypt had been regarded almost as a French sphere of influence; French culture and education

¹ In this connection the "Jones" of *Punch*, obviously an old-fashioned Liberal, had been made to say, "Whatever the end may be, it never justified the means. The slavery of Egypt is too high a price to pay to secure the quasi independence of Hindustan." (Feb. 18, 1882.)

had long been prevalent there, and indeed the new interest and research into her past glories dated from Napoleon's expedition, with its staff of *savants*. The seeds of discord that had fallen on stony ground at the Berlin conference were now fairly planted, and Bismarck might look forward, with every confidence, to the harvest.

The inevitable Wolseley was called in to finish Arabi, which he did with all the businesslike precision that at that time made the expression "Sir Garnet" the slang emphatic of "all right". The Egyptians would have stood no chance against the numbers and discipline of their assailants, even if treachery had not been at work; taken by surprise they ran in every direction, those of them who were not cut down in the pursuit dispersed to their homes. Sir Garnet became Lord Wolseley and another threepence was clapped on to the English income tax. Arabi was taken prisoner and Gladstone was strongly inclined towards abandoning him to the Khedive to be done to death, on which Morley's comment is worth quoting, "It is a great mistake to suppose that Mr. Gladstone was all leniency, or that when he thought ill of men, he stayed either at palliating words or at half-measures." Arabi's sentence was, however, ultimately commuted to honourable banishment to Ceylon.

Whatever may, or may not, have been the ultimate designs of Colvin and Malet, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of ministerial professions that no permanent occupation of Egypt was intended. No doubt they had hoped to make the country safe for investors, and then retire. Why they had ever gone in it is difficult even now to understand, and the only explanation that at all covers the facts is that the hidden financial interests, that were more and more beginning to determine the course of international politics, were not without their influence. However, having smashed up the only power in Egypt capable of working out her salvation from within and laid the country at her feet, it was less easy for England to get out than it had been for her to get in. An obvious responsibility devolved upon her of bringing order out of chaos, and this would take time. And Sir Garnet's march across the desert had stirred up fires more dangerous than those of Egyptian patriotism.

The great world of Islam was moved to its depths, and such teaching as that of Djemal ed Din had received terrible confirmation. Central Asia had gone, and Algeria, and Tunis, and India—and now Egypt. A Pan-Islamic movement was beginning to gather momentum, an uncompromising, unrelenting unison against the infidel, which had nothing in common with poor Arabi's Liberalism. The Sultan Abdul

Hamid, to whom any form of nationalism, even among his own people, was anathema, took very seriously his office of Commander of the Faithful, and made Constantinople a centre of Pan-Islamic propaganda. There was the mysterious Senussi, who was spreading the religion of the Prophet further and further into the heart of Africa from his inaccessible fastness in the Libyan desert. Local prophets and Mahdis were constantly arising, and attracting more and more followers.

The troubles of Egypt had not been without their repercussions on the vast, Soudanese hinterland over which a few governors in the service of the Khedive had exercised an uneasy sway. There was no particular reason why the warlike tribes inhabiting this region should submit to a sway from which they derived no good and which had no effective force to back it. It only needed the appearance of a Mahdi to unite them in overwhelming revolt against a country that could neither defend itself nor pay its own way. An Egyptian army, dispatched by the Khedive's pashas, under a retired English colonel called Hicks, was too frightened at the onrush of the Mahdi's wild dervishes even to run away.

Here was a nice dilemma for the government! They had, at any rate temporarily, assumed the control of affairs in Egypt, and it was impossible for them to remain passive spectators of a catastrophe which threatened to deprive her of those upper waters of the Nile the control of which was, even in the time of the Pharaohs, considered necessary to her welfare. On the other hand neither Gladstone nor the bondholders had anything to gain by committing England to a far more bloody and expensive war than Sir Garnet's ball-cartridge parade of Tel-el-Kebir. The ministerial instinct, displayed already in the Transvaal and Lower Egypt, was to postpone the taking of a vital decision one way or the other, in the hope that the course of events would, after all, relieve them of the necessity.

What they did was to send out, as Governor General of the Soudan, one of the last and certainly the most remarkable of those evangelical officers who flourished during the Queen's reign. This was General Gordon, "Chinese Gordon" as he had been styled from his success in suppressing a rebellion against the Manchu Dynasty. Gordon, a man of extraordinary intuitive genius, but perfectly incapable of acting a subordinate part to less single-hearted or imaginative men, was commissioned first to report on and then to arrange for the evacuation of the Soudan. The plan that had appeared to him to offer the best hope of success, the handing over of the

province to a certain Zobeir Pasha, a notorious slave-trader, was rejected by the cabinet on party grounds, although it had the backing of Sir Evelyn Baring, our Agent General at Cairo. Confronted with a hopeless task, Gordon went up the Nile to Khartoum, and was soon wiring proposals, not for evacuation, but for smashing the Mahdi by British aid. His own course was clear. He had been greeted in Khartoum as a saviour, and as a man of honour he could not abandon people who trusted him. He declared that, orders or no orders, he would not leave the Soudan until everybody who wanted to go down had had the chance to do so, that he would stay and fall with the town and run all risks.

It now became a question of whether or not Gordon was to be left to his fate. Public opinion, headed by the Queen, demanded the rescue of the "Christian hero".¹ But Gladstone was obstinately determined not to invoke the slaughter of thousands in order to rescue one mutinous subordinate whom he suspected of trying to force his hand. The cabinet was divided on the subject, with the result that an expedition was, at long last, resolved upon, which, after desperate and bloody fighting, failed to rescue Khartoum or Gordon, and succeeded merely in striking a blow in the air. Gladstone was at least about to stand firm against the subsequent demand for avenging Gordon, and for the next ten years British efforts were limited to safeguarding Egypt against the danger of a Mahdist advance northwards. But we were now more deeply than ever committed to the occupation of Egypt. Meanwhile the Soudan was left to the tyranny of the Mahdi, a tyranny so awful as to reduce, by slaughter, famine and disease, a population estimated at 8½ millions to something less than 2.

Meanwhile, in Egypt, the new British imperialism was at last showing itself at its best. Our representative there was Sir Evelyn Baring, a man whose unemotional demeanour had infuriated Gordon, and whose autocratic ways had not tended to his popularity. And yet, behind his reserve, there was an intense if disciplined enthusiasm : he was a bureaucrat, but that best type of bureaucrat who is possessed with a passion for good government. In the Carlylese sense, this silent and indefatigable worker might have qualified for the Book of Heroes. But, like Carlyle, he had little use or enthusiasm for

¹ A drunkard, insinuates Mr. Strachey, on the ground that Gordon once snubbed an agitated and importunate staff officer, whose duty it was, as commander of the camp, to provide for its defence, instead of bursting, against orders, into the Governor's tent. There happened to be a bottle, alleged to contain brandy, on Gordon's table and—Gordon is dead.

liberty, particularly where Oriental races were concerned. "The first thought," he said, almost in the words of Cromwell, "must be what is good for them, but not necessarily what they think is good for them."

With such ideals, and infinite patience, he set himself to the task of cleansing the Augean stable of Egyptian administration. It was a task of appalling difficulty. In form, at any rate, the Sultan's representative, the Khedive, still ruled the country, and all that Baring could do was to offer him advice, though the presence of an occupying army was a sufficiently strong argument against overtly flouting it. But even the Khedive's sovereignty was by no means absolute. The Bank of the Debt absorbed about half the revenue, the numerous foreign consulates could hold up legislation and impede the course of justice, and France, furious at our promise to evacuate the country never being fulfilled, pulled with the whole of her not inconsiderable weight to make our task impossible.

But Baring was not for a moment discouraged. Without chafing at his limitations, he patiently set to work, conquering one difficulty after another. Economy was his first need, and he saw that, until she was much stronger, it was necessary for Egypt to cut her losses in the Soudan and leave that unhappy province to stew in its own juice. But as practically the whole of the revenue came from the peasantry of the Delta, no penny-wise considerations must be allowed to interfere with a bold and scientific policy of irrigation. Having laid these two cornerstones of his policy, Baring went on, with the help of a few able Englishmen, to put the finances in order, to reduce the debt by a successful conversion, to create an army capable of standing up to the dervishes, to reform every branch of the administration, to lighten the burdens of the peasantry, practically to abolish forced labour, to purify and humanize the administration of justice, and to bring to the valley of the Lower Nile an abundance and prosperity such as it had not known for centuries. What proportion of this went to benefit the peasants, and how much was diverted into their own pockets by the financiers and big landlords, is a matter open to debate, but that all benefited to an appreciable extent there can be no doubt whatever.

Sir Evelyn Baring, or, to give him his more familiar title, Lord Cromer, was faced by a difficulty which was inherent in the very nature of his task, and which no conceivable statesmanship could altogether have removed. He was, in Mahommedan eyes, the representative of an alien and infidel power. Arabi's revolt had proved

that there was such a thing as Egyptian patriotism, but deeper and more powerful was the ancient and militant communion that united all true believers under the Crescent. The Egyptians might accept our gifts, they might acknowledge their excellence and even be thankful for them in a way, but gratitude for benefits, which, in the material sense, bless him that gives equally with him that takes, never did and never could reconcile Egyptians to the fact of their country lying at the proud foot of a conqueror.

Considerations of this kind never greatly disturbed Lord Cromer. He did not contemplate a permanent occupation of Egypt, though he would have postponed our departure until we could hand over our work to a government fit to carry it on. As the scanty education we vouchsafed to the Egyptians was exactly calculated to create a class of obedient understrappers to the Egyptian civil service that, on Lord Cromer's advice, we began to train up from the examinational pick of the English public schools, it is not surprising to find that he did not finally envisage our withdrawal as an event likely to become desirable for quite an indefinitely long period. It would, Lord Cromer opined, probably never be possible to make a Western silk purse out of an Eastern sow's ear.

6

IRISH NATIONALISM AND THE FIRST HOME RULE BILL

For the twenty years following the first visitation of the Black Famine, England might fairly congratulate herself on having got rid of her Irish difficulties. The drain of man-power went steadily on from the unhappy island : the leaders of Young Ireland were dead or in exile ; the romantic harp sounded but fitfully. When England was hard put to it in the Crimea and in India, Ireland did not stir a finger to embarrass her. The Catholic hierarchy, headed by Cardinal Cullen, frowned on anything of a revolutionary nature. The bitter hatred of England was not quenched, but it was driven beneath the surface. Meanwhile the process of eviction went on unchecked. An Encumbered Estates' Act, which was the best the English government could do towards solving the land difficulty, merely made it easy for creditors to sell up the estates of a needy landowner, and had the effect of replacing many of the old owners by speculators, who valued the land for what it would fetch, and rack-rented without mercy.

In Parliament, the Irish representatives were never so ineffectual. And yet, even as early as 1852, a golden opportunity came their way. The parties were very narrowly divided, so narrowly that the Irish vote sufficed to turn out the Tory government, and had the Whig Peelite Coalition that followed dependent on its support. But now England was able to employ the same insidious means as had enabled her to carry the Union. O'Connell, the chief of whose weaknesses was a tendency to nepotism, had set the example of allowing Irish patriots to accept English places. And now the Irish opposition was practically bought off by the government. The leaders settled down into comfortable appointments and not much more was heard of Ireland and her grievances. One of these leaders, Sadleir, turned out to be a thief and a swindler, and another of them, Keogh—what was far worse in many Irish eyes—became solicitor-general for Ireland and, ultimately, one of the judges who condemned the Fenian prisoners. The Irish vote made little appreciable difference during the fifties and sixties. It was, in fact, fairly even divided, and at one election there was actually a Tory majority. These years, so prosperous for England, were for Ireland a time of dull misery, of eviction and depopulation.

The real centre of Irish resistance had, in fact, shifted to the other side of the Atlantic. The Irish emigrants, such of them as survived the horrors of the voyage and the first rigours of transplantation, prospered in a way undreamed of under the English regime. Many of them made money, some fortunes, and during the American Civil War some of the most distinguished commanders on the Northern side were Irishmen. Not for a moment did these men forget the wrongs of their forsaken Motherland nor their hatred of England. In every centre of American population the Irish vote was eagerly courted, and it was bitterly anti-English. Nothing would have pleased the American Irish more than a war between the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon people, and it was only by the intervention of the dying Prince Consort—for which, if for nothing else, England owes a debt of profound gratitude to that much-ridiculed man—that such a catastrophe to civilization was averted, over the case of the "Trent" in 1861.

But the leaders of the American Irish trusted to more direct methods. The Young Ireland movement had collapsed miserably in Ireland, but its spirit was not dead, and America afforded an asylum to its leaders from which they could finance rebellion in Ireland and organize against England in perfect safety. One of the

most intransigent of these men, James Stephens, had built up a secret revolutionary association which had its centres dotted all over Ireland, and was prepared, at a given signal, to rise and proclaim the Irish Republic which, Stephens maintained, already virtually existed. The American Civil War brought matters to a head. The Irish, who had played so conspicuous a part in the Northern armies, were burning to employ their victorious arms in the service of their own country. These revolutionaries, both in Ireland and America, called themselves by the name of the Fianna or Fenians, after the old heroes of Irish epic.

The Fenian rebellion missed fire almost as ignominiously as that of Young Ireland. The two attempts made by Irish Americans to invade Canada were easily repulsed. In Ireland it had been hoped to take advantage of the war believed to be impending between England and Prussia over Schleswig Holstein. When this failed to eventuate, Stephens, who probably saw the hopelessness of the whole business, was compelled by pressure from his followers to make good his promises about rebellion. But the government was fully apprised of the danger and in 1865 had most of the leaders clapped into jail. Stephens, who soon managed to escape, and was suspected, though without proof, of having betrayed the whole plot in advance, suffered the typical fate of an Irish leader by being deposed and branded by his own followers as "a rogue, an imposter and a traitor".

For another two years the movement continued to simmer, and in 1867 an attempt was made to carry the war into England itself. An attempt to seize Chester Castle failed by the merest chance, and a bomb placed against the wall of Clerkenwell Prison, where some Fenians were confined, killed a number of innocent people. But the most lasting result of Fenianism was to furnish another of those martyrdoms which, whether rightly or wrongly, stir so profoundly the sentiment of Irish patriotism. Two Fenian leaders were rescued from a Manchester prison van by a band of their supporters, and in the course of the rescue a revolver, fired to blow off a lock, killed a constable. Five men were sentenced to death for this affair, of whom three were hanged. On receiving sentence,

" 'God save Ireland !' said they loudly ;
' God save Ireland !' said they all."

an incident which gave birth to a song whose effect has been likened to that of Lillibullero.

Fenianism was crushed, but not before it had ruffled up the depressed spirits of Irish patriots and—what was only less important

—convinced the most influential of English statesmen that something must at last be done by England to right the wrongs of her sister island. With more candour than prudence, Gladstone acknowledged that the effect of the Clerkenwell bomb had been like that of the bell which warns people that it is time to go to service. His great government of 1868 came into office pledged to disestablish the Protestant Church of Ireland, which it did in the following year. In 1870, Gladstone followed this up by a bill which endeavoured to remedy one of the most crying wrongs of the Irish peasantry by securing to the tenant the value of his improvements. Unfortunately these excellent intentions were largely foiled by the fact that the drafting of the act permitted it to be generally evaded by contracting out.

The combined influence of famine and corruption had postponed the nemesis of the Union for another generation, but the inevitable time was now at hand when Ireland would become conscious of her strength and pass to the offensive. The decline and fall of the Union is, in fact, to be measured with approximate accuracy, by the record of election statistics. The democratic franchise of 1867 and the Ballot Act of 1872 could not fail to result eventually in making the Irish membership in the House of Commons representative of the Irish people. And in 1874, out of the 103 Irish members, a solid block of 65 was returned to advocate the cause of Home Rule for Ireland.

Had Disraeli been as farseeing about the Irish as he was about some other questions, he might have recognized a unique opportunity of establishing his "*imperium et libertas*" on unassailable foundations, by meeting the moderate and statesmanlike proposals of the Irish parliamentary leader, Isaac Butt, an eloquent lawyer who had defended two generations of rebels. Butt was no enemy of England; all he wished was for Ireland to have the control of her own affairs and leave that of imperial matters to Parliament. He was, in fact, an imperial federalist, and there is little doubt that Ireland could even then have been brought into the Empire by a timely act of generosity. But Disraeli, like the rest of English statesmen, was utterly blind to the signs of the times, and to the power that the Act of Union gave to a united Irish party to impose its own terms on Parliament. But he allowed it, in his decorous and gentlemanly way, to bring forward a yearly motion in favour of Home Rule, which both sides of the House, with a decorum and gentility equal to his own, voted down.

The effect of this was to throw the leadership of the Irish movement into the hands of the extremists, whom the Irish Americans took every occasion to encourage and finance. A big, good-natured and far from refined member called Joseph Biggar was the first to discover that if the Irish could not get their business attended to by Parliament, they could at least give tit-for-tat to the British. Much to the disapproval of Butt, a few of the more active Home Rulers began systematically to take such advantage of the singularly elastic rules of the House of Commons as to hold up all business. These rules had been evolved on the assumption that they would be applied in a reasonable and patriotic spirit by an assembly of gentlemen who, whatever their party differences, possessed the goodwill that the honourable traditions of the House should be maintained. These Irish members, who had been forced to Westminster and denied access to College Green, cared nothing for these traditions except to bring them into contempt. And by introducing, as they did, the cult of obstruction into Parliamentary tactics, and by compelling governments to arm themselves with powers of gagging opposition, they permanently severed the continuity of House of Commons tradition and dealt a fatal blow to the usefulness and prestige of that assembly.

A more formidable leader than Butt had now come to the fore in the shape of Charles Stewart Parnell, American on his mother's side, Anglo-Irish on that of his father, a Protestant landowner. The secret of this man's extraordinary ascendancy over Irishmen is perhaps to be explained by the fact of his being thoroughly un-Irish in everything but his patriotism. He knew and cared nothing about Irish history and Celtic tradition. He had no gift of eloquence and not the faintest spark of humour; he was a frigid and haughty egotist. He was, in the hard and disillusioned age that had set in after 1870, perhaps the most consistent of all practitioners of *Realpolitik*. Compared with him Bismarck himself was emotional and human. As a youth he seems to have cared nothing about Irish aspirations until a police raid, in which his sword was stolen and his sister put to inconvenience, bent all his faculties to a cold hatred of England. He neither desired nor attracted the love of his followers, but the power of his ascendancy was irresistible; he saw plainly what winning advantages a solid Home Rule party possessed, and he played them without scruple for all they were worth. Poor, good-hearted Butt strove in vain to oppose this new ascendancy; his own people forsook him, he was rewarded for a life of service by being

thrust rudely out from his leadership, and, like O'Connell before him, he died of a broken heart.

But the Irish offensive was not to be confined to the Parliamentary front. The long oppression and misery of the peasantry had engendered a spirit of revenge that knew neither pity nor discrimination. The teachings of Lalor were now beginning to bear fruit, and in 1879 the Land League was founded by Michael Davitt, one of the imprisoned Fenians who was out on ticket of leave. This was the direct successor of Ireland's many secret societies, and worked in open day to wage unsparing warfare, ostensibly by legal means, against the landlords. The most formidable of its weapons was that of the boycott or social ostracism of anyone who incurred its condemnation. But the campaign did not stop short at the officially prescribed methods. In the early eighties every form of outrage was rife throughout the Irish countryside, murder and cruelty in which not even the dumb animals were spared.

The election of 1880 returned 61 Home Rulers, of whom 39 were under Parnell's direct leadership. Gladstone, who was fully alive to the seriousness of the situation, determined to pursue a twofold policy of upholding the authority of government and making a really heroic effort to remedy the chief Irish grievance, that of the land. With this object he threw all his amazing energy into the passage of a Land Bill which conceded what had been known and agitated for as the three F's, fixity of tenure, fair rent, and freedom of sale. Independent tribunals were set up to take the fixing of rents out of the hands of landlords. This was an immense advance, but it was accompanied in the same session by an act that placed Ireland under what amounted to martial law, and the government showed no signs of conceding the demand for a repeal of the Union. The land war, therefore, went on more bitterly than ever, and the Irishmen continued to give all the trouble they could in Parliament.

It was a miserable situation, and there appeared to be no prospect of an end to it. The principal Irish leaders, including Parnell, were shut up in jail, and then released in virtue of an understanding to moderate their "no rent" campaign, which led to outrages that multiplied with every attempt to exert the strong hand. Only two days afterwards, Parnell himself was horror-struck at the assassination of the newly appointed Chief Secretary, Lord Frederick Cavendish, with the Under Secretary, in broad daylight, by a gang of patriotic ruffians calling themselves "The Invincibles". The wave of horror that this crime excited in England extinguished any hopes of

conciliation, and the Liberal government was driven, for the remainder of its existence, to govern by the strong hand.

In 1885 it gave a notable access of strength to the Irish, by passing a Reform Bill which extended the franchise in rural districts. In the General Election that followed, Parnell, with consummate tactical skill, threw the now disciplined support of the Irish vote in England on to the Conservative side. The result of the election was to bring back a small Liberal majority over the Conservatives, but leaving either a Conservative or Liberal government at the mercy of a solid body of 86 Home Rulers, who had swept practically every Celtic constituency in Ireland.

Both parties were now, unless they could achieve the almost unthinkable feat of coalescing, at the mercy of an Ireland whose demand was for nothing less than a reversal of the Act of Union. Even the Conservatives who, under Lord Salisbury, had formed what was aptly styled a government of caretakers, began coquetting for Irish support. Their chief secretary was Lord Carnarvon, a liberal-minded peer who had worked hard, but unsuccessfully, as Beaconsfield's Colonial Secretary, for the Federation of South Africa, and might be presumed to favour some such scheme of federation as had been in the mind of Isaac Butt. With the Premier's leave, he had an interview with Parnell, from which the latter came away with the impression that the Conservatives were prepared to offer some sort of self-government to Ireland.

It was possibly the idea that his rivals might be before him that decided Gladstone to cut the knot by conceding the substance of the Irish demand and making Home Rule the first plank of the Liberal programme. Accordingly, with that immense energy that even in old age he could devote to any cause to which he had once given his heart, he tried to carry his party with him in offering this supreme act of conciliation to men whom he had previously characterized as marching through rapine to the dismemberment of the Empire. Of course, the Irish support was at once thrown on his side, and Gladstone returned to Downing Street to frame a measure of Home Rule in which Ireland should have her own Parliament, under various restrictions, for domestic affairs alone, though without the essential right of protecting her own industries. The Irish members were to disappear from Westminster. Most important of all, the Protestant North East was lumped in with the rest of Ireland, and placed at the mercy of the inevitable Catholic majority. Parnell, coldly contemptuous as ever, resolved to accept this instalment for the nonce,

though without the least abatement of his hatred for England or his ultimate aspirations for an independent Ireland.

Gladstone had miscalculated on the support of his party. So revolutionary a departure, which at least bore every appearance of a shameless sacrifice of principle for power, shocked many of the steady-going members of his party, and particularly the heads of the old Whig Houses, of whom Lord Hartington was the most influential. The leader of the Radical advance guard, Joseph Chamberlain, whose relations with Gladstone had for some time been anything but cordial, joined the seceders, or Liberal Unionists, as they came to be called. Undaunted, the Grand Old Man, as he was now affectionately styled by his admirers, proceeded with his Bill, and in a speech of solemn eloquence adjured the House to think well, to think wisely, to think, not for the moment but for the years that were to come, before they rejected a measure so fraught with the promise of conciliation. But reject it they did, amid a scene of wild enthusiasm, and at the election that Gladstone immediately challenged, the country endorsed their verdict. The once dominant Liberal party was now split from top to bottom, and the Conservatives, with the support of the Liberal Unionists, were able to secure a majority over Liberals and Irish combined that, with one brief interval, was to last for nineteen years.

7

TRANSVALUATION OF VALUES

All this time, a subtle and unperceived change had been taking place in the mental and spiritual atmosphere of Western civilization, a change whose importance infinitely transcended that of the merely superficial vicissitudes of domestic and international politics. The transvaluation of values—to adopt a phrase coined by Nietzsche—that had begun with the first stirrings of the Renaissance, was now almost complete. Under whatever high-sounding terms he might choose to disguise the fact, civilized man had come to fix his main endeavour upon the knowledge and control of external nature to the almost complete neglect of his own soul.

The Industrial Revolution, with its enormous advance in the knowledge of external nature, unaccompanied by any corresponding advance in the knowledge of the inner man, had enormously strengthened the tendency to value the meat above the life. But for a long time this had been masked and its effects delayed by the

Romantic Revival, the tendency to hark back, at least in sentiment, to an age of faith and spiritual values. But the Romantic movement had never given birth to a reasoned faith capable of compensating for the ever-increasing materialistic bias, and in the last quarter of the century, Romanticism was thoroughly discredited. The very veneer of spirituality was indignantly discarded; the new age stood forth realistic and unashamed.

It was a matter of something deeper than theory, an urge at once subconscious and almost universal, against which conscious reaction battled in vain. Things were in the saddle, as Emerson had said, and rode mankind. Symptomatic of this new phase was a notable decline in outstanding individuality. The mid years of the century had certainly constituted a heyday of giants—of Wagner and Victor Hugo, of Mazzini and Lincoln, of Auguste Comte and Darwin. There was a completeness or—as one might say—a rotundity about these personalities and their achievement that claims, with an assurance not to be denied, the epithet “great”. In such men the human spirit rose proudly superior to its environment; they pegged out imperial claims; whatever they touched they revolutionized. We know now that much of this achievement was neither so complete nor so unassailable as appeared at the time; subsequent criticism has revealed too much that was false, too much that was tawdry. But at least these frock-coated worthies succeeded in keeping the flag of the human spirit flying above the tide of the world, almost as proudly as in the days of Michelangelo and Leonardo.

But now the tendency is more and more to dwarf the individual, to acknowledge that the human spirit is no longer equal to the complexity and might of things. In every department of mental activity this is apparent, and especially in the science which is the chief glory of a machine-ridden age. It may fairly be argued that the science of the end of the century was more fruitful of true progress than that of any preceding period, that the methods of exact and exhaustive research, the innumerable qualifications, the shrinking from grandiose generalizations, more than compensated for the absence of towering personalities like Newton and Darwin and such revolutionary discoveries as that of the atomic law and natural selection.

There were certainly some notable personalities in the period with which we are now concerned; it was at this time, for instance, that Pasteur was doing his greatest work and that the inventive genius of Edison was working its mechanical miracles. But on the

whole its progress is not by leaps and bounds, but by multitudinous but comparatively small increments. There are no such sudden and sensational changes as accompanied the first stages of the Industrial Revolution, or the substitution of steam for animal transport. There is nothing to compare with the mental revolution associated with the name of Darwin, nor with the almost reverential homage paid by his contemporaries to Newton. It is more and more, as the great figures of the mid-century die off, an age of specialists. Standards in every department are made continuously more exacting; accumulated knowledge becomes too vast and complicated to be mastered except by limiting the field of vision to microscopic dimensions. To obtain a comprehensive view of all science, or even of one science, becomes less and less of a practical ideal. Each explorer confines his vision to his own particular tree, and leaves it to the popular journalist to convey some sort of impression of the wood.

The philosopher scientist who dominated English thought of the sixties and seventies was Herbert Spencer, who, starting as an engineer-mathematician, cast his shoe over bi', psych', and sociology, not to speak of ethics and metaphysics. Auguste Comte, the founder of the Positivists, had swept into his vision an even vaster field, comprehending the whole of human knowledge from mathematics to phrenology. By the end of the century, such claims seemed as out-of-date as those of the schoolmen. Even before the last bulky volume of his *Synthetic Philosophy* had left the press, Herbert Spencer had become an awful but superseded relic of a less critical age.

Along with the great personalities went the great certainties of the past. There were, of course, multitudes of imperfectly educated people who believed in Adam and the seven days' creation as unquestioningly as they accepted the sloppiest romance in novelette and melodrama, but with the leaders, whose opinions were bound gradually to leaven the inert thought of the multitude, faith in anything whatever was at a discount. Even the dogmatic and self-confident rationalism of the evolutionist pioneers had its foundations undermined. In 1879 a young philosopher-politician, Mr. Arthur Balfour, produced a remarkable *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, which suggested that the scientists themselves might be building their house upon the sand, and that a godless world was at least as incredible as one created. By the end of the century the evolutionary rationalism that had gone forth conquering and to conquer under the auspices of Huxley and Haeckel, Clifford and Tyndall, had shrunk,

at least in England, to the creed of a bitterly dogmatic and somewhat Philistine clique of enthusiasts, more honoured in Hyde Park than in the vital centres of thought.

Indeed, the sweeping generalizations of the days when Disraeli ranged himself on the side of the angels and Huxley preferred a simian to an episcopal grandfather, were quite out of the new fashion. In the first flush of victory over the Old Adam, the self-constituted apostles of the New Darwin had exploited their victory with an extravagance worthy of Versailles. The unfortunate doctrine of evolution was dragged violently out of its biological setting, and treated as a sort of master-key to all knowledge and all mysteries. Naturally in such an incongruous environment as that of sociology (a name that Spencer had coined for the science of society he imagined he had discovered), such high-sounding biological catchwords as natural selection could be, and were, used to justify any and every preconceived doctrine. State socialism and individualism, military violence and world-peace, egotism and altruism, strengthened or diluted to taste—you had only to formulate the magic word evolution and, preferably, to repeat some incantation of long biological words, wish devoutly for the triumph of your particular doxy, and lo, with the most infallible certainty, it would emerge crowned and dignified with all the authority of a scientific dogma! New scientist was old priest writ large.

Such an intellectual orgy was bound to produce a reaction. To scientists themselves it was soon apparent that such work as theirs did not thrive in an atmosphere of Belfast Addresses and theological controversies with prime ministers. They sought refuge in those peaceful realms of science that Darwin had never wished to leave. Natural selection was no longer a dogma to be trumpeted in the face of the infidel but a hypothesis to be carefully tested in the dry light of fact. Darwin's pre-eminence among the biologists of his century was less in dispute than ever, but he was no more infallible than Moses. As time went on, it became evident that the conclusions he had so modestly submitted were by no means the last word, and had not been the first word, on the subject of evolution. There was no going back on the now established fact of all species, including man, having somehow evolved by descent, though the gulf between living and dead matter remained obstinately unbridged. But natural selection offered no complete nor final explanation of how this process had come about, nor was it by any means certain that something akin to purpose, some form of creative activity, might

not have to be invoked after all as an explanation. To borrow an analogy of Bergson's, no amount of casual stone-throwing will account for houses.

In her own steady and unobtrusive way science, with her army of specialists constantly at work, continued to advance, though by no means on an even frontage. In the eighteenth century mathematics had made the running, with the dawn of the nineteenth chemistry had caught up, but as the century advanced, biology took and easily maintained the lead. As a science, she dominated thought, though often with little enough justification; as an art, the art of medicine, with her handmaid, sanitation, she succeeded in prolonging the average of human life by at least a decade. It is only by reading contemporary novels and diaries that we realize how dirty and unhygienic were the habits of our grandfathers, particularly when a system of water drainage was introduced without the knowledge of how to safeguard it. At Windsor Castle the simple plan was adopted of having the cesspools underneath the living rooms, and when one was full up, of leaving it as it was and starting another. An interesting consumptive was an almost invariable attraction of fiction for young ladies; villages were decimated by typhus; recurrent epidemics of cholera swept the country; a mad dog was a not unfamiliar sight. All this had been got well under control by the end of the century.

Science was accomplishing great things for the body, but in the realm of mind, which was the most important of all, it still lagged woefully behind. Herbert Spencer had made a gallant attempt to put psychology on a new evolutionary footing, but he had neither the patience nor the scholarship to establish any permanent results. To the very end of the century psychology remained, what the other sciences had been before the Baconian emancipation, inextricably bound up with metaphysics. If in the year 1900 Locke or Hume had come back to earth, he would have found his authority still as unquestioned as ever, and would, without any "mugging up", have been able to take the chair of psychology at either of our ancient universities. There was certainly an experimental psychology, of a kind, but its scope was so limited and its results so trivial as to be practically negligible. The improvement of the mind had not become, like that of machinery, a practical proposition, and the only serious work in elucidating mental problems was accomplished not by the scientists, but by seers of character like George Meredith and Thomas Hardy. There is probably more to be learnt from

The Egoist than from all the textbooks and treatises on psychology that were published during the Queen's reign, and have now ceased even to bore.

On the other hand, if in the most necessary department of all science had lagged behind, in the most unnecessary and mischievous she was making up leeway with ominous rapidity. The art of international suicide, or war, had for a long time failed to reap the benefits of the Industrial Revolution. The military mind, in all countries, is naturally unprogressive; it is against the soldier's instincts to dirty his uniform with chemicals and turn a gentlemanly profession into an affair of machinery. Even Napoleon had gone on perfectly content with smooth-bore ordnance and wind-driven ships—though he might have had steamers for the asking. A certain chivalry sometimes revolted against the new-fangled killing machines, as when the British War Office flatly refused to entertain Cochrane's posthumous scheme for gassing the defenders of Sevastopol. But after the middle of the century science was no longer to be denied; rifles, breech-loaders, ironclads, machine guns, made their appearance, and it was claimed that the war of 1870 had been won by the German schoolmaster. In the armed peace that followed, progress was rapid; the range and killing power of weapons was enormously increased, and before the end of the century a Polish thinker, Ivan Bloch, demonstrated with prophetic intuition that European war on a big scale could henceforth only be terminated by the exhaustion and slow bleeding to death of the combatants.

It was perhaps the fact that the advance of science was so uncoordinated and uneven, that accounted for its failure to provide a substitute for the ecclesiastical bodies whose dogmas it had discredited. Here, too, the extreme free-thinkers—as the opponents of religious faith elected to call themselves—allowed themselves to be carried away by an excess of zeal. Instead of criticizing the Bible with the understanding sympathy that such a compilation of ancient literature demands, many of them fell on it with a fanatical excess of hostility, until Christ Himself was written down as a mere plagiarist of the Rabbis, one who had very likely never existed at all. Of course such extravagance invited reaction. In 1874 the unwonted spectacle was witnessed of a Bishop, Lightfoot by name, turning upon the most formidable assailant of the New Testament, and convicting him of grave faults of scholarship. As time went on it became evident that the Higher Criticism, as it was called, had frequently overreached itself, and that the critic's function is other than that of

prosecuting counsel in a forgery trial. A more tolerant and understanding spirit succeeded that of anti-religious dogmatism, but it was impossible for science, with its almost medieval backwardness in psychology, to deal satisfactorily with religion. It had done enough to shatter the prestige of the old orthodoxies, but it conspicuously failed to provide any sort of substitute, or to build up an art of life as it did those of medicine and engineering.

The effect of this was to produce a kind of spiritual interregnum, an age too obviously lacking in faith and principle. There had never, perhaps, been so much individual benevolence and philanthropy, but it was dissipated for the lack of any intelligible cause, any acceptable philosophy of life, to bind men's wills together. The Romantic Liberalism of the middle of the century had no doubt perished by its own proven insufficiency, but while it lasted it had provided some sort of compass for the good ship Civilization, something, at anyrate, more reliable than a weathercock.

In England, the reaction against the Victorian morality of respectability was proceeding apace. Matthew Arnold, whose *Culture and Anarchy* appeared in 1869 and *Friendship's Garland* two years later, struck a deadly blow at the complacency of the once all-powerful middle class. The respectable citizen, the object almost of adoration to men like Roebuck and Bright, was henceforward Mr. Bottles, a pretentious, ignorant, and tasteless Philistine, the scorn and laughing stock of those laborious Germans who, thanks to their disciplined unity, their *geist*, were outdistancing us in every department of civilized activity. Arnold next turned to the already tottering fabric of religious orthodoxy, and with quiet sarcasm characterized its most cherished dogmas as mere superstition and "over-belief", not worthy of serious consideration by modern, educated people. This was all very well, as far as destructive criticism was concerned, but when Arnold started to substitute a positive faith of his own in place of the one he had demolished, he proved less satisfying than many a simple country vicar. The old God had been at least a more credible as well as a more satisfying object of worship than so bloodless a phantasma as "a Power not ourselves that makes for Righteousness"; nor was there much hope for a philosophy of life based on mere vague abstractions like "culture", "*zeitgeist*", and "sweetness and light".

The greatest of all destructive critics of Victorianism was Samuel Butler, a man the intransigence of whose iconoclasm was too much even for the declining years of the Queen's reign, and who only

came into his own, posthumously, in that of her son. To twist the tails of the clergy or discover those of their ancestors was becoming almost a fashionable amusement, but to cap this by plucking at the whiskers of the scientific hierarchy, and even to blaspheme the sacred name of Darwin, was an indecency about which the less said the better. When Butler called attention to the fact that no amount of natural selection ever taught a chicken how to get out of an egg, the only dignified and, indeed, the only practicable thing to do was to ignore him. And Butler's taste for image-breaking did not stop here. Nothing would satisfy him but to uproot the very foundations of existing society and morality. Duty, which to Wordsworth had been the daughter of God's voice, was to Butler a poisonous inhibition, of commonsense, and he had no more reverence for the bonds of the family than for those of duty. He hinted that if you were to punish crime, you might, with equal reason, punish disease. And above all, in his light-hearted way, he suggested a possibility of awful seriousness, to wit that civilization itself might be crushed by the power of its own inventions, that, with blind recklessness, man had summoned to his aid forces that he was unable to control, and would, in time, degrade him to being the drudge, and perhaps the victim, of his own machinery.

For the nineteenth century, perhaps the principal effect of Butler's criticism was the inspiration it gave to a more popular assailant of current orthodoxies in the shape of a young Dubliner, Mr. Bernard Shaw, who, starting as a musical critic, became one of the leading lights of a middle-class socialist society called the Fabians, and, in the teeth of long neglect and opposition, succeeded in galvanizing the now almost moribund English drama, by introducing a new type of intellectual play, partially borrowed from Ibsen. It was in an early work, called *The Quintessence of Ibsenism*, that Mr. Shaw declared uncompromising war on romance, idealism and everything connected with them, and endeavoured, in the true Butlerian and—as he would have said—Christlike spirit, to make a clean sweep of formal morality. "The golden rule," as he remarked in a subsequent work, "is that there are no golden rules." He possessed a rare knack of pleasantly shocking, without really offending, that suburban intelligentsia to which his appeal was mainly directed.

Mr. Shaw was far from resting content with a merely negative philosophy. Not only was he an ardent socialist, but he believed in the necessity of a positive religion and, following Butler, he sought this in a sort of biological pantheism. For Matthew Arnold's Power

making for Righteousness, he substituted what he called a life-force, a somewhat vague entity that at times seems to be the mere sum of vital processes, and at others the old anthropomorphic God dressed up in a ready-made suit of modern clothes, a Being capable of laying plans, even to the extent of forcing a reluctant and protesting swain into the arms of a terrific virago who has hunted him to the remotest confines of Europe for the purpose of demanding marriage.

Whether by his own fault or the obtuseness of his public, Mr. Shaw's practical influence was almost entirely negative, but that, among the class to which he appealed, was immensely powerful. The old Victorian respectability was everywhere breaking up; it became the fashion of that increasing class who prided themselves on being in the intellectual swim, to adopt a cynical attitude towards any sort of moral earnestness or positive enthusiasm. The up-to-date educated mind, if it had little faith, at least harboured few illusions. It had no use for a Martin Tupper, and not much for a Spencer or a Ruskin. The three-volume novel passed, during the nineties, to the limbo of whiskers and the crinoline; sounds of unholy mirth began to affront the Sabbath gloom; the rakishness of the cutaway competed with ever increasing success against the portentousness of the frock-coat; even the top-hat was threatened! Middle-class women, greatly stimulated by Mr. Shaw and Ibsen, started to revolt against the hopeless ennui of their existence. Young ladies, in all the joy of conscious emancipation, enthroned themselves on the leather seats of safety bicycles and were off at a pace that no chaperon could keep up with. Others came out of their paternal villas, with untidy clothes and serious faces, to form committees and discover affinities with earnestly emancipated males in soft collars. In the nineties there was a naive earnestness about this sort of thing; a self-consciously younger generation had not yet learnt to be cynical about itself.

It was all to the good that the pretentiousness and hypocrisy that had run riot in the heyday of Victorianism should be shown up in their true colours. But the Victorian age had at least been one of splendid and substantial achievement; its often unlovely earnestness was the source of a tremendous concentration. The three-volume novel demanded a capacity for sustained effort both in author and reader; the leading article and review of the sixties were addressed to a reader who was prepared to sit down and give serious consideration to the subject; even the Low Church Sunday had its uses as a discipline. A statesman or man of letters was more

often than not a scholar, and, in any case, he would be judged before a critical tribunal which, however defective its taste and standards, at least formed its judgment deliberately and generally knew its own mind. Flashiness, any form of journalese "snap", was under these circumstances at a discount. The art of literary self-advertisement was neither practised nor encouraged to any considerable extent.

It is the advent of Mr. Bernard Shaw that marks the transition from a deliberate to a hustling age, and therewith what, at least to the old-fashioned, must have appeared a definite lowering of intellectual and aesthetic standards. No one, least of all Mr. Shaw himself, could deny the genius that went to the making of his plays and prefaces. But it was a genius extraordinarily lacking in that austere self-restraint and conscientiousness which, as a professed Puritan, one would have expected Mr. Shaw to be the first to desiderate. In a moment of admirable candour, he pronounced what will probably form the final verdict on his own achievement. "The sceptic," he says, "who is cautiously feeling his way towards the next century has no chance unless he happens by accident to have the specific artistic talent of the mountebank as well, in which case it is as a mountebank that he catches votes and not as a meliorist." He was but telling the literal truth, as far, at least, as his own contemporaries were concerned, when in 1898, "For ten years past," he boasted, "with an unprecedented pertinacity and obstination, I have been dinning into the public head that I am an extraordinarily witty, brilliant, and clever man. That is now part of the public opinion of England; and no power in heaven or on earth will ever change it." To this may appropriately be subjoined an account of Mr. Shaw's rise to fame by a fervent admirer of his, the author of a cheap guide to success in life that achieved some notoriety in the year of its publication, 1906.¹

"Being a failure in Ireland he came to London. Whenever a few 'advanced' people gathered together Mr. Shaw would somehow work his way in. Then he managed to make a speech, sometimes even when he knew nothing of the subject about which he spoke. But he got his name in peoples' mouths and he got his name in print. He made some progress every day."

Mr. Shaw was an ardent and entirely sincere believer in his message, but so anxious was he to get it before the public that he shrank from no means of booming it, and, in consequence, missed his desired

¹ *Get On or Get Out*, by Peter Keary, p. 51.

end altogether, being reverently invested, in lieu of the prophet's robe, with the cap and bells of a licensed Merry Andrew. By dashing on to paper any epigram or argument calculated to raise a laugh or an eyebrow, he undoubtedly won his way to European fame, he found scope and audience for his dramatic genius, he exercised a destructive influence comparable with that of Voltaire, but when he turned to the most important part of his work, the reconstruction of faith and society—he was as one that mocked.¹

What Mr. Shaw had been accomplishing for the suburbans was being done, in the aesthetic field, for the upper class of the eighties and early nineties by Oscar Wilde. A man of dazzling talents and compelling personality, he was, not only in theory but, unlike Mr. Shaw, in practice, a rebel against all accepted standards. He fairly boxed the compass on respectability, and preached freedom from the seven deadly virtues to a delighted but incredulous audience, who refused to sully their lips with his name when it came out that he had actually had the courage of his convictions. Wilde was a scholar with a streak of literary genius, but in addition to being a snob and a libertine he was a past master in the art of advertisement. He might have justified his claim to be a lord of language earlier than during his sojourn in Reading Jail, had he been able to restrict the output of standardized paradox and epigram by which he boomed his own reputation.

It is a fact not without its significance, that during the early years of the twentieth century a philosophy was actually introduced from America and obtained a considerable vogue in no less a centre of ancient learning than Oxford, which flatly denied the existence, or rather the necessity, of what mankind had hitherto striven for under the name of truth. According to these pragmatists, a belief was only true in so far as it served a purpose. In other words, supposing we find belief in any proposition to serve an acceptable purpose, we ought both to proclaim and believe in it entirely irrespective of the trifling consideration whether or not it happens to be true. Such cynicism, couched though it was in academic jargon, was only too reflective of the spirit of an age which had discarded all the old faiths and standards and had hardly even faced the necessity of substituting new ones.

¹ A remarkable confirmation of this may be found in some just published correspondence between Mr. Shaw and Tolstoy, and Mr. Shaw's pathetic complaint of Tolstoy's "invincible preconception" of him as "a merchant of *jeux d'esprit*".

We have only touched on a few of the most prominent names and circumstances of a change that was subtly but rapidly transforming the whole spirit of English civilization. It is perhaps arguable that the change was good in so far as it was inevitable. The Victorians had steadily refused to go to the root of the problems created by the Industrial Revolution; their apparent prosperity was only on the surface, and before a true adaptation could be made of civilization to its ever-increasing requirements, it was necessary to make a clean sweep of the old half-solutions. But unfortunately those who had pulled down had totally failed to construct; the half gods had gone, the gods showed no signs of arriving. And the shadow of a measureless catastrophe was already beginning to darken the horizon.

8

THE MUSE SPECIALIZES

Oscar Wilde, though his views on art were of the most superficial, nevertheless stood in the public eye for a transvaluation of artistic values that culminated in the aesthetic movement of the Eighties and what was sometimes known as the Renaissance of the Nineties, but whose sources are in the palmiest times of Victorian Romance. The pre-Raphaelite movement was, as its name implies, an attempt to discard finally the heritage of the Renaissance and recover the pure spirit of Gothic Christianity. Its rising hope, Millais, whose *Ophelia* had constituted the manifesto on canvas of the new spirit, and Ruskin, its champion on paper, were as robustly Victorian as Tennyson himself.

But what was, at first, a revolt merely against the tasteless standards of the emancipated middle class, became, as the torch was passed on to a younger generation, a conscious revolt against the whole spirit of the age. The theory of Ruskin, which he had clothed with gorgeous prose in his *Stones of Venice*, had been that a nation's art is the mirror of its soul. But the idea of the rising school was that it is the business of the artist to cut himself wholly loose from the world around him and cultivate art for its own sake, a somewhat vague ideal, but which amounted in practice to a belief that life had become too hideous for art to ennoble, and that art must therefore shake the dust of life off her feet. But if life, uninformed by art, is bestial, art separated from life must needs become devitalized.

The theory became aggressively self-conscious in Whistler, who, though born in America, trained in Paris, and thoughly contemptuous of England, is too much a part of the Chelsea he transfigured not to have his niche in the temple of English art. Whistler brought with him from France a more scientific and economical method of transmitting to canvas impressions of colour, and above all of depth and spaciousness, than had been possible by the laborious accuracy of the Pre-Raphaelites. His study of Japanese art, though of the late and rather decadent Ukiyoe school, imparted a new grace and delicacy of coloration to his work. It was in his *Ten-o'clock*, a prose masterpiece as unique in its own kind as the Peacock Room, that he declared the independence of art in its most uncompromising form. The spirit of creative beauty was, by this account, entirely arbitrary in its visitations; there was no discoverable reason why it should have avoided Switzerland and dwelt at Nankin. Art was, in fact, a mystery with its priesthood of trained devotees, and woe betide any layman presumptuous enough to make his voice heard within the precincts. To such, the high priest himself did not disdain to act as chucker out, even when the intruder wore the pontifical robes and frown of John Ruskin.

What it amounted to was this: art was not a spirit, but a technique, specialized in all its branches as rigidly as late nineteenth century science. Beauty, that had cried in vain in the cities of the Philistines, had shaken off their dust from her feet, for a testimony against them.

In spite of the doctrine of Ruskin and the profitable understanding that Millais and Holman Hunt contrived to establish between themselves and the Five Lords of the Philistines, the tendency of the Pre-Raphaelite leaders, in proportion to their inspiration, was gradually to loosen the connection between art and life, and retire from an artistically impracticable reality into a dream world of their own, peopled by Rossetti with full-lipped and ripe-bosomed houris, and by Burne Jones with practically sexless figures of austere delicacy. The supreme exponent of this quintessential Romanticism was William Morris, in spite of a socialism that was, in itself, a flight from life into Nowhere. In Morris Pre-Raphaelitism attained its *ne plus ultra*. With his extraordinary facility in most kinds of art and craft he not only explored every continent and island of the medieval dream world, but succeeded in rendering it almost as commonplace as Piccadilly. What had started as an inspiration had now become a trick of craftsmanship, reproducible *ad infinitum*

The passing of the Gothic fashion only sent the fugitives from life in quest of other dream worlds to conquer. Walter Pater, who aimed at a cloistral seclusion rich with exquisite sensations, significantly named his philosophy of life the New Epicureanism, and indeed it was the product of a world-weariness not unlike that which had inspired the followers of Epicurus to take refuge in a sensuousness refined to the point of asceticism.

The waning of the Victorian complacency was marked by nothing so much as the increasing separation of art from life. In the eighties *Punch*, the mouthpiece of middle-class opinion, which had already punned Swinburne with "swine-born", did his considerable best to associate the very word "aesthete", coupled with his name, and those of Wilde, Pater, and Burne Jones, with all that was unmanly and contemptible. The Elect were by no means disposed to turn the other cheek to the Philistines. A cant of sin, which usually meant sex, answered the cant of respectability, and it was the aesthetic assumption that to be popular was pretty certainly to be banal.

It was during the nineties that the new aestheticism gained enough strength, in the hands of a number of ardent and mostly ill-fated young men, to arouse hopes of a veritable literary and artistic Renaissance. It is curious how little of this work was destined to survive, how little, in spite of all the talk of revolt, bore the stamp of originality. Even Aubrey Beardsley, a consummate artist in black and white, represents the Pre-Raphaelite tradition in its last stage of decomposition. Stephen Phillips, who was hailed as the elder Dumas speaking with the voice of Milton, has dwindled in perspective to a rhetorician, in a blank verse as horribly inflated as the frog in the fable. *The Yellow Book*, that manifesto of all that was young and advanced, exhales a remote, old-fashioned charm when we open it to-day, but its vitality has departed for ever. It is not so with Tennyson and his peers of the Victorian noontide.

The shock of the Oscar Wilde trial dealt a blow at the aesthetic movement from which it never properly recovered. It had, however, exercised an influence, even over the triumphant Philistines, whose effects were not destined to pass away with the cult of sunflowers and scarlet sins. The horrors of Victorian taste were at least mitigated. The hire-purchased shoddy that filled the rooms of suburban villas would at least fail to include plush-covered tables and painted looking-glasses. Not even their dressmakers would again induce English ladies to imitate their West African sisters in counterfeiting posterior expansion below waist-level. Church

windows were no longer adorned with colour schemes of salmon-pink and apricot, and the firm of Kempe, in spite of luscious sentimentality, did at least popularize the principles of William Morris and his School sufficiently to set up a new standard in the art of glass-staining, and to open the way for further developments. The art of monumental sculpture had a corresponding revival. Brock's recumbent effigy of Lord Arthur Hervey at Wells, on a tomb of cornelian-coloured alabaster, is a notable example, combining vividness of portraiture with great tenderness of feeling. If the dawning age could not rise to the heights of Victorianism, it would not, at any rate, sink to its depths.

This undoubted refinement of taste, important as it was, was not the most important effect of the transvaluation of artistic values during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It was that art was gradually ceasing to be an expression of anything vital in the national spirit, and passing from the hands of seers into those of specialists.¹ And where there is no vision, the old text may perhaps stand.

9

THE PREFIX "PAN "

What was taking place in England was only part of a movement that affected all countries of the white man. The shattering of the old orthodoxies, the discarding of moral conventions, was no insular phenomenon. If the Romantic period had harboured illusions, they were at least kindly and gracious phantoms; nations had their duties, had generous and disinterested enthusiasms as well as interests. Even war seemed less of an evil when waged for freedom by such a hero as Garibaldi—almost as much a hero in England as in Italy, or when John Brown's soul went marching on to the abolition of slavery, or even when Germany, long disunited and the prey of unscrupulous diplomacy, solemnly asserted her will to be a united Empire. And there was even an element of chivalry, however perverse its application, in the way the Iron Tsar came to the support of his brother Emperor against his Hungarian rebels.

After 1870—if we make an exception of the crusading ardour that undoubtedly inspired the Russian hosts in their advance on

¹ The most conspicuous exceptions were Mr. Kipling, in his relation to the imperialist spirit, Mr. Yeats and the apostles of the Celtic Revival, and, on the debatable borderland between art and sociology, the Shavian post-Ibsenite drama.

Constantinople in 1877, the very veneer of disinterestedness is dropped. Of the two conceptions of statesmanship, the collective righteousness of Gladstone and the frank egotism of Bismarck, that of Bismarck triumphed all along the line. But while the Iron Chancellor and his venerable master and friend remained at the helm of state, the egotism was at least intelligent and self-restrained, and, indeed, the old, Protestant Emperor had a constant if narrow ideal of honour and humanity which more than once acted as a brake upon the more realistic temperament of his minister. For all his sovereign's loyalty to the superior intelligence, Bismarck knew that he would consent to no decisive action that he believed, in his heart, to be wrong.

The history of Europe, between the Peace of Frankfurt and the outbreak of the World War, falls naturally into two periods, divided, in 1890, by the fall of Bismarck. The man to whose piping the other statesmen danced was a realist in the rarest and best sense. He had no part in the megalomaniac illusions of the new school of Pan-German imperialists. The victory of Blood and Iron, which had established the Empire, was, he knew, only the first bout in a contest of which no man could see the end. To all outward appearance, Germany, in the person of her chief minister, played with the European states as the conjurer with his coloured balls. It seemed so easy as one watched the sureness with which the balls were thrown and caught. Only the master conjurer could realize the perilous and incessant difficulty of the feat he kept on performing with such an impassive visage, and what was likely to happen when some half-trained amateur took over the job.

The Germany of Bismarck's vision was not an irresistible giant preparing to dominate the world, but a strong man ringed round by jealous rivals and one implacable enemy, and in hourly peril of having to defend, against desperate odds, what he already possessed. "Give peace in our time, O Lord," fairly sums up Bismarck's policy after the abandonment of his half-formed scheme of crushing France again and forever in 1875, and he was resolved, if war did come, that Germany should keep out of it. When the race for the colonies began in the eighties, it was only against his better judgment that he allowed Germany to be drawn into it, though he played the game of grab, once he was committed to it, with his usual address and energy. But to embark on colonial expansion was, as the old statesman well knew, asking for trouble. He had not pushed France into Africa nor England into Egypt out of disinterested philanthropy.

And the possession of colonies would eventually lead to the building of a fleet, and a policy that might add England to the list of Germany's enemies. So little did Bismarck dream of challenging the mistress of the seas, that he gave it as his deliberate opinion that her possession of Heligoland was a good thing for Germany, in as much as it denied that advanced base to a blockading French navy.

In the eighties, Bismarck's policy was, in the face of ever-increasing difficulties, one of consummate skill and success. The fatal rivalry between Austria and Russia in the Balkans had compelled him to break up the league of the three Emperors, which was the ideal cornerstone of his policy, and choose the alliance with Austria which his finesse enabled him to expand into the Triple Alliance. But he was constant in his resolve never to let go the support of Russia, and with infinite skill he managed to re-establish the understanding between the three Emperors, and finally to conclude a "Re-insurance Treaty" with Russia which, so long as it lasted, secured Germany from any danger of a war on that side. But it was beyond even Bismarck's powers to drive Austria and Russia in double harness. Russia could never forgive her neighbour for having secured a couple of Turkish provinces for nothing, when Russia, after her sacrifices and victory, had been compelled to return empty home. Since then, the Tsar's blundering brutality had set the whole of the Balkans against her, and at every point Russian and Austrian ambitions kept coming into conflict, particularly in Bulgaria. Nevertheless, Bismarck succeeded in holding fast the bonds of the Triple Alliance, while keeping in close enough friendship with Russia to prevent her doing the thing he so greatly dreaded, and seeking the alliance of Germany's worst enemy.

The old Emperor, now in his ninety-second year, at last closed his eyes, exhorting his grandson William, with his latest breath: "Thou must always keep in touch with the Russian Emperor, there no conflict is necessary." After a brief interval of three months, during which his son was dying of cancer, the throne was occupied by that grandson, who was destined, by his very insufficiency, to play a leading part in the now swiftly developing world tragedy. This young man was endowed with a certain superficial brilliancy that for a long time induced the mass of his subjects to accept him at not far short of his own valuation, and to see in him a symbolic figure, destined to go forth, in glittering armour, conquering and to conquer before God's—or Odin's—chosen people. As a matter of fact, he

was possessed of that neurotic temperament which had become increasingly common as the century had advanced; he was a creature of sudden and incalculable impulses, incapable of pursuing any constant line of action or forming a dispassionate judgment. This temperament, combined with the adulation from which the heir to a throne can hardly escape, resulted in a morbid egotism that took perfectly seriously, and pushed to its extreme logical implications, the doctrine of a monarch's Divine Right. William II was determined to govern as well as to reign. In less than two years he had rid himself of the wise though domineering old Chancellor who had stood before his father and grandfather. As confident of his Empire as of himself, he had no need of such senile precautions as the Re-insurance Treaty with Russia. In 1890, when it came up for renewal, it was allowed, by Germany, to lapse. In Bismarck's phrase, the wire to Petersburg was cut. Three years later the Russian fleet visited Toulon and a secret treaty of alliance was concluded between the Slav despotism and the Latin republic. The thing that Bismarck had for twenty years succeeded in preventing had come to pass. France had found the ally she sought, and the forces were already beginning to muster for Armageddon.

The mere fact of this unnatural alliance, and the almost hysterical joy with which the dull and reactionary Tsar was welcomed in Paris, shows how completely sentiment of any kind had been banished from the international relationships of the *fin de siècle*. To understand the politics of this time we must realize the emergence of a collective spirit of vaster scope and more dangerous ambitions than the nationalism that had flourished in the middle of the century. Disraeli had identified himself with this spirit when he said, "race, all is race." Of all the catchwords that had such vogue in this age of professed realism, "race" was one of the vaguest and most abused. Most Europeans are in fact mongrels of inextricably mixed ancestry, and to sort out this or that stock is a task to baffle the stoutest ethnologist. But it did not much matter whether your head was round or long, or whether your remote ancestor was a Viking or a Mongol, provided you and a sufficient number of your fellows could convince yourselves, on any grounds or none, that you were all pure bred Slavs or Teutons or Anglo-Saxons, and, what invariably followed, that your race was the elect of God or the life-force.

This might have been a harmless enough piece of mass suggestion had it stopped at this point. But unfortunately the self-chosen

race might proceed to deduce serious consequences from its choice. Within their borders there were usually other peoples with different ideals and presumed ancestry. It was not only a right, but a sacred duty, of the superior race to force these Lorrainers and Finns and Poles and Celts to conformity with the superior civilization. As the lesser breed usually displayed its ill-breeding by kicking against the pricks, there was nothing for it but to be very firm indeed with them; twenty years or so of firm government never did but always would work the required change. A still more dangerous consequence of the race theory was that outside the existing frontiers were nearly always to be found certain alleged kinsmen waiting to be brought into the fold, by force if necessary. If they were as yet unconscious of their kinship and its obligations, that was an occasion for propaganda, or, again, force. And where two such racial ambitions overlapped, there was no way of decision but that of the sword.

The two most dangerous of these racial movements were known as Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism. It was with the final shattering of Romantic Liberalism in Russia by the bomb that killed Alexander II, that Pan-Slavism began to take on a distinctive and formidable character. Russian civilization was, according to this version, quite opposite and superior to that of Western Europe. Russia, ever expanding towards the East, was proud to acknowledge her Oriental affinities. Peter the Great, according to some devout Slavophiles, had put her entirely on the wrong track by his policy of Westernization. Again, there were those who held that her mission was to bring the blessings of just government and Western science to the backward Asian races.

In Alexander III, who ascended the throne in 1881, the Slavophiles found a Tsar of the good old Russian type. His mind, like that of his people, moved with the ponderous inevitability of a glacier. Under him the Pan-Slavic creed shook off every vestige of Liberalism, and centred round the triple ideal of autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationalism, or rather, racialism. Such religious persecution was seen in Russia as recalled the dragonnades of Louis XIV, such racial tyranny as rivalled that of the Turk. Finally, though the constant terror of assassination kept him shut up like a hermit in his palace, the Tsar wished to be regarded as the leader and champion of Slavdom both within and without the fold. As the Austrian Empire was now run by a tacit agreement of Germans and Magyars to assist each other in holding down the other peoples of that incongruous conglomeration, it is evident that between

the racial ambitions of Pan-Slavism and the dynastic necessities of the Hapsburgs there could be no common ground of reconciliation. Moreover, militant Pan-Slavism aimed at a revival of the Eastern Roman Empire, with its Caesar and Patriarch at Byzantium. This was likewise incompatible with Austrian ambitions in the Balkans.

Even more dangerous than this autocratic and semi-oriental imperialism was the new spirit that ever since the Franco-German War had been rising in Germany. After centuries of disunion, impotence, and humiliation, the wine of victory had gone to the German head. The thinking and dreaming Germany of old days was now finally discredited in the eyes of her sons; it was Blood and Iron, the iron discipline of Prussia under her Hohenzollern sovereigns, that had raised United Germany to that headship among European powers she had enjoyed under her great Hohenstaufen. It was perhaps inevitable that a people of such immense thoroughness and so little humour should have carried their new-found belief in themselves to lengths of measureless extravagance.

Like all other peoples who get above themselves, the Germans had no difficulty in discovering their own membership of the chosen or supreme race. Their claims to be, *par excellence*, the *élite* of the Nordic, long-headed breed, were, as a matter of fact, based on a disingenuous begging of the whole question, since an exact inquiry would have established that in present-day Germany there is an actual preponderance of round-headed or Alpine men. But for purposes of racial propaganda, t'were to consider too curiously to consider so. It was assumed that the modern Germans were the authentic and pure descendants of the Teutons described by Tacitus, and the fact that most of the great men of Europe could, by sedulous grubbing in libraries, be shown to have had red cheeks or fair hair or names that in some way suggested a German origin, was enough to establish that anybody who had ever done anything had been a German without knowing it. Even Christ was conscripted for this noble army of Teutons. Celts were Germans and even Slavs were Germans, according to some hardy theorists, always however with the proviso that these were inferior and diluted breeds in comparison with the central Teuton.

This theory might only have been harmful in the sense that all other muddled sophisms are harmful, had it not been for the fact that it implied the existence of a vast unredemmed Germany "without the law". This was an intolerable state of things for patriots flushed with victory, and more confident, with every succeeding year,

of their resistless strength. Another and more rational cause was impelling Germans to expand their frontiers. The new Empire, even with the addition of the French provinces, was not large enough to contain a rapidly increasing population. And with German industry, backed by all the resources of science and government, making prodigious strides, a need was felt for markets and an assured command of raw materials. Germany had come late into the race for colonies, and she looked with undisguised envy on those supposedly inferior peoples who had secured the best places in the sun, and then smugly expected to enjoy peaceful possession.

The men of the old school, Bismarck and William I, had little enough sympathy with the new megalomania. The new school does not get control of German policy till the dropping of the pilot by William II. Bismarck displayed his usual shrewd insight when he divined that what most distinguished the young Kaiser's character from that of his father and grandfather was his lack of humility, his boundless confidence in himself and want of consideration for others. A precisely similar judgment might be passed on the difference between the old, earnest and relatively humble Germany that had established the Empire, and the new, cocksure and hectoring generation that entered into that heritage, staked it on one mad throw—and lost.

The new morality, or absence of morality, the rise of which we have traced in England, reached its height in Germany. It was necessary to provide the Pan-Germans with a doctrine that should ease all scruples of conscience about such trifles as despoiling or enslaving a neighbour. Something could be done by gush about the old Teutonic gods, more by writing up history in the spirit of a not too scrupulous attorney. This was especially the task of Treitschke, who captured the imagination of his countrymen with an unfinished history of modern Germany in a number of ponderously tendencious volumes. But the philosopher who most impressed his personality on the imagination was a Pole, Nietzsche, who had scant respect for the German intelligence and detested the Empire as the grave of individuality. His ideal, as might have been expected from a Pole, was one of aristocratic anarchy. But what counted in Nietzsche's writings was not his essential philosophy, but stray aphorisms, that he threw off in beautiful German, expressive of an invalid's pathetic desire to compensate for his infirmity by posing as a very terrible fellow—he was really the kindest of mortals. Such sayings as "the good war justifies every cause", "be hard", "the will to

power", were eagerly seized upon by the apostles of the new Pan Germanism, that Nietzsche would certainly have regarded as the quintessence of Philistinism.

Nevertheless Pan-Germanism was one of the most formidable of militant creeds, and was by no means wholly contemptible. Germany, under her Prussian masters, had drilled out of herself her reflective and visionary soul—she would no longer produce a Goethe or a Wagner. But what drill could get out of a singularly docile people was at her command. She had that infinite capacity for taking pains that is the exact opposite of genius. Her education, if it was calculated to reduce everyone to the same level, at least assured that that level should be of a respectable altitude. Her professors were glorified officials; where Germany was concerned, or could possibly be dragged in, research catered for propaganda. Her missionaries found the service of God not incompatible with that of Caesar. Her industry, magnificently organized in great monopolistic federations, or cartels, and supported at every turn by the government, by sheer hard work and energy, together with the systematic employment of research, was catching up that of free-trade England. Most ominous of all, from the English point of view, it became increasingly evident that the great German army was not enough for the ambitions of the German people and their Emperor. The Teuton must assert his natural supremacy, not only on land, but also on sea.

Such were the two great racial ambitions that threatened the peace of Europe towards the close of the nineteenth century. Both were entirely selfish in their aims and unscrupulous in their methods; of both the motive force was nothing more nor less than what Nietzsche had christened "the will to power". They were not the only movements of the kind. There was Pan-Turanianism—a quite different aspiration from Pan-Islamism—which aspired to unite all branches of the Turkish stock, from Thrace to Siberia, and looked for its heroes to those scourges of the human race, Jenghiz Khan and Timour. There was a smaller, but intensely dangerous movement to unite the Serb, Croat and Slovene stocks in one Empire of Greater Servia; there were similar aspirations after a Greater Bulgaria, a Greater Greece and a Greater Roumania, but these are perhaps more appropriately classed as national than racial. The same remark applies even more strongly to the aspirations of the two great Latin powers. France was proudly conscious of her nationality; all her aspirations were at present sharpened to one fine point of desire to get back her

lost provinces ; she was feverishly striving after an overseas Empire ; but it was for the French nation and not for the Gallic race that she cherished ambitions. Italy too, the youngest among the family of European nations, had her unredeemed children still not escaped from the Hapsburg yoke, but no racial ambitions corresponding to Pan-Germanism or Pan-Slavism.

Such was the witches' cauldron of international relations. The spectacle was one of a Europe from which Liberal aspirations and altruistic sentiment of any kind had been well-nigh banished, of nations arming to the teeth in the support of aims any one of which could only be attained at the price of a general war, of a diplomacy which was really a cut-throat competition in grabbing territory or manoeuvring for position in the conflict that might break out at any moment. Dominating everything were the two great alliances, one between a Pan-Slavist Tsardom and a France burning for revenge, the other between a Germany obsessed by the will-to-power and the illusion of her own invincibility, an Austria wrestling with the insoluble problem of maintaining equilibrium between centrifugal racial ambitions, and an Italy which, as Bismarck well knew, might or might not be restrained by her compact of alliance from flying at Austria's throat at the first opportunity of getting back her unredeemed lands.

If the military struggle hung fire, an economic war was already in full swing, and was being waged *à outrance* on the principles of the Kilkenny cats. In every important country but England, the peaceable and individualist economics of Cobden and Adam Smith were definitely superseded by the militant and protective nationalism of which List had been most authoritative exponent. Sometimes two nations—France and Italy, for instance—would wage regular tariff wars, much to the detriment of both. The tendency was to replace the free competition of individual traders by gigantic national monopolies. It was the grand object of every power to secure its own markets and own sources of raw materials, from which foreigners were as far as possible to be excluded. The idea of common access to the good things of the earth was scouted as unpractical sentimentalism. The result was that nations were compelled to strain every nerve to secure such parts of the world as were not already appropriated—and, failing that, those that were. How the vast Continent of Africa got parcelled out, under these circumstances, without a European war, though not without the imminent danger of one on several occasions, is nothing short of a miracle, and says

a good deal for the fear that kept the rivals from making the final plunge over the abyss.

Closely connected with this monopolizing tendency was that of industry to coalesce into larger and larger units. It was the United States that first set the example of amalgamating the bulk or whole of particular industries into enormous national monopolies, or trusts, ruthlessly crushing or freezing out rivals, utilizing all the economies of mass production, but holding up home prices at monopoly as distinct from competitive values. It is notable that centralization was carried to greater lengths in the trusts of democratic America than in the cartels of militarist Germany. Against these monsters the State itself, when it battled at all, battled in vain. The high protective tariffs, by blunting the edge of foreign competition, assisted the monopolists in getting entire control over the home market—it was a well-known occasional expedient to unload goods dirt cheap on the foreigner whilst selling them dear at home.

In every industrially backward community that was not the closed preserve of some civilized government, the capitalists of rival nations, usually backed by their governments, competed for concessions, or opportunities to exploit these peoples at higher rates of usury than could be obtained at home. The Turkish Empire was a happy hunting ground for these concessionaries, and here European *Realpolitik* was seen at its worst and meanest. The Sultan, Abdul the Damned, as he was nicknamed in England, soon began to realize that he could perpetrate with entire impunity the most flagrant outrages on his Christian subjects, in the face of Christian Europe. Germany, who had excellent military and business reasons for being on the right side of the Turk, was frankly indifferent to the death and rape of some myriads of wretched Armenians, and so, notwithstanding her recent crusading fervour for the Christians of the Balkans, was Holy Russia. Against such treason to civilization, the venerable Gladstone, emerging in 1897 from his final retirement, might thunder in vain.

The fact was that under the new conditions, in which national policy came to be more and more identified with that of "big business", as represented by a few leading capitalists working behind the scenes, there was no chance for ethical considerations to come into play, nor even for very far-sighted views of self interest. It is said to be a weakness of stockbrokers not to look beyond the next settling day, and though this is doubtless an exaggeration, the business is seldom the philosophic temperament. A ruthless

pursuit of immediate advantage may involve consequences ultimately disastrous to the pursuers, as when the South African Randlords manoeuvred for a war of Britain against the Transvaal. When the State and the capitalist work together, there is always a temptation to gamble with military support. The new capitalism was, in fact, as aggressive in its tendencies as the old was—generally speaking—peaceable.

The vast scale on which business was now conducted, and the practice of employing capital in exploiting distant and backward communities instead of earning low rates of interest in home manufactures, lent an ever-increasing power to the financier who worked the delicate machinery by which the accumulated wealth of a nation is made to flow, with the rapidity of quicksilver, now into this and now into that desired channel. Perhaps when, if ever, the inner workings of recent history are fully exposed, the part played by the international financier will stand revealed as the most decisive and sinister of all. Perhaps, on the other hand, it will be found that even Cassels and Rothschilds were in no sense supermen, but quite ordinary human beings, often moved by sentiments of sincere affection for their adopted countries, and more swayed by timidity than grandiose ambition.

This at least we can say with something approaching certainty, that in this latest age the most important events are seldom those trumpeted in newspapers or chronicled in text-books. What we chiefly want to know—too often in vain—is who were pulling the strings, what interests were competing behind the scenes. It may well be that in this age of capitalist operations on a vast scale, the individual capitalists and financiers were carried along as blindly as everyone else. That does not alter the fact that love of race and country was blended more indistinguishably than ever before with that of money; that men could be persuaded to die in the name of right and freedom for other men's dividends; that not even in the eighteenth century were the workings of international politics so frankly sordid and cynical. The sledge of civilization—to adapt a phrase from the Russian—had begun to fly downhill.

It is now time to ascertain in what way this tendency towards a militant and commercial imperialism, aiming at racial supremacy,

had affected the British spirit. Is there, during the period between the Peace of Frankfurt and the Great War, evidence of a Pan-Britainism corresponding in any way to Pan-Germanism or Pan-Slavism or the other "Pans" of which this age was so prolific?

The answer will be found to take the form of a carefully qualified affirmative. A Pan-Britainism, or British imperialism, did no doubt arise and flourish, and we shall find it exhibiting, at one time or another, all the characteristics that we have noted in the other imperialisms; there is the same vague yet flamboyant appeal to racial pride, the same cynicism in the pursuit of the main chance, the same anxiety to be armed to the teeth not only against military but against economic rivals.

Of all this it is easy enough to produce evidence, and yet at no time, not even in the late nineties, would it be correct to say that Pan-Britainism, taken in this sense, was ever dominant in this country to the extent that Pan-Germanism was dominant under the auspices of the Kaiser. In the first place, Englishmen have too little logic or too much humour ever (unless we must take exception of the short-lived Puritan Revolution) to commit themselves wholly to the support of any abstract idea.

Again, the supreme motive of an unredeemed population beyond our frontiers was entirely absent. The Americans were certainly recognized as—more or less—fellow Anglo-Saxons, and the idea that blood was thicker than water was a powerful, if often relaxed bond of sympathy that might, in the opinion of a few, ultimately tighten into one of union, but nobody ever dreamed of our going out of our way to "redeem" our lost colonies. England was in the happy and unique position of having large communities of her sons occupying vast countries habitable by the white man, and united with her under a common sovereignty. So far from wanting to redeem these incipient nations, most prominent men of the middle of the century had been cheerfully discussing when and how we should get rid of them.

Perhaps for both these reasons, and perhaps, also, owing to the longevity and influence of Gladstone, a Liberalism, at once romantic and utilitarian, retained its prestige and influence, only slightly impaired, long after it had ceased to be taken seriously on the Continent. At a time when the other nations and our own colonies were building up tariffs, more or less scientific, the fiscal policy of the United Kingdom never swerved from the strictest Free-Trade orthodoxy. And though Liberalism was badly scotched after the

fiasco of Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill, it was so far from being killed that, within less than twenty years, it was able to sweep the country with a completeness undreamed of since the Whig triumph of 1832. Even among the Unionists, as the combination of Conservatives and dissentient Liberals was called, imperialism was a less absolute doctrine than among Prussian Junkers or the courtiers of the Tsar. More and more, in so far as the white communities were concerned—though with the notable exception of Ireland—it was understood to imply free cooperation between free nations. And even where coloured civilizations, like India and Egypt, were concerned, there was always at least lip homage paid to the ideal of preparing them for the privileges of self-government.

For the first stirrings of the imperialist spirit we must look to the sheer nationalist pugnacity that flourished, side by side with Manchester pacificism, in the fifties and sixties. From the Palmerstonian heroics of Little England to the Disraelian cult of Big England the transition is so easy, that it says a good deal for the conservative mentality of the elder statesman that he never thought of making it, even in the sixties. It was perhaps natural that the poets should have been among the first to bridge the gulf. The Laureate, Tennyson, naturally one of the most bellicose spirits that were ever inspired by the muse, who had thundered the wrath of Europe against Russia, and appealed in trumpet tones for volunteers against France, passed on easily to "hands all round", "one life, one flag, one fleet, one throne", and finally to that jubilee paean of science, commerce and imperial expansion which, regarded as a poem, is worthy of such predecessors in the laureateship as Pye and Eusden. So likewise did Algernon Charles Swinburne forsake the Mazzinian ultra-Liberalism of his most creative years, for the equally violent assertion of British racial supremacy that made him, at last, out-jingo the wildest jingoism of the South African War-fever.

It is to Thomas Carlyle that we can trace no inconsiderable part of the spiritual, or philosophic ancestry of modern imperialism. Carlyle had always been in more or less conscious opposition to the utilitarian Liberalism of his own time, though he certainly partook, in full measure, of that time's Romanticism. The effect of German philosophy upon his Lowland mind had been to give him an ever increasing bias in favour of a State organization whose vital principle was not liberty but obedience, in the first place to the will of God, in the second to that of a godlike man or hero. Unfortunately the difficulty of ascertaining God's will drove Carlyle more and more

to applying the test of superior force, of accepting implicitly what Nietzsche formulated with brutal directness in "The good war justifies every cause". Carlyle's God was, in fact, not wholly unrelated to the "good old German God" employed by the Hohenzollerns.

As early as 1843, Carlyle had, in a few glowing pages of his *Past and Present*, anticipated all that was essential of an imperialism hardly dreamed of in that generation. He was an avowed believer in the merits and mission of the Anglo-Saxon stock, but his admiration was based on novel and significant grounds. To him, the best type of Englishman is constituted by the strong, silent man of whom we were to hear so much towards the end of the century. The countrymen of Shakespeare and Shelley, of Bacon and Newton, are not only assumed to be incapable of expressing themselves in any but the dullest and stupidest words, but are actually held up to admiration for it by this eloquent and voluminous apostle of silence. And here, conscious and over-conscious as Carlyle is of "Teutsch" ancestry, his doctrine is more intimately allied to Pan-Slavism than Pan-Germanism. It is by no accident that in this same chapter on the English we read :

"The dumb Russians too, as I said, they, drilling all wild Asia and Europe into military rank and file, a terrible yet hitherto a prospering enterprise, are still dumber. The old Romans also could not *speak*, for many centuries . . ."

Upon such a basis, Carlyle was able to sketch, in brief but unforgettable outline, what was to be the commonplace of fifty years later. He proclaimed that this little isle had grown too narrow for us, and his counsel was that we should fight the hostile tariffs, that were bound to arise, by securing our markets within the empire. Nor was this the only way of securing markets. In a passage only too ominously prophetic of the new spirit, he says :—

"All men trade with all men, when mutually convenient ; and are even bound to do it by the Maker of men. Our friends of China, who guiltily refused to trade, in these circumstances—had we not to argue with them, in cannon shot at last, and convince them that they ought to trade."

This enlistment of God in the task of breaking open the doors of weaker neighbours, characterized unctuously as "our friends", comes strangely from one who was never weary of denouncing cant. What Carlyle plainly has in view is the expansion of the Anglo Saxons over as much as possible of the habitable globe, though without loss of political and spiritual unity, conscripting, *à la Russe*,

less advanced peoples for the service of civilization, God, and Anglo Saxon commerce. Here was "a future, wide as the world, if we have the heart and heroism for it". Had Carlyle understood the English mind, and not tried to saddle it with ideas that were the legacy of imperial Rome and the heritage of modern Prussia, he might have been a prophet indeed !

As it was, his influence was a potent force with the younger generation. John Ruskin, who, in his social doctrine, was much under his influence, and gave more developed and serene form to his essential message, was an apostle of imperial expansion, though certainly not of bombarding Chinamen to force them to accept our opium. But in his inaugural lecture at Oxford, delivered in 1870, his Pan-British creed is announced with trumpet clearness :

"This is what she (England) must either do or perish : she must found colonies as fast and as far as she is able, formed of her most energetic and worthiest men ;—seizing every piece of fruitful waste ground she can set her foot on, and there teaching these her colonists that their first virtue is to be fidelity to their country, and that their first aim is to be to advance the power of England by land and sea " —words that, with the substitution of Germany for England, might easily have been written by Treitschke and endorsed by General Von Bernhardi.

Another disciple of Carlyle was the historian Froude who, in spite of his notorious inaccuracy, did, in some measure, for English history, what Treitschke, Droysen and others were doing for Germany. With a style as lucid as Macaulay's, Froude displayed a very different though not less intense patriotism. Macaulay was no respecter of empire-builders, his theme had been the growth of constitutional liberty, his hero, William III, pre-eminently a good European. Froude made his hero Henry VIII, and did succeed in showing, not that he was a good man—his attempt to do so was palpably disingenuous and foreign to his real purpose—but that he was an expert Machiavellian who united England by blood and iron, and made possible the future of our race on the water, and beyond it. It is not surprising that Froude should have constituted himself one of the first missionaries of Empire.

In 1869 another globe-trotter, Charles Dilke, notorious for his republican leanings, published the results of his travels two years previously, in the colonies, India and the United States. It was in this book that Dilke coined the name "Greater Britain". The idea which had throughout been his inspiration was, avowedly, "a

conception, however small, of the grandeur of our race, already girdling the earth, which it is destined, perhaps, eventually to overspread." This Pan-Britainism explicitly included the Americans, and as explicitly excluded the Irish, who are coupled with the Chinese as typical of the "cheap races" against whom the Anglo-Saxons have to strive.

Among these pioneers of imperialism must be numbered Professor Seeley, whose lucid, if somewhat too highly generalized *History of British Expansion* first threw into the perspective of many educated people the historic significance of the Empire, and who followed it up by a *History of British Policy*, which carried the origins of the Empire back to the Reformation.

11

THE LAW AND THE BLOOD

These writers appealed to a comparatively limited circle, though their influence no doubt percolated to multitudes who had never read their books. But imperialism needed an exponent capable of appealing to the class most likely to receive it with gladness, that of the black-coated city workers who, from the humble clerk to the substantial senior partner, were fated for the term of their unnatural lives to an existence of conventional monotony, without even the bourgeois dignity of their fathers. There were, too, shop-assistants and other employees who went to swell the class that is somewhat vaguely characterized as "lower-middle". It was among these more or less educated town and suburb dwellers that a great yearning was felt for a life of colour and adventure, of the strong arm and the open air, that should offer the strongest possible relief to their present pinched respectability. The reality of such a life was out of the question for most of them, but that made it all the more necessary to get the idea or vision of it into the dream world upon which doors open even in Balham.

It was during the eighties, in so far as we can assign to any particular decade a process so gradual, that the old middle class of Mr. Pickwick and Mr. Caudle, of Mr. Roebuck and Mr. Bright, with its solid virtues and stolid Philistinism, gives place to the new semi-genteel bourgeoisie, profoundly dissatisfied with its own status,

and the lover of every sort of existence but its own. The old self-satisfied and class-conscious doctrines of the Manchester School suffer a corresponding eclipse. The time is ripe for a new gospel.

And it was just such a gospel that a young Anglo Indian journalist of genius, Mr. Rudyard Kipling, was inspired to preach. Never was message more opportunely timed. From the first it was evident that a story-teller of consummate ability had burst into fame, and with the publication, in 1892, of *Barrack Room Ballads*, it became evident that the story-teller was also in the first rank of contemporary poets. Mr. Kipling's extraordinary faculties of observation and visualization were just what was needed to bring home to what he contemptuously characterized as "the poor little street-bred people", their membership of an Empire upon which, as it became fashionable to say, the sun never set. And not only membership but, in some unexplained way, ownership, for the clerk on a pound a week was thrilled with a profound conviction that by the mere fact of his being an Englishman he held the gorgeous East in fee and was among the lords of the Seven Seas. And there is no doubt that Mr. Kipling did more than fifty Matthew Arnolds could have done to wean the middle class from the provincialism and Podsnappery of the sixties. The Golden Gate and the Horn, the Karroo and the great, green, greasy Limpopo became as real and vivid to the city dweller as his own street of desirable residences. More wonderful, perhaps, because, from his never having seen them, they came to him with all the added glamour of romance.

Mr. Kipling might be classed, with equal plausibility, as among the first of the Realists and the last of the Romantics. For a brutal realism was just the sort of romance for which the brain-worker of the towns, sick of a civilization which offered him nothing but the drabbiest monotony, was yearning. It was delicious to exchange, even in imagination, the pinched and sallow security of an office stool for frail morals and strong liquor "somewhere East of Suez". As the Celtic visionaries had dreamed of a land beyond the sunset where none should ever grow old or sorrowful, so "our Mr. Smith" dreamed of limitless horizons, of colonials, rough-tongued and large of limb, or perhaps of spattering shrapnel and "juicy" gun-wheels, of loot and drink and "learning about women" from a succession of exotic mistresses.

With admirable art, Mr. Kipling put in the forefront of his picture of Empire the figure of the British private soldier, a man taken away from miserable and squalid surroundings to what Mr. Kipling

described, and apotheosized to his readers, as "the lordliest life on earth". Of all his poems, none has had so universal an appeal as *Mandalay*, the yearning of the ex-soldier amid the drizzle and grit of London to return to the spaciousness and spiciness of an Orient dreamland.

But it was romance of a strange and novel kind. Part of its attraction consisted in its sheer lawlessness, in the rein given to instincts that are choked by the conventions of life at home. This was also the attraction of Nietzsche's philosophy. The Kiplingese public schoolboy was even rougher, the Kiplingese Tommy even more ruffianly than the real article, and this constituted no small part of their fascination. It was exhilarating to think of "sons of the Blood" being able, in their teens, to rival Red Indians as expert torturers, and dreaming of a grand war in the near future "with plenty of loot and Sikhs". There was something splendidly daring in the very lilt of :

" Now remember when you're 'acking round a Gilded Burma god
That 'is eyes is very often precious stones ;
An' if you treat a nigger to a dose o' cleanin' rod,
'E's like to show you everything 'e owns."

It was a new idea, too, to write a song in the name of Her Majesty's Royal Marines containing the candid admission that most of them were liars, half of them thieves, and the remainder "as rank as can be". In the imperial nineties, this passed for a compliment !

Whether or not Mr. Kipling may have come under the conscious influence of Carlyle, his imperialism does but fill the outlines that Carlyle sketched in long before. There is the same glorification of work, the same contempt of happiness and individual rights, the same cult of silence and the strong man who cannot express himself, the same familiarity with the purposes of an up-to-date Jehovah.

It is also in the true spirit of Carlyle that the corner-stones of Mr. Kipling's imperial faith should be what he calls "The Blood" and "The Law". "The Blood," of course, is the English version of that cult of the super-race which, in Germany, Russia, and Turkey, was dignified by the prefix "pan". Like Carlyle's, Mr. Kipling's Pan-Britainism was nearer akin to the Russian than the German model. He was no philosopher, and despite his own imaginative genius, he had a certain obvious distrust for what recent slang has christened highbrows. His man who comes out to India with an interest in Comte and Spencer gets nicknamed the "blastoderm" by the strong, silent Englishmen around him, and has any tendency

to unorthodox speculation quickly knocked out of him; subalterns of independent ideas are ragged. The Sons of the Blood are hard and silent men, scornful of theory, bottling up the emotions, chary of amenities. If they come together, they will not fall on each other's necks like foreigners, but will as likely as not hide their real comradeship by sparring and quarrelling continuously. In the *Barrack Room Ballads*, the Queen is the "Widder of Windsor", and the flag itself, the English flag which Mr. Kipling has elsewhere hymned with such a noble passion, is a "bloomin' old rag".

It is just these outwardly unlovely characteristics that make the "blood" what it is, and the British stock the salt of the earth. All other foreign or subject peoples are lumped together as "lesser breeds without the Law". What is the "Law"? The answer to this question brings us to the heart of Kiplingese imperialism.

Mr. Kipling's "Law" is, in fact, something more akin to the imperial centralization of Rome, than the stubborn and often illogical insistence on "rights" that is the essence of the English Common Law. "My rights!" says Private Ortheris, in the true spirit of his creator, "S'trewth A'mighty! I'm a man." For everything savouring of Liberalism or democracy, Mr. Kipling is as contemptuous as Carlyle himself. Not liberty but disciplined obedience is his aim:

"The head and the hoof of the Law and the haunch and the hump is—
obey!"

It is curious that Mr. Kipling, when he wants to convey some notion of his ideal community, should have resource first to the law of a pack of wolves, and secondly, to the disciplined harmony of a machine. Nobody can read that fascinating story, *The Ship that found Herself*, without seeing in it the obvious allegory of the community that finds itself, by an exactly regulated co-ordination of services. This same allegory is made the theme of the engineer M'Andrew's lyric rhapsody in praise of his engine-room machinery:

"Interdependence absolute, foreseen, ordained, decreed,
To work, Ye'll note, at any tilt and every rate of speed,
Fra skylight lift to furnace bars, backed, bolted, braced and stayed,
An' singin' like the Mornin' Stars for Joy that they are made . . .
Now a' together let them lift their lesson, theirs an' mine:
Law, Order, Duty an' Restraint, Obedience, Discipline!"

This, of its kind, is a noble and austere ideal, but most assuredly it is not English. It was not for nothing that Mr. Kipling was born in Bombay, the most cosmopolitan city in the world, next to

Constantinople. His imperialism is that of Rome, "*pacis imponere morem*," and, for that very reason, profoundly unenglish. It is "*imperium*" without "*libertas*".

Nevertheless Mr. Kipling was above the mere jingoism and music-hall bragging that were the too common accompaniments of the imperialistic spirit among what he characterized—and despised—as "the poor little street-bred people". There was a stern, Old-Testament humility about the gospel he came to preach. The Lord his God, and Tommy's Gawd, was a jealous God, and

"Except ye pay the Lord
Single heart and single sword,
Of your children in their bondage shall He ask them treble-tale!"

This was a contingency that haunted Mr. Kipling, as it had haunted the prophets of Israel. He had no doubt about the rough colonials, "the men who could shoot and ride," but it became increasingly apparent to him that the very townspeople who acclaimed him as a prophet were not honouring the Blood nor serving the Lord at all, but whoring after "wise wood-pavement gods", who would leave them naked to their foes in the Armageddon that he foresaw. Even the Diamond Jubilee, that unprecedented proof and pageant of Empire, could only awake in its chosen apostle and laureate the fear,

"Lest we forget! Lest we forget!"

In an age when moral standards were everywhere being set aside, without being replaced, when art was retiring from life and organized religion almost ceasing to count, Mr. Kipling came forward as the evangelist of a definite and intelligible gospel, a gospel of work and obedience, of a chosen race serving its chosen God:

"Keep ye the law—be swift in all obedience
Clear the land of evil, drive the road and bridge the ford.
Make ye sure to each his own
That he reaps where he hath sown;
By the peace among our peoples let men know we serve the Lord!"

There was, of course, one aspect of imperialism which Mr. Kipling, through whose austerity there ran a strong streak of sentimentalism, persistently failed to envisage. He could see the rough workers and adventurers who bridged the ford and sunk the mine, but he could not bear to visualize these men as the blind tools, not of the Lord, but of financiers, whose object it was not to civilize but to exploit "the sullen, silent peoples", to whom Mr. Kipling's imperialism would have denied a voice in the decision of their own destinies. The blood was fine enough to sing, but what of the heart that pumped

the blood? What of the financial interests that bled Pharaoh white before sending Sergeant What's-his-name, with "a sarse of leaden bullet", to civilize him into further remittances. Mr. Kipling never did, and perhaps, being a poet, never could, attain to the enormous frankness of Cecil Rhodes's "philanthropy plus five per cent".

Mr. Kipling was at the height of his genius and influence during the decade that elapsed between the Queen's two jubilees in 1887 and 1897. These events in themselves were gigantic advertisements of the Empire for which Victoria had now come to stand as the crowned symbol. In the earlier part of her reign she had been a power in the land and a personality often the reverse of popular. In her widowed seclusion at Balmoral, she worked as hard and asserted her constitutional authority as stoutly as ever. But her ministers had learnt to discount the vehemence of her prejudices, and on important matters of policy her will was seldom allowed to prevail. Her pet aversion, Gladstone, could be scolded, but not shaken. And when at last, after her long retirement, she was coaxed back into the limelight, she had ceased to be Victoria and had become an institution. The reins of power slipped unperceived from hands that no longer had the energy to grasp them, and, while honour and affection were lavished upon her such as no English sovereign had ever previously received, the power of the Crown had shrunk to proportions that not even the first two Georges would have deigned to tolerate. The sovereign was, in fact, though without any formal surrender, the passive mouthpiece of her ministers.

But by the very fact of her personal power having disappeared, the Queen's symbolical value was enhanced out of all measure. There was now no chance of her unpopularity; the sovereign was lifted, by universal consent, above the controversies of party politics; the offensive caricatures and inuendoes, that had been so common in the Prince Consort's time, and after his death had not stuck at lampogning the pathetic invincibility of her bereaved devotion, disappeared from the reputable press; the little old lady, with the impassive face, who was drawn through the street inclining almost mechanically to the salutations of her subjects, was now a kind of universal mother, a Pan-Britannic Madonna. To the colonies and dependencies beyond the seas she embodied the Empire in the most convenient, because the most inoffensive possible form. The freedom-loving colonial might have nothing but abuse for Downing Street, he might even advertise for labour with the proviso "no English

wanted here", but he was loyal to the Queen, because she never interfered with him and because, at heart, he was usually a bit of a sentimentalist. In India the prestige of the throne was immense and traditional, most of all among the proud Indian Princes. Even African and Maori chiefs liked to think of their Great White Queen.

It was therefore an event not only of spectacular but of historic significance when the Queen passed through cheering crowds between lines of scarlet-clad soldiers and attended by such novel escorts as slouch-hatted colonials and gorgeously turbaned sowars. To adopt a phrase from Mr. Kipling, the Empire might be said to have found itself. Even the first jubilee acted as a tremendous stimulant of national and imperial self-consciousness. Everybody, from the Laureate downwards, started to compute the results of fifty years' progress and to find them superlatively good. The most obvious gauge of progress, to the ordinary man, was the way in which the English red had begun to colour the map of the world. That any statesman should ever have wanted to check the process, let alone decarnadine the map, now seemed little less than treasonable perversity. The red, like the Queen, had become a symbol, a romance, and especially so to the middle-class in the towns, to whose cribbed existences the very idea of the Empire brought colour and spaciousness.

Between the two Jubilees, then, imperialist sentiment was rising to fever pitch. The process of painting the map red had gone gaily forward, and so far without any serious mishaps. Meanwhile, the effects of compulsory literacy were first becoming apparent, in a veritable revolution of the press. The old bourgeois solidity and stolidity were less and less in demand. Everything had to be adjusted to the requirements of half-baked intelligences in a hurry, to the demands of that steadily growing majority who could read, but could neither reflect nor concentrate. What this new public required was not so much food for thought as emotional stimulus. The tamer a man's or woman's real life might be, the more ardently did they long to be transported into a world of adventure and dalliance, and the less exacting were their requirements with regard to truth or probability. The very fact of a man's being neither strong nor silent gave him a hunger for being a superman in his dreams. Where he sought for knowledge he preferred to take it in the form of easily received and easily forgotten snippets or *Tit-Bits*, as the first of the new order of cheap weeklies was appropriately styled.

Much of this new, sensational journalism was purely aimless, read one moment and forgotten the next. But it was inevitable that the capitalists, who were making fortunes by humouring the mentality of the new reading class, should come to see the advantage of exploiting crudely and on a vast scale the self-same needs for which Mr. Kipling's genius catered. In one form or another, the desire of the enormous mass of town-dwellers was to satisfy in imagination the instinctive lust for power and action, for which real life afforded no scope.

There were, of course, various ways of doing this which had no direct connection with imperialism. There was, most conspicuously of all, the vicarious satisfaction of the combative instincts that took the form of watching or reading about sport. It was at this time that sport began to be capitalized and professionalized on a vast scale. The watching of teams of hired footballers became the Saturday afternoon's amusement of multitudes who had sweetened a week of toil by the anticipation of one ecstatic hour. And for the instinct of adventure there was betting, often on horses or contests that the bold layer did not even aspire to behold.

There was, again, the cult of adventure of its own sake, and without any political or patriotic afterthought. The man of genius who rose on the crest of this wave was Robert Louis Stevenson, who, being, like Nietzsche, an invalid, felt in double measure the need for emotional consolation. But his mastery—perhaps a little over-conscious—of style demanded an educated mind for its appreciation. For the great mass of readers, coarser and more highly seasoned fare had to be provided. The nineties was the decade pre-eminently of magazine supermen, drawn with varying degrees of skill, detectives and criminals, sea captains and banditti, vivified mummies and nondescript mystery men, but all alike in their strength and silence, their practical omnipotence, and omniscience in pursuit of ends often the most trivial. There was the still lower form of standardized melodrama, in which the charms of blonde and submissive virgins are perpetually the reward of blameless fools in conflict with super-subtle villainy.

But the Empire afforded the most obvious and perfect satisfaction for desires of this kind. It was a vast collective adventure in which every one could picture himself as having a share. The vastness and prosperity and victorious progress of the Empire, ever getting bigger and bigger, enabled even the mild and anaemic clerk or shopman to suggest to himself that he, in some way, was

every day becoming prosperous and mighty. When his government took a strong line with a foreign nation, the line became his line, and the victory his victory. War itself, for which the State hired professional soldiers as his local club hired professional footballers, became the most exhilarating of all forms of sport, and he no more visualized the prospects of his being made to take a part in it, than he did of his being haled off to Lord's to stand up against Kortright's bowling. It is significant that a type of fiction that attained great vogue at this time was that of a future war, the more bloody and universal the better, in which, after thrilling vicissitudes, England always came out on the top. "Stalky and Co." were by no means alone in their ardent desire for such a war. The Englishman was perhaps too essentially good-natured, too much of a sportsman, to emulate the concentrated and ruthless racial ambitions of his Continental rivals, but his very immunity from personal service and his confidence in the ability of the fleet to protect him from serious danger, added a light-hearted irresponsibility to his desire for the greatest of all thrills.

There was much that was human and generous in the desire to feel oneself as part of a great, civilizing Empire, to share in that mystic communion of all the British race, living, dead, and unborn, to be lifted out of the drudgery of a self-centred life into the service of a great ideal. To honour the Queen, to reverence the flag, to be jealous for the national honour—these were good things in themselves. But the danger of this new-born imperialism was lest these noble professions should cloak the desire to obtain a cheap emotional satisfaction, that heroism should take the form of vicarious bullying, that individual should be sublimated into collective egotism, and that the generous and liberal impulses of past years should be choked by a will to power which was not a will either to personal service or personal risk. Equally serious was the danger that an ignorant enthusiasm might be turned, by interested persons, to the service of their own ends, whether these took the form of turning bloodshed and tyranny to their personal profit, or of diverting the attention and energy of the masses from the improvement of their own condition. Perhaps the greatest, because the subtlest danger, was that the newborn enthusiasm for empire might stampede a newly-enfranchised and half-educated populace into forsaking their true heritage of British tradition and whoring after strange gods—perhaps those of Rome.

And yet, it may be, that for the chance of crowning British

civilization with the attainment, not of empire, in the old sense, but of a Commonwealth of free nations, heralding the dawn of a new and brighter phase of the world's history—the risk was worth taking.

12

CAUCOCRACY

The Reform Bill of 1867 had hardly come into operation, when it became apparent that a new spirit had entered into politics. It was one thing to set up a democratic franchise, and quite another to make it function democratically. By a strange irony, the very expedient that was first hit upon for accomplishing this latter object proved to be the most effective means of frustrating it.

To strike a greatest common measure between the wills of millions of poor and uneducated men, in most of whose lives and interests politics plays an almost negligible part, and to get this average or general will translated into action, might seem, to anyone not obsessed by the catchwords of popular rhetoric, a task well nigh superhuman. This, however, was not the view of a few earnest Radical politicians in the city of Birmingham, the chief of whom, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, was destined to wield an influence in English politics comparable to that of Gladstone himself. In one respect the two men were strikingly similar. To an even greater extent than of Gladstone, we think of Chamberlain as a force, a torrential energy. He never displayed the least trace of Mr. Balfour's intellectual detachment or Disraeli's philosophic grasp. What manner of man he was his face reveals with extraordinary clearness—the head like a spear, the keen-cut features, the tight lips, the aggressive nose—one of those men who, whether for good or ill, are destined by sheer force of will to play the leading part on whatever stage they happen to figure. He started life as his father's representative in a screw manufacturing business, in which, in face of desperate competition, his tempestuous efficiency succeeded in establishing something like a monopoly for his firm, and a handsome fortune for himself. Still a comparatively young man, he next flung himself into municipal politics and, as Mayor of Birmingham, transformed that city, by a daring application of socialistic principles, from one of the most backward to the best-governed and most progressive in England.

This second not inconsiderable achievement was but the preliminary to a career first of national and then of imperial significance. To the man who had set up a new model of municipal government,

it did not seem an impossible achievement to make Birmingham give the lead to England in the application of Radical democratic principles. Disraeli's Bill had made the experiment of giving Birmingham a franchise designed to secure the representation of a minority by only allowing each elector two votes for the three seats. This was a direct denial of the Divine Right of a majority to absolute power, and the Birmingham Radicals, being a majority, would be satisfied with nothing less than the whole representation of the city for themselves. The actual plan for manipulating votes, by dictating to each member of the party which two Radicals he should support, emanated from a Mr. Harris, but Chamberlain's organizing energy made it certain of success. All three seats were secured and the experimental franchise was withdrawn.

But the Birmingham plan, as it was called, was by no means to be dropped with the attainment of its immediate object. Mr. Chamberlain had discovered a new model of political warfare, and one thoroughly after his own heart. For the effect of it was to organize a party as an army is organized, by the strictest discipline, for the purpose of enforcing its will, or the will of its leaders. As in an army, all individual liberty or freedom of judgment was mercilessly subordinated to the purpose of winning. It was a point of honour not to let a private opinion stand in the way of party efficiency. And as in war, almost any means were excusable for the attainment of the supreme object. To howl down opponents, to break up meetings, were regrettable but all too common expedients; even the employment of personal violence was an inevitable result of regarding amenability to argument as incipient treason.

The success of the Birmingham plan was rapid and conspicuous enough to make it apparent that the party that first adopted it would enjoy an advantage over its opponents similar to that of a disciplined army over a mob. First the Liberal and then the Conservative party hastened to refurbish their machinery on the Birmingham model. Not only were the rank and file regimented, as far as practicable, into hosts of enthusiastic partisans, but the candidates themselves, even veteran and distinguished statesmen, were expected to take their principles, with their orders, from the "caucus", as the new organization was called. The old sturdy individualism, that had been so conspicuous a quality of the mid-century bourgeoisie, was now a political crime to be suppressed without mercy by the caucus inquisition. Even Joseph Cowen, one of the old guard of

Romantic Liberalism, the friend of Mazzini and Garibaldi, was subjected to a merciless and minute persecution by the so-called Liberal organization in his own constituency, set upon by imported ruffians, and driven into private life, because he persisted in maintaining the right of a Member of Parliament to vote according to the dictates of his conscience.

It might have been foreseen that the caucus would not long remain true even to its narrow aim of enforcing the tyranny of a majority. The organization of an army is not the one best calculated for enforcing the preferences of its rank and file. Centralization was necessary for efficiency, and lavish subsidies were continually required to supply the sinews of war. As party organization became national, the importance of the local three-hundreds and six-hundreds rapidly dwindled, and that of the central office, from which the whole campaign was directed, became overwhelming. It was the central office that received and administered the great secret funds that were required for the success of competitive electioneering. And, paying the piper, it not unnaturally called the tune, only humouring the local associations on points of minor importance.

In this age of none too scrupulous politics, there was perhaps no system less obviously defensible than this latest development of English Parliamentary government. So far were the people from having the least control over the parties whose nominees governed them by turns, that all vital decisions of policy and legislation were taken by one or other secret junto whose very composition was unknown to all but a few favoured individuals. These bodies were in the uncontrolled possession of huge funds, a great part of which was raised by what can only be described as systematic corruption. It was a notorious but sedulously tabooed fact that one of the principal ways in which party funds were recruited was the prostitution of public honour involved in the sale of peerages, which were created on a scale of unprecedented lavishness, until the House of Lords was swamped with hitherto unregarded plutocrats whose titles amounted to little more than certificates of corruption. So jealously were the whole of these transactions wrapped with a veil of secrecy, so seldom was anything committal put into writing, so deeply was the reputation of both parties involved in keeping their shame from the light of day, that it was practically impossible to say in any individual case—"So-and-so bought his peerage for so much cash down." But the mere fact, that cannot be gainsaid, of all efforts to probe the facts having been sedulously burked, and, most of all, the damning

refusal to consider and unwillingness even to discuss the investigation and audit of party funds—theoretically contributed by the people themselves for public objects—is sufficient warrant for letting judgment go by default against those who make no secret of loving darkness rather than light.

The tainting of the fount of honour by the sale of peerages is only one of the crudest and perhaps one of the least important effects of the capitalization of politics involved in the caucus system. It has been already remarked that he who pays the piper calls the tune, and where the sinews of war come from the purses of very rich men, it is inevitable that the central office, and therefore party and national policy, can hardly fail to show a marked consideration for the wishes and interests of its patrons. There is no necessity to assume any such sensational corruption as that involved in the direct purchase of legislation; the “pull” that money exercises over policy may be quite informal and even negative. It may take the form of an extreme good taste in the eschewing of personalities, in declining to rake up the mud of public scandals, and generally in avoiding anything likely to be directly offensive to certain persons or interests. But corruption is none the less corrupt when it takes the form of avoiding trouble.

The Birmingham plan to realize the purpose of the democratic franchise had thus eventuated into the most effectual means of defeating it. The vote was no doubt in the hands of the poor man, but it was an instrument he had not the knowledge and perhaps hardly the will to use effectively. Every effort was made by constant and well-financed mass-suggestion to engender in him the team spirit, to make him desire the triumph of his political colour as he did that of his football team, to get him wild with enthusiasm about a few selected catchwords or formulas bearing scant relation to reality. Meanwhile the real decisions were taken and policies framed in a jealously guarded secrecy.

There was an intelligible defence of this system which for obvious reasons it was impossible to put forward in public. Probably few of the upper class in their heart of hearts believed that the newly enfranchised electors were capable of exercising their power with sufficient knowledge and self-restraint to preserve their country from disaster or bloody revolution. The Queen's government, the social system, must be carried on, the whole complicated mechanism of imperial and domestic politics must be kept beyond the reach of clumsy or violent hands. The old Liberal faith in

representative institutions, the instinctive trust in the people, were everywhere on the wane in an age dominated by the conceptions of *Realpolitik*. The English temperament was not enamoured of logical solutions and it might be held that a system, monstrous in theory, might produce, in practice, at least a better working compromise than any other within the range of practicability. To a generation inclined to doubt whether Pilate's question about truth admitted of an answer, there might not be any insuperable objection to a political system founded on falsehood, and raised in corruption. The subject was one almost tabooed in political controversy and in the press, so that the ordinary man had few opportunities, even if he would, of becoming acquainted with the reality behind the alluring show of the political war.

Not only without but within the walls of Parliament was what Nietzsche would have called the breaking of the old Tables to be observed. Parnell and the Irish Nationalists, who were no friends to England, had shown how the old, dignified conventions of the House could be deliberately strained so as to make a farce of its proceedings. But it was for members of the Conservative party, the traditional supporters of order and precedent, to show that they could take lessons from Parnell, and better his instruction. A young politician of genius, Lord Randolph Churchill, succeeded, with no more than three friends, in forming what was known as the Fourth Party, for the purpose of carrying on war to the knife against the Gladstone ministry, and forcing their own official leader, Sir Stafford Northcote—as Parnell had forced his leader, Butt—either to conform to their methods or to stand aside.

Lord Randolph himself was a convinced Tory democrat determined to make his party no longer merely Conservative, but, as Disraeli would have had it, national and progressive. But the motive that united the four friends was one of sheer combativeness, a desire to defeat the enemy by almost any means. The first point on which they challenged the government was whether Charles Bradlaugh, an atheist, could be allowed to enter the House, to which his constituents had elected him, without taking an oath. The four, with a sudden access of piety, maintained that an atheist could only qualify as an M.P. by denying his principles as well as his God. This appeal to bigotry on the part of men who were certainly not obsessed with any fanatical piety was actually successful in inflicting a severe check on Gladstone. Encouraged by its success, the Fourth Party continued to employ, with great skill, every possible weapon

for the discomfiture of the government. Gladstone was attacked with a brutality almost unbelievable, and the gentle Sir Stafford Northcote fared little better. The arts of obstruction were practised with untiring assiduity. Outside the House, Lord Randolph was busy fashioning a Conservative caucus on the Birmingham model.

Gladstone and his colleagues were thus driven to an innovation which was as much at variance with their professed Liberalism as their conquest of Egypt in the interests of the bondholders. They started to interfere by law with the old freedom of debate. Needless to say, the caucus threw the whole weight of its authority on their side, openly asserting the view that members must allow party loyalty to come before individual convictions. The institution of the "closure" was only the first measure in a code which was continually strengthened by successive governments, and had the effect of placing the House almost completely at the mercy of the executive. It was now possible to force through legislation by an ordered process of tramping through the lobbies, with only so much debate as the government cared to tolerate, and that often on the most trivial issues, while vital clauses and amendments were dealt with wholesale and undebated. The talking shop of Westminster was fast becoming a voting shop.

It is remarkable, under these circumstances, that, in spite of everything, so much statesmanship and patriotism should have survived in the government of the country. This must in part be attributed to the occasionally blessed illogicality of the English temperament, to the businesslike capacity for cutting moral losses that had distinguished no less a statesman than Chatham, who could profit by Newcastle's corruption to keep in office and save England. It was an accepted convention that the Prime Minister should turn a Nelson eye on the dubious proceedings of the Whips' Office. Again, much of the solid work of statesmanship, for which the politicians took and got credit, was really performed by the permanent officials of the different departments, whom Gladstone's reform of the civil service had relegated to a useful obscurity out of the scope of the caucus. Thus it came about that party programmes, or principles, as they were somewhat euphemistically called in the press, counted for a good deal less in practice than on the platform.

As regards the two traditional parties—as with Republicans and Democrats in the United States—it became increasingly difficult to understand what constant principles, if any, they represented. The Conservatives, now united with the seceding Liberal

Unionists, certainly made their first plank the maintenance of the Union with and firm government in Ireland, though only after coquetting with the Nationalists so long as their support had been in the market. But in Ireland the Conservatives were soon supporting the right of self-determination, even to the point of armed resistance, on the part of the Dissenting community in the North East. Again the Conservatives, the traditionally constitutional party, prompted the most violent constitutional innovation for two centuries by inducing the Lords, in 1910, to throw out a Budget.

The Liberals seemed almost equally rudderless. Between the old Gladstonian individualism and the new State socialism they oscillated uncertainly. A programme drawn up at Newcastle in 1891 was less a statement of principles than an attempt to provide what in acting parlance might have been called a bit of fat for each of their component groups. Between the new imperialism and the old Manchester Little Englandism they were, at the end of the century, openly and bitterly divided. They were in favour of applying the principles of Burke, much diluted, to Catholic Ireland, and those of George III and Lord North to the recalcitrant Protestants of the North East. Finally their attitude in respect of Free Trade was dogmatically and uncompromisingly conservative.

The dominating factor the whole time was the Irish Nationalist party. So long as either side could command a clear majority over this and its opponents combined, Home Rule might be shelved, even by the Liberals. Parnellite obstruction had been overcome, though the price paid had been the freedom of Parliamentary debate. In 1892 the Liberals managed, though in a minority themselves, to form, with Irish help, a government whose first business was, of course, to force through another Home Rule Bill by a drastic use of the new machinery for closing debate. This Bill was promptly and contemptuously thrown out by the Lords, and Gladstone, whose colleagues would not allow him to challenge the verdict of the country, made his second and final retirement from the leadership of his party.

A new feature now comes into our political warfare. The House of Lords had long been, if not the sleeping, at least the dozing partner of the Commons. Since the first Reform Bill it did, as a popular opera had expressed it (the thing being too universally admitted to give offence)—

“ nothing in particular
And did it very well.”

It existed as a possible brake on revolutionary legislation and a useful adjunct to the Commons, it had also gained a somewhat evil name for pruning, in its unobtrusive way, such humane and progressive legislation as had not too strong a backing. But it had known its place, though on two occasions it had had to be reminded thereof by Gladstone, and that place, by tacit convention, was very much lower than a strict interpretation of the law would have prescribed.

In an age of foreign and domestic *Realpolitik*, however, conventions are not honoured when there is any immediate advantage to be gained by ignoring them. Moreover, one of the most serious results of the Liberal split of 1886 was to bring the heads of the great Houses, which had been the old-guard of Whiggism, almost solidly over on to the Unionist side. The House of Lords thus became overwhelmingly Unionist—the name that was now adopted to denote the reinforced Conservative party—and as the grant and sale of peerages was, for seventeen out of the next twenty years, conducted by the Unionist caucus, the disparity was only increased. The temptation to use the peerage as a mere pawn in the party game became too overwhelming to be resisted, especially after the really popular action of the Lords in throwing out the second Home Rule Bill. Knowing the shaky tenure of the Liberal Government, the Peers followed up their advantage by contemptuously rejecting bill after bill. As far as the immediate situation was concerned they, or the caucus, had calculated well; divided and discredited, the Liberals were driven to the country and defeated, the Conservatives commanding an overwhelming advantage over them and the Irish combined. But the House of Lords, most of whose members had qualified by birth and some by purchase, had now committed itself to the position that it could, and ought to, hold up the legislation of an elected majority with which it disagreed. It had also fatally compromised its independence and dignity, not only by its tacit acquiescence in its own corruption by purchase, but also by its open participation in the caucus war on the Unionist side.

However much Parliamentary government may have suffered from the causes we have outlined, the years of Unionist domination were not unfruitful of quiet legislative progress. Education, which had been made compulsory in 1880, was made free in 1891, and centralized in 1902 in the County Councils, though the miserable squabbles of rival sects, which had been throughout the curse of English education, entirely diverted attention from anything but

what was called the "religious" aspect of the last-named Act. The system of local representative government was completed and brought down, by the short-lived Liberal ministry, to the parishes. Some progress was made in such social reforms as concerned Housing, Compensation for Accidents, and the provision of allotments for the landless. A genuine attempt was made to blend beneficence with firmness in the government of Ireland. Most significant of all, as a sign of the times, was the fact that in 1903 the Unionist government should itself have paved the way for Home Rule. It prudently withdrew the English garrison of landlords from Catholic Ireland by a system of state-aided purchase of the land for the tenants. Having once got the soil it could not be long before the Irish would demand and obtain the government of their country.

13

DAUGHTER NATIONS

The last two decades of the nineteenth century saw the most astonishing extension of European sway that had ever taken place in so short a time. The development of steam transport, by land and sea, invited the exploitation of the Continental hinterlands behind the coast strips to which colonial enterprise had hitherto clung. And just as capital, hungry for investment, had, in the eighteenth century, demanded and obtained inventors, so now, when the call was for explorers of genius, it was not unanswered. The spectacle was witnessed of a wild and none too scrupulous scramble for every inch of the globe that remained to be appropriated or exploited. This was only the logical application of principles of Realism and *Realpolitik* that were now everywhere dominant. It was in the eighties that France and Germany shed the last remnants of Cobdenite Free-Trade and pinned their faith to that form of extreme nationalism which sees even in trade not an exchange of benefits, but an unceasing struggle to vanquish and exclude all one's neighbours, the Darwinian anarchy backed by all the resources of science. In every civilized power capital was fiercely competing for dividends, and, whatever the form of government, it was capital that ruled the roost. If the process of bringing railways, rum, and other marketable benefits to backward countries, or of extracting metals from their soil, brought 5 per cent where only 4 could be obtained from investment at home, that was sufficient reason for forcibly or guilefully appropriating the land of any aboriginal

potentate or chief who might be supposed to be incapable of resistance, and of pushing claims to such appropriated or some-day-to-be-appropriated property as near as possible to the verge of war with civilized competitors in the good work.

It is, in fact, some tribute to the fear in which the different competitors stood of one another, that crisis after crisis, which threatened to drown civilized Europe in its own blood, was somehow or other overcome. We ourselves were within a hairsbreadth of war with Russia over Afghanistan, and with France over Siam, the Niger, and the Upper Nile Valley. Even with Germany the affair of Jameson's Raid brought us nearer to the brink than most of us realized before the disclosure of the German Foreign Office records. And with the Dutch in the Transvaal, only a bloody and expensive conflict could bring about a settlement that might have been obtained long before by peaceful diplomacy.

There was, of course, a nobler aspect of imperial expansion than that of mere capitalist grab, the spirit that inspired the cult of the White Man's Burden. There was abundant patriotism in the breast of many an explorer and Empire Builder who braved forest and wilderness, death and disease, in the effort to plant the flag in some hitherto unclaimed territory. There was, mixed with more questionable motives, a real enthusiasm for bringing order and science into the chaos of primitive barbarism. It was something to put down the slave trade, to substitute the arts of the engineer and chemist for those of the witch-doctor, to establish the Pax Britannica over regions formerly given up to incessant and uncreative strife.

It must also be remembered that England, owing to her distinctive national character and her isolation from Continental influences, travelled less far and less decidedly along the path of *Realpolitik* than her neighbours. From first to last the voice of the nation was firm against any departure from the fiscal policy of which Cobden had been the apostle—Free Trade was maintained with a rigidity which its opponents were never tired of characterizing as pedantic, having regard to the very different circumstances of their own time. England, as represented at any rate by the industrial North, deliberately preferred to fight protective tariffs by free imports.

Again the old-fashioned, half-cosmopolitan Liberalism, to which liberty and goodwill were more important than power, though severely scotched, was by no means killed. There was always a powerful current of opinion setting against imperialism and so ready to take up any case of alleged injustice or oppression as to invite

Canning's old taunt about the friends of every country but their own. As a popular rhyme had it,

“ Pro-Boer, pro-Fenian,
Pro-Greek, pro-Armenian. . . ”

Nor were even our most intransigent imperialists of the nineties quite of the same kidney as the hard and calculating men, who directed the politics of Continental powers. Looking back in the perspective of some thirty years, one sees two figures emerge from the feverish unrest of the nineties, in whom British imperialism seems to embody itself. These, it is hardly necessary to say, are of Joseph Chamberlain and Cecil Rhodes.

From the recorded utterances of both these men unsympathetic critics can extract, and have extracted, abundant quotations which would, taken by themselves, appear to indicate minds set wholly in the pursuit of material gain—Rhodes's “ philanthropy plus five per cent ” is notorious. There are passages in Chamberlain's speeches from which it would appear that the Empire itself was, as Burke might have put it, “ nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico and tobacco, or some other such low concern ”, and that the supreme object of enlightened statesmanship was to put the Empire, in Chamberlain's words, “ on a business footing.”

And no doubt commercial considerations swayed Chamberlain's mind as powerfully—even as disproportionately—as they had Cobden's. The Birmingham screw-king was apt to think of everything in business terms. There is a cartoon of Max Beerbohm's which depicts him as a veritable Lord of the Philistines, catching Austin Dobson and Mr. Edmund Gosse, then at the Board of Trade, in the crime of composing poetry during office hours. But there was a streak of poetry running unmistakably through his own temperament, and of him, as of an earlier Joseph, it might have been said, “ Here this dreamer cometh ! ” Before everything else, however, he was a fighter. Like Gladstone and like Chatham, he was more of a force than an intellect, the aggressive nose, that proved so irresistible a temptation to the caricaturist, betrayed an energy of will that bore everything before it. And this will was not masked by the subtlety of mind that deceived contemporaries about Gladstone. Chamberlain's mind was as clear cut as his face. Once he had fixed on any goal as worthy of attainment, he went straight for it with the simplicity and ruthlessness of a Berserker, rejoicing greatly at any opposition that might present itself. It is by no

accident that his name is associated with the form of party machinery that is designed to crush individual thought and conscience in the sole interest of victory.

A ruthless will and an eye to the business aspect of everything might well be supposed to stamp their owner as the typical statesman of capitalist *Realpolitik*. And no doubt the time had given birth and scope to the man. But Chamberlain was not only a fighter and a hustler, but also something of a visionary. Spinoza was described as God-intoxicated, and so, in the latter part of his career, might Chamberlain have been described as Empire-intoxicated. The subject moved him to passionate eloquence. "You are destined," he said in Johannesburg shortly after the South African War, "to become a powerful element in that federation of free states shortly to be established, and then to constitute one in a group of free nations gathered round the motherland. I think that is an inspiring thought. The day of small kingdoms with their petty jealousies has passed. The future is with the great empires, and there is no greater empire than the British Empire."

That is the string on which he never wearied of harping, and there is no reason to doubt of his sincerity. The Empire appealed to him perhaps most of all as something of unprecedented vastness and opulence, something about which, in his own memorable phrase, one could think imperially. But the Empire was also, in his eyes, a beneficent organization. With regard to its non-British subjects, his view resembled that of an ancient Roman: England was conferring an inestimable benefit upon them and upon mankind at large by imposing her peace, her civilization. She was right fearlessly to extend her responsibilities, to compel these lesser breeds to come within the Law. He had nothing but contempt for those who espoused the cause of potentates, such as Prempeh and Lobengula, whom we found it necessary to dispossess by the argument of maxim guns. "You cannot," he said, "make omelettes without breaking eggs; you cannot destroy the practices of barbarism, of slavery, of superstition . . . without the use of force." It was enough justification, in his eyes, to reflect that for every life lost a hundred had been gained. "We feel that our rule over these territories can only be justified if we can show that it adds to the happiness and prosperity of the people, and I maintain that our rule does, and has, brought security and peace and comparative prosperity to countries that never knew these blessings before."

British imperialism differed from that of Continental nations

in that it was not only concerned with peoples believed to be inferior to us in the scale of civilization. The daughter nations beyond the seas, to which there was nothing remotely corresponding in other empires, were now coming to maturity, and it was the prospect opened by this development that more than anything else caught and fired the imagination of Chamberlain. We had, he believed, reached the true conception of Empire in which the sense of possession had given place to the sentiment of kinship. He made himself the apostle of a new and broader patriotism that was not limited by the shores of one island or group of islands, but which would, he confidently believed, lead ultimately, and with the free will of all concerned, to a federation of the whole British race. United, this Empire, so vast in its extent and so diverse in its resources, could stand alone and safe against any possible combination. Speaking in 1903, he explicitly predicted that if ever we had our backs to the wall against a coalition of hostile nations, the whole resources of the colonies would be at our disposal. "That," he added, "is something which it is wonderful to have achieved, and which it is worth almost any sacrifice to maintain."

So tremendous was the driving force of Chamberlain's personality as to render it almost inevitable that his assumption of the Colonial Secretariat in Lord Salisbury's 1895 ministry should have opened what was, to all intents and purposes, a new chapter in Imperial history. The colonies themselves were thrust from their provincial obscurity into the full blaze of the limelight. They were treated with a respect and sympathy they had never known before. There was no question of separation, in however remote a future; the only concern of British statesmen was how far they could induce the colonies to travel in the direction of unity.

But Chamberlain himself was scarcely ready to accept all the implications of an Empire whose bond is not of the law but of the spirit, and whose service is perfect freedom. His business instincts were perpetually impelling him to look for formal and tangible evidences of union. One of his most cherished dreams was of a formal scheme of imperial federation, which was entirely repellent to the sensitive independence of nations just finding their feet. He would have put the Empire on a business footing by an elaborate system of fiscal preferences and on a war footing by a more or less centralized scheme of national defence. Though sympathizing with the colonial point of view to a greater extent than any previous statesman of the first rank, he was not fully prepared to fling the

reins on to the neck of colonial patriotism, in the faith that the spirit of love, and that alone, could freely unite these lesser loves into one imperial patriotism inspired by common principles and a common freedom. In an age that prided itself on a realism which, in practice, differed not much from cynicism, it was too much to expect that a faith, apparently so paradoxical, should find unreserved acceptance.

Whatever wisdom or folly might do to hasten or retard the advent of a world-wide Commonwealth, nothing could now arrest the advance of the new-born daughter nations in the realization of their own nationality. To write anything like an adequate account of the stage in colonial history in which the colonies cease to be colonies any longer and attain the status of dominions, would in itself demand many volumes. In all but South Africa the progress was the more rapid from being effected under conditions that allowed nearly the whole of each people's energy and resources to be devoted to the arts of peaceful industry. While Europe was staggering under the burden of armaments and distracted by the perpetual menace of war, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were working out their own destinies in a security almost idyllic, and safeguarded by the world-dominance of a navy to which it was only in the years immediately preceding the Great War that they thought of making any serious contribution.

The history of Canada was largely that of her system of railways, which now linked up her Pacific with her Atlantic coast, and enabled her to open up the great grain-lands of the West. The mere fact of this main artery of traffic running from East to West, tended to make still more remote the prospect of her ever amalgamating with her great Southern neighbour. Even those among the French Canadians who most resented any suspicion of British interference, were by no means minded to exchange King Log at London for President Stork at Washington. The main difference between the Conservative and Liberal parties, who alternated in the enjoyment of long terms of office, was that the Liberals were somewhat more inclined to push nationalist principles to their logical conclusion, and to oppose any effort to strengthen the formal bonds of Empire. They held that loyalty to the imperial connection would be only strengthened by the fact that they entered the partnership not as independents but as equals. But when, after a long term of office, they tried, in 1911, to effect a treaty of commercial reciprocity with the States, which some American politician was foolish or cunning enough to describe as a first step on the path to annexation, Canadian

feeling was aroused to the extent of hurling the Liberals from office by a decisive majority.

As for Australia and New Zealand, they were developing, though in separation, upon lines extremely interesting to students of advanced democracy in the older nations. By the close of the nineteenth century Australia had followed the example of Canada and united her separate states into one Commonwealth. As she was in no imminent fear of pressure from abroad, she was content with a federation of colonies, on the model of the United States, the central government only enjoying such powers as were expressly reserved to it in the Constitution. However, even thus early a menace was beginning to arise in the North that was destined to cast an ever deepening shadow over the peaceful prospects of this remote corner of the world. The warrior people of Japan who had been forced, by European cannon, to quit their age-long isolation, had decided that the West should have all, and more than all, that it wanted in the way of intercourse with them. Their overthrow of China in 1894-5 proclaimed them a force to be reckoned with; their triumph over Russia ten years later established their position as a military and naval power of the first rank.

Here was a position sufficiently disquieting for the European communities bordering the Pacific. Japan, with her commerce and manufactures enormously stimulated, was producing more people than she could feed, and it was inevitable that she should cast longing eyes towards the island continent whose population was yet sparse in relation to its resources. But Australia, as well as New Zealand, was jealously determined to remain a white man's country, and to keep out the Asiatic whose cheap labour would lower the standard of living which it was the first object of Australasian statesmanship to maintain at the highest possible level. Hence in both Dominions, strict immigration laws kept the Asiatic at a distance. It was, however, by no means impossible that the conquerors of Wei Hei Wei and Port Arthur might elect to take by force what was thus denied to them. As compared with any resistance that Australasia could offer on her own behalf, the numbers and armaments of Japan were overwhelming. In the early years of the twentieth century it had become more than probable that the cutting of the imperial connection, if such a thing were conceivable, by Australia or New Zealand, would amount to the signing of her own death warrant, unless, indeed, the United States could be induced to step into the place of the Mother Country. As the threat from the United States

contributed in no small degree to Canadian loyalty, so that from Japan was not without its influence on the loyalty of Australia and New Zealand. As early as 1909 Australia adopted the principle of compulsory service, though the most serious fighting she had ever witnessed within her own boundaries had been the police affair, too trumpery to be called a battle, of the Eureka stockade in 1854.

Meanwhile both Dominions (if we may apply the word without prejudice to Canada's special claim to be *the* Dominion) were showing to the world that the traditions of the British Constitution were capable of evolving orderly progress out of the most advanced experiments in social democracy. In both, the conditions were ideal for the control of the social organism by Labour and in the interests of Labour. There was no upper class tradition; the man at the top of the ladder did not differ so markedly in culture and tradition from him at the bottom. Again, the resources of Australasia had not yet, like those of the United States, permitted the formation of a powerful plutocracy. There was not that constant threat from abroad that turns men's thoughts from domestic concerns, and concentrates them on the supreme necessity for discipline and a united front. The working class were in the majority, and though they were slow to realize the power the vote had put into their hands, they were bound sooner or later to use it to the full. And it is the habit of the English mind to refrain from making an immoderate use of power by pushing class principles to their logical extreme, and when in a minority, to play the constitutional game by deferring peacefully to the will the majority as expressed in Parliament.

In both Australia and New Zealand, then, the spectacle was witnessed of a series of experiments in State socialism that, until the coming of the Bolsheviks, put the most ambitious advances of older nations into the shade. Labour was in the saddle; it imposed its taxes on the capitalists and its laws on the community. The results went far to show that the spirit of British institutions can adapt itself as easily to working class rule as to that of a bewigged aristocracy or a frock-coated bourgeoisie. The results of the new regime were neither catastrophic nor sensational. There was no tendency to run to revolutionary extremes, nor to make a logical application of socialist or any other doctrines. Labour, on the whole, improved its conditions without driving capital away. The Australasian Dominions presented the aspect of intensely busy, reasonably prosperous, and rather Philistine communities on the make. Common to all of the daughter nations was a profound love of liberty, in the

time-honoured British sense of liberties, and for this, when the time came, most of their sons were ready to shed the last drop of their blood. And it was because, in their heart of hearts, they recognized the Mother Country as the champion of this ideal, that they remained loyal to her at the crisis of her fate.

At the same time, life in the Colonies was almost aggressively devoid of introspection or spirituality. It was no wonder that between the white Dominions and India there could be scant sympathy. To the Indian the external world was nothing, an illusion; to the typical colonial it was everything. Leisure, to him, was apt to signify a mere diversion of energy from work to sport. Almost as much excitement was caused by a match between England and Australia at Sydney as if the two nations had been really at war and a decisive battle was in progress. It is said that the congregation in one of the principal churches was thrilled to ecstasy by the minister, who had just received a telegram, announcing with enormous emphasis from the pulpit, "there is no peace for *the wicked*," signifying that the team then touring England had beaten the old country by three wickets. Racing, with its accompaniment of betting, was also enormously patronized. This cult of organized sport was most developed in Australia, where the large towns absorbed so large a proportion of the population, and least, largely owing to climatic conditions, in Canada.

But in none of the Dominions is the inner life developed to even its normal extent amongst peoples of European stock. Such an idea as that of a colonial mystic seems almost a contradiction in terms. Artists and poets have occasionally arisen from the colonies—Australia can boast the name of Mackinnell in sculpture, and South Africa that of Lutyens in architecture,—but these are isolated instances and they seem rather offshoots of an alien culture than representatives of a tradition or spirit native to their respective Dominions. Even the culture of the United States, such as it is and has been, has nothing to be compared with it in these Dominions overseas—there is nothing remotely corresponding to a colonial Boston. Naturally beauties of nature, unique of their kind, have found artists to interpret them, though more often than not men have received their training in the schools of Europe, and who see their native land through strange glasses. It is inevitable, too, that poetry, of a sort—a breezy and sedulously manly sort, as a rule—should be produced, even to the extent of filling an Oxford Book. But we look in vain for a colonial Masfield or Kipling, let alone a

Shelley. No doubt colonial art has a certain vigour, no doubt it has improved with the prosperity of the Dominions, but no candid citizen of these young nations will be found to deny and very few to regret that it is as yet a provincial and essentially second-rate product. Where there is little time for reflection, where life is one strenuous pursuit of this world's goods or pleasures, where things temporal, in the gospel sense, are valued above things eternal, the seeds of art fall by the wayside or, at best, strike shallow roots.

14

EXPANSION IN AFRICA

In Canada, in Australia and in New Zealand we have had to record a steady growth in peaceful prosperity. It has been their good fortune not to have stood conspicuously in the limelight of the world's history. The Englishman in the street, during these supremely important years of their adolescence, knew very little about them. He had a vague idea of their loyalty to the Empire, a loyalty whose spirit he somewhat patronizingly misunderstood; he commonly thought of them as in some vague way identified with the Conservative party at home; he visualized their inhabitants as leading a romantic and open air life the very opposite of his own. It was perhaps just as well that this should be so—a distant and largely imaginary view often blurs outlines that might seem harsh and ungenial when viewed at close quarters. But if the affairs of the rest of the Empire were a closed book to the ordinary Englishman, those of the African Continent, and particularly those of South Africa, were continually thrusting themselves on his attention. It was here that the Empire was being enlarged to an extent vaguely adumbrated by expanding daubs of red upon the map; it was here that crisis succeeded to crisis and war to war; it was here that fabulous fortunes might be built up in a few brief years; it was here, finally, that the mighty colossus of Empire, fitly named Rhodes, was realizing, for himself and for the Empire, his vast dreams.

To get the key to this complex drama of European expansion in Africa, we must keep in mind a geographical principle understood by nobody earlier than by Rhodes himself. It was the ambition of no less than four European powers to establish an empire right across the Continent from sea to sea, but it was England alone who aspired to do this lengthwise from North to South. Rhodes, with his imperial vision, dreamed of an all-British railway from the Cape

to Cairo, with branches running to the coast, and gathering up the trade of the whole surrounding country. Of this line we had already acquired the termini, and it only remained—a by no means impossible task in his opinion—to secure the intervening few thousand miles. But to achieve this ambition would be to annihilate not only the claim of Portugal to join the hinterlands of her Eastern and Western possessions, but the more serious ambitions of France and Germany. And at the very outset of our advance from the South we should have on our flank, if not in our front, the formidable opposition of the Boer Republics, while in the North the Mahdi barred the gates of the Upper Nile.

. It was the essence of Rhodes's genius that he saw these problems, stripped of all their complexities, in bold and simple outlines. He was the son of a country clergyman, who had sought and found his fortune in the newly discovered diamond fields on the Western borders of the Orange Free State, fields that, when once their worth was known, we had acquired for ourselves by the bogus patronage of a Griqua Chief or, to put it bluntly, by an unblushing piece of sharp practice. Such a fortune as that of Rhodes, amid such competition as a rush for diamonds inevitably produces, could not be, and indeed was not, acquired by too scrupulous methods. But herein lay the man's greatness, what distinguished him from such mere money-grubbers as his rival, the little Whitechapel Jew, Barney Barnato—that to Rhodes money was not an end in itself, but the means to ends that were neither petty nor egoistic. These millions, to accumulate which he did not hesitate to employ the muck rake, were the fulcrum by which he aspired to lever the world.

Among all the men of his time of hardness and realism, there is none who approaches quite so closely to the popular conception of the superman. Rhodes was one of those natural aristocrats for whom the restrictions of everyday morality have no meaning. He was the strong man of magazine fiction translated into real life. He was imbued with that cult of bigness that, in the nineties, was the equivalent of greatness. He dreamed in continents, he thought nothing of conquering a country equal in size (so it was frequently pointed out) to France and Spain and the German Empire put together, and having it baptized with his own name. He had far more of romance about him than the clear-cut Chamberlain, only the most romantic thing in the world was to him, as indeed it had been to Balzac, money. Money, in an age of capitalist expansion,

was power, and could Rhodes have formulated a gospel he would certainly have altered "God is love" to "God is power". It is characteristic that when Gordon told him how he had refused a room full of silver offered him by way of backsheesh in China, Rhodes replied that he would have taken it and as many more as they liked to offer him. "What," he added, "is the use of having ideas if you haven't the money to carry them out?"

Rhodes was an ardent imperialist, and it was a pardonable exaggeration for one of his contemporaries to have placed him on the roll of men "whose one thought has been the glory of their country". From the moment his financial operations had furnished him with the means of entering the political sphere, he was perfectly clear as to what he wanted, and equally clear that he would stick at nothing in its pursuit. By sheer force of personality, he came rapidly to dominate the politics of Cape Colony, and it is not the least of his feats that he was able to make even the cautious and unimaginative Dutch dance to his piping. Autocrat though he was by nature, his imperialism comprehended the fullest liberty for the daughter nations. Unlike Chamberlain, he went further than Gladstone himself in his support (and support with Rhodes was not only intellectual but also financial) of Irish Nationalism, only stipulating that Ireland, besides enjoying full Dominion status, should share in that representation at Westminster in which, he hoped, the other white Dominions would also—and the sooner the better—have their share. His ideal for South Africa was that Briton and Dutchman should unite to form one great nation, absolutely free within its own borders, but a loyal member of the Empire. "I have ever," he said, "held one view: the government of South Africa, with the Imperial flag for defence."

Rhodes's part in the great advance northwards towards Cairo began with his appointment in 1884 as Deputy Commissioner of Bechuanaland. Already from both flanks rivals were closing in to bar the first stages of the venture. Germany, whom Bismarck had at last consented to launch on a career of colonial expansion, had, not without unnecessary friction with Gladstone's vacillating government, established herself on the barren shores north of the Orange River, and was pressing purposefully inland. Meanwhile the Transvaal Boers, in parties of unauthorized trekkers, had thrust out beyond their borders right across the destined track of the Cape to Cairo railway. It was owing to Rhodes's perception that it was now or never for us to grasp the key of South Africa, that

imperial forces brushed aside the intruders and the Queen's sway was formally advanced to the 22nd parallel.

But Rhodes was by no means minded to stop there; he was minded to stop nowhere short of the complete attainment of his imperial purpose. He saw that, as far at least as the shores of Lake Tanganyika, there were vast and potentially opulent territories waiting to be grabbed in what was now the European game of grab for Africa. These territories of course had owners, in the shape of savages, who were at any rate like enough to their white brothers in prizing their property and independence, but the morality of dispossessing, by fair means or foul, these out-dated heathens who were bound to fall victims to some other power if not to us, was a point that neither Rhodes nor any of his associates dreamed of debating. The means chosen for the next great advance was not that of government action, which was too slow and might be too scrupulous, but the time-honoured Elizabethan expedient of a Chartered Company, which indeed was, in this epoch of expansion, our characteristic method of pegging out ambitious and semi-official claims for the government to confirm at its leisure. But a private company, on the make for its shareholders, and very imperfectly controlled by the home authority, is perhaps better adapted to enhance the power than the credit of the Empire.

The greatest of all these was Rhodes's South African Chartered Company, financed, on terms very favourable to the promoters, by investors of various nations, and allowed by the Queen's government a practically free hand to realize the grandiose but sincerely patriotic ambitions of its Chairman. Never, since the days of Pizarro, was enterprise better organized or carried out with more pluck, energy and success than this of a handful of slouch-hatted conquistadores, who carried the flag into the very heart of Central Africa and added to the Empire the vast tract of country fittingly known as Rhodesia.

Unfortunately, as Chamberlain remarked, one cannot make omelettes without breaking eggs, nor, he might have added, can one break into Naboth's vineyard without breaking Naboth. The greater part of the country was already under the rule of the warlike Matabele, an offshoot of the Zulus, and of their King Lobengula. This by no means ignoble savage was pathetically anxious to keep on friendly terms with the white men, and had a naïve trust in the friendship and protection of the great white Queen. But it was not with the Queen he had to deal, but with rival concession hunters,

eager to possess themselves of the mineral wealth beneath the soil, and consequently of the soil itself. All over Africa it was now a regular part of the game of civilized grab to entangle illiterate potentates into putting their mark to treaties or concessions that they could neither read nor understand, and which had the effect of signing away the whole or most of their sovereign rights. Such a trick was played on Lobengula by an emissary of Rhodes. When the unhappy chief discovered what he had done, he instantly ordered the execution of his chief councillor who, by persuading him to sign, had allowed him to be entangled in a net from which there was no escape. It was in vain that he threw himself on the protection and advice of the Queen. She was far off, and the Company did not mean to let him go. A quarrel was picked, and Dr. Jameson, Rhodes's right hand man, proceeded to organize an expeditionary force against the Matabele by offering each trooper loot and gold-claims to the tune of several thousand pounds. The naked Matabele stood no chance against the rifles and machine guns of their extremely efficient invaders, and the business of slaughtering them would have been as safe as a picnic, had it not been for the fact that an advance patrol was cut off by a swollen river and annihilated, an episode that was soon realistically staged for the benefit of delighted audiences in London. It was a fitting conclusion that when Lobengula, who had scrupulously guarded the lives of those Englishmen who were in his power, sent a money present with a message of surrender, the two troopers to whom they were delivered stole the money and kept back the message. Desperate and forsaken, the King perished miserably.

The sequel to conquest, as in Bengal after Plassey, was exploitation. The expenses of the war had created a hunger for dividends, and the country was rich in gold. Settlers, fired with the hopes of speedy wealth, flocked into the colony. The Matabele were ground to the dust. By a legal ingenuity that recalls that of the first English settlers in Ireland, the whole of their cattle was treated as having belonged to the King, and therefore as now belonging to his conquerors. Their land too was declared to have been similarly forfeited by the strict legal interpretation of some document that Lobengula had been tricked into signing, though this modest claim was, in 1918, quashed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The labour of their young men, which was very necessary for the profitable running of the concern, was conscripted under some politer name than slavery. It is, under these circumstances, not

surprising that, within three years of the conquest, the Matabele were up in a final desperate attempt to shake off the yoke, nor that they were joined by the peaceful Mashonas, to protect whom against Lobengula's tyranny had been the Company's ostensible pretext for destroying him. This second war was ended by Rhodes, who possessed an extraordinary influence over the natives, riding out, quite defenceless, to parley with the still embattled chiefs in their mountain fastnesses. After some hesitation between killing and trusting him, they decided on the latter. So strangely were the threads of heroism and commercial greed twined throughout this story of British expansion in Africa.

It would be superfluous to detail the stages by which Britain proceeded in her attempt to appropriate a continuous stretch of territory from the Cape to the Mediterranean. Besides her converging advance from each of the extreme points, she struck straight in, from the East coast, at the centre. Here the owner of most of the country to be exploited was the Sultan of Zanzibar, but as he was powerless to put up an effective fight against Europeans, the real rivalry was between England and Germany, or rather between the two State-backed capitalist companies which bore respectively, into the Dark Continent, the Union Jack and the black, white, and red flag. As England and Germany happened to be on comparatively friendly terms at the time, they managed to patch up an arrangement between themselves portioning out the Sultan's territories, with the exception of a bit in the North for Italy and a strip ten miles broad along the coast for the Sultan, which of course he was neither intended nor allowed to keep. The next advance of the British East African Company was to take possession of the rich land of Uganda, giving access to the head-waters of the Nile. The ruler of this land seems to have been a less estimable personage than Lobengula, and his dismissal necessitated somewhat less blood-letting, but there was one end to the noble and to the ignoble savage who happened to stand in the path of an enterprising Chartered Company, and it was that of the cuckoo in August,

"Go he must."

Not the least remarkable feature of this episode of seizing Uganda, was the proof it afforded that the foreign policy of the short-lived Liberal government of 1892-5 had, under Lord Roseberry, a connection of the Rothschilds, become almost as amenable to imperialist influences as that of its rivals.

It was now time to link up this central section of the Cape Cairo

route with the two extremities. This, however, could only be accomplished by severing the equally sought-for East to West routes of our European rivals. Portugal, without the force to back her ambitions, was easily disposed of, and made to yield us a path between her Eastern and Western possessions. But the rivalry of Germany was a tougher proposition, and though we actually arranged with the Congo Free State for a strip of territory joining up Uganda with Rhodesia, Germany and France, who for once found it convenient to stand together, compelled us to abandon this part of the Cape-Cairo project until such time as a war with Germany should allow us to step into her colonies.

Meanwhile France was making a desperate bid to forestall us by getting astride of the Nile valley. Bismarck, when he encouraged French colonial adventure, had probably never dreamed of the vast and sinister access of military strength that might accrue from France's possession of a North-West African Empire. Already French territory had come to stretch in a solid block from the Mediterranean to the Congo. It now remained to extend the thrust Eastward, through the Sudan and Abyssinia to the Gulf of Aden, in which France had already acquired a strip of coast. Since the fall of Khartoum, England had resolved to stand on the defensive in Egypt and leave the Sudan to its Mahdist conquerors. The French took the position that since we had thus vacated the Sudan, it was open to anybody who could plant a flag there. For a time their advance was suspended by what amounted to a threat of war on the part of the Liberal Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, in 1895. But the French, after what was for them a fatal delay, resolved that not even this should deter them, and converging expeditions set out for the Nile from West and East.

Now or never, therefore, was it time for the Conservative government, on the crest of the imperialist wave, to start the advance from the North. In 1896, with almost precipitate haste, the Anglo-Egyptian forces were set in motion Southwards. This time it was no forlorn hope across the desert, but a deliberate, scientific, inevitable advance, carrying the railway along with it. In 1898, after a tremendous slaughter of dervishes by magazine rifles, machine guns and modern artillery, the Khalifa's power was smashed for ever, and it merely remained to resume control, in the joint names, this time, of England and Egypt, of the Upper Nile valley. But the French were there already. Their expedition from the West had established itself at Fashoda; that from the East had been bungled

and had failed to eventuate. It was plainly a question of whether France would give way or fight, and for a few days the fate of Europe trembled in the balance. But our sea-power was overwhelming and our Mediterranean fleet off Bizerta. With bitter reluctance, France abandoned her claims on the Nile, and left us free to link up our Northern with our central gains.

CHAPTER IV

THE INCLINED PLANE

1

THE CLIMAX OF IMPERIALISM

BRITISH imperialism was at its zenith in the two years that intervened between the Diamond Jubilee and the South African War. This second Jubilee had been the excuse for a very orgy of self-congratulation on the part of the average British citizen. A reign of record length had culminated in the attainment of an Empire of record size and magnificence. An army of authors and journalists turned their pens to the exposition of the thesis that England had, in every way, since 1837, been getting better and better, more and more powerful, prosperous and happy. Maps were produced in which the anaemic appearance of the world in the thirties was contrasted with the apoplectic flush of *fin-de-siècle* red. The Queen herself had ceased to be a woman of human clay, and had become a sort of imperial mascot. Nothing, it was felt, could go wrong so long as she lived, and her life seemed as permanent a thing as the Empire itself. Only one voice, and that, strangely enough, of the man to whom the laureateship of Empire was universally conceded, struck a note of solemn warning, to the insistent, almost knell-like refrain :

“ Lest we forget ! Lest we forget ! ”

The tide of success continued at the flood throughout the next year. Gordon, the Christian hero, had been avenged, his enemy's tomb destroyed and corpse thrown to the fishes. France had been humiliated by us, and warned off the Nile in the face of the whole world. Our fleet was more than a match for any conceivable combination that could be brought against it. No doubt foreigners hated us, but that was because they were jealous—we rather appreciated the compliment. With our fleet, our colonies, our Empire of India, we could well afford to stand in what we deemed a splendid isolation. Imperialism had not yet begun to touch our pockets to any marked extent. Taxation was low and consols in

the hundreds. Nobody believed that in the event of a strong policy leading to war he would be compelled to fight—Britons might be patriots but it was unthinkable that they should be conscripts.

It was small wonder that under these circumstances the type of patriotism that is associated with the yellow press and the music halls should have outrun all bounds of restraint and even of humour. There was no feat of military heroism that Englishmen were not capable of undertaking, in chorus :

“ They [foreigners] may build their ships
And think they know the game,
But they can't breed boys of the bulldog breed
That have made old England's name ! ”¹

In one tongue-doughty defiance of the armies of the world to take us on; there occurs a curious footnote to the line

“ The Uhlans of the Kaiser or the Cossacks of the Tsar.”²

For the Uhlans it is explained, may now be substituted “ The Dervish of the Mahdi ”. Sometimes the note becomes historical :

“ We've thrashed the Danes and Saxons too ! ”

was the discovery of one music-hall Homer. Most popular of all was *The Soldiers of the Queen*, a song no less remarkable for its grammatical construction than for its sentiments, in which all that was crudest and most ignoble in the spirit of this time found perfect expression :

“ Now we're roused we've buckled on our swords,
We've done with diplomatic lingo !
We'll do deeds to follow on our words,”

after which terrific announcement the patriot bard adds the consoling qualification that—

“ old England's laws do not her sons compel
To military duties do.” [sic !]

and finally accounts for the somewhat startling allegation of our having “ always won ”, by “ proudly pointing ” to—

“ every one
Of England's soldiers of the Queen,”

whom*England's fire-eating civilians paid to fight their battles for them. Surely not even the epistolatory Rahabs of the Great War society weeklies descended to quite this level !

No wonder that survivors from the ranks of mid-century Liberalism witnessed this change with wonder and horror. There is an essay of the aged Herbert Spencer, written during the South

¹ Or perhaps “ fame ”. Quoted from memory.

² I heard this sung at a village smoker the other day. It had become—
“ The Germans of the Kaiser and we've shown them what we are.”

African War, in which, with a penetration no doubt intensified by his own horror of anything military, he enumerates the signs of rebarbarization that he notes everywhere around him. In politics the semi-military discipline of the caucus has crushed out electoral and Parliamentary freedom; in the Church "There is a return towards that subjection to a priesthood characteristic of barbaric types of society"; there is the rampant militarism of the Salvation Army and its respectable understudy, the Church Army; there is the change of sentiment evinced by the fact that it was thought fit at the Mansion House to celebrate the jubilee of the Great Peace Exhibition of 1851 by a Naval and Military Exhibition; there is the universal cult of sport, the more brutal the better; there is finally the rebarbarization of literature, journalism and art, as evinced by enormous output of books and articles dealing with every aspect of war, real or imaginary; "the fiction filling our monthly magazines," observes Spencer, "has been mainly sanguinary. Tales of crimes and deeds of violence, drawings of men fighting, men overpowered, men escaping, of daggers raised, of pistols levelled."

In such a light did the new age appear to the old, synthetic philosopher, whose last days were embittered by this reversal of what to his mind was the normal course of evolution from the military to the commercial State. But England was not a military state in the sense of her continental neighbours, and the mere fact that the majority of her citizens were in the habit of getting their fighting done by proxy had the effect of rendering such militarism as there was rather skin deep. There was no such blind cult of the army as that which was causing, in France, the terrible scandal of the Dreyfus case, or in Germany led to a regimentation of civilian life such as no one in England would have dreamed of tolerating. Even imperialism was by no means unchallenged; the Liberal party was still formidable and the largest section of it frankly leaned to Manchester or Gladstonian principles in foreign policy. Some of the weightiest organs of the press made it a point of principle to espouse the cause of anyone who had a case to put forward against England or the Empire. And, up to the end of the century, Free Trade, which had been the central plank of the Manchester platform, and which our rivals, and even our colonies had finally abandoned, remained in England a dogma that nobody of the least influence seemed likely to challenge. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that British imperialism, with all its excesses and its froth of music

hall sentiment, was after all less cynical, more humane and more open to liberal influences than that of Continental nations, large and small.

It needed only a severe shock to produce a violent reaction against the swaggering and essentially un-English mood of the nineties, and, it may be, to purge what was really of value and permanence in the ideal of a free Commonwealth of Nations from this alloy. Even at the height of the tumult and shouting there were ominous signs of trouble brewing in South Africa. Rhodes's premiership of the Cape, which began in 1890, saw him at the climax of his career. His capable and energetic government seemed likely to unite Dutch and English in a common patriotism of South Africa under the flag. But the two Dutch Republics to the North, and particularly the Transvaal, stood obstinately in the way of such a consummation.

The effects, which Wolseley had long ago foreseen, of the discovery of gold and diamonds in the Transvaal, had raised that republic of farmers to an altogether new importance and had created a problem whose peaceful solution would require the utmost tact and goodwill. The new mining city of Johannesburg rapidly became the most populous and important in the country, and immigrants from all over the world, but preponderantly of British origin, flocked thither in the hope of making their fortunes. The coming of these strangers was regarded by the Boers with mixed feelings. It was no doubt all to their advantage to find so opulent a market for their produce and even a good deal of their land, as well as an almost unlimited source of revenue; but the strangers were many and the Boers, scattered over the veldt in their lonely farms, feared the coming of a time when their dearly won independence and their mastery over their own land would be swamped by sheer weight of numbers.

The direction of affairs in the Transvaal was in the hands of Paul Kruger, who belonged to the Doppers, or extreme set of Boer Calvinists, and who had all the shrewdness and dogged obstinacy of the typical farmer. This old patriot, whose memory ran back to the Great Trek, had a rooted dislike and distrust of the English which since the experience of Majuba, had been reinforced by contempt. His method of dealing with the immigrants, or Uitlanders, as they were called, was to exclude them from any share in civil rights and at the same time to make them pay most of the expenses of government. This effort to hold a whole population in permanent subjection, however understandable its motives, was bound to fail in the end, especially under such unsympathetic and even corrupt

auspices as those of Kruger's government. The Uitlanders petitioned for redress, and Kruger's reply was to make their yoke heavier. But he was playing a dangerous game, more dangerous than he realized, for he was arousing the enmity not only of the mining community, among whom the agitation had originally started, but also of the immensely rich mineowners, or randlords, whose business and profits he was hampering at every turn.

Nobody had a greater personal interest in the mines than Rhodes himself, who did not consider it inconsistent with his position as premier of the Cape to retain his headship of the Chartered Company and to continue his multifarious financial activities. And now his masterful and unscrupulous nature betrayed him into the great mistake of his life. Incomparably as Rhodes excelled Kruger in brain-power and imagination, he lacked altogether the old man's invincible patience. Profoundly impressed as he was with the shortness of human life, he could not wait for the course of nature to remove Kruger and give scope to the Liberal elements that were working against his rule even in the Transvaal. He determined to cut the knot, like a true superman. He did all he could to assist and arm the Uitlanders to rise against their Dutch masters, and at the same time brought Jameson, with the force that had conquered Lobengula, to the Transvaal border in order that he might ride to their help the moment the arsenal of Pretoria had been seized by the rebels. Jameson had even less patience than Rhodes. Taking the bit between his teeth, on December 29th, 1895, he with his troopers invaded the Transvaal, only to be rounded up and ignominiously captured within a short distance of Johannesburg.

This sudden invasion of a neighbouring state in time of peace produced a profound impression even on that not very squeamish age. In England a few brave efforts were made to make a hero of Jameson, the most notable taking the form of some painful doggerel by the poetaster Lord Salisbury had chosen to succeed Tennyson in the Laureateship. But the general impression was one of scandalized disapproval, and a Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to investigate the matter, though the result of its proceedings was to afford a personal triumph for Rhodes, who escaped with nothing worse than a little harmless censure. In South Africa, however, the whole political work of Rhodes was shattered; the co-operation between Briton and Dutchman gave place to race antagonism; the Free State threw in her lot unreservedly with that of the Transvaal; Kruger's position was

established more firmly than ever, and the Transvaal began to use the money got from the Uitlanders to arm feverishly against the power that it suspected, not without some excuse, of harbouring designs upon its independence.

During the next three years matters were working up to a climax. The Uitlanders' agitation was sedulously stoked up by the millionaires who, following the example of Rhodes, had persuaded themselves that the Boers could be easily smashed and that a great boom in mining shares would be the result. Meanwhile Kruger was more than ever determined not to make any substantial concession and was perfectly willing to try the fortune of arms. Not only were the Boers convinced that they were capable of driving the English into the sea as easily as they had stormed Majuba, but they had some reason to hope for the support of Germany. For after the Jameson raid the erratic Kaiser had burst a bombshell on Europe by sending a telegram to Kruger congratulating him on having repulsed Jameson without appealing to the aid of friendly powers. This telegram, though as Bismarck truly remarked it might have been sent by the British Government itself, was taken by both British and Boers to imply a threat, or a promise, of German intervention in any armed conflict between the two. How near the neurotic Emperor, who was probably acting more from impulse than calculation, came to launching a virtual ultimatum to his amazed neighbour, and how this was averted by the tact of Lord Salisbury, has only recently come to light. A wave of fury swept through England, and a naval demonstration, which played right into the hands of the German big-navy party, was our reply. On the Boers the effect was to stiffen up their spirits for a conflict in which they fondly imagined they would not fight alone.

The crisis came in 1899. The British High Commissioner at the Cape was now Sir Alfred Milner, one of these strong and autocratic administrators who, like Cromer and Curzon, stood for the imperialistic spirit of the nineties with decidedly more stress on the "*imperium*" than the "*libertas*". He and Chamberlain were quite in accord in their determination to have the Uitlander question settled once and for all, and to stand no more nonsense from Kruger. A conference was held at Bloemfontein between the High Commissioner and the President, in which the younger man's incisiveness of argument and determination to carry his point failed to move the obstinate old farmer, with his farmer's determination to drive a hard bargain and not to yield anything essential. The

conference, which broke down, merely served to reveal, to anyone who had eyes to see, the impassable gulf that lay between the British and the Boer standpoints. The Uitlander question was merely part of the larger question whether the Boers should enjoy the complete independence to which they considered themselves entitled, or whether they should frankly acknowledge their subordination to the Empire and consent to revolve in the British orbit.

On this point neither Kruger nor Chamberlain was minded to yield an inch, and the Boer offer of submitting the disputed matters to arbitration was rejected on the ground that this would imply an equality between the disputants. As, throughout the summer, the President continued to haggle and temporize, the line taken by Chamberlain and Sir Alfred waxed stronger and stronger, and Chamberlain's public pronouncements took on an air of open menace. But, with that strange unreality that characterized the imperialism of this time, nobody in authority seems seriously to have contemplated the possibility of having, in the words of that time's most popular song, to "do deeds to follow on our words". While we practically threatened war, we continued to garrison South Africa with forces so miserably insufficient as positively to invite the Boers to sweep them into the sea. Their commandoes were already beginning to concentrate on the frontiers; it was evident that the Free State would stand in with the Transvaal; and Kruger, so far from meaning to climb down, determined to commit his cause to the Lord of Hosts.

On September 22nd the British Government, replying to a flat refusal of the Boers to accept our demands, intimated that they would reconsider the whole situation, and formulate their own proposals for a settlement. But it was useless to launch our final ultimatum without force to back it, and the Government, at last alive to the seriousness of the situation, resolved to keep these proposals in suspense until they could mobilize and land in South Africa what was then considered to be an overwhelming force of troops. This was the true decisive moment of the war. The Boers, fully armed and on the frontier, were not going to wait upon their adversary's convenience. They prepared an ultimatum of their own, and had they been able to strike at once, nothing could have prevented them from overrunning Natal, and the Cape Colony, and raising all the Dutch of South Africa to join them. But their staff and transport arrangements were not equal to the effort, and during the precious days that the ultimatum hung fire, a force of 6,000 regulars

from India, under Sir George White, was landed at Durban and rushed up to reinforce the few troops already collected in the salient of Northern Natal. On October 9th the ultimatum was launched and the commandoes were put in motion—just a week too late.

Most people at home imagined that the business of avenging Majuba was going through as smoothly and irresistibly as that of avenging Khartoum. One of the most distinguished military journalists was half afraid that all the fun would be over and White in Pretoria before the main English army could get out. As for Rhodes, such was his contempt of the Boers that, untaught by the Jameson raid, he had denied them even the capacity to shoot. For the first few days it seemed as if these estimates might be justified. News came of victories, of Boer positions stormed with the precision of an Aldershot field day, of lancers "pig-sticking" the fugitives . . . and then of an almost incredible change, of White's whole force soundly beaten and besieged in the little town of Ladysmith, of two British battalions laying down their arms with suspiciously few casualties. Even then the nation hardly realized that it was in for one of the most bloody and costly wars in its history.

Happily the Boer leadership was even more feeble than our own. Their commander-in-chief, the leader of the party opposed to Kruger, had only half his heart in the struggle, and allowed White's force to act as a magnet for his main army. Other Boer forces that might have been invading the Cape sat down quietly before the outpost towns, Kimberley and Mafeking. The Boer push had, in fact, come to a stop near the frontier, and the British army corps, when it arrived, found them already on the defensive covering their siege armies. The new English commander, Sir Redvers Buller, possessed the slowness without the science of the pre-Napoleonic Austrian generals, though it must be allowed that the force at his disposal was insufficient. However he weakened it still further by splitting it up, with the result that the British push was, in its turn, brought to a standstill, after three successive repulses, the last of them being inflicted on Buller himself, who had launched a blundering and half-hearted attack on the Boer lines in front of Ladysmith and broken it off with the loss of a thousand men and eleven guns, which reduced him to such a state of despondency that he actually suggested to the incredulous White that he should surrender Ladysmith.

The effect on the country of the "Black Week" in early December was stupendous. At the beginning of the war, the Jingo fever had risen to the pitch almost of delirium. To the frequenters of the

music halls and the *clientèle* of the yellow press, the whole affair had appeared in the light of a glorious piece of fun, the master sensation of the age. Typical of the sort of spirit that was abroad was this song, a fair sample of innumerable others :

" We'll take the lion's muzzle off
And let him have a go ! . . .
Whisper to him Majuba Hill,
And at his chain he'll pull !
There's only room for one out there,
And—that's—JOHN—BULL ! " ¹

Perhaps the climax of cynicism was attained in these lines of another song,

" We don't know if the quarrel's right or wrong,
And hang it, we don't care ! " ¹

Even the poets were not immune from the infection. Swinburne, the some-time bard of liberty, dashed off a furious sonnet, exhorting his countrymen :

" To scourge these dogs, agape with jaws afoam
Down out of life."

while Henley blossomed into a music-hall rhymster—and not a very successful one at that—with such strains as—

" Storm along, storm along, storm along, John ! " ¹

To minds thus inflated, the repulse of Buller's army corps appeared in the light of a veritable catastrophe, though the actions themselves would have hardly risen above the level of " some liveliness " as judged by European standards. Our communications by sea were safe, and whatever might be said against our military leadership, the Admiralty provided for the transport by sea with its usual unobtrusive efficiency. So long as European intervention could be avoided, it was only a question of our spending enough money and hiring enough soldiers to make the issue ultimately certain. It was considered a proof of its iron resolution that the home public did not shrink from this sacrifice, though when the idea of conscription was broached in the halfpenny press it was soon evident that it was not likely to go down. The government acted promptly and energetically ; Lord Roberts, one of our few soldiers with a touch of imaginative genius, was sent out to take over the chief command from Buller ; additional divisions were formed ; volunteers were raised in considerable numbers.

In February the new forces were ready to take the field. Roberts, who had concentrated overwhelming numbers against the Boer army in front of Kimberley, succeeded in capturing it, and swept

¹ I quote this from memory.

on, only feebly opposed, to the Free State capital. Meanwhile Buller, after repeated failures, at last succeeded in finding the way to Ladysmith. After a prolonged halt, during which the army was decimated by an epidemic of typhoid, brought on by defective hygiene, the advance was resumed and Pretoria captured. With the subsequent flight of Kruger and the break up of the Boer field army it was assumed that the war was practically over and the country breathed a sigh of relief. Even the disasters of Black Week now seemed only like the thrilling incidents that lead up to the triumphant climax of a melodrama. The government took advantage of this illusion, in which, no doubt, they shared, to go to the country with the cry that every vote given to their opponents was a vote given to the Boers. They came back with their great majority substantially unimpaired.

But facts had already emerged of extreme importance to the Empire. The first was the not wholly disinterested hatred with which we were regarded by the other imperialist powers. That the slave-masters of Poland should find their hearts bleeding at the spectacle of little nations fighting for their independence may have been human, but it was not ingenuous, nor had France, with her own record in Tunis, in Madagascar, and in the French Congo, any particular right to pose as the censor of unscrupulous expansion. France was, in fact, sore from Fashoda and from the wave of honest indignation that had swept over England at what everybody held to be the fiendish injustice with which an innocent man, Captain Dreyfus, had been sacrificed to political expediency; Russia had been at daggers drawn with us ever since "peace with honour"; Germany was jealous of our start in the colonial race, and could not abide a command of the sea more unquestionable than her own command of the land. By a strange irony, our only friends in Europe, Italy, and Greece, were those we had bound to us by that sympathy with freedom with which Gladstone's name was prominently associated.

On the other hand, the war revealed, for the first time, the strength of colonial loyalty to the Empire. The white Dominions were more whole-hearted in their support of England against the Transvaal than England herself. Contingents of splendid fighters, constantly reinforced, were supplied by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, with an enthusiasm not to be damped even by the monumental fatuity of the War Office in intimating that unmounted men would be preferred. The colonial attitude was certainly not one of uncritical or sentimental admiration for the Mother Country or

Englishmen as such. It was based on the conviction that the civilization of which their free institutions were the expression was in conflict with something essentially inferior, that if the Dutchman was allowed to supplant the Briton in shaping the destinies of South Africa, they, and all that they stood for, would be in a mortal peril. In this organism of free nations, one member could not be allowed to perish.

The war was not over, nor half over, in the Autumn of 1900. It had, in fact, entered on its most difficult phase with the breaking up of the Boer armies into small, mobile commandoes. It was also the phase most damaging to British prestige and self-complacency. The spectacle was presented to the world of a few devoted patriots holding at bay a gigantic adversary, evading his ponderous blows, and striking him again and again with telling effect. One of the Boer leaders, De Wet, proved a master of this kind of warfare, and scarcely inferior to him were Louis Botha and the chivalrous Delarey. It is doubtful whether, with such immense lines of communication to safeguard, and such enormous tracts to subdue, any other army would have done even as well as the British. But these things were hidden from the public at home, and our foreign rivals had not even the wish to judge our achievements fairly. To anyone but a military expert, England's failure to subdue the Boers placed her in the most humiliating light.

Lord Kitchener, who succeeded Roberts on the latter's return to England, had none of his predecessor's *flair* for imaginative strokes of generalship, and set himself to wear down the Boer resistance by a gradual process of attrition. If the war was not to go on forever, it was necessary to deprive the commandoes of the aid that they everywhere received from the farms scattered on the veldt, and, indeed, it was impossible to leave the women defenceless at the mercy of their Kaffir servants. Accordingly the civilian population was removed from the farms, many of which were burnt, into concentration camps. It was not to be expected that an administration which had failed so lamentably to provide for the health of our own troops, more of whom perished from bacilli than bullets, would show any greater sense or consideration in providing for the health of a populace whose insanitary habits aggravated the difficulties of the task. Whoever may have been to blame, the fact remains that the Boer children perished by thousands in the camps, and the non-imperialist section of the opposition was loud in its denunciation of "methods of barbarism" and "hecatombs of slaughtered

babes". When such language could be used by responsible English statesmen, it is no wonder that nothing was too foul or too improbable to be believed against us on the Continent.

In strange contrast to all this bitterness, was the remarkable good humour which was displayed by the combatants on both sides. The British had scrupulously refrained from the employment of native or even Indian auxiliaries, and between the "Tommy" and the Boer there was no real ill-feeling. Moreover it was evident that the hearts of our men were not engaged in this war as they would have been in a struggle in which our national existence was felt to be at stake. To surrender, and be relieved of one's breech-loader and perhaps of one's breeches before being turned loose to fight another day, must have struck many a British working lad as preferable to a Mauser bullet between the eyes in some unrecorded scrap. And as the contest wore on, troops of very doubtful fighting value were raised by the promise of high pay, and the hope of supplementing it by loot. A large force of these, in the Western Transvaal, disgraced themselves and their uniform by bolting in wild panic and leaving one of our most distinguished commanders to fall, wounded, into the hands of Delarey, who nobly refused to imperil his enemy's life by holding him prisoner.

For a year and a half, after the supposed end of the war, this guerilla phase continued, with its monotonous record of petty surrenders, regrettable incidents, and failure to corner the Boer leaders. The war was carried into the Cape Colony, and to our other difficulties was added that of a widespread rebellion. At last Kitchener hit upon the plan of dividing the country by lines of blockhouses, connected by barbed wire, and of a series of drives by which the Boers would be shepherded against these lines by mobile columns and forced to surrender. The method was only partially successful, but the Boers were becoming tired of a contest in which all hope of outside intervention had disappeared, and in which their surrender was only a question of time. The British, who were themselves heartily sick and tired of the war, were not disposed to press them too hard. Accordingly, in the spring of 1902, the Boer leaders met Lords Kitchener and Milner, to discuss terms of peace. The High Commissioner was still for a more or less complete surrender, but the soldier leaned to more generous counsels, and peace was finally arranged on surprisingly easy terms. The Boers were indeed to lay down their arms and swear allegiance to the British crown, but a substantial indemnity was to be paid, for perhaps the first

time on record, by the victors, to help the vanquished rebuild their farms, and rifles were to be allowed on registration. There was also an eventual promise of representative institutions. The Boers were thus enabled to settle down with the consciousness that though they had been beaten in a fair fight they were neither ruined nor humiliated. They were no sentimentalists and were, for the most part, content to let bygones be bygones and make the best of a by no means unpromising situation.

2

THE TIDE TURNS

There is a story that Kitchener, talking in confidence with the Boer delegates, suggested that a Liberal government would soon come into power in England, which would certainly hasten to give them the fullest possible measure of freedom, treaty or no treaty. Be this as it may, no one who had the faintest understanding of English history and constitutional tradition could have imagined that we should, for long, under any circumstances, essay so uncongenial a task as that of holding down a white community by force. No sooner was peace signed than Lord Milner began to devote all his great administrative ability to healing the wounds and repairing the damage caused by the war. He was already known as an authority on British work in Egypt, and he set to work in South Africa with the energy and something more than the sympathy of a Cromer. The Boers found themselves treated with a respect and generosity that they could not but acknowledge, and with their practical farmers' instinct they could appreciate the benefits of a cleaner and more efficient government than they had enjoyed in the days of their independence. Unfortunately Lord Milner, in his desire to procure a revenue sufficient to finance his policy of a united and prosperous South Africa, tried to restore the shattered prosperity of the mines by allowing thousands of Chinese coolies to be imported on three years' indentures, and under conditions that were reputed at home to be little better than servile. This capitalist expedient of buying up coloured labour and transporting it wherever it was wanted, ran directly contrary to the deepest-seated instincts of the British as well as the colonial working man. An immense outcry, fomented no doubt for interested purposes, was raised in the home

country, and the last gleam of romance seemed to have faded from the memory of the war when it was believed that our unfortunate soldiers had given their lives in order that a few cosmopolitan money-bugs might add to their already enormous wealth by dealing in yellow flesh as they hoped, before long, to deal in white.

The Unionist Government was already tottering, but before it fell from power, Alfred Lyttelton, Chamberlain's successor in the Colonial Office, had drafted a provisional constitution for the annexed Republics, which, though under any but Anglo-Saxon auspices, it would have appeared incredibly generous, stopped short of complete self-government, and threatened to create that separation between executive and legislature that the whole experience of British and colonial history has shown to be fraught with the seeds of discord. But this constitution never got to work, for the Liberal Government, which came into office at the end of 1905, resolved to put their principles into practice without counting the risks, and, with rare courage, made a grant of complete self-government, under the Crown, to our former enemies. The Boers were not slow to recognize a magnanimity that this time, at any rate, invited no taunt of weakness. In that same year, 1906, the success of the experiment was testified by the appearance of our doughtiest opponent, Louis Botha, at the Imperial Conference in loyal co-operation with his colleagues, the other Dominion Premiers. It was not without its piquancy that the man who had so recently defeated the British main army in two pitched battles, should now be chiefly interested in questions of imperial defence!

But the success of the experiment did not stop here. In spite of the fact that an anti-imperialist reaction had placed Dutch majorities in power not only in the Transvaal and Free State, but also in the Cape, no sooner were representative institutions conferred than a movement for that union of South Africa under the Crown, for which British statesmen had striven vainly in the past, began to gather irresistible momentum. The white South African, of either race, is beyond all things a practical man, and such inconveniences as conflicting tariff, railway and native policies were not to be borne. Lord Milner's successor, Lord Selbourne, worked with infinite tact and self-effacement to hasten the coming of this crowning mercy, and come it did. In 1908 a National Convention met to draft a constitution, and in 1910 the Cape, the Transvaal, the Free State, and Natal became provinces in the Union of South Africa, and voluntarily consented to a constitution in which provincial rights

were more rigidly subordinated to the authority of the central government even than in Canada. The spirit of Rhodes—he had passed away during the war—must have rejoiced to see the dream's fulfilment that his own criminal rashness had so nearly frustrated.

In so far as it cleared the path for a free union of South Africa, the war of 1899–1902 may have been a success, though it is by no means certain that the same end could not have been compassed by tact and patience without the firing of a shot. It also had the effect of stimulating at least a partial reform in our military system, a reform whose effects were first manifested when, at Mons and Le Cateau, it was our turn to teach a “bull-headed” opponent the lesson of Colenso. In every other respect, the war had been a scarcely qualified disaster. Even the mining magnates, who, in anticipation of an easy triumph, had pulled the strings for war, found their business hard hit, if not actually ruined. The nation, which had been almost gulled into believing that the war could be made to pay for itself, suffered bitter disillusionment. The ever mounting prosperity which had been the theme of countless Diamond Jubilee panegyrics was rudely checked. The National Debt, which had sunk to its lowest point since the Napoleonic wars, mounted, despite substantial increases of taxation, by over 160 millions, while consols declined about 20 per cent. Altogether the war had run us up a bill of over 200 millions.

Things were almost equally bad if regarded not from a business but a sentimental standpoint. The war had damaged our prestige even more than our credit. Our War Office, with its red tape, its chaotic organization, and its total failure either to understand or provide for the requirements of modern war, had become the laughing stock not only of England but of Europe. The Continental opinion of our leadership was fairly summed up in a cartoon of Caran D'Ache, which represented Buller as discovering a brick wall by butting against it with his head. To the no doubt prejudiced minds of our neighbours, and, it may be added, to not a few British “pro-Boers”, the spectacle presented was that of our soldiers constantly in conflict with hopelessly inferior numbers, requiring to be four or five to one even for a Pyrrhic victory, and disgracing their uniforms by what the leader of the opposition described as “methods of barbarism”. Holders of such opinions could no doubt be mobbed whenever they tried to express them, but what was to be done when the Laureate of Empire himself turned suddenly and furiously on the “sons of the blood” in the home country, branding them with the stigmata of the most contemptible degeneracy and anticipating the time,

not far distant, when a foreign invasion would humble their pride of empire in the dust of a deserved slavery? The war, in fact, had become a thoroughly unsatisfactory business, and even the periodical "mafficking" riots were voted a nuisance after the disgraceful scenes on the return of the City Imperial Volunteers late in 1900. The imperialism of the nineties, of which the war was the culmination, was now succeeded by a fast gathering reaction, and when the old Queen died, with the first dawning of a new century, it seemed as if the luck of the Empire had died with her, and as if the glad, confident light of the longest reign were already obscured by the first storm-clouds of the coming deluge. •

• This might have assumed a still more ominous significance had anyone, at the time, marked the beginning of a change more vital than the loss and dislocation incident to the war. The Diamond Jubilee had come at the end of a time during which the prosperity of the wage earning class, if not much to boast of, had at anyrate been on the increase. All candid statisticians could not but agree that the real value of wages had tended slowly, but none the less surely, to rise. In the year 1896 the money level of wages was approximately the same as it had been in 1875, but the level of wholesale prices (which is all we have to go by exactly) had fallen something like $37\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Making every allowance, then, we can confidently affirm that the average employed workman in 1896 was, as regards this world's goods, at least 30 per cent better off than his father had been at about his age. But in the year of the Diamond Jubilee we see the first signs of a comparatively steep rise of prices, with which the money value of wages only kept pace up to the outbreak of the war. Between 1900 and 1903 the money value of wages fell some 3 per cent while that of retail prices rose 4 per cent. Nor was this process arrested on the return of peace. In the first decade of the century prices had risen 10 per cent while wages remained practically what they were. Moreover the average income of the propertied classes, as judged by the assessments to income tax, had increased, during this period, by 16 per cent.¹

The supremely important fact of the period between the South African War and the Great War was, then, that whereas the prosperity of the capitalist continued, on the whole, to increase, that of the wage-earning class did so no longer, but probably to some extent declined. This must be considered in conjunction with the facts that the wage-earners were now armed with the vote, that they

¹ For these statistics see Sir Leo Money's *Things that Matter*, pp. 1-36.

were no longer illiterate, and that this new state of things appeared to confirm the revolutionary teaching that, for many years, had been sedulously propagated among them.

3

THE *Realpolitik* OF CLASS

In order to understand what forces were gathering for the overturn of the existing social order, it will be necessary to go back to the fountainhead of distinctively modern Socialism. It was in 1864 that the International Working Men's Association, or First International, was founded in London by Karl Marx, and it was three years later that the first volume appeared of his great treatise on Capital. This, which is now the Bible of Bolshevism, would hardly, in itself, seem calculated to exercise much influence on great masses of men, since it is highly improbable that more than a few exceptional human beings have ever completed the task of reading it. What accounts for Marx's influence is partly his disinterested and almost heroic personality, but most of all the completeness with which he embodies the spirit of his time. It was his life's work to translate the conceptions of Realism and *Realpolitik* from the international to the social sphere. Like Bismarck and Cavour, he banished sentiment from policy, and, with a more conscious purpose than theirs, devoted his genius to hastening the coming of an Armageddon, a war of extermination not of nation against nation, but of class against class.

If Marx's tomes are as tangled and impenetrable as the virgin jungle, the ideas underlying them are transparently simple. He is a complete and logical materialist. Man is the result of his material and social environment. Meat and raiment are not only more than the life, but they absolutely condition it. Religion and art are mere by-products of the social system. The rise of Christianity is accounted for neither by the personality of its Founder nor the excellence of its doctrine, but by economic forces that were at work in the Roman Empire.

To Marx, distinctions of race, nationality, and religion were of no particular importance. He looked out upon the world and saw two classes of people, those who lived on their wages and those who lived on the proceeds of capital (including land). "The first class produced the whole of the wealth by their labour, the second exploited

the whole of the proceeds except what they doled out to keep the first class alive. It was the policy of the landowners and capitalists deliberately to keep the workers in a state of virtual slavery, by maintaining a large reserve army of unemployed labour. This, according to Marx, explained why, despite the immensely increased output of wealth resulting from the advance of science and technical skill, the condition of the workers tended to get not better, but rather worse. There could be no improvement till the workers, organized as they now were in the service of their taskmasters, succeeded in dispossessing the employing class of their ill-gotten gains, and in securing for themselves not only a pittance, but the whole product of their labour.

* Much has been said, which it is not necessary to repeat, about the flaws in Marx's argument. Here we need only notice two things, first that he did, however crudely, endeavour to face the problem that had been staring mankind in the face since the Industrial Revolution, and to show how mankind could, by taking control of its own destinies, attain a sane and prosperous way of life. The second is that his doctrine is merely a translation of the realistic nationalism, of which Clausewitz and List were the prophets and Bismarck the high priest, into terms of class. The old, Romantic Liberalism and philosophic Radicalism had envisaged a state of things in which nations, though independent, should seek and ensue each other's prosperity by a friendly interchange of services and studious non-aggression. All this was foolishness to the stern patriots who regarded even peace as a kind of modified war, in which battles were fought with tariffs and concessions instead of bullets, and in which every other nation was either an ally to be exploited or an enemy to be circumvented by any means, fair or foul. There was a similar transition from the kindly Socialism of men like Owen, to the ruthless dogma of Marx. To Owen the very idea of hatred or violent expropriation would have been unspeakably distressing, his idea was of a peaceful evolution of the new Utopia, which an enlightened Dives joins hands with a benevolent Lazarus in bringing to pass. But to Marx the opposition between the two classes neither could nor ought to be reconciled, and could only be ended by the absolute extinction of the capitalist class as a class, and the absorption of its survivors into the ranks of the workers. Any attempt to smooth the working of the existing system by conciliation, or social reform that left the investor in the possession of his dividends, was sheer treason to Labour. As early as 1847, Marx and his friend Engels had, in a celebrated

manifesto, appealed to the proletarians of the world to unite in wresting all capital from the bourgeoisie, concentrating it all in the hands of the State, and in creating an industrial army, based on the liability of all to labour. Not even the Junkers went to quite these lengths of regimentation.

It was not likely that such extreme doctrines as those of Marx would find much immediate favour with a being so conservative and addicted to compromise as the English working man. Even in the seventies the glamour of Victorian Liberalism, if a little tarnished, was still bright enough, and the name of Gladstone was one to conjure with for advanced democrats. The outburst of indignation caused by the Liberal crippling of Trades Union activities had died down when Disraeli's government redressed the immediate grievance. During the long depression of trade in the later seventies, Trades Unionism was at a low ebb and its forces sub-divided into innumerable jarring sections. The First International quietly flickered out, and Socialism was hardly enough thought of to provide a joke or a bogey.

It was after the Liberal triumph of Midlothian and Gladstone's second assumption of the premiership that some shaking began to be perceptible among the dry bones to which Marx had for so long vainly prophesied. The surrender of the government to capitalist ambition in Egypt, their total failure to accomplish anything worth speaking of in the way of social reform, and their policy of coercion in Ireland, went far towards convincing politically minded working men that they had as little to expect from the capitalists of the Liberal as from the squires of the Conservative party, and that unless they could make a better use of the vote than to present it to one or other of the rival caucuses, they might as well be without it altogether. A more plebeian type of representative was wanted than that of the frock-coated and prosperous M.P., and a new policy which should not be directed to maintaining the existing distribution of property but to replacing it by one more equitable.

It was in the early eighties that a book appeared which, though less comprehensive in its reasoning than that of Marx, had, through the greater attractiveness of its style, a more immediate influence. This was the *Progress and Poverty* of the American, Henry George, in which the author harks back to the conception, as old as the French physiocrats of the eighteenth century, of land as the prime source of wealth, and of the rent on land as being something essentially different from the surplus pocketed by the capitalists. Therefore

instead of adopting Marx's solution of confiscating impartially land and other forms of capital, George would make the land bear the whole burden of taxation, perhaps leaving the landlord just enough to induce him to stop on as manager. In a still largely unpeopled country, like the United States, such a scheme might at least have a greater veneer of plausibility than in agriculturally depressed England, where the landlords were hard enough put to it, as it was, to make ends meet. But the Englishmen to whom it appealed were largely town dwellers, and its influence on the democratic intellectuals was particularly marked.

It was in the early eighties that a number of these began to come together to form the nucleus of a Socialist party, inspired, more or less, by the principles of Marx and George. But it was not in the English temperament to render a very close allegiance to such sweeping doctrines as those of the old German Jew. Least of all was it in the nature of the most remarkable of these men, the poet and craftsman William Morris, who wrestled with Marx with more conscientiousness than comprehension, and attacked the existing social system not in the name of any abstract theory of value, but in that of art and beauty, in fact, of life itself. What was apparent to Morris, and that small but not unimportant band of artists and writers who thought like him, was that the state of things produced by capitalism was nothing less than damnable. Morris, with the Romantic bias of a Pre-Raphaelite, knew enough about the Middle Ages to understand that, by one means or another, they had managed to evolve a way of life more pleasant and human than that of the Victorian prosperity to which Tennyson prostituted his lyre. Perhaps the most telling of all Morris's essays is that in which he contrasts the squalid hideousness of the modern railway town of Peterborough, with the greatness of soul that had gone to the building of its cathedral.

Morris was, in fact, profoundly and reasonably unhappy in his modern environment, and dreamed, passionately, of a state of things in which mankind should return to an idyllic simplicity, in which all work should be a pleasure, in which competition should be replaced by loving generosity and universal kindness, in which there should be no prisons nor marriage bonds and in which (it was a fellow poet, Mr. Alfred Noyes, who was the first to see this significant characteristic of Morris's Utopia) the sun should always be shining and no woman should ever grow old. It was a somewhat medievalized rendering of the state of things visioned in the last act of Shelley's

Prometheus Unbound, and expressed rather an aching of the heart, than any practicable scheme for the future.

When it came to bridging the transition from what was to what might be, Morris had less of an intelligible scheme than the comparatively unambitious, and yet sufficiently drastic programme of social reform advocated, largely through the inspiration of Carlyle, by Ruskin. In one way Morris had only too thoroughly accepted the teaching of Marx, for, if we are to judge from his *News from Nowhere*, he seems to imagine that Utopia is to be the result not of a change of heart but a change of system. After a general revolt of the workers and a massacre in Trafalgar Square, things somehow straighten themselves out, human nature changes as if by magic, and from a sordid tragedy human life is transformed into a pretty, if rather insipid pastoral. "Rend your hearts (or perhaps your minds) and not your garments" was a text which Morris could hardly have appreciated, though his own experiences with his fellow Socialists might have convinced him of its relevancy. From the original Social Democratic Federation he was fain to part company after a violent quarrel with one of its leaders, and the new society to which he attached himself he soon discovered to be composed less of idealistic enthusiasts than of would-be bomb-throwing ruffians, who had no mind to be lectured into better courses by Comrade Morris.

The appeal of Socialism proved to be especially potent with men of intellect and creative genius, to whom any escape would prove welcome from a state of things which compelled them to prostitute their highest gifts. Even that decidedly snobbish dandy, Oscar Wilde, caught the infection, and produced an essay of *The Soul of Man under Socialism* which at least made it clear that the problem to be solved was essentially spiritual. To Wilde, any transformation of society by legislative coercion was simply horrible, Socialism in his eyes was a voluntary and spontaneous effort to achieve a more unqualified freedom for each man's individuality than had ever been achieved before. He took his inspiration not from Marx but from Christ.

The Social Democratic Federation had been recruited mainly from the working class, but the year 1884 saw the birth of another society, the Fabian, remarkable in being drawn from that suburban middle class which, one would have imagined, would have had most to lose from any attack directed against the bourgeoisie. That a minority of this class, trifling in numbers but distinguished by the intellectual gifts of many of its members, should have embraced a

policy which, to judge from their official manifesto, would have been one of wholesale confiscation, can only be accounted for by that extraordinary unrest and dissatisfaction with their conditions of life which impelled so many suburbans to seek compensation in the cruder enthusiasm excited by the idea of empire. Mr. Bernard Shaw, who early joined the society and became one of its most influential members, constituted himself a very high priest of middle-class culture, and his somewhat erratic genius was reinforced by the infinite capacity for taking, and inducing others to take pains, possessed by his friend and colleague, Mr. Sidney Webb.

The type of Socialism affected by the Fabian society, was of a less alarming brand than a strict interpretation of their principles might have led one to suppose. Their very name implied caution, and if they dreamed of a social revolution it was a goal not to be rushed in a year or even a generation, but in the direction of which one must advance by deliberate sap and parallel, and in the comfortable assurance that no revolutionary change was likely to come, yet awhile, into the region of practical politics. This did not prevent the Fabians from doing invaluable work in their own chosen sphere, which, under the influence of Mr. and Mrs. Webb, came to be more and more that of systematic research into every kind of social problem, a turning aside from the sophistries and will-o'-the wisps of abstract economics to the facts themselves. Gradually the distinguishing principle of the Fabians came to be less the engineering of revolution than a disposition to seek the remedy for every evil in extending the functions of the State and its officials. Capitalists themselves came to see the advantage of a bureaucracy that might, with a very little modification, end in providing them with a well-fed, well-housed, and well-drilled body of workers. The social problem was in fact to the Fabians—and this in despite of one or two essays on its religious and moral aspect—primarily one of transforming not the heart or mind, but the machinery of government.

The formal Socialism of the eighties, though a powerful leaven, was as yet negligible as a political force. Such candidates as it put up at elections did not succeed in attracting more than a few odd votes. The most important practical advances towards the realization of a working class policy were made in the characteristically English way of getting ahead with the business without too much fuss about ultimate ends or abstract principles. The policy, once the workers could get into the saddle, would no doubt shape itself. And the workman was, in nine cases out of ten, almost exclusively concerned with

what affected him immediately ; like the Englishman he was, he cared nothing at all about the rights of man, but he was invincibly obstinate about his own rights and grievances. It is noticeable throughout the British Labour movement that the revolutionary impulse comes almost invariably from the "Celtic fringe". To the Celt abstract ideas and logical extremes are as congenial as they are repellent to the Englishman.

The year 1886 saw the country at the lowest depths of trade depression and consequent unemployment. Some very sanguine or very nervous people began to wonder whether the revolution might not even then be at the door, and this fear was intensified when a mob of half-starved men, tramping through Pall Mall, were insulted by some ill-conditioned clubmen, and replied by ensuring employment at least for the neighbouring glaziers, subsequently breaking loose and looting some shops. Next year, Jubilee year, when trade was getting a little better, the authorities tried to prohibit meetings of unemployed, and this led to a "bloody Sunday" in Trafalgar Square, and what was perhaps the most moving lyric that Morris ever wrote, to the refrain,

"Not one, not one, nor thousands must they slay,
But one and all if they would dusk the day!"

These attempts at revolt were pathetically feeble, and only served to show the weakness of revolutionary Socialism in England. The main progress in the Labour movement, during the eighties, was in the all-important department of Trades Union activity. The Trades Unions were at last beginning to feel their feet after the impotence and timidity of the late seventies, and a new and ambitious policy was beginning to be advocated by the younger leaders, in opposition to the stalwarts of the old school, who strongly disapproved of aggressive methods, and who kept the Parliamentary Committee tinkering inoffensively at comparatively petty reforms. The New Unionism as it was called, was much more in harmony with the militarism of the time. It aimed at developing the Unions first and foremost into fighting organizations. Sometimes, indeed, the war chest was allowed to absorb the whole of the cash, to the exclusion of a benefits fund. An atmosphere of bitterness and even violence was introduced into trade disputes, and harmony between employer and employee ceased to be regarded as an end desirable in itself—the trend of the New Unionism was to regard the capitalist and the wage-earner as beings of irreconcilable interests. At the same time a tendency was apparent towards embracing all members and branches

of each particular industry into one comprehensive Union, and also towards introducing militant Trades Unionism among those unskilled and badly paid masses of workers who had hitherto been impossible to organize.

It was in 1889 that a new era in Trades Unionism was inaugurated by a great strike of the London Dockers, whose poverty and uncertainty of employment rendered their conditions peculiarly hard. It is a proof of the British instinct of fair play that the grievances of these men attracted not only sympathy but even financial support from the well-to-do, and, what was even more remarkable, from fellow workers in Australia. A committee presided over by Cardinal Manning succeeded in obtaining peace on terms that granted the substance of the men's demands.

The revival of trade, which started in the Jubilee year, coincided with a great and enthusiastic revival in Trades Union activities. The victory of the Dockers not only put fresh heart into the workers, but greatly strengthened the hands of the New Unionists, who had been bitterly opposed to the cautious tactics of the old leaders. The New Unionism was by no means satisfied with a sectional and purely industrial policy, it aspired to reinforce industrial by political and even international action. The tendency of the older leaders had been thankfully to accept such crumbs of legislation as might fall from the Liberal table. But to the younger leaders the Liberal party itself was incurably capitalistic and the feeble compromise of the Liberal Newcastle programme they rejected with contempt. Labour must have a party and a policy of its own, not bound to any abstract theory like that of Marx, but seeking every opportunity to promote the distinctive interests of the wage-earning class, and keeping closely in touch with the Trades Unions. In 1892 such an organization, the Independent Labour Party, came into being, and in the election of 1895 it put up no less than 28 candidates. But it had entered the field at an unfortunate time; the imperialist ardour was at its height and every one of the candidates was defeated. It is not till eleven years later that Labour became a political force to be reckoned with seriously.

All through these years of obscurity and Conservative dominance, the Labour party was gathering strength for an advance that was sooner or later inevitable. With the vote in their hands, it was hardly credible that the manual workers would be forever content to have their policy dictated and their affairs managed by the members of another class. They were being constantly urged to take their

destinies into their own hands, and though their instinct was to look with distrust on any violent breach with accepted tradition, one step was bound to lead on to another. The real struggle would come when the great party organizations, financed by the capitalist class, pitted their utmost resources of wealth and propaganda against the crude power of the vote possessed by the wage-earners.

4

THE RIGOUR OF THE GAME

If there had been anything like a deliberate conspiracy on the part of the "haves" against the "have nots", as some democratic enthusiasts have alleged, every consideration of party tactics, in the old sense, would have been subordinated to the necessity of combining, if only in secret, against the common enemy. But imagination was not the strongest point of orthodox politicians, and their actions are sufficient evidence that, in so far as they thought of Labour and its demands at all, it was in the light of a useful pawn in the old game of Conservative versus Liberal. The Liberals themselves, especially after the retirement of Gladstone, saw that the old individualist Radicalism was now hopelessly behind the times, and that Social Reform, by which was implied a cautious and unrevolutionary extension of State activities to better the lot of the workers, was the best card to play against imperialism, regardless of the fact that a Labour party, if it ever came into being, could always produce a higher card of the same suit, even if they did not trump it with Social Revolution. And the Unionists, largely under the influence of Chamberlain, had a social policy of their own, including the provision, which they never succeeded in materializing, of pensions for the aged poor.

The Khaki election of 1900, though it gave the Unionists a fresh lease of their overwhelming majority, marked the bankruptcy of their domestic policy. They had demanded and obtained a vote of confidence for having won a war which had yet the best of two years to run, and while they had a constructive foreign and imperial policy, in the domestic sphere they allowed themselves to slide into reactionary and merely conservative courses, against which Beaconsfield's, and to a lesser extent Chamberlain's influence, had been directed. But now Chamberlain was throwing the whole of his Titanic energy into the cause of the Empire, and imperialism, as

he understood it, had now lost its pre-war glamour and was steadily declining in popularity. The Colonial Conference that met in 1902 made it clear that the Dominions were not going to compromise their national independence by any visible tightening of the imperial connection; that bond must be unseen, not of the law but of the spirit. But this Chamberlain, with his ardour to put the Empire on a business footing, was ill fitted to understand.

On his return from South Africa, where he had done splendid work in forwarding the reconciliation between English and Dutch, he boldly launched out into the exposition of what he meant to be the crown of his policy. Admirer of Germany as he was, and deeply imbued with the conceptions of *Realpolitik*, it was almost inevitable that he should, sooner or later, challenge the Cobdenite dogma of Free Trade, which our rivals and Dominions had long since discarded, and which was a survival of that pacific Liberalism of which Chamberlain's later career was the direct negation. He had at first dreamed of an imperial Zollverein, of trade between England and the Dominions as free as that between England and Scotland. But as early as the Diamond Jubilee Conference it had been borne on him that under no circumstances would the Dominions expose their growing manufactures to the unrestricted competition of the mother country. Canada had, however, given the lead in conceding a preference to British products, and Chamberlain welcomed the idea of uniting the Empire, if not by Free Trade, at least by a system of mutual preferences. But as most of the important colonial and foreign products already entered our ports free, the only way to afford a *quid pro quo* to the Dominions was to put a duty on foreign imports, and particularly on corn and meat. But, despite a shilling duty on corn during the war, the very name of corn law was, after the "hungry forties", as much a bugbear to the English as the name of King to the Roman mind.

Nothing daunted by the prejudice he was certain to arouse, Chamberlain flung himself into the fray, and resigned his office in the ministry in order to free his hands for his campaign of propaganda, in which preference quickly yielded place to a modified revival of protection. To tax the foreigner and not to take his tariffs lying down was a programme congenial to Mr. Chamberlain's fighting instincts. The Unionist party was hopelessly split; the Duke of Devonshire and his Free Trade colleagues in the ministry also resigned, and only the rump of a cabinet was left under the premiership of Lord Salisbury's nephew, Mr. Arthur Balfour, a master of debate and of

the minor tactics of party warfare, and a somewhat theistical sceptic, whose power of drawing fine metaphysical distinctions was better adapted to the lecture room than the public platform. Mr. Balfour showed a suicidal ingenuity in refusing to commit himself either to what Chamberlain understood by Tariff Reform or to what the Free-Traders among his followers understood by Free Trade. Conscious of centrifugal forces in his own party, he evaded even debate in the House, and allowed the opposition to pass what resolutions they liked. Such finesse was interpreted by the electorate as a declaration of political bankruptcy.

• And bankrupt of a domestic policy the Unionists in fact were. An Education Act was passed which, though it made a notable advance in unifying the old voluntary and board-schools under the control of the County Councils, was scarcely regarded as educational at all by press and public, who saw in it an excuse for reviving that everlasting competition in envy, hatred, malice and all uncharitableness between the professed followers of Christ, which had proved the curse of our education for a century. After the passing of this Act, a strange lethargy descended on the once powerful and confident Unionists. They acted, or rather avoided action, as if they were conscious of having lost not only the confidence of the electorate but even confidence in themselves. Their aspirations after Social Reform grew faint and cold, and, untaught by experience and blind to the signs of the times, they committed the supreme blunder of mortally offending Labour.

This they did on the old question of picketing during strikes, the neglect of which by Gladstone had given Disraeli a winning advantage in 1874, and which his government had, as everybody believed, settled on a satisfactory basis once and for all. This, however, was reckoning without the power of English judges to refashion the law by interpreting it and—as every trades unionist would have said—without the natural bias of these prosperous old gentlemen in favour of their own cause. Towards the end of the century, some disposition had been manifested to whittle down the privileges of the Unions, but not until the Taff Vale Decision, in 1902, was it established, to the consternation of the workers, that Trades Unions were liable in damages for actions done by their individual members in the furtherance of industrial disputes. Whatever the rights and wrongs may have been, the effect of this decision was nothing short of catastrophic, so much so that few employers had the hardihood to take advantage of it. Every Union in the country saw its funds

threatened. On the other hand, the decision was greeted with undisguised satisfaction by the reactionaries who now dominated the Unionist caucus. The cabinet tacitly endorsed the decision by doing nothing, and organized Labour had now got an electioneering cry far more potent with the British working man than any amount of appeals to Socialist doctrines and class hatred.

By all the laws of party warfare, this unpopularity of the Unionist government, sedulously fanned by the Liberal press and caucus, ought to have redounded to the advantage of the alternative party. This expectation was in a large measure fulfilled when, Mr. Balfour's finesse having failed to keep even his own supporters together, the discredited and disheartened Unionists came back from the country early in 1906 with no more than a beggarly 157 members. If no other consideration had weighed in the balance, the industrial districts of the North were invincibly biased in favour of Free Trade, and had been moved only to opposition by Chamberlain's proposals. But there was also a general feeling throughout the country that things were not well with the wage-earner; already he was beginning to feel the pinch of diminishing wage values, and not only the very real threat of his unions, but the flood of opposition rhetoric about Chinese slavery and the government's apparent indifference to social reform made him demand, with increasing insistence, a bold and constructive policy of redress for his many grievances, some plan for at least mitigating the disparity of wealth and opportunity between Jack and his master.

But however vehemently he might inveigh against the Conservative party, there was no more conservatively minded person in England than the worker. Now that he was thoroughly aroused, his first instinct was to turn to what had hitherto been the only alternative source of government, the great Liberal party, which had proclaimed from a thousand platforms the gospel of progress and reform, and could even rise to such almost Marxian slogans as,

- "Why should we be beggars with the ballot in our hands?"

Accordingly the Liberals were returned with a majority the like of which had not been seen since the morrow of the First Reform Bill. But this majority, huge as it was, was not the most sensational feature of the election. The continuous and often disheartening efforts of independent Labour were rewarded by the election of no less than 53 members pledged to its principles. A new party had come into being definitely anti-capitalist in its policy. At present it could only serve as an auxiliary of the all-powerful Liberals—but what if

Liberalism should fail to realize the expectations it had aroused? Would the workers swing back to Tariff Reform? That was the Unionist calculation. Or might they not be inclined to give their own class an innings where the gentry had failed?

A ceaseless work of preparation and propaganda had led up to this first appearance of organized Labour as a serious factor in the political situation. Since the days of Morris, Labour questions had begun to attract more and more attention. The great work of Charles Booth, himself a rich employer, on *Life and Labour in London*, had laid bare, street by street, the appalling squalor and destitution on which the fabric of Victorian prosperity was built. The Fabian Society continued its work of detailed research; the influence of the Webbs was very potent in the newly formed London School of Economics. Mr. Shaw started a school of drama, largely under the influence of Ibsen, in which social problems were boldly ventilated on the stage, and Mr. H. G. Wells, a Fabian who eventually broke loose from the society, made sociological dialogue a leading feature of his novels. These gentlemen made their appeal primarily to the bourgeoisie, but Robert Blatchford, of the true spiritual lineage of Cobbett, spoke straight to the heart of the masses, pleading in good muscular English the cause of Britain for the British, and contrasting the Dismal England of capitalism with the Merry England she had been and might yet be made. The social question was, in fact, everywhere being discussed; people were familiarizing themselves with the most advanced and even revolutionary proposals.

The triumph of the Liberals in 1905 was as deceptive as that of their rivals five years earlier. They were, indeed, prepared to go considerably further in the way of social reform than any previous government, and they even provided a pittance of 5s. a week for such of the septuagenarian populace whose incomes did not exceed £81 10s. and who were not in receipt of other than medical poor relief. They passed a number of acts on such varied subjects as Labour Exchanges, town planning, sweated industries, an eight hours' day for miners, small holdings, the protection of children, and the feeding of necessitous school-children. Such measures fell far short of the expectations which the Liberals had aroused by their democratic professions, and there were not a few among the wage-earners who began to suspect the new Liberal was old Whig writ in red ink. These suspicions seemed to be confirmed by the conspicuous failure of the government to deal with the most important question of all, that of the reform of the Poor Law, and this in spite of the fact that

a Royal Commission, after years of patient inquiry, produced in 1909 a famous report which gave the Socialist minority an opportunity of formulating, under the auspices of Mrs. Sidney Webb, a highly bureaucratic programme which was, in fact, the quintessence of Fabianism, and included proposals for dealing with the able-bodied unemployed which seemed, to unfriendly critics, to smack too strongly of a modified slave system.

The Liberals were hardly more conscious than their opponents of the extent to which the new conditions threatened to make the old party game a battle of frogs and mice, with Labour in the role of the owls. That they meant to play the game with the utmost rigour was evidenced by the way in which they continued to pack the House of Lords, even while they denounced it, with men distinguished for nothing except their riches, and by their cynical procrastination in honouring their promise to purge the Rand of the Chinese. The Unionist caucus was not a whit behindhand in factiousness, and it had a great if perilous advantage in the fact that the House of Lords was to all intents and purposes its mouthpiece. True to the principles of *Realpolitik*, its leaders, or bosses, decided to throw constitutional moderation to the winds, and use this advantage for all it was worth. The plan was to let through all measures of ostensible Social Reform, as well as that which reversed the Taff Vale judgment, and to throw out those which were either aimed at some distinctively party advantage, or at placating one or other section of the government's supporters. Accordingly a so-called Education Bill, which was the leading measure of the government's first year of office, and was merely another move in the everlasting sectarian controversy, was amended to death, and other bills, in spite of the immense majorities with which they passed the Commons, obtained short shrift in "another place". Two years later a grossly unpopular Licensing Bill was flung out by the Lords, and the government did not dare to appeal to the country. The Unionists had so far played their dangerous game with masterly finesse.

But it was a game in which the country was ceasing to take much interest. Among working men there was little indignation to be worked up over the failure of their social superiors to cure them of their intemperate habits, or even at the spectacle of some comfortably off Nonconformist having to part with a piece of furniture in default of paying his school rate. The politicians were perpetually promising the worker a new heaven and a new earth as the price of his vote, but the goods never seemed to be delivered. The new

Labour party was quick to assimilate the atmosphere and traditions of the House, even to the extent of tacitly acquiescing in the unwritten law which protected the shady side of caucus activities from investigation or discussion. This alone sufficed to cast an atmosphere of unreality over the proceedings of Parliament; more and more it began to be suspected that what got on to the hoardings or into the papers was mere camouflage, and that the real decisions were taken in secret where money talked with an all-compelling persuasiveness. And many of the workers suspected that their leaders, once they had entered the portals of St. Stephen's, were not wholly unresponsive to these siren pleadings. They even suspected them, in more than one industrial dispute, of a conciliatoriness that amounted to treachery.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the bolder spirits among the workers were influenced to a greater or less degree by the French doctrine of syndicalism, which carried the class war to more extreme lengths than had been envisaged even by Marx. This theory repudiated the State altogether, as representing the interests of consumers and as being incurably biassed towards capitalism, and sought to concentrate all power in self-governing associations of producers, exalting the Trades Unions into glorified soviets. The out and out syndicalists were prepared to stick at nothing in the attainment of their ends; sabotage, "ca'canny," and violence were regular parts of their programme. Majority rule they repudiated—if a minority of workers could seize power by force and hold it by terror, so much the better. They were, in fact, applying in an intensified form to the industrial sphere those principles of militarism that were destined, ere long, to turn Europe into a shambles. So extreme a doctrine was not likely to find acceptance undiluted, in this country; it rather acted as a spirit which embittered and intensified industrial disputes, made the men revolt from their leaders and repudiate official agreements, and inspired a great deal of extremist propaganda, especially among the young and in the Celtic fringe. A Bowdlerized and somewhat bourgeois rendering was the theory of national gilds, an arrangement by which power should be balanced between the producers, as organized in a few gigantic monopolies, and the State, as representing the consumers, the two to worry out their differences after some more or less ingenious plan. This doctrine, another of the many that have sought social salvation not by a change of heart or mind, but by a change of machinery, bears about the same relation to Syndicalism as Fabianism to the teaching of Marx.

The suspicions of the syndicalists and of that apostle in England of French anti-Semitism, Mr. Hilaire Belloc, with regard to the corruption and falsity of our political system, were at least understandable. That the pressing of certain charges and the investigation of certain activities was sedulously boycotted, that there was a good deal of collusion on the lines of "you keep a blind eye on my dirty work and I'll keep one on yours", was past a doubt, and the extent to which the caucus system had lowered our standards of political honour was revealed in 1913, by the notorious Marconi scandal, which, if it failed to reveal naked corruption, at least suggested a lack of delicacy and candour in high places which, if it would have been fatal to Victorian, could provide no more than a piquant advertisement to Georgian public men. Indirectly, also, the same lesson was taught by a group of women who, weary of continual polite evasions of the now growing demand for a bi-sexual franchise, resolved to get by foul means what they could not obtain by fair, and advertising their contempt for man-made law and male legislators, began to browbeat the King's ministers with physical arguments to which they might presumably be more susceptible than those of justice and reason. The fact that ministers did not feel a sufficient force of public opinion behind them to defend effectively themselves or the law, by allowing that law to take its normal course against repeated outrages, is sufficiently indicative of the contempt with which the ordinary citizen had come to regard his elected rulers.

But when Mr. Belloc went on to imply that party warfare had become a deliberately arranged sham fight, he was palpably overshooting the mark. Had the politicians been fully conscious of the menace created by the spread of socialistic doctrine, and secretly united in combating it, they would hardly have gone out of their way to excite class antagonism to fever pitch. The fact is that, since the Unionists had resolved to use the Second Chamber to paralyse the Liberal Majority, both sides were playing the skin game against each other with an entire recklessness of consequences. The Liberals had hitherto had all the worst of a game in which they had only been able to chalk up "No veto" on the door of the Lords and run away. Now, however, they bethought them of a card in their hand that might yet prove a winner. A convention, older than that which prevented the King from using his veto, had hitherto restrained the Lords from interfering with the financial proposals of the Commons as embodied in the Budget. What could be simpler than to compel the Lords to swallow, under the guise of finance,

what they would have rejected as legislation, and thus give them their turn of public humiliation? The opportunity brought forth the man, in the shape of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George, a Welsh solicitor with all the abounding vital energy and quickness of mind characteristic of the Celt, and the Celt's characteristic lack of gravity, in the old Roman sense.

This Chancellor found himself, in 1909, confronted with a heavy deficit caused by the granting of Old Age Pensions and the expenses of strengthening the navy against Germany. He met this by a series of proposals palpably designed to exasperate his opponents as much as possible. The Unionist cause being notoriously bound up with those of the landed interest and the brewing trade, he introduced a harassing and ultimately unworkable system of land taxation, and what one of his colleagues described as "swingeing duties" on licences. At the same time, he made mild but significant concessions to the principle of Socialism by the introduction of a super-tax, by large increases in the form of capital levy known as the death duties, and by emphasizing the favour shown to earned, as against saved or inherited wealth. The Unionists might have been wary enough to see the trap, but with the recklessness so characteristic of those feverish pre-war years, they played straight into their opponents' hands. They furiously assailed the Budget, and Mr. Lloyd George, addressing an East End audience and carried away by its enthusiasm, launched out—impromptu, if rumour speaks truly, and to the consternation of some of his colleagues on the platform—into a magnificent emotional piece of oratory, which was plainly a call to the poor to rise and mutiny against the existing distribution of wealth. Infuriated by these tactics, and perhaps egged on by those Tariff Reformers who were by no means minded to see any practicable substitute for their own proposals, the Lords, in the Autumn, flung the last shreds of discretion to the winds and took the revolutionary step of throwing out the Budget.

The horror and indignation with which the Liberals expected this step to be greeted, and which were typified by the sending up of rockets, were certainly not reflected in the electorate. The confident trust of 1906 had long evaporated, and not even Mr. Lloyd George's philippics could excite the man in the street to anything like enthusiasm for a continuance in office of his existing rulers. At the same time, the industrial North had not budged an inch from its determination to have no government which would tamper with Free Trade, and though there was no great disposition to

execrate the Lords for accepting a challenge so plainly offered, the prestige of their order had steadily declined since they had, for so many years, allowed it, without protest, to be swamped and corrupted by the direct and indirect purchase of what could only ironically be characterized as "honours". As for the Labour party, the experiment of trying it in office was not only too sensational an innovation to capture the somewhat sluggish imagination of the Englishman, but so far that party had not given evidence of possessing any distinctive policy, nor of constituting anything more formidable than the detached left wing of the Liberal caucus. The results of the election reflected both the uncertainty of the electorate and its boredom with the whole ostensible business of party warfare. The Unionists were returned with a trifling majority over the Liberals, the Labour party showed a slight diminution but substantially maintained its astonishing gains of 1906 and—most important and ominous of all—the Irish Nationalists now, once again, held the balance between parties. They had their own reasons for disliking the Budget, but they were prepared to sell their vote at a price, a price which, as it included not only Home Rule for themselves but the subjugation of the Protestant North East, must, in all human probability, involve civil war. But so embittered was the party controversy grown, and so completely had constitutional restraint been abandoned, that it was safe to calculate on the price being paid—or at least pledged.

5

DOMINION NATIONALISM

The tendency of mankind to coalesce into huge Empires or racial entities dignified by the prefix "pan" was by no means unchallenged in the early years of the twentieth century. The old sentiment of nationality was not only alive, but becoming increasingly active, and was no respecter of Empires. Poles and Finns, Serbs and Czechs, the unredeemed children of France and Italy, ceased not to cherish aspirations that were, to the high imperialist way of thinking, not only treasonable but half a century out of date. And nowhere was this tendency more active than in that strange and heterogeneous union of peoples known as the British Empire. While Englishmen at home were being exhorted to think imperially, their fellow subjects overseas were thinking in a number of intense and jealous

patriotisms, and it remained to be seen whether the Empire could achieve the miracle of fostering these patriotisms and blending them into one supreme and all-inclusive love, to designate which the word imperialism would be not only inadequate but misleading.

In the years preceding the Great War, the self-conscious independence of these daughter nations was becoming ever more pronounced. Any idea of inducing them to enter into a scheme of formal federation was obviously hopeless. Even the harmless proposal of the British Colonial Secretary in 1905 that the Imperial Conference should rename itself the Imperial Council, and should appoint an advisory commission to preserve continuity during the four years' interval between its meetings, was turned down by Canada, who scented a possible encroachment on her sovereign rights. When, at the Imperial Conference of 1911, the Premier of New Zealand formulated a definite project of imperial federation, its reception merely showed how far was such a scheme from coming within the realm of practical politics.

It was no wonder that under these circumstances foreign and even British critics, whose minds were bound by formal conceptions of sovereignty, should have derided the notion of so centrifugal an association ever being able to function in unison in such a crisis as that of a world war. Such exponents of militarism as General Von Bernhardi confidently anticipated that so far from helping the Mother Country, the Dominions would add to her difficulties in time of war by becoming centres of revolt. And when it came to talk of Canada's right of deciding for herself whether to join in a war declared by the Mother Country, there were not wanting Englishmen to point out that an imperial bond, so conceived of, would not even have the value of an alliance between independent states. Nor would it, had formal ties been the only ones that bound.

The situation was certainly not without its drawbacks. The cloud of the German menace was beginning to darken the sky, and though all the Dominions were agreed as to the necessity of sharing the burden of imperial defence with the Mother Country, their intense and jealous particularism made it extraordinarily difficult either to secure that unity of organization and command so necessary in war, or to pilot any scheme at all through the shoals of party politics. When the question of naval defence came up in the Canadian Lower House, the whole House rose to sing the National Anthem, and yet the differences between the Liberals, who favoured a separate Dominion navy, and the Conservatives,

who were for a contribution to the Imperial fleet, led to the whole scheme proposed by the newly elected Conservative government being wrecked in the Senate.

Nevertheless, and despite the anti-imperial influences emanating from the presence of French reactionaries in Canada, Boer irreconcilables in South Africa, and Irish nationalists in Australia, at no time was the invisible bond more firmly drawn between the Mother Country and the Dominions. Canada had, by rejecting the commercial advances of the United States in 1911, given overwhelming proof of her desire to remain within the Empire in defiance of geography; a Labour government in Australia was prompt to show that in loyalty it meant to fall no whit behind its predecessors; in the new-born Union of South Africa the great-hearted Premier Botha, so recently the doughtiest of our enemies, now hastened to approve our generosity by showing himself the staunchest of our friends; as for New Zealand, her patriotism was the most ardent of all, and small as she was, she was the first in the gift of a Dreadnought to the Imperial navy. How this unique and almost paradoxical loyalty would answer to the supreme test, was all too soon to be demonstrated.

6

“BANDE MATERAM”

It was not only in the white Dominions that the consciousness of nationality was awake. There were, by the beginning of the twentieth century, unmistakable signs that India, so long divided against herself and passive in her subjection to alien rule, was astir with a new patriotism. That this should have been so, that India should at last claim the birthright of her ancient civilization and become proudly intolerant of any rule but her own, may prove to be the most splendid achievement of the British Raj. To impose one's sway may be glorious, but to supersede the necessity for that sway has in it something that may not extravagantly be characterized as divine.

It was, however, only a few Englishmen who consciously pursued such an ideal. Macaulay, with his Whig cult of liberty, had proclaimed it in memorable terms, and so long as the old Radical individualism remained a force in British politics, men were bound to arise to whom the liberties of Indians were no less sacred than those of Englishmen, and in whose opinions representative institutions did

not cease to be a panacea from being applied East of Suez. Such beliefs were, through the medium of European education, sedulously propagated among Indians themselves. With the rise of the imperialist spirit, the enthusiasm for efficient government more and more tended to cool that for liberty in the breasts of India's rulers. Not so in those of Indians ! Those teachings of Macaulay and Mill, which were every year falling more and more behind the times in the West, were, to many a young Hindu and Moslem, living and burning realities.

Meanwhile the English bureaucracy continued to function after its competent, but aloof and unimaginative fashion. After the terrible lesson of the Mutiny, it would be many years before there could be any dream of resistance to British power. It was the heyday of the Anglo Indian, of that light-hearted, unintellectual, and not too chaste society in the cantonments which Mr. Kipling described with so obvious a sympathy. Few of the ruling race had the least idea of entering into any social or spiritual communion with what they were pleased to describe as the " natives ". Many Englishmen, in fact, expected any Indian who met them in the street to lower his umbrella in passing as a sign of respect, and instances were not unknown of offending umbrellas being knocked down.¹ According to its lights, however, the bureaucracy was upright, active and benevolent. Invaluable work was done in the way of irrigation, of famine relief, of education of a sort, and of evenhanded justice, though the drain on India's resources continued, and the interests of Lancashire made the Home Government set its face with the utmost sternness against the slightest protection of Indian against British industries, and thus helped to create the very poverty against which its agents strove.

It was on the accession to power of Gladstone's ill-starred ministry of 1880, that English Liberalism got its chance of showing what it could do for India. That flamboyant imperialist, Lord Lytton, was succeeded in the viceroyalty by Lord Ripon, whose object it was to apply, with due caution, those principles of generous trust in the people with which the name of Gladstone was identified. This he did by a comprehensive scheme of local self-government, fashioned on the English model, and by repealing a law, passed under his predecessor's auspices, for muzzling the press. But in 1888 he allowed the Legal Member of his Council to bring in a Bill which placed Indian on the same footing as British magistrates, and thus made

¹ By the time of the war, this particular form of offensiveness had been so severely frowned upon by authority as to be practically extinct.

Englishmen and—what was even more resented—Englishwomen, amenable to their jurisdiction. The introduction of this measure was the signal for an unrestrained outburst of racial passion on the part of the Anglo Indian community. The Viceroy was vilified in the press and insulted in the streets; the English volunteers were urged to resign in a body, and the opponents of the measure did not hesitate to express themselves in terms of open contempt and hostility for Indians, who on the whole displayed restraint and dignity under provocation. One somewhat unclassical patriot signing himself “Britannicus” was allowed to express himself repeatedly in the columns of the *Calcutta Englishman* in such terms as: “The only people who have any right to India are the British. . . . Privileges the so-called Indians have which we do not begrudge them and for which they ought to be grateful instead of clamouring for more.”¹ That the Bill was replaced by one maintaining its principles in a considerably modified form, is a fact of comparatively minor importance. What did matter was that the Anglo Indian community had, in so conspicuous a manner, proclaimed its resolve to admit the people of the country to no sort of equality with its white rulers. And the Queen Empress’s government had, at least ostensibly, given way to them. Moreover, as Sir Valentine Chirol points out, the Anglo Indian had taught the Indian the uses of agitation.

After Lord Ripon, at the end of 1884, had resigned the viceroyalty, Liberalism was in official India, as it was in England, a spent force. But it had sowed a seed on Indian soil that was destined to bear fruit. It had been the deliberate policy of Lord Ripon to strengthen his hands by encouraging those Indian reformers whose principles were similar to his own, and there was still left in India a sprinkling of old-fashioned British Radicals whose initiative was invaluable in giving shape and direction to Indian aspirations after self-government. It was one of these men, Allan Hume, believing that the salvation of India could only come from Indians themselves, played a leading part in the foundation of an annual assembly of notables calling itself the Indian National Congress, and designed to unite reformers from all parts of the country and to enable Indian educated opinion to make its voice heard on India’s destinies. At first the attitude of the Viceroy’s government, and of the Viceroy himself, Lord Dufferin, was not only benevolent but encouraging, but when the first Congress began to adumbrate

¹ *The Life of the First Marquis of Ripon* by Lucien Wolf, vol. ii, p. 129.

reforms based on the principle of no taxation without consent, the authorities took fright, and his Lordship proclaimed an official boycott of subsequent Congresses by forbidding any government servant to take part in them. Though this decision had the effect of still further widening the gulf between rulers and ruled, the Congress, for the first twenty years of its existence, amply fulfilled its purpose of focussing Liberal opinion throughout India, and preparing the way for representative institutions. The goal that the typical "Congresswallah" came to envisage, was that India should as soon as practicable, though not necessarily at once, be granted the same rights of self-government within the Empire as had been conceded to the Dominions. At first there was no widespread or vocal desire for complete separation.

The situation, however, created by an all-powerful alien bureaucracy out of touch and sympathy with educated opinion in the country, could not fail to become intolerably difficult in face of any widespread sentiment of Indian patriotism. And, thanks very largely to the peace that we had imposed, the common language we had provided, and the liberal ideas we had introduced, educated Indians were everywhere awakening to an intense pride in their ancient civilization, and a consequent determination to rest content with no arrangement that implied the least political or social inferiority to their very distant cousins of the Western isles. To such a way of thinking, "India for the Empire" might perhaps still be a desirable aspiration, but only in so far as it was compatible with "India for the Indians".

In tracing the spiritual influences that are all-important in the development of India, we must be on our guard against too facile generalization. The reformers, of whom she was so prolific, could not, unless they were reactionary to the point of obtuseness, be solely concerned with the deliverance of India from foreign rule. They had first to deliver her from herself, from the superstition that had cankered and the formalism that had overlaid the pure philosophy of the Upanishads and the social insight of Manu. Those reactionary Brahmins who made a complicated tyranny of caste and consecrated lechery under the name of religion, those "sanctified wretches" as we once heard a distinguished pundit characterize them, furnished an excuse for the enemies of Indian freedom to denounce every step on the path of reform as a base betrayal of the Indian masses to a twice-born tyrant whose little finger would be thicker than the Englishman's loins. Exactly the same argument, with the priest

substituted for the Brahman, was constantly employed by the opponents of Irish self-government. As a matter of fact, this power of reactionary Brahmanism had been enormously weakened during the nineteenth century, not only by the efforts of the enlightened reformers of whom Ram Mohun Rai was the pioneer, but by the corrosive influence of Western science and rationalism. When the Brahman was fain to avail himself of a third class carriage, packed like a sardine tin, it was hardly possible to stand on points of untouchability. Nor would it be by any means fair to lump all Brahmans together as reactionaries. Many of them lived, in spirit as in letter, up to the high ideal of an intellectual aristocracy, and some of the boldest and most enlightened reformers were drawn from their ranks. On the other hand, it is an easily demonstrable fallacy that the Indian patriotic movement was either exclusively or even mainly Brahman in its aims or leadership.

Had there been any real effort of the ruling race to understand Indian aspirations and to meet them half way, it is possible that the spiritual partnership dreamed of by Ram Mohun Rai and Keshab Chandra Sen might have become an accomplished fact. But aloofness on one side was bound to produce an equal and opposite reaction on the other, and accordingly, in the last quarter of the century, we find the spirit of all-comprehensive impartiality, embodied in the original Brahma Somaj, distinctly losing ground, and a tendency on the part of Hindus to exalt the principles of their own faith and civilization as definitely superior to all others. It was in 1875 that a new prophet, called Dyananda Saraswati, founded the Arya Somaj, which eventually came to number a quarter of a million members, and whose principal centres were the Punjab and the Bombay Presidency. Dyananda has not inaptly been compared with Luther in his desire to sweep away the whole superstructure of Brahman “over-belief”, and to rest on the impregnable rock of Holy Scripture in the shape of the Vedas. So obnoxious did he become to the defenders of the old order, that he was constantly persecuted, and even the manner of his death is not above the suspicion of poison. His ideal was a noble one, and resembled that of the Brahma Somaj in its desire to benefit all mankind, its foundation of the purest monotheism, and its guiding principles of love and justice. But it differed from Keshab’s society in its aggressive patriotic bias and its militant desire to proselytize from other faiths, particularly from Christianity. It was his desire to raise up a virile population for the Motherland that betrayed Dyananda into sanctioning the

practice of Niyoga, in other words of licensed concubinage, under certain circumstances.

It was in Bengal that there arose the spiritual revival connected with the name of Ramakrishna. He was a Brahman of rustic origin and little book-learning, but he combined a shrewd peasant wisdom with a saintly and wholly lovable disposition, and he taught his disciples the essential sameness of all gods and religious beliefs. "Different creeds," he said, "are but different paths to attain God." He personally preferred to approach God in his native, Bengali way, by the worship of Kali, the terrible goddess of destruction, whom his devotion transfigured into a sweet and tender mother, a Madonna. His work was continued by his favourite disciple, the Swami Vivekananda, a less human and lovable personality, but perhaps the most remarkable intellect that modern India has produced. With him, Ramakrishna's genial tolerance was transformed into a proud and passionate assertion of the mission of Hindu faith and civilization to conquer the world, not by force, but in the might of the spirit. "Let foreigners come," he cried, "and conquer the world with their armies, never mind. Up, India, and conquer the world with your spirituality! Aye . . . love must conquer hatred, hatred cannot conquer itself." It would no doubt have surprised Vivekananda had he known that he was only echoing the cry of the old, Puritan "Diggers", on St. George's Hill,

"To conquer them by love, come in now! come in now!"

Vivekananda, with his profound philosophical insight, was able to discern in just what, from the Hindu standpoint, Western civilization had gone wrong and was driving headlong to ruin. In its mad striving for material accumulation, the perpetual outward turning of its mind's eye, it had cast away the better part and lost its own soul. Vivekananda was an adept in the art of Yoga, the ancient mind and soul training of the Hindus, and he held that to conquer one's own spirit, deliberately, scientifically, and to the point of absolute non-attachment, was the only thing on earth worth striving for. No doubt he carried this cult of the inner man to as unqualified an extreme as in the West materialism had carried its own will to power over matter. But at least the issue was fairly joined between the West as the home of materialism and India as the fount of spirituality. And Vivekananda was as vehement as Dyananda himself in his denunciation of the abuses of Hinduism and the rigours of caste exclusiveness. He did not wish to abolish caste, but his teaching on the subject may be best expressed by the

transposition of a homely English proverb into “Brahman is as Brahman does”.

Despite his doctrine of non-attachment, the master passion of Vivekananda's soul was patriotism. “He was born,” says his English disciple, Sister Nivedita, “a lover, and the queen of his adoration was his Motherland.” He was not without a certain admiration for the manliness that he perceived in Englishmen, but he believed English civilization, such as it was, to be derived from Indian sources, and to be a very inferior product at that. The subjection of his country to a foreign domination was, in his eyes—as is quite evident when we read between the lines of his writings—a tragedy. His object as regarded India, as he admitted in private, was to make Hinduism aggressive. He had seen how 40 millions of Englishmen held down 300 millions of Indians because the Englishmen were united and the Indians were not, and he pointed the moral that Indians must sink all their differences and bring their ideas and wills into the same focus.

We have selected the Ayra Somaj and the Ramakrishna Mission as the most powerful of the many new spiritual influences that were at work among educated Indians at this time, and were introducing a new element into the relations between the English bureaucracy and the people they governed. But it was not only to the religious and philosophic sphere that the revival extended. In both art and literature that peculiar quality of spirituality for which India had ever been distinguished was inspiring work which had nothing to fear by comparison with the most exacting European standards. The Tagore family, now in the third generation of genius, produced the two great brothers, Rabindranath, a poet whose fame became world-wide, and Abanindranath, who bore a leading part in a revival of Indian painting which was fruitful almost in direct proportion to its continuity with Indian tradition.

In art, in fact, as in every other branch of life, the vital question was whether India could keep her identity unsubmerged by the encroaching flood of Western influence. It would be of little use to attain political freedom at the price of spiritual death or slavery. Before the awakening of Indian national feeling this had been a very real danger. And a particular value attaches to the work of men like Mr. E. B. Havell, who have revealed to Indians the glories of their own culture, and combated the all too prevalent idea that their only resource is to cut loose from their old moorings and trim their sails to every Western breeze. But the Indian artistic revival had

of its accomplishment gave it the effect of a spark in the powder magazine of Indian nationalism.

A revolutionary movement, very different from the friendly Liberalism of the first Congresses, had, in fact, been astir for some years before Lord Curzon's viceroyalty. The first centre of this had been, as might have been expected, in the country of those Mahrattas who had, in the seventeenth century, effected so notable a revival of Hindu power against the Moslem, and in the eighteenth had made an almost successful bid for the Empire of India. The memory of the hero Sivaji was revived, and significant stress was laid on Sivaji's unscrupulous but selfless methods of ridding the country of the hated foreigner. An able but reactionary Brahman called Tilak helped to foster a patriotism that had much in common with the Bismarckian realism of the West. A propaganda of hate led inevitably to murder. The plague broke out in Poona, the Mahratta capital, and the authorities, who had not yet come to understand the connection between the plague and the rat flea, adopted a series of preventative measures that were not only futile medically, but involved what to a Hindu constituted outrageous interference with his family life. On the very day of the Diamond Jubilee celebrations, a couple of Brahmans, who had some time previously tarred a statue of the Queen, shot dead the police officer whose duty it was to enforce these measures, together with a colleague. The government displayed no lack of firmness in dealing with the situation; but this murder was only the first of a series committed, usually, by young enthusiasts fired by a propaganda ceaselessly conducted both in India and by Indians in Europe, having for its object the deliverance of their country from the alleged tyranny of its rulers.

The other great centre of revolutionary nationalism was Bengal. The Bengali is less warlike, less a man of action than the Mahratta, but he is possessed of a vivid imagination and impulsive emotions. It was from Bengal that Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, and the Tagores sprang, and its patriotism centred not so much round the idea of a human hero as in the mystical cult of Kali, goddess of destruction, but also the gracious and benignant mother who merges imperceptibly into the idea of the Motherland, India, and who claims the worship and self-immolation of all her sons. This idea inspired the famous hymn "*Bande Materam*" or "Hail to the Mother", which had originally been part of a patriotic novel :

“My motherland I sing; Thou art my head,
Thou art my heart . . .
Before thy feet I bow!”

The partition of the province, whatever may have been the arguments for or against it, was exactly calculated to inflame the quick, emotional temperament of the Bengali, and just at this time, in 1904-5, a fresh hope was added to his enthusiasm by an event that profoundly affected the whole of the East, the overthrow of the most gigantic of European powers by the arms of Japan. The news spread rapidly from bazaar to bazaar, from village to village, that the white man was not invincible, that what Japan had done to-day . . .

Lord Curzon's viceroyalty, which in 1905 came to an abrupt end owing to a clash of wills with an even stronger man than himself, the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Kitchener, closed with the gloomiest forebodings. The revolutionary element among the nationalist forces was rapidly gaining ground, and was leavening the Congress, until, in 1907, the antagonism between the two factions culminated in an undignified row, which led to the secession of the extremists and the break up of that year's Congress. Meanwhile a movement had been started to fight the economic dominance of Great Britain by an organized boycott of British goods and a resolution to use none but Indian products. This too often took the form, not of a revival, under scientific auspices, of the indigenous arts and crafts, but of an attempt to set up the factory system, after the most approved Western models, on Indian soil, and to foster the cheap mass production of shoddy by Indians instead of Europeans.

Such was the state of things when the imperialist government collapsed, and a Liberal ministry at last stepped into its place. The hopes of all moderate reformers ran high when it became known that John Morley, an uncompromising Radical and consistent champion of freedom, had accepted the Secretariat of State for India. Morley's genuine desire was to conciliate Indian sentiment by a liberal grant of reform, but he was handicapped by his ignorance of India, and his temperamental disability to appreciate a national spirit so far removed from his own somewhat colourless rationalism. This betrayed him into the serious blunder of applying to Indians what they held to be the offensively discourteous term “native”. Like some other Radicals, he proved, when in power, to be an administrative autocrat; he was determined at all costs to maintain unimpaired the strength of the paramount power and the supremacy of the British Parliament; he was convinced of the unfitness of

Indians for Parliamentary government, and would sooner have resigned than introduced any reforms calculated to lead up to it. Unfortunately educated Indians themselves, even the moderates, aimed at nothing less, and did not admit the notion that institutions that had succeeded so well in England were "a kind of thing that don't agree with"—Orientals.

Within these limitations, the reforms introduced, after three years' consideration, by the Secretary of State, supported by the Viceroy, Lord Minto, represented a distinct advance, and one that was received with gratitude by no less a patriot than Mr. Gokhale, the leader of the moderate party in the Congress and founder of a brotherhood, the Servants of India, pledged to lives of poverty and service to the Motherland, but loyal to the British connection. The effect of the reforms was, briefly, to allow a small minority of Indians to be nominated to the executive, to enlarge the Provincial Legislative Councils, to make a somewhat complicated and indirect application of the elective principle, and to transform these bodies into fairly effective debating societies. This was all very well as an instalment, but it is strange that a statesman so experienced as Morley should not have perceived that it could only have had the effect of whetting the appetite of Indians for genuine Parliamentary institutions. An executive owning no responsibility to the legislature, and a legislature with no power except that of criticism, could hardly be regarded as a final solution of the Constitutional problem by Indians brought up in the traditions of British Liberalism.

Nevertheless, the reforms worked quite well to start with. Lord Morley, to give him the title he had most unwillingly consented to assume, had placed his trust in the spirit if not in the form of British institutions, and it was by virtue of that spirit that the Councils were permitted to exercise a power, in practice, which the letter of the law by no means conferred on them. Lord Hardinge, who succeeded Lord Minto in the Viceroyalty, was a sincere and trusting friend of the people over whom he ruled. In 1911 the new King, George V, and his Consort, performed an act of great physical and moral courage in coming out in person to see and be seen by their Indian subjects. Loyalty, despite the unrest, at once flamed up to an extraordinary pitch; the partition of Bengal, which Lord Morley had coldly characterized as irrevocable, was reversed, not without considerable Mahommedan heartburnings, and by a stroke of real imaginative genius, India was given her ancient capital of Delhi instead of the mushroom, commercial centre of Calcutta. The

campaign of hate and murder was gradually got in hand by the police, the seasons were favourable, and India, just before the storm that was to break over her, with the rest of the world, seemed prosperous and reasonably contented. Appearance was no doubt deceptive. Aspirations were astir that the reforms could stimulate but could not satisfy, and a democratic patriotism was leavening the educated classes and from thence spreading to the mass of the population. The citadel of bureaucracy stood fast—it was, in fact, a grievance that the higher posts in the civil and military service were practically closed to Indians—but its foundations were undermined.

Meanwhile the very freedom accorded to the different parts of the Empire had provided another bitter grievance for Indians, one with whom it was peculiarly hard for the central government to deal. It was the practically invariable policy of Britons overseas to reserve the lands they occupied as much as possible for the white man. The Indian, who was invited to be loyal to the Empire, found himself not only considered unfit to govern his own land, but rigidly excluded from other parts of the King's Dominions. When Ranjitsinhji, one of the proudest Indian Princes and most popular men in the Empire, went out with an England team to Australia, it was only after some time and considerable difficulty that he was allowed to pass the gangway shorewards, so rigid was the exclusion of the brown man from “God's own country”. But matters were worse in South Africa, where the Indian was not excluded, but allowed in under the most humiliating and repressive conditions. To the heads of the South African Union, even otherwise liberal minded Boers like Generals Botha and Smuts, the Indian was on a level with the Kaffir and to be treated accordingly. And Indians could not but note that whereas England had been ready to go to war rather than see the white Uitlanders treated as helots, she did not lift a finger to end this much worse helotage of the King's own subjects in the King's dominions. But Lord Hardinge, at least, threw official discretion to the winds by protesting vigorously, as ruler of India, against the wrongs suffered by Indians overseas.

The importance of this Indian question in South Africa is to be reckoned, not so much on its own merits, as by the fact that it brought to the front one who, whatever may be said for or against his methods, is certainly among the most remarkable figures that India has ever produced. This was a Gujerati lawyer of the Bania, or trading caste, named Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, a man who was, even by the admission of his opponents, disinterested to the

point of saintliness, and who burned to sacrifice everything that ordinary folk hold dear to the service of his country and his fellow men. He started, not as a philosopher trying to enforce some abstract theory, but as one profoundly moved by the spectacle of intolerable wrong and determined to right it or perish in the attempt. He first went out to Natal in 1893, and for the next twenty years he was engaged in a seemingly hopeless campaign on behalf of his fellow countrymen, in the prosecution of which he threw up a lucrative practice of some £6,000 a year.

It was only gradually that Mr. Gandhi evolved what was less a philosophy—for as a thinker he was curiously vague and never very consistent—than a mode of action. This, which was in direct continuity with the purest stream of Indian thought, from Gautama Buddha to Vivekananda, was the exact negation of the spirit of egoistic realism that was, at the close of the nineteenth century, all powerful in the West, and, incidentally, of the revolutionary violence favoured by Bengali and Mahratta extremists. Mr. Gandhi believed, like Vivekananda, that it was the mission of India to conquer the world by her spirituality. To answer hatred with hatred and force with force was worse than useless. Accordingly he met persecution on the part of Christ's professed worshippers by the exact methods that the early Christians had pursued in the days of Nero and Diocletian. To oppressive laws, to unjust impositions, he and his followers meekly refused to conform. They courted persecution, they gloried in the martyr's crown. Only when real suffering would be caused to their persecutors by a continuance of this heroic passivity did Mr. Gandhi, even when on the eve of victory, order it to be suspended. Meanwhile, when opportunity offered of service to his white fellow-citizens, it was faithfully and loyally rendered. Mr. Gandhi organized an Indian ambulance corps in the South African War, and again during a Zulu rising in Natal, and performed service that was gratefully acknowledged. But these were only interludes in the extraordinary contest between force and non-resistance, not the least of whose effects was a union between Hindus and Mahomedans in South Africa that might conceivably pave the way for one in India.

In 1914 Mr. Gandhi's principles were still not fully developed, and he had no idea at the time of breaking loose from the Empire or of refusing to co-operate with the government. But the more far-sighted among his countrymen were already beginning to suspect that in him India had found the patriotic leader for whom she had

so long been waiting, not, perhaps, a thinker worthy to be classed with Vivekananda, or a politician as astute as Gokhale and Naoroji, but a personality of compelling force and a patriot capable of carrying Indian spirituality to victory against Western force and materialism, not by bombs and bullets, but by the sword of the spirit. But if the full scope of Mr. Gandhi's faith was as yet unrealized, neither yet were its weaknesses apparent, the confusion of thought that never seemed quite able to define its own ends, the grotesque provincialism, and the readiness to work hand in glove with the exponents of that very violence and unscrupulousness against which Mr. Gandhi set his own face. For, as with so many other compelling personalities, the Mahatma's intellect was too plainly the slave of his will.

7

THE AWAKENING OF EGYPT

As in India so in Egypt, the early years of the century saw an awakening of a nationalist spirit under British rule. The work of Lord Cromer had no doubt been a miracle of administrative talent in face of the most difficult circumstances, but any hope of permanently reconciling the Egyptians to British rule was too plainly a mirage. They took what we had to offer them, but the only effect of the benefits we conferred was to stimulate their desire for independence. Patriotism had been astir before the occupation, and had not been crushed with Arabi. Moreover, patriotism in Egypt was intimately connected with devotion to Islam, and the Mahommedan world was beginning to seethe with unrest. In the decade before the Great War, a series of crushing blows fell upon Islam. There was the absorption of Morocco by France, the rape of Tripoli by Italy, the Russian penetration of Northern Persia, and the overthrow of Turkey by the Balkan League. And yet while the arms of Islam were everywhere defeated, its spirit was merely inflamed by adversity and its invisible empire was actively enlarging its boundaries.

The end of Lord Cromer's long period of office was clouded by an incident that revealed, in a flash, how little chance there was of real sympathy between rulers and ruled in Egypt. A party of English officers provoked a riot in the village of Denshawai by shooting some pigeons belonging to the villagers, and one of them succumbed to the heat on the way to fetch help for the rest. The punishment meted out for this regrettable but not wholly

unintelligible outrage was of a barbaric and theatrical severity, which inspired even more hatred than terror in the breasts of the Egyptian peasantry. But the new Liberal Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was firm in its support of the men on the spot, and though a certain amount of indignation was aroused even in England, the approval of the average elector was fairly well expressed by Punch's cartoon, "The Grey Knight rides on."

Lord Cromer was succeeded, in 1907, by the Liberal Government's nominee, Sir Eldon Gorst, who wore himself into the grave in an unavailing effort to reconcile the maintenance of British rule with sympathy for Egyptian aspirations. But Egypt had set him the time-honoured task of making bricks without straw. The people had never wanted us and did not want us now. The English bureaucracy was steadily losing touch with them, tending to isolate itself in the same sort of frivolous and sport-loving society as already existed in the Indian cantonments. The Educated Egyptians found themselves more and more coldly received in this society, and the gulf between the two communities widened instead of narrowing.

Meanwhile, in what much more nearly corresponded to Parliament in Egypt than any similar body in India, the demand for independence and an end of the British occupation became vocal. The Khedive Abbas, a thorough Turk in sentiment, was an irreconcilable and cunning enemy of the British, and his formidable influence was used for no other end than to make trouble between us and his people. The years of friction and intrigue between the retirement of Lord Cromer and the War are ennobled by none of those creative ideas and outstanding personalities (if we except that of Lord Kitchener), that lend such a fascination to the story of modern India. Little positive fault can be found with our rulers. Sir Eldon Gorst did his best to conciliate Egyptian feeling, particularly by a large concession of local self-government. But his efforts were in vain, and before he retired he was forced to admit the impossibility of the task which he had been set.

His successor, Lord Kitchener, dealt with the problem as a plain and competent soldier, fired by a genuine love of Egyptians, and particularly of the peasantry, for whose interests and protection he was solicitous to provide. But though he could do much towards developing the resources of the country, he could do nothing to check the rise of an aggressive patriotism of Egypt for the Egyptians, and at every turn he found himself thwarted by the Khedive. A spirit of anarchical unrest was abroad. In 1910 a Christian Prime

Minister, Boutros Pasha, had been assassinated, and plots afterwards came to light to do the same to Lord Kitchener and even the Khedive. A political press, of almost unbelievable scurrility, helped to diffuse an atmosphere of hatred and detraction. The most compelling personality in Egyptian politics, Zaghul Pasha, was converted from a potential friend to an active enemy of the occupation. So far, at any rate, there seemed no prospect of our being dislodged by force, but our position in Egypt had rather too much resemblance to that of a man who tries to master a wasp's nest by sitting down on the hole.

8

GATHERING CLOUDS

Even before the close of the nineteenth century, it was becoming apparent to those who had eyes to see, that the final catastrophe could not be long delayed of the world tragedy whose fourth act had opened with the Peace of Frankfurt in 1871. This act, whose dominant note is one of materialistic realism, and whose setting is the Armed Peace, is divided in the middle by the fall, in 1890, of the master realist, Bismarck.

There were three ways in which Germany could have dealt with the French menace, and Bismarck had failed in two of them. He had failed to crush France; he had failed to conciliate her by casting a benevolent eye on her African expansion, and had, in fact, helped to provide her with the reinforcement of a black army. But while he held power he could at least keep her isolated. This last safeguard the young Emperor and his advisers had wantonly thrown away. What call had they to play for safety? Germany, secure in her own strength, secure in her headship of the Triple Alliance, had only to think of securing a power commensurate with the superiority of Teutonic culture, science, moral earnestness, to those of lesser breeds without her particular law. She was, emphatically, a power on the make, not as Bismarck had modestly envisaged her, a "saturated power".

"In gallant trim the gilded vessel goes;
Youth on the prow, and Pleasure at the helm;
Regardless of the sweeping whirlwind's sway,
That, hush'd in grim repose, expects his evening prey."

But the prime cause of the catastrophe, that which rendered it inevitable, must be sought for deeper than in the insufficiency of Germany's rulers. To isolate a foe by diplomatic finesse is at best

a temporary expedient. The forces that were driving Western civilization to the abyss were hidden even from a Bismarck. The gradual transvaluation of values that had begun at the Renaissance, the mad pursuit of power over the outer world to the neglect of the inner man, the consequent inability of man to meet the challenge of a man-changed environment, were now turning the very resources of science into the means of suicide. In default of any collective attempt of the human race to take charge of its own destinies, was witnessed an anarchy of individual and national egotisms. Religion was rapidly losing what little power it still possessed, and even the veneer of romantic sentiment had gone out of fashion among educated people. Untrained minds and characters stunted in egotism cannot be saved against the consequences of their defects even by the subtlest diplomacy.

It was Germany that was setting the pace to the rest of Europe, not only on account of the uncompromising thoroughness of her realism, but because she was able to back it with greater resources of science and organization than her neighbours. It was the consciousness of her superiority to a Russia known to be half civilized and a France believed to be decadent that made Germany underrate the menace to herself of the Dual Alliance. And no doubt her diplomatists were justified in believing that so long as these two stood alone against the Triplice, they were powerless. Even Bismarck did not anticipate the coming of the general war during his own lifetime. But how long could Germany count on so artificial a combination as the Triple Alliance? Austria, so long as she held together under the Hapsburg, was no doubt safe enough, but Italy, a Latin power, had stronger affinities with the Gaul than with the Teuton, and her pique about French sharp practice in Tunis would wait longer than her hatred of the Austrian, who had not even yet relaxed his clutch on Italian-inhabited soil. Besides, Italy, with her exposed seaboard and lack of coal, would hardly, under any circumstances, court the hostility of England, and if England were once to throw her weight into the scales against Germany—what then?

To men capable of forming a dispassionate judgment of the European situation, it should have been obvious that once France and Russia had drawn together against the Triplice, the vital thing for either side was to secure the support of England. Bismarck had no love for the English, but he had never been so foolish as to provoke their serious hostility. Indeed there was, for at least a

generation after the Franco-German war, a tendency in England to regard the Germans as our friends, and even as possible allies against French and Russian hostility. There was even a fashion for emphasizing the Teutonic element in our very mixed descent, an emotional bias which, more than evidence and probabilities, was responsible for the theory, favoured by historians like Freeman and Green, that the Anglo Saxons had actually exterminated the British population in the lands they conquered. There was also a literary movement for purging the language of its Latin accretions, for calling omnibuses "folk-wains", and so forth. In Low Church circles, voices were heard solemnly acclaiming the victories of Protestant Germany over Catholic France and Austria as the fulfilment of prophecy, and the end of the Time, Times, and Half a Time of the power of His Holiness the Beast in Revelation.

More important than these straws in the wind was the definite orientation of our policy in favour of Germany. Lord Salisbury, who combined the office of Premier with that of Foreign Secretary, brought, somewhat incongruously, to the game of *Realpolitik*, the spirit of a great English gentleman. Cautious and profoundly cynical, he aimed at keeping Britain out of entangling alliances, and at the same time pushing her interests wherever the opportunity presented itself. His attitude was one of friendly sympathy with Germany, and distrust of France. In 1887 it seemed as if a new Franco-German War was on the point of breaking out, owing to the frothy heroics of the popular idol of the moment, General Boulanger. There is reason to believe that in the event of a rupture, Salisbury would have done nothing to stop a German invasion of France by way of neutral Belgium. Mr. Stead, the imperialist editor of *The Pall Mall Gazette*, went to the trouble of explaining that the afterwards famous "scrap of paper" bound us to no military action, and *The Morning Post* said that we must protest and nothing more.¹ The cloud passed away and long before the violation of Belgian neutrality had become an accomplished fact, our press and statesmen had found reason for a somewhat greater insistency of conscience.

There is no doubt that at this time a little tactful persuasion might have drawn England from her isolation into the orbit of the Triple Alliance. But England wanted to be sure that her adhesion would be a guarantee for the peace of Europe and not the signal for Germany to settle accounts once and for all with France. Above all English statesmen, and Lord Salisbury in particular, were by no

¹ *History of Modern Europe* by C. P. Gooch, pp. 134-5.

means to be hustled or driven into a hard bargain. Unfortunately the new ruler of Germany was wholly incapable of appreciating this trait in the English character. Though half English by birth he had, even as early as 1884, written to the Tsar Alexander III in the most venomous terms of England, and tried to make all the mischief he could between her and Russia. Perhaps, however, it would be rash to attribute to so neurotic a mind any steady sentiments of love or hatred, and it is certain that for the first six years of his reign the Kaiser succeeded in maintaining the happiest relations with England. But in 1894, Caprivi, who succeeded Bismarck as Chancellor, and was a cool-headed, peace-loving statesman, was sacrificed to interested Junker hostility on account of his efforts to conciliate Russia by fiscal reciprocity. The Kaiser now had begun to feel his feet sufficiently to make his own will, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say his impulses, supreme in matters of foreign policy.

It was in the same year that Tsar Alexander III, a strong and bigoted reactionary, was succeeded by the cold-blooded and feeble-minded Nicholas II. With the two mightiest Empires on the Continent at the mercy of these amateurs, the last and most fatal phase of *Realpolitik*, when unscrupulousness was no longer restrained by commonsense, had set in.

The Kaiser had enough shrewdness to see the advantage of keeping on good terms with England, but he thought that by taking a sufficiently strong line he could coerce her into an alliance which would bind her to a war with France. England, he said to Colonel Swaine in 1895, must choose definitely for the Triple Alliance or against it. But already he had, by his overbearing tactlessness, not only alienated his uncle, the Prince of Wales, but succeeded in falling foul of Lord Salisbury. At the end of the year he undid all his previous work of conciliation, and insulted British feelings in a way that was never wholly forgiven him, by his telegram to Kruger. We next find him toying with the idea of an anti-English coalition with France and Russia, less apparently with the idea of realizing it than of frightening England into joining the Triple Alliance.

The depth to which European civilization was capable of sinking was now to be revealed in the revival of the Near Eastern question caused by the wholesale massacres of Christian Armenians perpetrated under the auspices of Sultan Abdul Hamid. These devilries went on with perfect impunity, because the Powers, bent on their own sordid interests, stood by without lifting a finger. Only in England was there any real disposition to intervene, and Gladstone,

a survivor of the old Romantic Liberalism, emerged from his retirement, despite his 87 years, to hurl his last Philippic at the "Great Assassin". Salisbury, who confessed that we had put our money on the wrong horse in backing Turkey, did what he could to bring pressure to bear on the Porte, but the result of his efforts was merely to forfeit our influence at Constantinople without benefiting the Armenians. Russia, who had flown to the aid of the Christian Bulgarians twenty years before, showed how utterly lost were her rulers to any such unpractical idealism, by not only refusing any sort of aid, but by throwing all her weight into the scale to keep the ring clear for the butchers. Her mild Tsar confessed himself tired of the Armenian question. And it has since transpired that the Tsar and his advisers were meditating at this time no less an act of criminal insanity than the sudden and unprovoked seizure of both shores of the Bosphorus.

As for Germany, her policy was equally immoral, but less hare-brained. The Kaiser had enough sentiment to sympathize with the poor Armenians—"shame on us all!" was his comment on the inaction of the Powers. But sentiment is one thing and business another. England's efforts, such as they were, on behalf of the Armenians, had put her out of favour with Abdul Hamid, and here was a splendid opportunity for Germany to step into the vacant place at Constantinople. The advantages, both political and commercial, to be derived from such a friendship, were expounded by the ablest of all Germany's diplomatists, Marschall von Bieberstein. From this time forth the Kaiser began a strenuous courtship not only of the Great Assassin, but of the Islamic world. Naturally, there could be no nonsense about restraining the Caliph's proclivity for disembarassing himself of the Christian dogs within his borders. Or if the Turk must be punished, it was better to do so by exploiting him by means of concessions to Christian capitalists at extortionate rates of usury. The whole story of the dealings of the Powers with the Near East during the concluding years of the century is one of unspeakable sordidness.

An alliance between England and Germany seemed, from 1898 to 1901, a distinct probability. It would have created a combination of overwhelming strength, and enabled Germany to regain the security she had lost by driving Russia into the arms of France. That she should double the blunder by doing exactly the same to England might have seemed incredible. But in the close and poisonous atmosphere of the German court, petty intrigue had taken the place

of statesmanship. Somewhere behind the scenes, pulling incessant wires, was the arch mischief-maker, Baron Holstein, a man incapable of straightness either in vision or action. The idea of a fair bargain was alien to such a mentality; with a little patience and finesse England could be drawn into the German orbit on Germany's terms, as a humble satellite of the Triple Alliance.

Accordingly when Chamberlain, who, like Rhodes, was temperamentally drawn towards the great imperialist power of the Continent, frankly broached the idea of an alliance in 1898, his frankness was mistaken by the German Foreign Minister for the clumsiness of an amateur, and the opportunity was allowed to slide. But even the South African War, and the wave of Anglophobia that swept over Germany, did not stop the Kaiser and his Chancellor, Bülow, from toying with the idea of an alliance. Towards the end of 1900, Chamberlain, who had been privately encouraged by Bülow, to put out a public feeler towards an Anglo-German-American Entente, got well snubbed by that elusive statesman for his pains. The matter did not end here, for next year a treaty was actually drafted by the German Foreign Office for the inclusion of England in the Triple Alliance. But Lord Salisbury, who had in mind Prussia's record of diplomatic bad faith, was not to be drawn into a bargain whose dangers seemed to him to outweigh its advantages, and which the British people might refuse to honour. Germany, in endeavouring to overreach Britain, had fatally overreached herself, and was to experience the truth of Chamberlain's warning to Bülow, that if we could not find friends in one of the two camps into which Europe was divided, we should have to seek them in the other.

Forces were now at work to put an Anglo-German Alliance definitely beyond the bounds of possibility. No sooner had the Kaiser got fairly into the saddle than he had started to develop *Realpolitik* into *Weltpolitik*; his ambitions ceased to be merely continental and became world-wide. A necessary part of this policy was to provide Germany not only with an overwhelming army, but with a fleet to match. In the Kaiser's phraseology, which often rivalled that of Ancient Pistol, her hand must grasp the Trident. He had some difficulty in reconciling his subjects to the financing of this new and expensive whim, but circumstances played into his hands, and those of the true creator of the modern German navy, Admiral Von Tirpitz. The ostentatious commissioning of a British flying squadron as a counter-demonstration to the Kruger telegram had only served to strengthen the hands of the German big-navy

faction, and the tactless seizure, during the South African War, of a German ship suspected of carrying contraband, had aroused a fury in Germany that confirmed her determination not to be at the mercy of British arrogance on the High Seas. But once Germany began to bid for the command of the seas, or once her statesmen began to use language implying such a challenge, England could not but feel her very existence threatened, and a deadly rivalry, with its accompaniment of hatred, was the inevitable sequel. But before this could be translated into terms of European politics, England had a card to play that showed at least the extraordinary astuteness with which her foreign policy was conducted.

The Far East, at which we must now take a retrospective glance, had provided almost as promising a field for the practice of *Realpolitik* as the Near East. The ancient civilization of China, with her incompetent Manchu dynasty and the capitalist leeches who continued to bleed her white, was sinking to lower and lower depths of degradation. On the other hand, the island people of Japan had now succeeded, almost miraculously, in adapting the methods of their would-be exploiters, and in transforming themselves into a young and vigorous power on the Western model. The game of *Realpolitik* was one to which Japan took with a zest, and her first experiment was to fall, in 1894-5, upon her huge but inert Chinese neighbour, and trounce her with scientific thoroughness, taking, amongst other spoils, the great harbour fortress of Port Arthur. This was too much for Holy Russia, who was already, in the euphemistic language of the time, peacefully penetrating the Chinese province of Manchuria, and had designed to fitch this very harbour for the warm-water terminus of her Siberian railway. So Russia, in a virtuous access of indignation for Chinese rights, warned Japan off her new conquest, and her ally, France, naturally stood in with her. Germany, with that blundering indifference to making enemies that distinguished her policy under the Kaiser's auspices, consented to make a third. With unruffled suavity, the Japanese gave up their dearly-won fortress, registering a determination to settle the account in due course. Germany, who had not entered this honourable partnership for nothing, made the murder of a couple of missionaries, in 1897, the pretext for seizing the harbour of Kiao-Chau and the surrounding territory, and Russia quickly followed this up by appropriating Port Arthur, under what she humorously described as a lease. England, righteously indignant at an act of brigandage so contrary to her own interests, nevertheless did not feel herself

strong enough to dislodge the intruders by force of arms, and accordingly made the best of a bad business by appropriating, or leasing, the very inferior harbour of Wei-Hei-Wei, as her share of the pickings.

The next few years were marked by considerable fluidity in the relationships of the competing powers, each playing for her own hand and in entire disregard of their victim's rights or feelings. In 1900 Chinese reactionaries, as patriots are called when they fail to possess white skins, broke into desperate revolt against their exploiters, and besieged the legations at Peking. These were safely relieved—after the chief organ of the English halfpenny press had effected a rare scoop by certifying, in luscious detail, the massacre of all their inmates—by a heterogeneous force of Europeans, Americans, and Japanese, of whom the Germans and Russians, especially, disgraced their uniforms by fiendish and filthy outrages. After this there was some talk of actually partitioning China, but as this could hardly have been effected without a general war, nothing in particular was done beyond looting some of the priceless treasures of art at Peking. England and Germany patched up an arrangement for combining to keep the open door for European trade and exploitation, but as it was evident that Germany was not prepared to keep faith to the extent of acting as a brake on Russia, we had to look elsewhere for support.

This we found in accepting the proffered hand of Japan. Calculating and unforgiving, the island Kingdom was only biding the time when she would be able to deal with first one and then the other of the powers who, after warning her off the shores of the Yellow Sea, had gone there themselves. Russia threatened the most immediate danger, and Japan, confident in her newborn efficiency wedded to her ancient patriotism, only asked for a fair field in the contest that she foresaw with her giant antagonist. England, for her part, was only less troubled than Japan by the seizure of Port Arthur and Russia's expansion in the Far East, and desired nothing better than that Japan should pull the chestnuts, which she had found too hot to grasp with her own fingers, out of the fire for her. Accordingly an alliance was concluded, the practical effect of which was that England should keep the ring in any contest in which Japan might be engaged. In two years' time the foreseen happened; the Tsar's courtiers had pushed their country into war to forward their own speculations in Corea, and next year Russia, in danger of revolution, and bluffed into believing herself beaten, conceded to

an exhausted Japan the objects, including Port Arthur, for which she had gone to war.

1903 witnessed the last attempt of England to act in friendly co-operation with Germany, the two combining to blockade Venezuela for the purpose of dunning a rascally President for some long-outstanding debts. The experiment was not particularly successful, as it brought us into bad odour with the United States, and served rather to heighten suspicion than to promote friendship between England and Germany. It provided the excuse for one of the worst poems that Mr. Kipling ever wrote, a violent anti-German tirade in which occurs the expression "barbarous Hun". Already, by this time, England was fairly embarked on a policy that would range her at the council board, and ultimately in the field, among Germany's opponents.

9

THE FLIGHT FROM VICTORIANISM

Whatever constitutional historians may have to say about the vanishing power of the throne, there is no doubt that the death of Queen Victoria marked as definitely as that of Elizabeth the end of an epoch. The revolt against Victorianism and all its works was the result of forces that had been continuously at work for many years, but the prestige of the great Queen's name, and the social influence that emanated from her court, had sufficed to hold them partially in check. Now, however, her place was filled by a sovereign who, owing to the awful parental repression, of which he had during his adolescence, and, to a lesser extent, ever since, been the victim, naturally tended to react against anything sanctioned by his mother's authority. A man of the world, a sportsman and a humorist, he was the very antithesis of Victorian respectability, and on that account in singular harmony with the less strait-laced age in which his lot was now cast. He had no use for the invisible barriers with which his mother had fenced her court; under his auspices money began to talk, and not always in the purest English. But King Edward possessed, to a degree unapproached in any English King since the Merry Monarch, that supreme gift which cannot be defined otherwise than as personality. He may not, after the fashion of his ancestors, have exercised power, but he more than made up for it by influence. What exact part he had in determining British foreign policy during the few critical years of his reign is a question that will

probably never admit of an undisputed answer—it is exceedingly doubtful whether he could have answered it himself. But the Kaiser was not without reason for his despairing outburst on the breaking of the peace in 1914: “Edward VII after his death is stronger than I who am alive.”

The reaction against everything Victorian now set in in full flood. It is possible that innumerable children of frock-coated papas were moved by a similar anti-parental bias to that of their sovereign. The exaggerated homage that had been paid to the great Victorians was succeeded by an equally exaggerated depreciation. It was now quite in the fashion to write, as one rhymster did, of “the drivell and belch and stink of Tennyson”; to take seriously Spencer as a philosopher or Ruskin as an art critic would have been classed as hopelessly *démodé*; the universal homage paid to a dead Queen was succeeded by a tendency to treat her memory as a butt for irreverent witticisms.

The strenuously cultivated moral earnestness of the Victorians gave place to an equally strenuous cynicism and flippancy. To hitch one's waggon to a star of any sort was an eccentricity that few had the courage to avow. Even the enthusiasms of the nineties had grown cold; the gospel of aestheticism had been fatally discredited by the end of Oscar Wilde, and the flamboyant imperialism that had culminated in the South African War had only survived it in a very chastened form. In the upper and middle classes, at any rate, there was a distinct reaction from anything demanding serious concentration, except sports and games, the cult of which was pursued with an abandonment that was really, in a social sense, pathological, since it represented a desire to provide a world of make-believe for the energy that could find no congenial outlet in that reality. There was also a veritable cult or, as its devotees would have expressed it, a craze for dancing, and the Viennese gaiety or English sentimentality of the valse was more and more interspersed with the neurotic stimulus of negroid rhythms, brutally direct in their expression of sex.

And yet these hectic and frivolous years that elapsed between the Queen's death and the outbreak of the Great War cannot be classed as merely barren or decadent. They were a time, if not of great achievement, at least of extraordinary ferment. New movements of every kind were being started and dropped, the only guiding principle of which seemed to be that they should be as defiant as possible of the old traditions, a tendency, it must be confessed, which by no means distinguished England from other Western

nations. The Victorians had exaggerated prettiness, the Edwardians and Georgians made a perfect fetish of ugliness ; an artist or sculptor could hardly pass for anything but a back number unless he were capable of making a beautiful woman into an eyesore ; poets were encouraged to make their words grate and shriek as they were jammed into the lines, to write sonnets about being sick, or to interlard their idylls with the vernacular of Billingsgate.

It is significant that the most valuable achievement was effected in arts in which the Victorians had been admittedly weak, and in which consequently there was no authority of tradition weighty enough to be worth defying. This was most of all true of architecture, in which there was no violent break with Victorian precedent, but rather a continuous and creative evolution from imitative and consequently lifeless Gothic and Renaissance Classic, to a style in which something of the aspiring spirit of Gothic was wedded to classical dignity and design. This was fairly effected in the, as yet, unfinished Cathedral of Liverpool, designed by a grandson of the architect who designed the Albert Memorial. It was inspired, though in a Low Church stronghold, by that Anglo-Catholic impulse that was perhaps the most vital element in the not very fervent religious life of the time. It was this period, too, that saw the rise of one of the supreme geniuses of our architecture, in Sir Edwin Lutyens, a master of all Western styles without being the slave of any of them, and capable, as it proved, of expressing at will the whole gamut of architectural moods, from the opulent light-heartedness of a rich man's week-end cottage to the solemn pride of an Empire mourning its glorious dead. For this last triumph, however, Sir Edwin's supreme craftsmanship had to wait upon a unanimity and depth of national feeling that did not exist in pre-war days.

His name was only the chief in what was a veritable architectural renaissance. The sense of civic pride arising from the steadily increasing activities and scope of local self-government found expression in a number of imposing and yet simple public buildings, of which those at Cardiff, and the London County Hall (designed though not completed before the war) are among the most distinguished examples. Country houses seemed to gain in refinement and sincerity with every increase in the vulgarity and pretentiousness of those who could afford to pay for them. In a humbler sphere, new streets of suburban villas discarded the fussy adornments of Jubilee Road and Mafeking Avenue, and cottage architecture at last shook itself free from the skinflint, utilitarian ugliness of Victorian tradition, and

often expressed itself in forms worthy of comparison with the still surviving Gothic of Stuart times.

But perhaps the most striking, if not the most pleasing feature of this revival was the clamant architecture of commerce, in which the builders were at least sincere in expressing the spirit for which they catered. Taken as a whole, it may be described as the architecture of advertisement, the assimilation of the shop or hotel to the hoarding, the art of putting all the showiest goods into the front window. The dignified and self-respecting merchandize of Regent Street was broken in sunder by the irruption of a building from which desire of money seemed to be perpetually appealing through a megaphone to pride of money; in Oxford Street arose another building so overlarded with ornament as to suggest a recently ennobled Hebrew money-lender displaying to the world the rings on his fingers and the diamonds in his shirt-front; further up stood an Ionic translation into stone of the type of printed advertisement that begins with a picture of Plato and a quotation from Carlyle, and ends with a panegyric of somebody's patent medicine.¹ But perhaps, for historical monuments, these buildings are more worthy of preservation even than the churches and municipal halls. For they express, as truly as Lincoln Cathedral or the Parthenon, the age that produced them.

In music, another art in which the Victorian had had no pretensions to excel, the new century saw a revival which, if it did not recall the days when England gave the lead to Europe, produced a number of English composers not perhaps in the same class as a Strauss or a Debussy, but at least capable of raising English music to a consideration which it had not deserved since the seventeenth century. It is another instance of Nietzsche's law that music expresses the spirit of a previous age, that at a time when everything else Victorian was absolutely taboo, Sir Edward Elgar should be translating the spirit of Tennyson and Watts into the prettiest of melody, while Mr. Cyril Scott continued to harmonize the exotic aestheticism of the nineties long after it had become *démodé* in literature.

In painting, English art was content to take its lead from France, where the hitherto neglected pioneers of that extremely subjective craft of mood painting known as post-impressionism were at last coming into their own. This form of art was so exactly in consonance with the spirit of the age, which hankered after violent colouring

¹ Contrast the squalor and shabbiness of any part of such buildings that happens not to be for show.

and vivid though unsustained emotions, and shrank from the labour of concentration, that it was bound sooner or later to prevail over such laborious, not to say dull methods, as those inculcated by the pre-Raphaelites and the more conservative academicians. But England, with her shrinking from logical extremes, was bound to adopt a more cautious and eclectic attitude than that of the Parisian salons. There were certainly attempts to go one better on the post-impressionists by carrying subjectivity to the point of bathos, but these were never regarded in much more than the light of a joke. It was more characteristic of English art to produce such a genius as that of Mr. Augustus John, who, while he was capable of assimilating all that was best in post-impressionism, made up for what he may have lacked in that definition of personality which is of the essence of the Parisian *flair*, by a greater scope and universality. Of even more unquestioned supremacy in his own branch of art was the sculptor, Mr. Epstein, who, however, was only English by adoption, and in consequence carried the distinctive principles of the new art, with its fierce hostility to anything, in the popular sense, beautiful, to an uncompromising and essentially un-English extreme.

It was in literature that the breach of continuity was most pronounced, and that the revolution against Victorianism had the most levelling effect. There was an extraordinary incompleteness about the achievement of these years, which can best be realized by comparing their leading names with those of the same number of years in the middle of the nineteenth century. Indeed in perhaps the most representative writer of this time, Mr. H. G. Wells, we find a veritable complex against the very idea of a great man. In his satire, *Boon*, published during the first year of the war, he rejoices to think that there is no place in modern life for the great man, and implies that the reputations of former times are built on a basis of humbug. Still later, in what he calls an *Outline of History*, he surpasses Quixote and all other dons by demolishing his own puppet show of labelled celebrities. Popular dislike of any sort of intellectual distinction crystallized itself in the pre-war "*brainy*", as in the post-war "*high-brow*".

Perhaps the solemn self-consciousness of men like Tennyson and Gladstone was responsible for a tone of half-humorous self-depreciation in a generation to which they and their like were anathema. The fact remains that the Victorians were capable of achievement that could be characterized as great with more plausibility than that of their Edwardian and Georgian successors, and this because, with

all their defects of taste and humour, the Victorians excelled in the essential faculty of concentration.

The itch for obtaining quick intellectual returns was more than ever prevalent in the opening years of the twentieth century. A trick of flashy epigram or paradox was enough to create a reputation at which not even the severest critic would trouble seriously to cavil. The entire absence of any authority or accepted standards in criticism produced something not far short of literary anarchy. Critics, like authors, were expected to be snappy, to catch and titillate and continually revive the attention by stimulants. The moral earnestness, that had inspired a man like Sainte Beuve to devote a week's concentrated hard labour to the production of every article, would have been suicidal in twentieth century journalism, and journalism was coming more and more to dominate literature. It was marvellous, under the circumstances, that so much good work got into print with the rest, that a master of rhymed narrative should have arisen, in Mr. Masefield, not unworthy, at his inconstant best, of comparison with Chaucer, and that the brief career of James Elroy Flecker should have produced one or two lyrics of an Oriental colour and sensuousness unique of their kind in English.

What was most conspicuous in the thought of these pre-war years was its void of anything that could be described as faith. The old creeds hardly maintained the semblance of their authority among educated people; nobody who mattered would have dreamed of citing scriptural authority in philosophic or scientific discussion, and in fact there were Anglican churchmen, often in distinguished posts, who would cheerfully reduce to folklore not only Genesis but the Resurrection. Perhaps what came nearest to religion was the compassionate and somewhat backboneless humanitarianism of Mr. Masefield and Mr. Galsworthy, and the conviction of Mr. Wells that mankind was capable of fashioning for itself a new order of society as rational and satisfying as its present condition was muddled and miserable, and that the way to this Utopia was through the education of the next generation. For the time, at any rate, in culture and philosophy, in social and international affairs, organized Christianity had practically ceased to count, nor had anything come into its place capable of restraining the tendencies that were now palpably driving mankind to the alternative forms of suicide represented by an international and a class war of annihilation.

So far we have dwelt upon tendencies mainly effective among what communists lump together as the bourgeoisie. Beyond that

pale, sentimentality, of the crudest description, reigned as supreme as in the sixties. It was, in fact, enormously stimulated by compulsory education, which created a demand for the mass production of the cheap and standardized trash which in bulk far exceeded any other form of literature. The melodrama maintained its grip on popular affections, and the newly invented cinema, with all its immense possibilities, was devoted to the exploitation of a form of melodrama more monstrously divorced from sense and reality than that of the traditional Surrey side theatre.

Outside melodrama, the chief motives of proletarian literature were crime and sport. By the cheap Sunday weeklies, through whose distorted glass immense masses of the population looked out upon life, crime and indecency were muck-raked into one festering mass, and made blacker and more noisome in the process. As for sport, that too was commercialized on an ever-increasing scale, and more and more corrupted by gambling. On the other hand, a real enthusiasm for knowledge was evidenced by an unprecedented output of reprints of the classics and cheap scientific summaries.

And yet, amid all the crudeness and cupidity, that seemed inseparable from the herding of the population into great cities, there were signs that the heart, at least, was sound, that the majority of Englishmen were on the side of virtue, as they understood it, against villainy, of society against the criminal, of fair play and sportsmanship against whatever was "not cricket". It remained to be seen how far soundness of heart could compensate for a lack of knowledge and training, that placed the mind practically at the disposal of those whose interest it was to exploit it. And such minds were by no means a working class monopoly. The type of magazine that catered for the snobbishness of villa dwellers by snapshots of and gossip about rich people, the time-killing short story and novel that were standardized almost as rigidly as the melodrama, merely represented a slightly less crude form of mental parasitism.

The question was now presenting itself more and more insistently whether, at this eleventh hour, it was possible for mankind to level up its mental capacities to the demands of the environment that its own conquest of matter had created. Was there any chance of our improving our minds in proportion to the improvement in our machines? The prospect was certainly not rosy, but there were signs of hope, though often of dubious and equivocal import. For

one thing, the demand for mind training had become sufficiently insistent to make it a paying proposition to meet it by the preposterous method of secret courses. Then, again, literature and the intellectual drama were showing an intense and minute interest in problems of psychology. Finally psychology itself was showing a belated tendency to escape from the academic and metaphysical grooves in which it had struck unprofitably for so many years. Already before the war the science of understanding the emotions by psycho-analysis and the art of controlling them by suggestion were being studied on the Continent, and even discussed in England. All this may not have been much to build upon, but at least it showed that men were beginning to wake from the self-complacent apathy of the nineteenth century, and to face, once again, though in a new spirit, the old medieval problem of human salvation.

If the time was one of tentative beginnings in the all important science of mind, in other departments of science the record was one of steady, if unostentatious progress. Science had shared in the reaction against the ideals of the nineteenth century. Its leading exponents seldom ventured outside the bounds of the severely limited fields that they marked out for their activities. Men like Huxley, who were not only scientists but also philosophers and something of prophets into the bargain, no longer stood in the public eye; the very names of the scientific leaders were seldom known to the man in the street. This was all to the good, in so far as it allowed scientists to devote themselves to their business of research in which they were now perfectly free, without being distracted by controversy or the necessity of playing to the gallery. But there was another side to the shield in the necessarily limited outlook and lack of co-ordination that comes from excessive specialism, an evil that profoundly affected every department of intellectual and artistic activity. More and more it was becoming the rule that a man must have his distinctive label, whether this bound him for life to elucidating the Baltic policy of George I or to unravelling the psychic complexes of mercantile seamen East of the 90th meridian from Greenwich. The ideal of the complete man, of one who should be not in name but in very truth a Master of the Arts and a Doctor of Science, was as dead as Leonardo da Vinci. Thus culminated the long process, which had started at the Renaissance, of sacrificing everything, the dignity and even the soul of man, to power over matter. The supreme achievement of a mechanical age was to make man a cog in a machine over which neither he, nor anyone else, had the least control. A machine that,

with its wheels racing madly and its bearings red hot, might at any moment be blown or smashed to smithereens.

10

“ OURSELVES ALONE ”

The most notable, as well as the most positive, of all the literary movements of this time was the Celtic Revival in Ireland, which was already in full swing by the beginning of the century, and should have been sufficient proof of the wrong-headedness of that school of political thought which imagined that twenty years of firm government would suffice to extinguish the sentiment of Irish patriotism and, by satisfying the material needs of a people as emotional and unforgetting as any in Europe, make them contented members of the United Kingdom. In the last quarter of the century, a movement was afoot to give back to Irishmen the lost heritage of civilization bequeathed them by their ancestors. Not by romantic intuition, but by laborious and patient research, the treasures of Gaelic literature were recovered, reprinted, interpreted with an understanding born of love. The task was even assayed, though with necessarily imperfect success, of reviving that Gaelic language which had received its death blow at the time of the Black Famine, and was now only spoken by a minority of the people in three or four counties. It was, however, in the English language, which was now the living tongue, that the Celtic Revival achieved its most enduring successes. The Romantic impulse died harder in Ireland than in any other part of Europe, and it was very congenial to the dreamy and imaginative Celtic temperament. Mr. W. B. Yeats, whose personality came to dominate the whole movement, was at least as much a product of English Pre-Raphaelite medievalism as of his native Gaelic civilization. The most moving, as well as the most patriotic of all his plays, in which Ireland, in the form of a poor old woman, comes exhorting her sons to take part in a hopeless revolt for her sake, and then changes into a young girl with the walk of a Queen, is of the kind that would have moved young ladies, and perhaps the Prince Consort himself, to tears in the fifties, and the very names of the Shadowy Waters and the Land of Heart's Desire seem as if they came straight out of a Victorian song book or album.

Much more in harmony with the new spirit in Ireland was the work

of that bitter and melancholy genius, J. M. Synge. It was he who pointed the would-be revivers of Gaelic to a better way by re-creating not the Irish but the English language, and importing into literature the lovely and picturesque phraseology he had assimilated among peasants and fishermen. But Synge, though he could express perfectly the sad mysticism that is native to the very soil of Ireland, was at heart a realist of a realist age, and the Ireland he saw was peopled by folk very different from the kindly and wistful creations of Mr. Yeats's romantic imagination. He saw a people into whose soul the iron of centuries had entered, in whom suffering had begotten bitterness and oppression cruelty.* The finest of all his plays depicted an Irish village in which a lad is made a hero of by the men and adored by the women for the sufficient reason that he is believed to have killed his own father. Superior critics, who could see that the play was a beautiful work of art, could not understand the feelings of hostility that this holding up by an Irishman of a mirror to Ireland not unnaturally aroused. There was the conventional talk about the separation of art from morals, and Synge himself, in a somewhat confused defensive, tried to pass off the whole thing as an extravaganza—as if such a *jeu d'esprit* would have had any point or even intelligibility as applied, say, to an English village! The time was at hand when Ireland was to give proof, if the days of the Land League had not already given it, that the state of things depicted by Synge fell, if anything, short of the naked reality, and that the Catholic faith itself had not such a hold on Irish villages as the gospel of "Killing no murder".

We have, then, to distinguish in the Celtic Revival two main tendencies, the one of a wistful and romantic melancholy, the other¹ of a grim and bitter realism that refused, even from patriotic motives, to sentimentalize about such an Ireland as centuries of English rule had left it, and saw in that most distressful country what Mr. Shaw's visionary priest had seen—Hell. And the patriotism that sprang, logically enough, from this vision of Ireland, took the form of ah unyielding and ruthless hatred of the country that had, so it was deemed, brought to such a pass the land of the saints and dreamers. It took for its motto the words, which might indeed have served equally for the hard and bitter realism that had infected Western civilization—Sinn Féin—Ourselves alone.

¹That attained its incoherent and insanitary culmination in Mr. James Joyce's *Ulysses*.

11

THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

Those last years, before the now plainly foreshadowed catastrophe of a world war, may be likened to nothing so aptly as those last days before the breaking of the Indian monsoon, when the clouds are packed and glooming and yet refuse to break, when the whole air is charged with electricity, and men strong enough to have endured the months of cloudless heat go mad or die from the intolerable strain.

In 1904 occurred the event which the whole of German policy should have been directed to avoid, and which in fact determined the grouping of forces for the final conflict. With the measureless growth of German ambitions, and the feverish haste to push on the construction of a navy which, whatever plausible reasons might be alleged, was, as everybody knew, a direct challenge to the English command of the seas, it became overwhelmingly the interest of both England and France to sink their differences in the presence of a common danger. What held the two nations apart was not so much policy as sentiment, which had been embittered on one side by the humiliation of Fashoda and on the other by incessant pinpricks and unfriendly opposition. It was here that the personality of Edward VII proved a priceless asset to our foreign policy. In 1903 he paid a visit to a frigidly hostile Paris, and before he left he had taken it by storm with his tactful geniality and sheer *joie de vivre*. The path was now clear for the diplomats. Most of the questions that had caused friction and even threatened war proved perfectly susceptible to the operations of a friendly deal. The two great outstanding difficulties were those presented by the British occupation of Egypt and the Eastern Gate of the Mediterranean, and France's threat to the Western Gate by her thinly concealed ambition to absorb Morocco. This was settled, with the addition of a certain amount of pious verbiage about native rights, by Britain saying in effect to France, "if you give me a free hand in Egypt, I will do the same to you in Morocco, only please remember to keep away from the neighbourhood of Gibraltar."

To all outward appearance nothing could have been of better augury to the cause of peace than this agreement of two great and hitherto far from friendly powers thus to remove every possible excuse for strife or friction between them. But so roscate a view was almost too good to be the whole truth in an age of *Realpolitik*.

Was it only a desire for peace on earth and goodwill to men that had induced these neighbours to join hands? Or might it not perhaps be that Entente contained the germs of an alliance, and would never have been arrived at unless on an unwritten, and perhaps even unspoken understanding to that effect? Not until all the archives are revealed, perhaps not even then, shall we know what inducements were offered, what possibilities were suggested, in the course of negotiations. It is certain, at any rate, that as regards Morocco the open agreement was reinforced by a secret one which frankly contemplated a state of things in which France should be compelled, as it was euphemistically phrased, by force of circumstances, to modify her unexceptionable and avowed policy of respecting Moroccan independence. In that case, it was stipulated, France should leave to Spain the strip of North Western coast in which England was so vitally interested. This amiable division of the Sultan's dominions, in a future which French policy was capable of rendering by no means distant, was confirmed and still further defined by an agreement with Spain a few months later.

The Entente was concluded not a moment too soon. For already France's ally, Russia, had blundered into war with England's ally, Japan, and a situation of the utmost delicacy was created, one that might have turned to the decisive advantage of Germany, either by plunging Britain and Russia into war, or by giving the Kaiser an opportunity of reversing his first fatal blunder in alienating Russia, and perhaps of again buttressing the cause of Divine Right by a renewal of the Three Emperors' Alliance. The attitude of France as a friend of both England and Russia was invaluable during a time when partisanship with Japan and consequently against Russia was rife throughout England. When the Russian Baltic fleet, passing the Dogger Bank, opened fire on torpedo boats that in default of proof to the contrary must be presumed imaginary, and sunk some British fishing boats, war was perilously near, but reason and arbitration prevailed.

It was when the Tsar was smarting under a sense of this and other grievances against the English, that the Kaiser played what he evidently thought a winning card. He had, for years, kept up an extraordinary private correspondence with Nicholas II, whom he plainly imagined he could twist round his thumb. In July, 1905, he managed to arrange a meeting of their two imperial yachts, and having, for a time, got the Tsar completely under his influence, induced him to sign a treaty of defensive alliance which was flatly

in contradiction of the already existing treaty of alliance between France and Russia. But the Kaiser had overreached himself. When the Tsar got home, his ministers and the ablest of his family, the Grand Duke Nicholas, lost no time in opening his eyes to what he had done. The treaty was never ratified, and the only effect of the Kaiser's masterstroke was to estrange Germany from Russia more decisively than ever, and to pave the way for the now inevitable expansion of the Dual into the Triple Entente.

While these manoeuvres were taking place behind the scenes, public interest was focussed on Morocco. Whatever may have been the intentions of the British Foreign Office in framing the Entente, we certainly acted as if that agreement had bound us not only to countenance, but to support with our whole forces whatever action the French might take. For good or evil, we were fairly committed to the game of *Realpolitik* that was now being played with a keener intensity than ever. Previously to the Entente, our policy in Morocco had been precisely the same as that of Germany, to keep the French out and the door open to trade. Now however France had bought off our opposition by allowing us a free hand in Egypt. She bought off Italy by letting it be understood that she might, so far as France was concerned, lay violent hands on Tripoli, to which she had no shadow of right. Germany she ostentatiously refused to buy off, and her Foreign Minister, Delcassé, had on the conclusion of the Entente agreement omitted the civility of notifying Germany even of its public provisions in regard to Morocco.

Germany's shrewdest policy would undoubtedly have been either to have crushed France out of hand, when Russia was powerless to help her, or else to have pressed strongly but diplomatically for a deal such as France had already concluded with the other powers interested in Morocco. Instead she acted with the provocative clumsiness that characterized the whole of her foreign policy at this time. On the last day of March, 1905, the Kaiser landed for a couple of hours at Tangier, and delivered himself of a rhetorical outburst which was a plain challenge to the Entente, and by recalling the never forgiven insult of the Kruger telegram served instantly to rally England to France's support. Conscious of her overwhelming military strength, Germany went on to insist on the Moroccan question being taken out of the hands of France and submitted to a European conference. The wildest rumours circulated—that England had promised to land 100,000 men in Schleswig in the event of war, that Delcassé, who had resigned owing to his policy of refusing

a conference being unacceptable to his colleagues, had been driven from office by a German ultimatum. The upshot was that the conference was accepted and met in due course at Algeceiras, an arrangement being patched up that apparently safeguarded the independence of Morocco. At the conference board, Italy gave her support, not to her ally Germany, but to France, a plain sign that the Entente was drawing into its orbit the Latin partner in the Triple Alliance, for though that compact continued to be punctually renewed when it came up for signature, nobody, who understood the ethics of European diplomacy, imagined that a treaty more or less would weigh in the balance against more practical considerations.

The Morocco crisis was the first of a series of violent shocks to European tranquillity, each of which left the atmosphere more charged with hatred and suspicion and brought the nations more plainly in sight of the war which all dreaded, but none knew how to avoid. England, in spite of her now having a Liberal government pledged to peace and friendship with all nations, and in spite of the repeatedly avowed resolve of the Cabinet to remain unentangled by any formal alliance, was borne along as helplessly as the rest. The impression left on the public mind by the Morocco crisis of 1905 was that England had stood by France in resisting the pretensions of a bully, and that Germany, which was credited with a fiendish and far-sighted ingenuity, was plotting and arming for nothing less than the subjugation of the world. This impression was steadily propagated by the imperialist organs of the press, which, now that there was no longer any chance of the alliance dreamed of by Rhodes and Chamberlain, lost no opportunity of stimulating the hatred and still more the fear of Germany.

When the Liberal government came into office, it was too much of a temptation to use the German peril as a stick to beat them with, to talk of a Potsdam party in the Cabinet and to insinuate that every vote given at a by-election to a Liberal was a vote for the Kaiser. Besides there was an impression, that seemed to obtain some countenance from the diminished programmes of shipbuilding, that the Government were, for political ends, ready to imperil our naval supremacy. This impression was strengthened when it leaked out, in March, 1908, that the Kaiser had been in secret correspondence with our First Lord of the Admiralty with the object of lulling any suspicions he might harbour on the subject of Germany's naval preparations, and thus, it was at once assumed, trying to take an

infamous advantage of us by keeping down our naval programme. In October of the same year, *The Daily Telegraph* published an almost hysterical interview in which the Kaiser, who in private had never lost an opportunity of setting the Tsar against England, protested, not without a hint of menace, the sincerity of his friendship for England and his irritation at the way his advances were received. Naturally this only added fresh fuel to the fire of suspicion.

It is needless to detail the sordid and pitiful story of how, in two great and kindred powers that might have co-operated in the work of civilized progress, business motives begat misrepresentation, and misrepresentation fear, and fear hatred, and hatred, at last, war. There is no need to doubt the sincerity of those who were chiefly responsible, even when, like one great newspaper proprietor, they succeeded in exactly reversing the attitude they had held a few years before. Nor is there any need to look for a villain or even a liar in the piece. No doubt there was a danger, one that every hectoring article or alarmist rumour made more imminent. The peril from the German navy was a real peril; the ambitions of swashbuckling generals, of dividend-hunting concessionaires and armament bosses, of a swollen-headed public unacquainted with the miseries of war, were, in very truth, a menace to the peace of Europe and the security of every peaceful citizen. But at such a time the one conceivable chance of averting a catastrophe whose horror no one as yet could realize, lay in a great and sincerely peace-loving nation keeping her head, taking, without fuss or panic, every reasonable precaution for her own security, but preserving a magnanimous determination to live in courtesy and charity even with the most aggressive neighbours, and to hope for peace until events compelled her to despair. Unfortunately this would have required an enlightenment and moral elevation quite inconceivable in any of the European nations at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Germany, for her part, was as much the victim of fears, real and imaginary, as England. Edward VII became in her eyes a person like the English version of the Kaiser, of fiendish ingenuity, who could not go near a brother monarch without the object of drawing a circle of flame and steel round the devoted Germany. Every Anti-German tirade of an English leader-writer, driving a fountain-pen in the most precarious of all trades, was liable to be quoted in Germany as a serious expression of national opinion, and, what was much worse, the Under Secretary of the Admiralty, in 1905, was credited with using language which implied that we might, at a chosen moment,

send the German fleet to the bottom without even a declaration of war. This was not unnaturally hailed as a godsend by every German supporter of a big navy, and quoted as the deliberate pronouncement of a responsible statesman on British policy. Curiously enough, the not wholly unreasonable fear of being set upon on all sides by a coalition of enemies proved not by any means inconsistent with a grotesque national megalomania, a cult of violence and Machiavellianism, and a supreme trust in the might of German arms. At the second Peace Conference, held at the Hague in 1907, it was Germany who truculently vetoed any attempt to mitigate the suicidal competition in armaments.

One of the effects of the crisis of 1905 was to induce the British War Minister, with the knowledge of the Premier but not of the Cabinet, to initiate military conversations between the British and French staffs, with the view to a possible war with Germany. These conversations, which were followed by others with the Belgian staff, implied no formally binding obligation on either party, but it was impossible thus to make common preparation for the event of English armed support of France against Germany, without creating an atmosphere in which it would be extremely difficult to refuse with honour that co-operation when the expected day dawned. When, subsequently, France was allowed to concentrate her fleet in the Mediterranean, leaving her Northern shores defenceless, while we effected a similar concentration in the North Sea, we could hardly, for very shame, stand by while a German fleet swept up the Channel to bombard the French ports or to convoy an invading force. And yet such was the almost universal blindness to reality that ministers could go on, to the last, asserting our complete freedom of choice in all contingencies.

It now only remained to round off the Entente by the addition of France's ally, Russia, and to end the long mutual animosity which Disraeli's policy had begun. After the fiasco of the unratified German alliance, Russian statesmanship was ripe for such a move. But in England reports of the successful efforts of the Tsardom to strangle the new-born liberties of Russia had made an understanding with that blind and corrupt tyranny a bitter pill for Englishmen to swallow, even for the most cogent considerations of high politics. Swallowed it was, however, not without considerable murmurings from Labour and the advanced wing of the Liberal party, and on August 31st, 1907, a new Entente agreement was signed, on the lines of that with France, which settled all outstanding differences between

England and Russia in the Middle East, where alone, since the Japanese war, their interests clashed.

The place of Morocco in this new Entente was supplied by the almost helpless kingdom of Persia, on which, since her rebuff in Manchuria, Russia had fixed greedy eyes. It was arranged that Russia should take the Northern part, including the capital, as her sphere of influence, that England should do the same to an area in the South East, and that the intervening strip should constitute a common hunting ground for concessions. It was Russia's deliberate object to absorb as much of Persia as she could, and her statesmen not vainly calculated on the fact that Britain's interest in maintaining the Entente would induce her to turn a blind eye to the strangling of Persian liberties as far as Russia's own sphere was concerned. It was the usual story of a spendthrift Oriental despot mortgaging his own and his people's resources to Western usurers, and of the bailiffs being put in in the shape of armed men. The deposition of the Shah and the triumph of a constitutional party made no difference to the Russian policy, and when an American Treasurer General showed some signs of restoring Persian finances to order, Russia actually obtained England's support in compelling his dismissal. The Russians went about their work of absorption with a barbaric crudity that moved our Liberal Foreign Secretary to repeated and, on one occasion, grave remonstrance, but not even when they proceed to such unprovoked ruffianism as the bombardment, in 1912, of the holy places at Meshed, did we put any effective brake on their proceedings. If we could not be loyal to our principles and the Entente at the same time, who could blame us for consulting our interests in making the choice?

It must not be imagined, however, that even under these circumstances British policy was committed to the deliberate and Machiavellian realism that found favour with our more logical neighbours. Sir Edward Grey, who was, by general admission, a very Aristides among politicians, had inherited, with his name, the generous and at the same time patriotic principles of the last Whigs. Among the ranks of all parties in Parliament, and particularly among the more advanced democratic element, was to be found a genuine and sincere philanthropy, though perhaps, under the now rigid discipline of the caucus, it did not matter much one way or the other what Members of Parliament chose to believe. Where the supreme necessity of maintaining the Entente against Germany was not in question, Great Britain was always to be found taking the generous part.

This was particularly the case as regards the persistent efforts, both of our Conserváitive and Liberal Foreign Ministers, to combat the tyranny of the Belgian King Leopold's government, or rather organized plunder of the Congo, and our endeavours to mitigate the evils of Turkish misrule in Macedonia. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that, so far as our interests did not commit us to the support of our friends in the Entente, every effort was made to conciliate and pacify Germany, even to the extent of letting our naval construction drop below what many people thought to be the margin of safety, during the first three years of Liberal rule.

12

THE STORM BREAKS

The very year after the Triple Entente had taken form, another crisis came within an ace of precipitating the European War for which the lists were now set, and which, as Bismarck had foreseen, would begin in the East. In 1908 there were ominous signs that the Balkan volcano was becoming active, and the comparatively harmonious Concert of the Powers, in pressing for never-accomplished reforms in Macedonia, was liable to be broken up by the never extinguished rivalry between Austrian and Russian ambitions. Austria started the trouble early in 1908, procuring the concession for a railway through the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, in which Russia detected a move forward towards the goal of Salonika, and in which Italy also felt her interests slighted. In July, while nerves were still on edge from this unpleasantness, the Turkish nationalist party rose and forced a constitution, and their own government, on the Pan-Islamite party as represented by the Sultan.

What followed showed the utter contempt into which the public law of Europe had fallen. In October, with an obviously concerted synchronization, Bulgaria proclaimed her independence of Turkey, and Austria her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she had been allowed to administer under the Treaty of Berlin. This annexation, though Russia had just previously suggested it as part of a deal with her rival, was not only a cynical defiance of a treaty solemnly agreed to by all the Powers, but roused the utmost indignation in Serbia, whose nationalist ambition of uniting the whole of the Southern Slavs received a rude set-back. Russia's Pan-Slavist sentiment was thoroughly roused to the support of her kin, and for

some time it seemed as though a war was about to break out between Austria and Servia, into which the rest of Europe would be dragged. The plain fact, however, was that Russia, exhausted by foreign and domestic strife, was in no condition to fight, and when Germany, suddenly intervening, presented what was practically an ultimatum at Petrograd, she gave in unconditionally. The Kaiser, characteristically, rubbed in her humiliation by talking of his appearance in shining armour at his ally's side, and the effect of the incident was to set Russia at work re-organizing her military system, so that next time such a threat was offered her, she might answer it in a very different spirit.

The Morocco crisis, which the Conference of 1906 had only postponed, came to a head two years later. France had not for a moment abandoned her designs on the Sultanate, and indeed there was no chance of anything like a stable native government being attained, once the usual type of spendthrift Oriental potentate, as represented by the Sultan Abdul Aziz, had got himself and his country into the toils of the moneylenders. It is needless to detail the successive turns France gave to the screw, how Abdul Aziz, bankrupt and helpless, disappeared from the scene, and how his supplanter, Muley Hafid, unable even to pay soldiers to defend him, failed in his turn to curb the now chronic anarchy, and how, finally, a French expeditionary force of overwhelming strength, that chanced to be handy, marched to Fez to take care of the European inhabitants—and stopped there. Still less need we unravel the complicated negotiations that had been afoot between combinations of French and German capitalists for the exploitation of the unhappy country.

Suffice it to say that when it became evident that the Act of Algeceiras was waste paper, and that France meant to plead force of circumstances for an occupation of Morocco, the German government, now thoroughly aroused, determined at all costs at least to have a *quid pro quo* from France. Accordingly in the summer of 1911 she dispatched a gunboat to the Moorish harbour of Agadir. This move, which not only foreboded the seizure of a slice of Morocco, but of a naval base on the Atlantic from which she, Germany, could threaten English commerce, at once landed Europe in a crisis more dangerous than any that had gone before. As the summer waned and negotiations dragged on behind closed doors, it became evident that at any moment England might find herself in the throes of a war about a quarrel in which both our honour and our vital interests

were supposed to be somehow involved. Mr. Lloyd George, speaking in the name of the Government on July 21, plainly intimated to all whom it might concern that if there was a war, Britain meant to be in it. The glove, thus publicly thrown down, was, however, not taken up. This time it was Germany who proved unready for a fight. So she continued to bargain, and after a prolonged and dangerous haggle consented to withdraw from Agadir and leave France a free hand in Morocco in return for a large strip of French Congolese territory. Again Europe had avoided the catastrophe by the skin of her teeth, but this time Germany, thanks to England's appearance in shining armour, felt aggrieved and humiliated, and like Russia, determined to arm to the teeth in order that there should be no question of refusing any subsequent challenge.

The Moroccan danger was thus shelved, but that in the Balkans was as acute as ever. Taking advantage of the Agadir disturbance, Italy now proceeded to realize a long-cherished ambition by falling, without the shadow of provocation, on Tripoli and embarking on an unexpectedly troublesome war for its subjugation. English public opinion was horrified, especially when reports came of a massacre perpetrated by the Italian troops, but the Government, conscious of the priceless value of Italian support for the Entente, acted the part of Gallio. Italy's example was not thrown away on the Christian peoples of the Balkans who, with the exception of Rumania, managed to suspend their mutual hatreds for long enough to enable them to make a sudden attack upon the "sick man", and deprive him of the whole of his European possessions except the corner of territory covering Constantinople and the Straits. In the partition of the conquered territories Servia, baulked of her access to the Adriatic by Austrian hostility, demanded a revision of the arrangements. This led to a swift war, in August, 1913, in which Bulgaria, who launched a sudden and treacherous attack on her allies, was promptly crushed with the assistance of Rumania.

By what seemed almost a miracle, the peace of Europe was preserved throughout this prolonged crisis during which Austria and Russia stood glaring at each other, and England and Germany joined, with unexpected goodwill, in keeping the peace. The fact was that in 1913 none of the Powers was quite ready for the supreme contest. Germany was pushing on her military, naval and financial preparations with feverish haste, and France replied by extending the term of military service from two years to three; Russia was constructing a network of strategic railways on her Western frontier ;

in England Mr. Winston Churchill was pushing on with the multiplication of Dreadnoughts, and an expeditionary force was ready at a few days' notice to take its place on the left of the French line. In the opening months of 1914 it was evident that the least spark would be enough to fire the European powder magazine. A furious campaign of threats and insults between the German and Russian presses testified to the neurotic tension which might at any moment result in words being exchanged for blows. And yet, at this time, British and German official relations were more cordial than they had been for years, and there seemed a real chance of the two governments working together in comparative harmony. Unfortunately it was now no longer a question of Britain against Germany, but of an Entente, that included Britain, against Central Europe.

Meanwhile there seemed every chance that before the European War could break out, the United Kingdom would be in throes of civil war. The Liberal Party had come back from a second election in 1910, again in practical equality with the Unionists, and in the bitter constitutional struggle that had resulted from the rejection of the 1909 Budget, the Irish still held the balance. It was a disastrous situation, as it left the Government with no alternative between the humiliating fiasco of seeing their policy defeated, or of purchasing Irish support by granting Home Rule on the only terms on which it would be accepted, namely the subjection of the Protestant North East to a Dublin Parliament in which their representatives could be outvoted on every issue. After the bitter feelings that had been aroused by the two previous Home Rule Bills, it should have been obvious that the dour and intolerant Protestants would sooner die than be put under the heel, as they believed, of the Papishes and Molly Maguires. The problem of giving liberty to Catholic Ireland and at the same time preserving it to the Protestant community was perhaps the most difficult that had ever confronted British statesmanship, and demanded the utmost caution and impartiality. Unfortunately the Government was not free to be cautious, and the inflamed state of caucus rivalry did not conduce to impartiality on either side.

The Liberal Irish Entente, so similar in principle to the Egyptian-Moroccan compact between England and France, was duly honoured by the passing of the Budget and a Parliament Act, in which the veto of the Lords was restricted to a power of holding up, for two years, all except financial legislation. It was now the turn of the Irish, and the Government, in 1912, brought in a Home Rule Bill which,

despite a good many general safeguards, gave neither exemption nor differential treatment to the North East. The Protestants, who for their part were determined not only to have the government of their choice, but if possible to deny Home Rule to the Catholics, promptly began to organize resistance, and the Parliament Act had given them the certainty of over two years' grace to complete their preparations.

The story of these two years is one which an English historian must wish to hurry over as quickly as possible. The factiousness of party was displayed in its worst form. On the one side the cue was to insult, ridicule and hector at the Protestants, who bound themselves in a Solemn League and Covenant never to submit to Home Rule, and in whose breasts every fresh challenge engendered a more unyielding determination. On the other side the friends of the Protestants, instead of enjoining patience in a crisis that imperilled the whole Empire, did not hesitate to stimulate open rebellion, or even to supply arms, made in Germany, for not improbable use against British troops. Tories seemed to have shed their patriotism and reverence for the authority of the State, Liberals to have pinned their faith to the doctrine of George III that rebels must be made to obey the law whether they agreed with it or not. And all the while, in England, an atmosphere of unreality invested the whole proceedings, arising from a fixed belief that this was all in the party game, that the thing would be compromised somehow, and that nothing really serious would happen. Unfortunately in Ireland both sides were in deadly earnest, and neither understood the English instinct of compromise. The God to whom the Covenanters had appealed may have been an Old Testament Jehovah, but to them He was at least a living God, and a Man of War.

Nor was this the only danger that threatened England from within. The fall in the real value of wages, and the growing disbelief of the workers in the politicians, produced a serious unrest in the years immediately preceding the War, and an outbreak of strikes on a larger scale, and involving greater inconvenience and loss to the nation at large, than had ever been known before. On the whole, these disputes were conducted with surprising good temper, though the results were, from the workers' point of view, so meagre, that there was an increasing tendency to suspect the leaders of being "got at", and, in consequence, to repudiate agreements and adopt the uncompromising tactics of syndicalism. The respect for constitutional methods was ominously on the wane, and the example of the

suffragettes and Ulster volunteers was not unmarked by proletarian extremists.

In 1914, which was the year for the final passing of the Home Rule Bill, there seemed, and perhaps, barring what actually occurred, was, no chance of averting the threatened Civil War. The Covenanters had formed themselves into a numerous and disciplined army, and the Catholics were beginning to follow suit, and organize a volunteer force of their own. A new order of Irish patriots, the Sinn Feiners, who desired nothing less than independence of England, were already beginning to gain ground on the more moderate Nationalists. If these latter showed any signs of compromise, they might easily lose Ireland in gaining England. So they continued to press for an undivided Ireland, and their leader, John Redmond, openly boasted of his ability to make Mr. Asquith "toe the line".

But the politicians had now taken fright. An attempt to nip the threatened rebellion in the bud by the use of troops showed plainly that the army was not to be relied on to fight against the Covenanters. In April a large consignment of arms and ammunition was landed in Ulster and transferred to the Covenanters without the least effort to stop them. It was evident that, bargain or no bargain, some way must be found of saving the Government's face and at the same time avoiding the necessity of coercing the North East. In July a conference was called at Buckingham Palace in which the leaders of both English and both Irish parties met in the desperate endeavour to arrange a compromise by leaving the Protestant counties out of the Bill. Unfortunately the two counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh, where Protestants and Catholics were almost inextricably mixed, were claimed by both sides, and neither the Covenanting nor Nationalist leaders dared give way an inch, or could have induced their followers to do anything but lynch them if they had. The Conference broke up in despair, and the end of the month saw bloodshed in the streets of Dublin, where a force of British troops, detailed to intercept a landing of arms for the Catholics, were compelled to fire on a crowd which mobbed them on their way back to barracks.

But this bloodshed, which might have been the first of a Civil War, was soon forgotten in the presence of the catastrophe that was even now beginning to break over Europe. The exact manner of its coming will probably be a theme for research and controversy as long as history continues to be written. From our point of view, it is comparatively unimportant. In the state of intellect and morals at which Europe had arrived in these opening years of the twentieth

century it is perhaps strange that it had been delayed so long, certainly impossible that it could have been delayed for many months longer.

Austria, whose position in the Balkans had been compromised by the double triumph of her rival Serbia, and whose rickety Empire was seriously menaced by the Jugo-Slav nationalism that was itself an offshoot of Pan-Slavism, was determined to end the nuisance once and for all. She had sounded Italy in 1913, without encouragement. In 1914 she had a golden opportunity to act for herself. The heir to the throne, who paid a deliberately provocative visit to the Bosnian capital on the anniversary of Kossovo, was murdered by an Austrian subject, a Serb. After waiting for nearly a month, Austria suddenly launched an ultimatum to Serbia which was equivalent to a declaration of war. No doubt she gambled on the prospect that Russia would act in 1914 as she had acted in 1908.

This time, however, there was to be no drawing back at St. Petersburg, where indeed the signs of impending revolution were so manifest as to make a national war perhaps the best chance for the Tsardom. Once Russia had determined not to permit the crushing of Serbia, Europe was sliding down an inclined plane to the abyss. In vain did Sir Edward Grey endeavour to get the matter submitted to a European Conference—Germany vetoed the proposal. The Kaiser seems to have been still under the delusion that by appearing once more in shining armour he could get Russia to stop. Perhaps if it had rested with the Tsar he might have calculated rightly, for that ill-fated autocrat allowed himself to be frightened, at the last moment, into countermanding the general mobilization of his armies. But the vast military machine, once set in motion, could not be stopped without throwing it completely out of gear, and the mobilization went on. In the extraordinary state of international anarchy then prevailing, such a step was tantamount to a declaration of war on both Germany and Austria, since if they failed to strike at Russia the moment her mobilization started, they would be throwing away the important strategical advantage of more rapid concentration—a thing unthinkable to minds steeped in the tradition of Clausewitz. Germany therefore instantly mobilized in her turn, and declared war on Russia; with its logical sequel of war with France.

England, whose government and people desired nothing more than peace, was too deeply committed to her colleagues in the Entente to keep out of the struggle. Germany, which was, as everybody had long expected in such an event, preparing to add another to the recent defiances of European law by dashing at France

through Belgium, was as little minded to add England to her foes as England was to fight Germany. It is just conceivable that she might have refrained from what was not only a crime but a strategic blunder, could England have given her a clear pledge of her own neutrality on the understanding that Belgian neutrality should be respected by Germany. But Sir Edward Grey could give no such pledge, and, besides, England had already been compelled by honour to give notice that she would use her fleet to prevent the perfectly legitimate German act of sending her own to attack the French Northern coasts, thus practically declaring a naval blockade. Germany's characteristically clumsy failure to seize this opportunity of putting herself in the right, or perhaps a desperate belief that Britain after all might draw back at the last moment, gave us the opportunity of consulting at the same time our honour and the vital interests of centuries, by taking our stand on the time-honoured ground that under no circumstances could we allow Flanders to be crushed or conquered by one of the Continental powers.

So, in those first August days of 1914, from the remotest wastes of Siberia to the Atlantic seaboard, amid scenes of hectic enthusiasm and stifled apprehension, millions of men left their peaceful employments to take part in the universal suicide. For more than four years, while victory, hardly less ruinous than defeat, hung in the balance, the contending nations were employed in one vast, co-operative effort to waste and destroy the civilization by which they lived, moved and had their being. Science, once a beneficent angel, became a fiend, destroying at an incalculably faster rate than she had ever been able to construct. More important by far than the success or failure of this or that combatant was the supreme fact that as days lengthened to months and months to years, the flower of the world's manhood was being mowed down, lands wasted, railroads torn up, bridges destroyed, towns bombarded, ships sunk, factories wrecked or diverted to ends of destruction, children starved, the religion of hate propagated with more success than had ever attended that of love, epidemic disease allowed to sweep the world, a weight of debt accumulated that threatened, and still threatens, to bring to bankruptcy and chaos the most prosperous communities.

This aspect of the situation, though seemingly the most obvious of all, was ignored in those early heroic days, when the cause of little Belgium was turning a nation of civilians into one of soldiers, and the historic soil of Flanders resounded to the tramp of khaki-clad regiments whose songs, like those of their Anglo-Saxon fathers, impressed strangers most of all with their note of melancholy.

EPILOGUE

HISTORY is a story that always leaves off in the middle, though it is the temptation of every historian to discover an end. And, seeing that story-books, if not stories, have got to end somewhere, we can hardly write "finis" more appropriately than on the eve of a catastrophe that threatened the fall, and may conceivably portend the decline, not only of British, but of human civilization. Conceivably—but assuredly not inevitably!

And yet, unless we have been altogether wrong in our reading of the facts, the Great War, like the Reformation and the French Revolution, was the product of forces that had long been at work, and continued to work after it. Through the mad horror of those years, it was good that we should have had visions of a mental and spiritual rebirth that would have made the sacrifice worth while. It would have been too much to have faced the prospect of mankind, so terribly enfeebled, learning nothing and forgetting nothing, harking complacently back to the collective egotisms, the *Realpolitik* of class and race and nationality, the bankruptcy of faith and ideals, that culminated in civilization's all but complete suicide.

But we have studied history in vain, unless it has taught us to reinforce hope by patience. We must not look for revolutionary change except as the result of a process as gradual and unhurried as that of growth. One fine morning may suffice to burst the bud, but it takes months to develop seed into flower. On the soil, enriched by that red rain, the seeds may have been well and truly planted. We can at least water and prepare the ground, waging sharp war upon all things rank and gross in nature, weeds of cupidity and untruth and all uncharitableness.

The question whose answer spells life or death for civilized man, is being put with ever more menacing insistence—are the human mind and spirit capable of being adapted to the requirements of a Machine Age? With blind precipitancy, we have revolutionized our environment; it has yet to be seen whether we can effect a corresponding revolution in ourselves. If the old platitude about human nature being unchangable is really true, there is nothing for it but to resign ourselves to the doom that has overtaken every

species whose circumstances have changed more rapidly than its powers of adaptation. The next experiment in suicide need not lack for completeness.

To face facts is not to counsel pessimism. We know that human nature can be changed because history shows us that it is constantly changing. We have faith that it must and shall be changed, in time to save the bright adventure of our civilization from ruin. God's image must not be allowed to go the way of the giant lizards, its predecessors.

Instead of talking of the decline of civilization or the West as if it were something outside ourselves and beyond our control, let us, in words applied to a crisis far less momentous, continue to hope until events compel us to despair. Even a forlorn hope is better than none.

In spite of all the guilt and imperfection, which there is no attempt in these pages to cloke or extenuate, it may well be that on British civilization as expressed in a free Commonwealth of Nations,¹ the fairest hopes of mankind are destined more and more to centre. The discovery that spiritual bonds are more potent than those of force or interest, is one of untold possibilities for the healing of nations. The very League is but an attempt to apply British principles on a world-wide scale.

If this be our high calling, now, more than ever, it behoves us to shape our future in the light and understanding of our past. Only thus can we hope to attain the patriotism of Britain true to herself because loyal to mankind, a patriotism purged of every selfish and ignoble taint, founded on great principles, supported by great virtues, the love of our country because she is lovable.

In that sense alone may we be permitted to say—Patriotism is enough !

¹ On the limits of whose possible extension I do not presume to speculate here.

THE END.

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